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Abstract 
Philo of Alexandria forged his theory of the soul and its passions while 
expositing the meaning of Torah. Though writing as a Jewish teacher and disciple of 
Moses, his biblical reflections display a strong orientation toward Middle-Platonic 
philosophy. On the topic of the soul and its passions, however, Philo also exhibits 
significant Stoic influence. The introduction notes Philo’s apparent incompatible use 
of both the complex Platonic and the monistic Stoic psychological models. After 
assessing the degree to which Philo understood 'passion' to be a type of Stoic 
impulse or opinion (chapter one), chapter two demonstrates that Philo consistently 
drew upon the Stoics’ depiction of all passions as irrational, excessive, and 
unnatural. Though Philo also joined the Stoics in condemning the passions and 
championing their extirpation, he is unique, even among the Stoics, in the extent and 
degree to which he emphasized their blameworthiness. Chapters three and four 
examine Philo's Stoicizing treatment of the tripartite and bipartite Platonic elements 
in his psychology, including Plato’s chariot metaphor and variants. In each of these 
areas, Philo’s key deviations are noted. Chapter four concludes by demonstrating 
that Philo arranged the Stoic and Platonic accounts of the soul and its passions 
within a biblical and spiritual narrative of spiritual progress that moves from Stoic 
fool to Platonic progressing soul and finally arriving at the ideal of the apatheiac 
Stoic sage. The outlook summarizes the results and suggests lines of further 
research. 
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Introduction 
Psychology stood at the intersection of the various branches of philosophy in 
antiquity. The Old Academy, and later, the Middle Platonists,1 had accorded to the 
soul a ‘vital central and mediating role’ in the first principles of their philosophy.2 
Reflection on the soul touched on topics in physics, logic, and ethics. Similarly, in 
moral psychology and anthropology, ‘passions’, ‘emotions’, or ‘affections’ (πάθη)3 
had constituted a vital area of reflection, especially in the Hellenistic era following 
the rise of Stoicism, which had made ‘the demanding aspiration of getting rid of 
emotion … central in life’.4 Unlike contemporary perceptions of the emotions, 
Hellenistic philosophical reflection on the emotions was fundamentally about the 
correct assessment of one’s ‘impulses’ (ὁρµή) and management of one’s emotions, 
because these were understood to be either a ‘mental antecedent to voluntary action’ 
or to an improper movement of the soul itself.5 Consequently, one’s account of the 
                                                
1 Although we will follow Dillon and others in speaking of a loose school of ‘Middle Platonism’ 
between the end of the sceptical Academy and the Neoplatonism inaugurated by Plotinus, we do well 
to heed Zambon’s caution regarding this label. While it represented a return to a dogmatic 
understanding of Plato’s teachings associated with Antiochus of Ascalon, Philo of Larissa, 
Posidonius of Apamea, and Eudorus of Alexandria, the positions of these and later writers is so 
varied and irreconcilable as to make it difficult to identify what doctrinal elements can properly be 
called ‘Middle Platonic’. See M. Bonazzi, ‘Towards Transcendence’ (2008), 233; T.H. Tobin, ‘Was 
Philo a Middle Platonist?’ (1995), 147-8; M. Zambon, ‘Middle Platonism’ (2006), 561-2. Of course, 
scholars debate whether or not we can correctly categorize Philo himself as a ‘Middle Platonist’ at 
all. Runia offers a helpful typology of scholarly opinion on the subject. See D.T. Runia, ‘Was Philo a 
Middle Platonist?’ (1995), 124-6. With Runia, I conclude that Philo was ‘doing his own thing’ as a 
loyal Jew, but drew extensively upon Middle Platonist and Stoic developments of his day in the 
process. 
2 J.M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (1977), 3. Philo flatly says as much regarding the mediating 
role of the Logos in his cosmology. See Philo, QE 2.68. Daniélou observes that, further, Philo 
constantly drew a parallel between the cosmological and the psychological. See J. Daniélou, Philon 
d’Alexandrie (1958), 172-3. 
3 Price notes that in Greek antiquity, πάθος had the general meaning of ‘that which happens to a 
person or thing’; it came to be ‘commonly applied to experiences to which a person is subject’ as 
well as to ‘lasting states manifested in such experiences, or initiated or alterable by them’. A.W. 
Price, ‘Emotions in Plato and Aristotle’ (2009), 121. Tieleman points out that ‘passion’ is not exactly 
apt either in contemporary English, given ‘its specific sense of a very strong emotion, in particular 
(sexual) desire’, preferring instead ‘affection’, because this preserves an aspect of passivity as well as 
the common sense of disease or illness associated with the notion in Stoicism. See T. Tieleman, 
Chrysippus’ On Affections (2003), 15-6. Nevertheless, given its long-standing use in the Western 
philosophical tradition, as well as by many contemporary Stoic experts, I will refer to πάθος as 
‘passion’, except when speaking of it in a strictly anti-Stoic sense or in a non-pejorative, generic 
sense, in which case I will opt for the term ‘emotion’. 
4 R. Sorabji, ‘Peripatetics on Emotion after 100 BC’ (2007), 621. 
5 J. Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (1992), 104; T. Brennan, Stoic Life (2005), 86, 91-2. 
Carone implicitly equated emotion and motivation when she framed her entire discussion concerning 
Platonic and Stoic emotions in terms of one’s motivations that result in moral action. See G.R. 
Carone, ‘Plato’s Stoic View of Motivations’ (2005). 
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emotions often in turn impacted one’s psychology of action and, ultimately, one’s 
understanding of how to live the happy life – the life of virtue.6  
Emotions functioned as an important factor of motivation in all the ancient 
theories. Plato, in outlining his tripartite theory of the soul, had sought to show how 
‘certain states of feeling’ about circumstances ‘affect the ways one is inclined to 
act’. By dividing the soul into three ‘independent sources of motivation’, Plato 
underscored the psychological complexity of our actions.7 Alternatively, Aristotle 
had distinguished between what Fortenbaugh called ‘practical’ and ‘non-practical 
emotions’. Fortenbaugh argued that ‘practical emotion’ is oriented toward ‘a 
particular kind of goal and normally manifests itself in a particular kind of goal-
direction behaviour’, whereas the ‘non-practical emotions’ by contrast are not 
oriented toward a particular goal, nor do they necessarily manifest in action.8 
Emotions took centre stage above all in the Stoic account, because unlike the 
competing Hellenistic philosophies, Stoicism understood a virtuous or vicious act to 
be complete from the moment of its inception in the heart, irrespective of its result. 
Thus, although both Aristotle and the Stoics were interested in the emotions as 
indicators of our motivations, passions took on a heightened importance in the Stoic 
account because for them all passions were ‘practical’. A single failure of thought – 
for the Stoics took a strongly intellectualist line on the emotions – can have ‘dire 
consequences for the agent’s whole moral condition’,9 not merely because it will 
often cause us to act wrongly, but because such failures are the ‘only and sole cause 
of wrong action’.10 The feeling-tones associated with the emotions were only of 
secondary importance, since they did not account for our actions.11  
One of the most influential religious philosophers,12 who had a significant 
impact on the exegesis and theology of the early Christian writers, especially Origen 
                                                
6 A.C. Lloyd, ‘Emotions in Stoic Psychology’ (1978), 233; A.A. Long, ‘Epictetus’ (2006), 378. 
7 J.M. Cooper, ‘Plato’s Theory of Human Motivation’ (1999), 118-9, 121. 
8 W.W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion (1975), 79-83. 
9 Ibid., 366. 
10 T. Brennan, ‘Old Stoic Theory of Emotions’ (1998), 32. 
11 Indeed, Brennan observes that the Stoics would have positively excluded any feeling-tone, 
such as gloominess, if this does not eventuate in action. See T. Brennan, Stoic Life (2005), 91-2. This 
is indeed strange for those of us who live in the wake of Romanticism, with its idea ‘that experience 
itself, and in particular the variety and power of emotional experience, contributes to the value of 
life’. See B. Williams, ‘Stoic Philosophy and the Emotions’ (1997), 213. 
12 Whether or not to call Philo a philosopher is, of course, a matter of some dispute. Runia, for 
instance, following his teacher Nikiprowetsky, argues that we should most aptly describe Philo as a 
‘philosophically orientated exegete’, though a ‘serious philosopher’ nevertheless. D.T. Runia, ‘Was 
Philo a Middle Platonist?’ (1995), 120-3. 
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and Clement of Alexandria, was Philo of Alexandria.13 However, as Runia argued, 
before Philo ‘can be used to shed light on others’, he must first be ‘understood for 
himself’.14 On the one hand, like the Platonists, Philo had given soul a mediating 
role in his philosophy between the intelligible or noetic, and sensible or bodily 
realms, describing it as composed of elements from both.15 In the soul converged 
what is most excellent, divine, and immortal in us – the mind; and what is most 
earthly and mortal, that is, the body. On the other hand, like the Stoics, Philo had 
been highly preoccupied with the passions. One can read barely a single page of his 
writings without encountering some reference to the passions. Further, he also 
tended to follow the Stoics in considering the passions to be vicious motivations, 
vile in themselves, and the cause and source of all moral evil.16  
Philo’s complicated approach to the soul and its passions 
One of the first things to confront readers is that in his pursuit of articulating 
what he understood to be the philosophy of Moses, Philo drew upon two apparently 
incompatible models of the soul and its passions; namely, the Platonic tripartite 
model versus the Stoic monistic and intellectualist approach.17 Plato had posited a 
genuine division in the soul that pits against one another three different ‘parts’ of the 
soul, described variously as the ‘rational’ (λογιστικός), ‘spirited’ (θυµικός), and 
‘appetitive’ (ἐπιθυµητικός), or simply as ‘reason’ (νοῦς, ratio), ‘wrath’ (θυµός, ira), 
and ‘desire’ (ἐπιθυµία, cupiditas).18 He treated each of these parts as genuine 
‘centres’ in the soul, with the result that they took on ‘a homuncular’ character, each 
acting like ‘a little man’, that is, an agent-like independent centre, with its own 
desires and calculating ability.  
Against the Platonists, the Stoics had posited a unitary theory of the soul, in 
which they divided the soul into eight parts or powers centred on ‘a commanding 
part’,19 variously described as ‘the hegemon[ikon]’ (τὸ ἡγεµονικόν),20 ‘mind’ 
                                                
13 J.M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (1977), 144.  
14 D.T. Runia, ‘How to Read Philo’ (1990), 186. 
15 J.M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (1977), 6. 
16 Philo, Decal. 142-53; Spec. 4,79-80, 84-91. 
17 Cic., Acad. 2.124. 
18 Cic., Tusc. I 10.20. 
19 Long summarizes its importance as follows: ‘The Stoics’ unification of all mental functions in 
a single ‘governing part’ is their most far-reaching contribution to ancient psychology.’ A.A. Long, 
‘Stoic Psychology’ (1999), 570. 
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(νοῦς/διάνοια), or ‘reason’ (λογισµός), and seven subordinate extensions, including 
the five senses, speech faculty, and the reproductive faculty.21 In this approach, the 
mind or hegemon alone engages in conscious decision-making processes,22 and thus 
features as the only ‘centre’ for all moral activity.  
As we will show, Philo used both approaches to the soul and its passions, but 
unevenly. He explicitly invoked the Platonic tripartite theory on few occasions. If 
we include his much more common use of Plato’s myth of the charioteer and horses, 
which also implied a relation of three ‘parts’ of the soul, indeed, even if we include 
Philo’s related metaphor of the different kinds of ‘riders’ of horses as a genuine 
extension of Plato’s charioteer myth,23 we still find that Philo utilized the Platonic 
tripartite theory in a minority of his discussions connected to the soul.24  
In contrast, Philo often utilized features of the Stoic monistic approach to the 
soul and its passions throughout the bulk of his writings, usually without any 
reference to the Platonic, tripartite approach. Not only did he explicitly invoke the 
Stoic eightfold description in various forms, but he also made normative for his 
psychology the allegorical interpretation of Adam, Eve and serpent in Gen. 2-3 as 
man-sense-pleasure. The psychology outlined there, as I will show, reflects Stoic 
influence, though also situated within a strong body-soul dualism drawn especially 
from Plato’s Pheado. On a few occasions Philo even used both approaches 
alongside one another in a manner that suggests that he could do so without any 
sense of contradiction.25 
                                                                                                                                    
20 Long points out that ‘hegemonikon’, translated variously as ‘governing principle’, 
‘commanding part’, ‘ruling part’, was first used by the Stoics as a noun to designate a component of 
the soul. See A.A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy (1974, repr. 1986), 171. 
21 E. Bréhier, History of Philosophy (1961), 55. 
22 J. Sellars, Stoicism (2006), 105. 
23 I will show in chapter 3 that while this horse and rider image is probably inspired by Plato’s 
charioteer myth, it in fact represents a highly Stoicized reinterpretation. 
24 Philo’s use of Plato’s charioteer myth could itself be Stoic as there is evidence of wide Stoic 
use of the myth in the exposition of their moral psychology. See M.C. Nussbaum, Therapy of Desire 
(1994), 4435. Additionally, Vander Waerdt suggests that Posidonius may have revived the use of the 
charioteer simile in his modification of Stoic ethics by introducing it as a ‘powerful new element in 
the interpretation of Platonic moral psychology that proved highly influential among later writers’. 
He even suggests Posidonian influence on Philo’s use of the metaphor. See P.A. Vander Waerdt, 
‘Peripatetic Soul Division’ (1985), 386, 390-158.  
25 Lévy argues that Philo could express himself sometimes in Stoic terms, sometimes in Platonic 
terms, because he did not ‘adhere to any dogma in the domain of psychology’. For Lévy, Philo’s use 
of either approach depended rather on the biblical text that he was commenting. C. Lévy, ‘Philo’s 
Ethics’ (2009), 155. 
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To complicate matters yet further, though Platonists, Peripatetics, and Stoics all 
would have considered the lower parts or powers ‘irrational’ in some sense,26 the 
Stoics meant it in the sense of non-rational, whereas for the Platonists and 
Peripatetics it rather denoted ‘ir-rational’ or perhaps ‘sub-rational’.27 With regard to 
the passions themselves, again, all parties agreed that they are irrational in the first 
sense of ‘ir-rational’, but exponents of the Old Stoa like Chrysippus differed from 
Plato and Aristotle in positing just one power, namely, the mind, as cause of the 
passions; a single source of motivation or impulse, rather than some alternative 
power in ‘an appetitive part’ of the soul. The question is, with which alternative did 
Philo align himself, if he did at all?28  
One the one hand, as we will discuss, Philo embraced a thoroughgoing body-
soul dualism derived especially from Plato’s Phaedo,29 as well as a rational-
irrational dualism within the soul itself.30 On the other hand, excepting those places 
                                                
26 Oddly, Winston suggests that ‘the Stoics themselves made no such contrast’ between rational 
and irrational parts of the soul. See D. Winston, ‘Philo on the Emotions’ (2008), 2145. The Stoics in 
fact did implicitly make such a contrast between the mind and lower parts of the soul, though by 
‘irrational’ they meant that the lower parts are ‘non-rational’ and instrumental extensions of the 
hegemonikon or ruling part of the soul. Philo made precisely this distinction at Sacr. 45-7, when he 
identified the sort of unreasonableness wherein reason is eliminated, as in the case of the unreasoning 
animals, with that of the lower senses.  
27 SVF 2.989. Brennan observes that the Stoics recognized two senses of ‘irrational’: 1) any 
behaviour or mental activity that is inconsistent with the maximally rational activity of the sage, 
which is contrary to nature in some way, and 2) the mental states and activities of children and beasts, 
which might be better called ‘a-rationality’ or ‘non-rationality’. T. Brennan, ‘Old Stoic Theory of 
Emotions’ (1998), 23-5. This second sense of ‘irrational’ is based on the idea that animals and 
children have no reason with which to give assent. In adult humans, the soul’s capacities are 
subsumed within the ruling part on a developmental model without denying their logical 
independence.  
28 The sharpness of the question would be attenuated to some extent if Gill is correct in 
suggesting that ‘the contrast between part-based and monistic conceptions of the psyche’ did not 
become an issue of debate until around the second century CE with Plutarch and Galen. See C. Gill, 
‘Competing Readings of Stoic Emotions’ (2005), 464-7. Price notes, however, that Galen reports that 
it was Posidonius who kept pressing the question of the cause of the passions. See A.W. Price, ‘Zeno 
and Chrysippus at Odds?’ (2005), 483. Sedly, also on the basis of Galen, argues that Chrysippus 
openly opposed ‘at least one feature of Plato’s psychology, namely, the tripartition of the soul’, thus 
placing the issue of soul complexity early in the debate. See D. Sedley, ‘Chrysippus on 
Psychophysical Causality’ (1993), 313. If Nussbaum is correct in asserting that the Stoic insistence 
on a monistic conception of the soul came as a conclusion of arguments in moral psychology, rather 
than as an unargued principle of departure, then Gill’s proposal might follow. See M.C. Nussbaum, 
Therapy of Desire (1994), 373-81. Early philosophical disputes would have centred on the arguments 
that led to the conclusion of a single, rational part as source of all thought and emotion. Only later did 
disputes about the conclusion arise. See also Brennan’s objections to Nussbaum’s proposal. T. 
Brennan, ‘Old Stoic Theory of Emotions’ (1998), 52-4. 
29 G.J. Reydams-Schils, ‘Philo on Stoic and Platonist Psycho-Physiology’ (2002, repr. 2008), 
170. 
30 For further discussion, see R. Baer, Categories Male and Female (1970), 15-6; D.T. Runia, 
Philo and the Timaeus of Plato (1986), 263, 299-301; G.J. Warne, Philo and Paul (1995), 134-5; 
W.T. Wilson, ‘Sin as Sex and Sex with Sin’ (2002) 149-50; D. Winston, ‘Philo on the Emotions’ 
(2008), 2144. 
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where he explicitly resorted to Plato’s tripartite psychology, Philo also exhibited 
significant Stoic reliance in his treatment of the relation of the mind to the 
‘irrational’ parts in humans, in his account of the irrational soul in animals, and in 
his characterization of the irrationality of the passions themselves.31 Greater clarity 
regarding how and why he used these alternative approaches would provide further 
insight into Philo’s own approach as well as assist in situating Philo’s account of the 
soul and its passions within the wider context of Hellenistic philosophy. 
The question posed in this study is: as a follower of Moses and a philosophically 
oriented exegete, where does Philo overlap with the Platonists, where with the 
Stoics, and where does he stand in isolation in regard to either school on the matter 
of the soul and its passions? 
History of research 
When one reflects on Philo’s varied use of these two incompatible approaches to 
the nature of the soul and its passions, commentators have sought how best to assess 
the relative influence of the various philosophical and religious elements in his 
conception of the soul in general, and in his conception of the passions in particular. 
There is no doubt and it is widely accepted that this Jewish philosopher was 
substantially influenced in varying degrees by Stoic, Platonic and Jewish-Biblical 
traditions,32 and even to a lesser degree by the sceptical New Academy.33 Scholarly 
debate on how exactly to position Philo as a philosopher extends back to Lipsus in 
                                                
31 Svebakken, by contrast, argues that Philo rejected Stoic principles and followed the Middle 
Platonic psychological model of Eudorus. For Svebakken’s evidence and arguments, see H. 
Svebakken, Philo’s Exposition (2009), 60-99. 
32 While A. Terian acknowledged that ‘Platonism and Stoicism have long been regarded as being 
of major importance in moulding Philo’s thought’, he nevertheless cautioned the reader not to 
overlook the ‘religious tone’ and ‘Jewish outlook’ of his thinking. A. Terian, Philonis Alexandrini De 
Animalibus (1981), 49. Runia adds, ‘that Philo is first and foremost an exegete of scripture, which has 
gained almost universal acceptance in Philonic studies over the past three decades’, should always be 
borne in mind when interpreting Philo. Runia credits Valentin Nikiprowetzky for this ‘paradigm 
shift’ away from the ‘unitarian approach’ that characterized Philo studies before the 1970s. See D.T. 
Runia, ‘Rehabilitation of the Jackdaw’ (2007), 489-94. In this vein, Warnes asserts, ‘for all his use of 
philosophical terminology and conceptuality, Philo’s primary concern remains distinctly theological. 
His objective, it seems, is to contextualize Jewish theology in the Hellenistic environment of 
Alexandria.’ See G.J. Warne, Philo and Paul (1995), 11. 
33 C. Lévy, ‘Concept de Doxa’ (1993), 251. Lévy points out, for instance, that Philo’s De 
ebrietate contains a version of the sceptical Modes of Aenesidmus as well as an integration of neo-
Academic concepts such as ‘suspension of judgment’ (ἐποχή) or what is ‘plausible’ (πιθανός or 
εὔλογος) into a fideist perspective in which scepticism expresses the nothing of human reason before 
the divine vision. See C. Lévy, New Academy (2006), 459; Philo, Fug. 135-6. 
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the early 17th century.34 Philo demonstrated first hand knowledge of, above all, 
Moses and Plato,35 but also the Stoics,36 as well as second hand knowledge of 
Aristotle.37 Philosophically, Dillon adds that Philo was above all ‘steeped in Plato’. 
The Timaeus and Phaedrus were his favourites, two texts that will also repeatedly 
feature in this study, as well as key portions of the Theaetetus, Symposium, 
Republic, and the Laws.38  
Assessments of the relative influence of Platonism, Stoicism, and 
Aristotelianism have varied among scholars. In the mid-twentieth century, 
Goodenough and Sandmel saw Philo’s distinction between a ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ 
mind as broadly Aristotelian.39 Others emphasize the Platonist thread in Philo’s 
psychology. Wolfson proposes that Philo was a Platonist, who constructed his entire 
religious philosophy as ‘a criticism of Stoicism’.40 More recently, Radice, for 
instance, argued that though Philo everywhere utilizes Stoic terminology and 
concepts, the Platonic influence is more fundamental.41 Lévy likewise sees in Philo a 
psychological dualism that is fundamentally contrary to a Stoic perspective.42 Others 
emphasize the Stoic elements. Dillon, for instance, argues that Philo’s overall 
philosophy resembles the ‘Stoicized Platonism’ of Antiochus or Eudorus, but with a 
‘distinctive streak of Jewish piety’ and the superimposition of Pythagorean ideals.43  
                                                
34 B.A. Desbordes, ‘Un Exemple D’Utilisation de la Philosophie’ (1996), 3931. 
35 M. Bonazzi, ‘Towards Transcendence’ (2008), 234. 
36 Arnim, for instance, lists 190 passages from Philo as evidence for the early Stoa in the 
Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta. Contemporary scholars of Stoicism show much greater restraint in 
citing Philo as a Stoic source. A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers (1987) excerpt 
only 10 texts, K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, and M. Schofield, Cambridge History of Hellenistic 
Philosophy (1999) 17 passages, and B. Inwood and L.P. Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy (1988) none 
at all. Long states that in his judgment selections from Cicero and Seneca are more accurate and 
useful source material. See A.A. Long, ‘Philo and Stoic Physics’ (2008), 121-2. 
37 See R.W. Sharples, ‘Philo and Post-Aristotelian Peripatetics’ (2008), 55-73. 
38 J.M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (1977), 140. Runia observes that his knowledge of Plato, 
with the exception of the Laws, runs parallel to the situation in Middle Platonism in general. See D.T. 
Runia, Philo and the Timaeus of Plato (1986), 486-7.  
39 E.R. Goodenough, By Light, Light (1935), 370-413; E.R. Goodenough, Introduction to Philo 
(1940), 149-57; E.R. Goodenough, ‘Philo on Immortality’ (1946), 96, 106; S. Sandmel, Philo (1979), 
99-101, 153. Wolfson also argued for significant Aristotelian influence throughout his vast study of 
Philo. See H.A. Wolfson, Philo (1962). For a more recent assessment of the Aristotelian influences in 
Philo, see R.W. Sharples, ‘Philo and Post-Aristotelian Peripatetics’ (2008), 55-73. 
40 H.A. Wolfson, Philo (1962), 111-2. 
41 R. Radice, ‘Observations on the Theory of Ideas’ (1991), 126. Radice lists Windisch, Billings, 
Reale, and Wolfson as among other twentieth century scholars who emphasized Philo’s Platonic 
thread. For bibliographic details, see note 1681. 
42 C. Lévy, ‘Concept de Doxa’ (1993), 276. 
43 J.M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (1977), 143, 148-50, 182; J.M. Dillon, ‘Philo and 
Hellenistic Platonism’ (2008), 226, 231. This would appear to be all the more likely if Dillon is right 
in his conjecture that Antiochus stuck close to the Stoic unitary model where he made ‘a contrast 
between the intellect and senses, which could be taken to imply a bipartite model’. See J.M. Dillon, 
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Philo specialist David Winston shares Dillon’s overall perspective, but recently 
suggests rather Posidonius as the proper antecedent,44 an approach previously 
proposed by Lévy and Pohlenz.45 Assessing Philo’s wider psychology from the 
perspective of Philo’s approach of the passions, Winston sees ‘Philo’s theory of the 
passions’ as ‘essentially that of the Stoics with occasional modifications’, but argues 
that the Middle Stoic Posidonius is the closest parallel to Philo’s approach to the 
passions.46 Posidonius reportedly adopted features of the Platonic tripartite approach 
to the soul in his revised Stoic philosophy,47 with its implicit dualism between two 
sources of movement or impulse in a corporeal soul – namely, the mind and ‘the 
affective part’ (τὸ παθητικόν), the latter of which experienced various spatial 
movments that Posidonius termed ‘emotional movements’ (παθητικαὶ κινήσεις). 
Given Philo’s use of Plato’s tripartite psychology and the charioteer metaphor of the 
Phaedrus, and given his otherwise wide embrace of Platonism in his religious 
philosophy, Winston concluded that Philo had followed an approach similar to 
Posidonius’ in positing multiple impulsive centres in the soul.48 Winston 
nevertheless also recognizes an incongruity between Philo’s approach and that of 
                                                                                                                                    
‘Philo and Hellenistic Platonism’ (2008), 231. Berchman, in a similar vein, sees Philo’s philosophical 
project as ‘an attempt to harmonize the two divergent theoretical positions proposed by Antiochus 
and Eudorus’. See R.M. Berchman, From Philo to Origen (1984), 2, 27-8; É. Bréhier, Philon 
d’Alexandrie (1950), 257-61. Svebakken argues that Philo followed the prevailing trends of 
contemporary Platonism reflected especially in Eudorus. Though he acknowledges that Middle 
Platonists like Eudorus adopted Stoic technical terms and definitions, Svebakken argues that they 
nevertheless applied ‘distinctively Platonic understandings’ to the Stoic philosophical language, 
especially in the field of ethics. See H. Svebakken, Philo’s Exposition (2009), 412. 
44 D. Winston, ‘Philo on the Emotions’ (2008), 202. Lévy and Pohlenz both note similar 
parallels. See C. Lévy, ‘Philon et les Passions’ (2006), 28-34; M. Pohlenz, Philon von Alexandreia 
(1942), 454-8, 478. 
45 Lévy and Pohlenz both draw similar parallels. See C. Lévy, ‘Philon et les Passions’ (2006), 
28-34; M. Pohlenz, Philon von Alexandreia (1942), 454-8, 478. 
46 D. Winston, ‘Philo on the Emotions’ (2008), 201. Others have likewise concluded that Philo’s 
moral psychology is primarily Stoic in character, including A. Terian, in Philonis Alexandrini De 
Animalibus (1981), 37, 49, 121. 
47 E. Bréhier, History of Philosophy (1961), 135; R. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind (2000), 
95; R. Sorabji, ‘Chrysippus, Posidonius, Seneca’ (1998), 149-65. For a detailed defence of 
Posidonius’ departure from Chrysippus, see R. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind (2000), 95-108. 
Cooper argues that Posidonius differed from Chrysippus not by returning to Plato’s tripartism, but 
rather by suggesting that some of the force of impulse derives from an independent non-rational 
source, though he still maintained the orthodox Stoic position that the passions themselves are 
expressions of the agent’s decisive opinion, dependent upon the assent of the rational faculty. If this 
account is accurate, Posidonius may have pointed the way toward what later become known as the 
pre-emotions or ‘propatheia’ (προπάθεια). See J.M. Cooper, ‘Posidonius on Emotions’ (1998), 72-3, 
99.  
48 Winston also builds his argument upon Philo’s use of the controversial phrase ‘our judgment’ 
(ἡ κρίσις ἡ ἡµετέρα) found at Philo, Leg. 3.116. D. Winston, ‘Philo on the Emotions’ (2008), 208-9. 
We will discuss this later in relation to Philo’s understanding of the passions as opinions and 
judgments. In any case, this passage is not important for the supposition that Philo embraced Platonic 
tripartism.  
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Posidonius as he understood him, when he acknowledges that Philo felt ‘an affinity’ 
for the Old Stoic monistic view of the soul, expounded above all by Chrysippus, that 
‘constrained’ him in his use of the Posidonian paradigm,49 but ‘the incongruity’ 
went further than Winston thought.  
Philo’s approach to the passions, however, does not correspond to that of a 
Middle Stoic such as Posidonius as neatly as suggested by Winston. Philo never 
used the terms ‘affective part’ (τὸ παθητικόν), ‘emotional movements’ (παθητικαὶ 
κινήσεις), collective terms that Posidonius had apparently coined for Plato’s two 
lower parts of the soul.50 Similarly, Philo seldom utilized Posidonius’ technical term 
for the reasoning part (τὸ λογιστικόν), and it is possible that he derived this from 
Plato rather than Posidonius.51 Moreover, while Posidonius insisted in Aristotelian 
fashion on calling the threefold division in the soul ‘powers’ (δυνάµεις) rather than 
‘parts’ (µέρα) or ‘forms’ (εἴδη),52 Philo often used each of the terms 
interchangeably, though he was aware of the Posidonian position.53 Philo also 
explicitly rejected Posidonius’ putative suggestion that animals have emotions, in 
favour of the Old Stoic view that animals do not have emotions because they lack 
reason.54  
                                                
49 D. Winston, ‘Philo on the Emotions’ (2008), 202. If Gill and Tieleman are correct that 
Posidonius was in fact translating Platonic ideas such as the charioteer-horse image or the tripartite 
psyche into a Stoic form, however, Winston might, ironically, be a closer paradigm after all. This 
alternative interpretation rests on the assumption that Galen got it backwards. See C. Gill, ‘Did Galen 
Understand?’ (1998), 130-7; C. Gill, ‘Competing Readings of Stoic Emotions’ (2005), 463-4; C. Gill, 
Naturalistic Psychology (2010), 198; C. Gill, Structured Self (2006), 282-90. Tieleman argues that 
Posidonius remained within Chrysippian monism, but reappropriated Plato and Aristotle to show that 
they originated a trend in philosophical reflection on the soul and its activities that culminated in the 
Stoic teaching. See T. Tieleman, Chrysippus’ On Affections (2003), 284-7. 
50 Galen, Plac. V 5.26. According to Aspasius, the Peripatetic school also called the irrational 
part of the soul ‘affective’ (παθητικόν) as an alternative to their usual appellation, ‘the appetitive 
portion of the soul’ (τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν µόριον τῆς ψυχῆς). See Asp., In Eth. Nic. 44. Gill represents this 
notion as introduced by Posidonius. See C. Gill, Naturalistic Psychology (2010), 197. 
51 Both uses occur at Philo, Leg. 3.115-6, in connection with his discussion of Plato’s tripartite 
soul. Plato used λογιστικόν as a technical term in Book four of the Republic for the reasoning part of 
the soul. See Plato, Resp. 4.339d, 440e, 442c. 
52 For Posidonius, see Galen, Plac. VI 2.5. For Aristotle, see Arist., An. 2.3 414a-b, 2.4 415a, 2.5 
417a; Arist., Sens. 437a; G.J. Reydams-Schils, ‘Philo on Stoic and Platonist Psycho-Physiology’ 
(2002, repr. 2008), 186. 
53 Philo, Leg. 3.115.  
54 For Posidonius on emotions in animals, see R. Sorabji, ‘Chrysippus, Posidonius, Seneca’ 
(1998), 158-9. For Philo, see especially Philo, Anim. 71-100. For the orthodox Stoic view, see J. 
Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (1992), 90. Svebakken argues that Philo rejected the Stoic 
account of impulse in animals and humans in preference for a Middle Platonist one. At issue is the 
question of whether or not passionate impulses in humans are ever ‘natural’. I will argue in section 
two that Philo flatly denied legitimacy to passions in all circumstances. Svebakken is right in 
portraying Philo as a Middle Platonist, but misses the degree of Stoic influence in Philo’s moral 
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Increasingly, there is a growing recognition among scholars that what mattered 
most for Philo was a fundamental dichotomy between the ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’. 
Reydams-Schils suggested that what was most important was Socrates’ body-soul 
division as outlined in Plato’s Phaedo. In her view, Philo balanced the Platonic and 
Stoic threads in his psychology, because since both Platonists and Stoics were heirs 
of Socrates, he felt free to draw from each as he pursued his own larger purposes as 
an expositor of Moses.55  
Most scholars, however, locate the division rather between the rational and the 
irrational elements in the soul. This assessment finds recent support in Bonazzi, 
Dillon, Lévy, Long, and Runia.56 This should not come as a surprise, since 
‘throughout the long tradition of Greek anthropological speculation the principles of 
popular and philosophical psychology were based, virtually without exception, upon 
the dichotomy between rational and irrational forces in the human soul’,57 and were 
possibly adopted even by some of the later Stoa.58 According to Vander Waerdt, 
                                                                                                                                    
psychology, as I hope to show. For Svebakken’s arguments, see H. Svebakken, Philo’s Exposition 
(2009), 68-72. 
55 G.J. Reydams-Schils, ‘Philo on Stoic and Platonist Psycho-Physiology’ (2002, repr. 2008), 
170. 
56 M. Bonazzi, ‘Towards Transcendence’ (2008), 246-51; J.M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists 
(1977), 174-5; C. Lévy, ‘Concept de Doxa’ (1993), 276; A.A. Long, ‘Philo and Stoic Physics’ 
(2008), 140; D.T. Runia, Philo and the Timaeus of Plato (1986), 263, 299, 468-9. 
57 P.A. Vander Waerdt, ‘Peripatetic Soul Division’ (1985), 373. 
58 Though it is commonly argued that two leading Stoics of the late Hellenistic Age, Panaetius 
and Posidonius, may both have rejected Chrysippus’ unitary and cognitivistic theory for a form of 
bipartition that recognized a non-rational source of impulse, Bonazzi points out that some scholars 
suggest that their aims may have rather been to prove Plato’s compatibility with Stoic monism. He 
adds that alternatively, Platonic, Neo-Pythagorean, and Peripatetic foes to Stoicism, such as 
Antiochus and Plutarch, utilized a strategy of ‘polemic resemantization’ where they reclaimed Stoic 
terminology and doctrines as their own and then in turn accused the Stoics of wrongfully 
misappropriating them! In the process, they reformulated their own psychologies. See M. Bonazzi, 
‘Eudorus’ Psychology’ (2007), 114-28. Additionally, Annas points out that later Roman Stoic authors 
such as Seneca and Markus Aurelius could often make ‘very free use of terminology which draws a 
sharp, almost Platonic contrast between the mere body and the all-important mind or rational soul’. 
She notes that Seneca could describe the body as a clog or as a prison of the soul (Sen., Lucil. 65.16, 
25ff), as something from which the soul seeks to escape. She argues that this dualistic language and 
imagery is ‘ethically motivated’ rather than a rejection of physicalism. See J. Annas, Hellenistic 
Philosophy of Mind (1992), 5546. Long likewise notes that though the Stoics posited a physio-
psychological continuity between the mind and the rest of the soul, they nevertheless drew ‘a sharp 
distinction between the human mind, located in the heart … and the rest of the psyche, situated in all 
the other parts of the body’. See A.A. Long, ‘Stoic Psychology’ (1999), 17. Reydams-Schils also 
shows that this psychological dualism is related to the ‘Socratic’ body-soul dualism that Socrates 
argued for in Plato’s Phaedo. She adds that imperial Stoics such as Epictetus and Seneca viewed 
these arguments as Socratic rather than Platonic and thus were inclined to find a way to adapt this 
sort of dualism into their psychology. See G.J. Reydams-Schils, ‘Philo on Stoic and Platonist Psycho-
Physiology’ (2002, repr. 2008), 171-2, 174. Philo, by contrast, displayed little interest in such inter-
school polemical strategies since he counted himself a follower of Moses, not Plato or Zeno. Hence, 
he freely and creatively incorporated elements from both camps, even drawing on the philosophical 
strategies of Eudorus, but in a non-partisan manner. 
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Plato had made the most radical attempt to modify this bipartite division so 
fundamental to Greek ethics by elevating the status of a third, ‘spirited part’ 
(θυµοειδές) of the soul, but Plato’s radical attempt was almost immediately re-
interpreted in terms of the principles of Aristotelian bipartition as early as the first 
generation of the Peripatos, and later by the Middle Platonic writers and in the 
doxographical tradition. Hence, for both traditions the bipartite division had become 
virtually ‘canonical’.59 Winston agrees that Philo followed this Aristotelian, bipartite 
reading of Plato’s tripartition, although key Aristotelian/Peripatetic terms with 
reference to the soul and its parts, such as ‘τὸ ἄλογον’ and ‘τὸ λόγον ἔχον’, do not 
appear in Philo.60  
Given Philo’s use of terms, ideas, and similes from a wide variety of competing 
philosophical traditions, whether Socratic, Platonic-Pythagorean, Stoic, or 
Peripatetic, some have charged him with philosophical incoherence. Vander Waerdt, 
for instance, argues that ‘Philo’s usage was determined largely by the needs of his 
immediate argument’, but that ultimately he made ‘no effort to reconcile these 
different divisions [of the soul]’.61 Similarly, Goodenough saw in Philo the 
amalgamation of a wide variety of conflicting Greek and Jewish conceptions of soul 
and God in the service of an Orphic-Platonic ‘mysticism’ toward the One that never 
ultimately reconciled all of the competing elements of this thought.62 Vander Waerdt 
is certainly correct in recognizing that Philo’s choice of psychological terms or 
images was often shaped by the biblical context upon which he was commenting. As 
Runia has shown, Philo’s pronouncements on a subject nearly always came in the 
                                                
59 P.A. Vander Waerdt, ‘Peripatetic Soul Division’ (1985), 373-4. Fortenbaugh likewise sees 
Aristotle’s bipartite psychology as the full formation of what Plato was already working toward in the 
Laws. See W.W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion (1975), 23-6. 
60 The closest Philo ever came to this Peripatetic formula is when he juxtaposed the λογικόν and 
ἄλογον parts as a fundamental division of the soul. See Philo, Her. 132; Fug. 90. Note, in these two 
instances Philo retains Plato’s terminology (λογικόν) for the reasoning part. Alternatively, he could 
also juxtapose the ἄλογον part with the Stoic ἡγεµονικόν. See for instance, Philo, Leg. 2.6. 
61 P.A. Vander Waerdt, ‘Peripatetic Soul Division’ (1985), 380; Dillon concurs that Philo freely 
utilized numerous conceptions of the soul as it suited him, but immediately rejected characterizing his 
approach as ‘chaotic eclecticism’, since the basic division between rational and irrational is what 
really counted for Philo. See J.M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (1977), 174-5. Svebakken similarly 
argued that this apparent eclecticism reflects Philo’s Middle Platonism, with its bipartite division of 
soul into rational and irrational parts. See H. Svebakken, Philo’s Exposition (2009), 22. Baer also 
concludes that as a philosopher ‘Philo is rightly called an eclectic’, but then adds that he did not 
follow other philosophies ‘arbitrarily’. Instead, Philo was seeking to present scriptural truth in terms 
of the best philosophical thought of this day, since he presumed that both have their source in God. 
Moses, however, is the more fundamental between the two. See, R. Baer, Categories Male and 
Female (1970), 5-6. 
62 E.R. Goodenough, ‘Philo on Immortality’ (1946), 85-108. 
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context of a problem that he was wrestling with as an exegete of Mosaic scripture.63 
Hence, ‘the path to understanding Philo’s thought must go through his biblical 
exegesis’, which is ‘his primary mode of discourse’.64 Goodenough is also certainly 
correct in identifying Philo’s Platonic-Orphic vision of the soul’s moral migration to 
God, but as to the question of coherence, we will show that Philo displays a greater 
degree of consistency than either Vander Waerdt or Goodenough admit.65  
In summary, there is a general consensus among scholars that Philo would have 
classified himself as a disciple of Moses, not Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, or any other 
philosopher; in his view, all other Greek philosophy imperfectly refracts true, 
Mosaic philosophy. Modern scholars also broadly agree that we can classify Philo as 
a Middle Platonist. When it comes to his conception of the soul and especially of the 
passions, however, the relative influence and importance of Plato’s tripartite soul, of 
the ‘Socratic’ body-soul dualism of the Pheado, of the Post-Aristotelian bifurcation 
of the soul between rational and irration elements, and of the Stoic monistic 
approach to the passions and ideal of apatheia upon Philo’s own philosophy remain 
in dispute.  
Plan of the dissertation 
In order to identify more precisely how Philo, as a follower of Mosaic 
philosophy, related to his Stoic, Platonic, and to a lesser extent, Peripatetic sources 
in his account of the soul and its passions, we will compare three sets of evidence: 
the surviving materials from the works of 1) Plato, 2), the Stoics, and 3) Philo of 
Alexandria. Additional attention will be given to Aristotle and the Peripatetic 
tradition in the context of discussions of Philo’s relation to the Stoics and Plato since 
Hellenistic philosophers often interpreted Plato through the prism of Aristotle’s 
critiques and because Aristotle also served as an important background figure for 
later Stoic philosophical developments.  
In chapters one and two we will begin by examining in detail Philo’s Stoic 
definition of a passion as a species of impulse and type of judgment that is irrational, 
excessive, unnatural, and blameworthy. Each key term in his definition will be 
                                                
63 D.T. Runia, ‘Rehabilitation of the Jackdaw’ (2007), 489-95 
64 D.T. Runia, Philo and the Timaeus of Plato (1986), 535; A. Kamesar, Cambridge Companion 
to Philo (2009), 3. 
65 So, likewise, concludes Lévy. See C. Lévy, ‘Philon et les Passions’ (2006), 34. 
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explored to see where Philo follows the Stoic tradition, where he deviates, and in 
those instances when there was disagreement within Stoicism, where he was most 
closely aligned. Since, as Lévy rightly notes, ‘every conception of passion goes 
back, directly or indirectly, to a conception of soul’,66 attention will also be given to 
any Stoic or Platonic influences on Philo’s conception of the soul, especially in 
relation to the soul’s internal structure and its relation to the body, to provide further 
context for the discussion. 67  
In chapter three we will compare Philo’s use of Plato’s tripartite soul in the three 
key Platonic texts in which it appears, namely, the Republic, the Phaedrus, and the 
Timaeus. After noting similarities, we will highlight Philo’s deviations and explore 
his rationale for both. In chapter four, we will next examine Philo’s use of Plato’s 
charioteer simile, which both Philo and Plato related to the tripartite soul. After 
again noting similiarities and differences, we will explore Philo’s transformations of 
the metaphor into other related, but distinct, similes under the influence of the 
biblical text and Stoic ideals. We will conclude by comparing his use of these 
similes in relation to his typology of biblical soul-types in an effort to relate his 
conception of the soul and its passions to his wider narrative of spiritual progress. 
By so doing, we will aim to identify in what ways Philo draws on Platonic and Stoic 
themes in his account of the soul and its passions and what organizing principle, if 
any, underscores his choices. 
                                                
66 C. Lévy, ‘Philo’s Ethics’ (2009), 154. 
67 Brennan points out that this movement from psychology to ethics, implicit in the structure of 
Philo’s thought, reflects a wider practice in antiquity in general and among the Stoics in particular. 
See T. Brennan, ‘Stoic Moral Psychology’ (2003), 258-9, 269. 
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Section 1: Stoic passions 
Introduction 
Pohlenz once observed that ‘no part of Greek philosophy appears so frequently in 
Philo as the Stoic doctrine of the passions’.1 Even a casual reading of Philo would 
confirm that the theme of moral psychology, with its focus on virtue, vice, and the 
passions, was central to his oeuvre. Philo apparently even intended an entire treatise 
dedicated to the subject, although we are not certain if he ever wrote it.2 Yet, as 
Lévy observes, the problem of the definition of passion in Philo has not yet been 
fully elucidated.3  
More so than his psychology, Philo’s conception of the passions assumed a 
particularly strong Stoic tint. This is evident, as we will see, in the manner that Philo 
defined passion as an impulse of a wretched mind, and in his description of passion 
as irrational, excessive, unnatural, fluttering, and blameworthy. Nevertheless, we 
will also find that just as in the case of the soul, in his otherwise orthodox Stoic 
exposition of the passions, the influence of Plato can be felt. This is especially 
evident in his continual reference to the body-soul anthropology outlined in the 
Phaedo. It is also felt on the few occasions when Philo opted to use Plato’s tripartite 
scheme for the soul, which doubled as a way to describe the passions since he more 
or less identified the appetitive part with desire and pleasure and the spirited part 
with anger. Philo generally conceived of the passions in opposition to Aristotle, 
though he did make use of Aristotle’s depiction of the passions as a mean or 
metriopatheia in connection with the intermediate stage of the soul’s progress 
toward the apatheia and perfection of the Stoic sage. Nevertheless, on the question 
of the passions, the Stoic approach proves the dominate factor. 
                                                
1 M. Pohlenz, Philon von Alexandreia (1942), 457. 
2 Philo, Leg. 3.139. 
3 C. Lévy, ‘Philo’s Ethics’ (2009), 157. 
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Chapter 1: What is a passion?  
Philo’s definition of ‘passion’ 
Philo’s formal definition of ‘passion’ (πάθος) was Stoic.4 In De specialibus legibus, 
Philo introduces his discussion of the final Mosaic commandment against 
‘covetousness’ (ἐπιθυµία) by reinterpreting it philosophically as a censure of every 
passion. He thus begins his discussion of desire with a formal definition and 
description of passion in general:  
Every passion (πὰν πάθος) is blameworthy (ἐπίληπτον). This follows 
from the censure (ὑπαίτιος) due to every inordinate and excessive 
impulse (ἄµετρος καὶ πλεονάζουσα ὁρµή) and to irrational and unnatural 
movement (τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν κίνησις) of the soul, for 
both of these are nothing else than the opening out of a long-standing 
passion (παλαιὸν πάθος ἐξηπλωµένον).5 
In this passage, Philo begins his exposition of Moses’ censure of desire by 
immediately shifting to a discussion of ‘every passion’. For Philo, desire was but 
one instance of an entire family of passions. He later argues that Moses singled out 
this one passion – desire – to condemn in the Decalogue, rather than passion in 
general, because he deemed it to be the most difficult of all of the passions to deal 
with and the source of myriad evil deeds,6 and also to be concise.7 Moses focused on 
desire so that, having learned to master this passion, the soul can then apply the 
knowledge and skill gained to master all the remaining passions. Hence, when Philo 
begins his explanation of Moses’ injunction against desire in the Decalogue, he 
immediately shifts back from the particular to the ultimate goal at which the 
abridged lessons aim, namely, the censure of ‘every passion’. Thus for Philo, 
Moses’ condemnation of desire was in fact a shorthand and strategic way of 
reproving passion of every sort. 
                                                
4 For further discussion of the Stoic character of Philo’s definition above, see H.A. Wolfson, 
Philo (1962), 231. 
5 Philo, Spec. 4.79; see also Philo, Leg. 3.185. For an alternative reading of this passage, see H. 
Svebakken, Philo’s Exposition (2009), 154-6. All translations of Philo are F.H. Colson’s unless 
otherwise indicated. 
6 Philo, Spec. 4.80, 84. 
7 Ibid., 4.96. 
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Philo next explains that the reason why every passion is inherently blameworthy 
is that each passion is by definition ‘an inordinate and excessive impulse’ or ‘an 
irrational and unnatural movement of the soul’. Both these phrases closely match the 
definitions of passions reportedly laid down by the founder of Stoicism, Zeno of 
Citium, who had likewise defined passion as ‘an irrational and unnatural movement 
of the soul’ (ἡ ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις) or again as ‘excessive 
impulse’ (ὁρµὴ πλεονάζουσα).8 This immediately places Philo’s treatment of the 
passions within the sphere of Stoicism. Nearly all the terminology in this passage is 
of the technical sort found in Stoicism. Moreover, his definition includes all its key 
elements. Passion is a certain type of impulse or psychic movement that is 
characterized by excessiveness, irrationality, and unnaturalness, and as a 
consequence is deserving of censure. We will return to each of these features to 
discuss in greater detail below. 
Philo adds that ‘the impulse’ and ‘movement’ of the soul in the preceding clause 
are nothing else than the opening out of ‘a longstanding passion’. He does not 
explicitly identify what this ‘ancient passion’ is, though one might initially presume 
that it refers to desire, since that is the particular passion under consideration in this 
passage. Since Philo does not refer to ‘an ancient passion’ anywhere else in his 
entire corpus, we are offered no clues from elsewhere in his writings. Furthermore, 
not once does this notion of ‘ancient passion’ appear anywhere in Stoic, Platonic, or 
Aristotelian writings. If Philo had used the phrase with reference to his Jewish view 
of the history of the world and the origins of passions, then the likely candidate 
would be rather pleasure, since he had allegorically identified ‘the serpent’ in Gen. 3 
                                                
8 For passion as ‘impulse’ (ὁρµή), see Andronic., Pass. I 1.1; Asp., In Eth. Nic. 44; Diog. Laert., 
Vit. phil. 7.110; Cic., Tusc. IV 6.11 (the Latin translation of impulse = appetitus or appetition); 
Galen, Plac. IV 2.4, 2.8, 5.10; Stob., Anth. II 7.1. Inwood offers further evidence of Cicero’s 
translation of ὁρµή as appetitus or appetition. See B. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action (1985), 
263n30. For passion as ‘psychic movement’ (ψυχῆς κίνησις), see Andronic., Pass. I 1.1; Diog. Laert., 
Vit. phil. 7.110; Galen, Plac. IV 2.8, 5.10, V 2.2. Aspasius reported that the Stoics described 
passion’s impulse as ‘vehement’ (σφοδρός) rather than ‘excessive’ (πλεονάζουσα). See Asp., In Eth. 
Nic. 44. We should note that Stoic impulse is defined in Stobaeus as a motion of the mind ‘toward 
something in the field of action’ (ἐπί τι τῶν ἐν τῷ πράττειν) at Stob., Anth. 2.7.9. The four primary 
passions are a special kind of impulse. Desire and fear are directed toward pursuing (ὄρεξις) or 
avoiding (ἔκκλισις) something in the future. See Stob., Anth. 2.7.10b. Grief and pleasure, by contrast, 
are directed at contraction (συστολή) or expansion (ἔπαρσις) of the soul’s pneuma itself in response 
to something that is at hand. Hence, in the case of gief and pleasure, the soul assents to the 
proposition that 1) a good or evil is present and that 2) ‘it is appropriate’ (καθήκει) for the soul to 
contract or expand, which is the field of action for these impulses. See Stob., Anth. 2.7.10b; Galen, 
Plac. IV 17.4; Cic., Tusc. IV 6.14. For further discussion of the four primary passions in relation to 
the movements of psychic impulse, see B. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action (1985), 143-65.  
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with pleasure, not desire. When discussing God’s curse of pleasure, he argued that 
pleasure/the serpent was cursed beyond all the other wild beasts, which he identified 
with the passions,9 because it was both logically and temporally prior to the rest of 
the passions. Logically, the other passions ‘depend’ (ἐφορµέω) on pleasure. Philo 
even called it ‘the starting point’ (ἀρχή) and ‘foundation’ (θεµέλιος) at the bottom 
(ὑποβάλλω) of all of the other passions – lust is begotten through the love of 
pleasure, pain through its withdrawal, and fear at the prospect of its absence. He 
then suggested that pleasure is also temporally prior to the other passions. He 
argued, ‘these [the passions of desire, grief, and fear] would perchance never have 
taken shape at all, if first there had not been deposited that which is ‘productive’ 
(οἰστικός) of them, pleasure’.10 Hence, if we were to look for a likely candidate for 
‘the ancient passion’ mentioned above, we would expect it to be pleasure, not desire.  
Perhaps Philo did not intend the term ‘passion’ in this phrase to refer to any 
particular passion such as pleasure or desire, but rather to any of the passions in 
general, since he did not utilize the definite article. This possibility is further 
supported by the fact that the preceding sentence refers to ‘every passion’ rather 
than any one in particular. Since Philo was expositing Moses’ legislation for a nation 
whose biblical story included a long history of expressions of passion, his 
modification of ‘passion’ with ‘ancient’ perhaps simply meant to indicate that the 
passions of whatever sort have long plagued humankind, ever since the first 
empirical human was tempted by the serpent, pleasure. Alternatively, Philo might 
have been referring to the infirmities associated with a warped mind. In this case, the 
passions arise from the more ‘ancient’ infirmity of ‘a wretched mind’ (ἄθλιος νοῦς) 
that has misjudged the true good or evil.11 Any new expression of an excessive 
impulse or irrational and unnatural movement of the soul is yet another instance of 
this longstanding problem, however understood, a problem for which Torah offered 
a curative therapy. Since Moses was quite aware of this problem, however 
understood, he detested ‘passion’ (τὸ πάθος) in general as something that is ‘most 
vile’ (ὡς αἴσχιστον),12 and introduced the tenth commandment in the abridged form 
of the censure of desire13 to help a person learn how to set bounds to his impulses.14 
                                                
9 Philo, Leg. 2.9-13. 
10 Ibid., 3.113. 
11 Philo, Conf. 106; Migr. 99; Leg. 2.102, 3.230. See pages 73-4 for further discussion. 
12 Philo, Spec. 4.95. 
13 H. Svebakken, Philo’s Exposition (2009), 24, 10-1, 15, 20. 
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Philo was arguing that ‘each of these’ – ‘the impulse’ and ‘movement’ of the 
soul in the preceding clause – are nothing else than ‘the breaking out’ or ‘unfolding’ 
(ἐξαπλόω) of longstanding passion. By so doing, he equated passion with the 
inappropriate impulses and movements of soul. In other words, the unfolding or 
rolling out of passion, to which humans have been subject since the dawn of history, 
is an excessive impulse or unnatural movement of the soul. This gains further 
confirmation if we look at other instances where Philo described passion in terms of 
impulses or movements of the soul. For example, he used nearly the same language 
as our definition at the outset of the section when he spoke of ‘the unreasoning 
(ἄλογος) and exuberant (πλεονάζουσα) impulses of the passions’.15 In this case, 
impulse clearly belongs to passion, and two of the four modifiers in his formal 
definition above reappear. In relation to ‘impulse’, he parenthetically defined 
passion as ‘irrational impulse’ (ἡ ἄλογος ὁρµή) on three occasions in the Legum 
allegoriae,16 while elsewhere he described the passion associated with the biblical 
figure of Lamech as a child of ‘irrational impulse’.17 In this case, passion belongs to 
impulse that has been perverted, rather than impulse to passion. Similarly, he could 
also speak of ‘the unmeasured impulses of the passions’ (αἱ ἄµετροι τῶν παθῶν 
ὁρµαί),18 or in a slight variation, ‘the unreasoning and unmeasured impulse of 
passion’ (ἡ ἄλογος καὶ ἄµετρος ὁρµή).19 Again, in each of these instances, Philo 
clearly identified ‘inordinate impulse’ as something that belongs to passion.  
Finally, with reference to ‘movement of the soul’, just as in the definition above, 
Philo described ‘all of the passions’ as ‘moving and shaking the soul contrary to 
nature’ (πάντα…τὰ ψυχῆς πάθη…κινοῦντα καὶ σείοντα αὐτὴν παρὰ φύσιν).20 
Hence, in all these instances, Philo treated this unnatural movement or inordinate 
and excessive impulse as a basic characteristic of the passions, though he once 
appeared to make passion a characteristic of impulse. Moreover, Philo was careful to 
follow Stoic precedence regarding how ‘impulse’ and ‘movement of soul’ were 
                                                                                                                                    
14 Philo, Spec. 4.79. 
15 Philo, Conf. 90. 
16 Philo, Leg. 3.185, 248-9. 
17 Philo, Post. 74. 
18 Philo, Opif. 81; Spec. 1.305. See also Philo, Congr. 60. 
19 Philo, Congr. 55. 
20 Philo, Decal. 142. See also Philo, Decal. 150; Prov. 2.18. At Mos. 2.139. Philo did not use the 
term ‘movement’. Instead, he described the movements themselves as related to each of the four 
canonical passions. Pleasure expands (ἐξαίρω) the soul, desire stretches it forward (ἀποτείνω), grief 
contracts it (στέλλω), and fear diverts and turns it back (ἀποστρέφω and ἀποκλίνω). We will discuss 
this in greater detail when we explore the four cardinal passions. See also Philo, Abr. 26. 
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modified.21 When he used the prepositional phrase ‘contrary to nature’, he always 
connected it to the term ‘movement’, not ‘impulse’. Alternatively, throughout his 
corpus Philo consistently modified impulse with ‘inordinate’ and ‘excessive’. 
However, he did apply the modifier ‘irrational’ to both ‘impulse’ and ‘movement’. 
This appears to be related to his common description of passion as ‘irrational’ 
(ἄλογος πάθος), but not as ‘inordinate’, ‘excessive’, or ‘unnatural’.22 Irrationality 
thus functioned as a sort of global characteristic for passion in a way that the other 
adjectives did not. What is important to recognize is that Philo clearly and 
consistently made ‘impulse’ and ‘movement of soul’ the fundamental constituents of 
passion. Both were described as irrational, since passion as a whole was treated as 
such, and this irrationality shows itself precisely in the tumultuous, conflicting, and 
unstable character of its psychic movements, and the assent to impressions of 
objects that are not genuinely good or evil as if they were. 
This identification of passion as a kind of impulse or movement of the soul was 
common to Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. However, several features of Philo’s 
conception of impulse display more Stoic influence than Platonic or Peripatetic. 
These include his further identification of the passionate impulse with a movement 
of the mind, to which we will return to in a moment, as well as the specific 
combination of descriptors that he used to characterize passion – blameworthy, 
excessive, irrational, and unnatural. Though Plato and Aristotle could describe 
passion as excessive and irrational, neither would have considered it to be inherently 
unnatural and blameworthy. Thus, while attribution of irrationality or excessiveness 
to the passions is not necessarily Stoic, since other philosophical traditions also used 
this exact terminology, the specific combination of all four of these terms is. We will 
explore these characterizations of passion in Philo in greater detail in the sections 
that follow. 
The passions as a species of impulse 
Philo, like Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, conceived of passion or emotion as a type 
of ‘impulse’ (ὁρµή) or event in the soul that gives rise to intentional action. The key 
difference between the three traditions was the way in which each viewed the 
                                                
21 See my discussion below of Philo’s conception of the soul’s ‘movement’ in relation to the 
‘movement’ associated with plant growth. 
22 Philo, Sacr. 81; Mos. 2.139; Leg. 3.116; Her. 192; Det. 46. 
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structure or composition of the soul. As noted in previously, the Stoics considered 
the soul to be simple, with a single centre, namely the mind or hegemon, whereas 
both Plato and Aristotle treated the soul as a complex entity with two or more 
centres that can come into conflict with one another. In the Republic, Plato’s three 
parts of the soul functioned as three centres, each of which originated its own 
distinct impulse (ὁρµάω or ὀρέγω).23 The appetitive part was responsible for 
impulses toward the attainment of bodily desires such as food, drink, and sex, and 
social desires such as the accumulation of wealth in business. The spirited part 
sought to avenge injustice and to protect one’s honour. In the soul, it normally 
served as an ally to the mind in opposing the impulses of the appetitive part, though 
it could align itself with the appetitive part when corrupted. Socially, Plato identified 
it with the military spirit that provided protection for the Greek city-state. Finally, 
Plato treated the mind or reason as a third source of impulse. He tended to treat 
reason quite optimistically inasmuch as he believed that it was of divine origin. As 
such, it was most ‘at home’ contemplating the incorporeal ideas far away from the 
more base concerns of the two lower parts of the soul. In the Republic, Plato 
associated the rational part of the soul with the social role of his philosopher-kings.24  
Toward the end of the Republic, in his proposal to ban poetry and comedy, Plato 
then overlaid this tripartition of the soul with a bipartition that pitted what he termed 
‘the best part’ (τὸ βέλτιστον) against unnumbered inferior (φαῦλοι) parts.25 Though 
he implied that more than one inferior part exists by his use of a plural adjective, 
what matters most in this section is the soul-division into two elements. Rule by the 
better, rational part leads to ‘deliberation’ (τῷ βουλεύεσθαι)26 or ‘calculation’ 
(λογισµός), while the inferor, irrational (ἀνόητος) part, which the poets appeal to 
and seek to arouse, results in ‘mourning’ (πενθέω), ‘bafoonery’ (βωµολοχία), ‘sex’ 
(ἀφροδίσια), ‘wrath’ (θυµός), ‘desires’ (οἱ ἐπιθυµητικοί), ‘pleasures’ (οἱ ἡδεῖς), and 
‘pains’ (οἱ λυπηροί) in the soul.27 Plato here opposed reasoning to the various 
                                                
23 Plato, Resp. 4.436b, 439a. Plato does not use the term ‘impulse’ (ὁρµή) in the technical sense 
that it later came to possess in Stoicism. As Inwood has shown, Plato used the term to refer efforts by 
the soul or one of its consituent parts to aquire or achieve something. See Plato, Resp. 4.439d. Plato 
seems to use the notion as a general term to cover ‘what drives and drags’a person to act as a result of 
one’s emotions. For further discussion of impulse in Plato, see B. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action 
(1985), 243-4. 
24 Plato, Resp. 9.580d, 586d. 
25 Plato, Resp. 10.603a, 604b, 606a-d.. 
26 Plato, Resp. 10.604c-d, 605d-e. 
27 Plato, Resp. 10.606a-d. 
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emotions of the soul and suggested that the reasoning part should rule in such a 
manner that it ‘moderates’ (µετριάζω) the emotional responses of the inferior parts. 
He nevertheless presumed their ongoing existence as the source of an opposing 
‘inclination’ (ἀγωγή) to that of the mind that ultimately terminates in action.28 
Aristotle accepted the basic thrust of Plato’s complex psychology, but revised it 
in a number of ways. First, he rejected Plato’s soul-body dualism, opting instead for 
a ‘hylomorphic’ theory in which the soul and its powers are related to the body as 
‘form’ (µορφή) is related to ‘matter’ (ὕλη).29 Accordingly, the ‘soul’ is the structure 
whereby bodily matter is so ordered as to form a living animal or plant.30 As such, 
he conceived of bodily matter and its psychic form as two ‘complementary aspects 
of a single entity, the whole complex living creature’.31 Hence, while Plato made the 
body contingent to the soul, Aristotle considered it to be necessary and 
inseparable.32 In so doing, he rejected Plato’s body-soul ‘substance dualism’33 
associated with his Orphic-styled theories of prenatal existence, transmigration, and 
immortality.34 As a result, Aristotle insisted that all psychological acts, emotions 
included, involve a corresponding or concurrent (ἅµα) physiological process,35 as 
opposed to Plato’s vision of non-incarnate chariot-soul led by spirited and appetitive 
horses in the heavens.  
Second, Aristotle rejected Plato’s tripartism, opting instead for a bipartite 
division in his moral psychology that turned on a distinction between ‘appetite’ 
(ὄρεξις) and ‘reason’ (λόγος).36 As a result, for the Peripatetic tradition that 
followed, the division that counted most for moral psychology in general and for the 
passions in particular was between the rational mind and the irrational powers.37 He 
divided the mind into two – the scientific and deliberative – but subsumed the 
                                                
28 Plato, Resp. 10.603d, 604b. 
29 Arist., An. 2.1 412a-b. 
30 V. Caston, ‘Aristotle’s Psychology’ (2006), 316-7. 
31 D. Gallop, ‘Aristotle’ (1999), 92-3. Caston points out that Aristotle’s hylomorphism represents 
a sort of ‘middle course’ between dualism and materialism, which we might roughly associate with 
Platonism and Stoicism respectively. Nevertheless, Caston goes on to point out that scholars differ on 
whether to characterize Aristotle’s hylomorphism as functionalist, psychophysical supervenience, or 
as emergentist. See V. Caston, ‘Aristotle’s Psychology’ (2006), 318-26. 
32 S. Goetz and C. Taliaferro, Brief History of the Soul (2011), 20-1. 
33 C. Shields, Aristotle (2007), 278-85. 
34 D. Gallop, ‘Aristotle’ (1999), 93-4; J.C. Malone, Psychology (2009), 74. 
35 Arist., An. 1.1 403a-b, 1.4 480b. J.C. Malone, Psychology (2009), 74; A.W. Price, ‘Emotions 
in Plato and Aristotle’ (2009), 131. 
36 Arist., Eth. Nic. 1.13 1102b-1103a; W.W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion (1975), 26-37. 
37 Arist., Mag. mor. 1.5 1185b. 
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appetitive and spirited elements into a single ‘desiderative and wholly appetitive 
part’ (τὸ ἐπιθυµητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικόν) of the soul.38 Further, he acknowledged 
three species of ‘appetition’ (ὄρεξις): ‘wrath’ (θυµός) ‘desire’ (ἐπιθυµία) and ‘wish’ 
(βούλησις).39 In On the Soul, he assigned wrath and desire to the appetitive part of 
the soul, but wish to the mind.40 In both Politics and Movement of Animals, by 
contrast, Aristotle placed wrath, desire, and wish in the alogical half of a bipartite 
soul.41 The first case reflects his ‘biological’ division, but the second, his ‘ethical’ 
and ‘political’ division.42 An impulse (ὁρµάω or ὀρέγω) to animal movement occurs 
when one of the faculties of ‘appetition’ (ὄρεξις) are actualized (ἐνέργεια) by one of 
the informational components of the ‘mind’ (νοῦς). Aristotle preferred to call the 
combination of the two, when it followed deliberation, ‘choice’ (προαίρεσις),43 but 
‘appetition’ (ὄρεξις) when voluntary, but originating in the irrational part of the soul 
alone.44 As Inwood has shown,45 Aristotle did not use impulse (ὁρµή) in a technical 
sense as the Stoics would later. Rather, he commonly treated it as a synonym to 
‘appetition’ (ὄρεξις), ‘emotion’ (πάθος), ‘desire’ (ἐπιθυµία), and ‘choice’ 
(προαίρεσις). He nevertheless sometimes distinguished it as the activated impulses 
of either the rational or irrational parts of the soul, foreshadowing Stoic impulse.46 
Elsewhere, Aristotle made a similar point by observing that passions such as anger 
ought to be regarded as ‘movements’ (κίνησεις) that originate ‘from the soul’ (ἀπ’ 
ἐκείνης [ψυχή]) and result in the boiling of the blood surrounding the heart.47 These 
originating movements of the soul that result in action corresponds to Aristotle’s 
activated impulses noted above. 
                                                
38 Arist., Eth. Nic. 1102b; An. 2.3 414b, 3.9 432b; Motu an. 700b, 701b; Pol. 7.15 1334b; Eth. 
Eud. 2.7 1223a, 2.10 1225b; Mag. mor. 1.12.2; Pr. 956b. 
39 Arist., An. 2.3 414b; Motu an 700b; Pol. 7.15 1334b. Vander Waerdt shows that this collapse 
of the spirited and appetitive parts into a single irrational, desiderative part became widely adopted in 
the Peripatetic tradition, as shown in the Magna moralia, in later doxographers such as Arius 
Didymus, and in the Middle Platonic movement. See P.A. Vander Waerdt, ‘Peripatetic Interpretation 
of Plato’s Psychology’ (1985), 286-7, 294-301; id., ‘Peripatetic Soul Division’ (1985), 373-382. Note 
also that Plato does not make the distinction between ‘wish’ and ‘desire’ made later by Aristotle, and 
following him, the Stoics. For instance, see his use of ‘wish’ in his famous argument for the tripartite 
soul in the Republic. Plato, Resp. 4.439a; A.W. Price, ‘Emotions in Plato and Aristotle’ (2009), 125. 
40 Arist., An. 3.9 432b. 
41 Arist., Motu an 700b; Pol. 7.15 1334b. 
42 W.W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion (1975), 27, 31-2. 
43 Arist., Motu an 700b-701a; Eth. Nic. 1113a, 1139a-b. For further discussion, see B. Inwood, 
Ethics and Human Action (1985), 9-17, 245-9. 
44 Arist., Eth. Nic. 1147a-b. 
45 B. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action (1985), 245-9. 
46 Arist., Eth. Nic. 1149a (of ἐπιθυµία and θυµός);1180a (of ἐχθαίρω). 
47 Arist., An. 1.1 403a, 1.4 408b. 
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Given Aristotle’s bipartite division of the soul, the appetites could come into 
conflict with one another or with the informational faculties of the mind, since their 
‘irrationality’ did not exclude what Nussbaum calls an ‘intentional awareness’ in the 
appetitive part, that is, ‘beliefs’ directed at or toward objects.48 This, Aristotle 
argued, accounts for one’s experience of incontinence or akrasia.49 He integrated all 
these elements relating to his moral psychology within a wider theoretical 
psychology that included biological, non-rational psychic elements or powers drawn 
from his scala naturae, including the so-called ‘nutritive element’ (τὸ θρεπτικόν)50 
and the ‘perceptive element’ (αἰσθητικόν) with its related power of ‘imagination’ (ἡ 
φαντασία).51 He did not assign any impulse to the nutritive element, since this part is 
responsible for the powers of growth, nourishment, and reproduction, shared by 
sentient and non-sentient living things alike.52 Like a fire, it digests and nourishes if 
one gives it food, but if one does not, it remains passive.53 In the same way, while 
the perceptive power aids in an animal’s apprehension of ‘the sensible forms without 
the matter’, and imagination recalls past sensations, it too has no direct share in 
human moral conduct, since it passively receives the sensible form.54 Aristotle’s 
introduction of these non-rational nutritive and perceptive elements foreshadowed to 
some extent the manner in which the Stoics would treat the seven lower parts of the 
soul as sharing in ‘soul’ (ψυχή), conceived of rather as an organic principle of life 
distinct from Plato’s Orphic-styled soul ‘true self’,55 without being a source of 
impulse or activity. Philo, by contrast, diverged from both Plato and Aristotle’s 
acceptance of multiple sources of impulse in his basic psychology, though he 
retained Plato’s Orphic-styled soul-body dualism, drawn especially from the 
                                                
48 M.C. Nussbaum, Therapy of Desire (1994), 80-1. 
49 Arist., An. 3.9 432b; Eth. Nic. 1.13 1102b-1103a; P.A. Vander Waerdt, ‘Aristotle’s Criticism 
of Soul-Division’ (1987), 639-40. 
50 Aristotle elsewhere called this ‘the vegetative part’ (τὸ φυτικόν) at Arist., Eth. Nic. 1.13 
1102b; Eth. Eud. 2.1 1219b, or ‘the growing part’ (τὸ αὐξητικόν) at Arist., Eth. Eud. 2.1 1219b. See 
also P.A. Vander Waerdt, ‘Aristotle’s Criticism of Soul-Division’ (1987), 635. Long rightly points 
out that Aristotle in fact utilized a bottom-up approach that begins with the vegetative elements 
common to plants and animals and ascends through sensory perception, appetition, imagination, and 
finally to mind, whereas Plato utilized a top-down approach. See A.A. Long, ‘Platonic Souls as 
Person’ (2005), 185-6. The Stoics would follow Aristotle in a bottom-up approach. Philo drew on 
both strategies, depending on the context. 
51 Arist., An.3.3 428a-429a. For further discussion of ‘imagination’ in Aristotle, see V. Caston, 
‘Aristotle’s Psychology’ (2006), 331-5. 
52 Arist., An. 2.4 415a. 
53 Arist., Mag. mor. 1.4 1185a. See especially Arist., An. 3.10, 433a-b. 
54 Arist., Eth. Nic. 6.2 1139a; An. 2.5 416b, 2.12 424a, 3.2 425b, 3.12 434a-b; P.A. Vander 
Waerdt, ‘Aristotle’s Criticism of Soul-Division’ (1987) 636-7; D. Gallop, ‘Aristotle’ (1999), 98. 
55 D. Gallop, ‘Aristotle’ (1999), 91-2; Arist., An. 1.4 408b 
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Pheado, and occasionally utilized Plato’s tripartite soul metaphor of the Republic 
and Timaeus. We will return to discuss these further in later chapters. 
Philo instead normally conceived of the soul as simple with a single source of 
impulse originating in the mind or hegemon. Though the Stoic approach proved to 
be the more important source of inspiration for the passions themselves, as we will 
discuss below, he accommodated it to the psychological monism implicit in Plato’s 
Phaedo as well as its strong ‘body’ (σῶµα) and ‘soul’ (ψυχή) dualism. In this 
alternative scheme, the passions and senses are somehow connected to the body, 
while the soul admits of no composition at all.56 Throughout the Phaedo, the ‘soul’ 
(ψυχή) seems to have been inexactly connected with ‘the mind’ (διάνοια) on the one 
hand,57 and the life or animation of all animals (ζῷον) and plants (φυτός) on the 
other,58 whereas the senses and passions were closely associated with the body.59 
Philo could likewise opt for a strong body-soul opposition by treating body and soul 
as in conflict with one another,60 by describing the body as a burden to or prison of 
the soul,61 by externalizing pleasure and other passions as belonging to or closely 
related to the body,62 or by aligning sense-perception with the ‘earth’ (γῆ).63 
Repeatedly, the Phaedo pitted ‘the soul’ against the ‘the affections of the body’ 
(τὰ κατὰ τὸ σῶµα παθήµατα),64 which included not only hunger or thirst, but also 
the ‘senses’ (αἰσθήσεις)65 as well as passions such as ‘pleasures’ (ἡδοναί), ‘desires’ 
(ἐπιθυµίαι), ‘fits of anger’ (ὀργαί), and ‘fears’ (φόβοι).66 Plato even went so far as to 
personify the body, with its senses and passions, by describing it as speaking (φηµί) 
                                                
56 Plato, Phd. 64c-e, 66b-e, 78c, 79c, 81a-d, 83a-c. Plato could similarly closely connect the 
senses to the body, calling them ‘bodily powers’ (αἱ  τοῦ σώµατος δυνάµει) at Tht. 185e. Again their 
precise relation to the body and soul is unclear. He describes them as ‘instruments’ (ὄργανα) through 
which external experiences reach the soul as a sort of gateway. Plato, Tht. 184c-d, 185e, 186c.  
57 Plato, Phd. 67c, 76c, 79a, 80b 
58 Plato, Phd. 70d, 71d. We should note that Sorabji has shown, however, that for Plato, animals 
do seem to at least possess beliefs and perhaps also a latent reason, given his supposition that animals 
are reincarnated humans. See R. Sorabji, Animal Minds (2000), 9-12; Plato, Resp. 4.430b. 
59 Plato, Phd. 82c, 82e-83d. Plato’s description of the senses and passions as elements in the 
‘another kind of soul’ (ἄλλο…εἶδος …ψυχῆς) that is ‘mortal’ (τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς θνητὸν γένος) at Tim. 
69d-e perhaps represents a mediating position that connected the Phaedo and the Republic for Philo. 
60 Philo, Leg. 107. 
61 Philo, Leg. 1.108; 3.42, 69, 71, 72 (includes an allusion to Plato’s Phaedo), 74; Sacr. 95; Gig. 
15; Deus 2, 150; Agr. 25; Migr. 8-9, 16, 21; Her. 68, 85; Somn. 1.139, 148; 2.237; Spec. 4.188. 
62 Philo, Leg. 2.71-4; 3.158-9; Sacr. 49; Det. 9; Migr. 203; Spec. 1.148; 2.163-4. 
63 Philo, Leg. 1.1. Philo was commenting on Gen. 2.1 LXX. 
64 Plato, Phd. 80a-b. Plato similarly spoke once of the ‘desires according to the body’ (αἱ κατὰ τὸ 
σῶµα ἐπιθυµίαι), Phd. 82c. 
65 Plato, Phd. 65c. 
66 Plato, Phd. 64c-d, 66b-c, 81b, 83d, 94.b-e. 
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to the soul.67 He attributed sinister motivations to the body, describing it as 
attempting to ‘deceive’ (γοητεύω, ἐξαπατάω)68 the soul in an effort to coax it to 
‘surrender’ (παραδίδωµι) itself to the body.69 Sometimes the deception works and 
soul falls under the body’s power. At other times, body and soul engage in a kind of 
‘fight’ (µάχη), ‘rebellion’ (στάσις), or ‘war’ (πόλεµος),70 in an effort to ‘rule’ (ἄρχω, 
δεσπόζω) over its opponent.71 The soul’s defeat results in its imprisonment in the 
body.72 If it is victorious, the soul is able to escape or withdraw from the body, 
senses, and passions.73 Philo could similarly describe the mind in conflict with the 
body,74 senses,75 pleasure,76 or externals,77 though he usually argued that the body 
and externals where able to tempt the mind through the medium of the senses as a 
sort of gateway.78 Furthermore, like Plato, he often characterized the objects of the 
senses as inflicting harm on the mind or soul by means of deception.79 This was 
especially true of ‘pleasure’ (ἡδονή), which he identified with the cursed serpent of 
Gen. 3,80 a theme reminiscent of Plato’s treatment of ‘pleasure’ (ἡδονή) in the Laws 
as personified, persuading (πείθω) the rest of the soul ‘by forcible deception’ (µετὰ 
ἀπάτης βιαίου) to its ‘wish’ (βούλησις).81 Finally, Philo could similarly argue for a 
strategy of withdrawing from the body and sense perception as a means of avoiding 
falling prey to passionate impulses.82 
Though the Phaedo clearly did not reflect the later Stoic position of making the 
passions an impulse of the mind, in contrast to the Republic, Pheadrus, or Timaeus, 
it located the opposition between the soul and things external to it, rather than within 
the soul. As such, Philo creatively could creatively accommodate its psychological 
monism, which equates the mind with the soul and locates the ‘cause’ of passion in 
bodily externalities, with an approach to the passions that located their origin in the 
                                                
67 Plato, Phd. 83d. 
68 Plato, Phd. 65b, 81b, 83a; Compare also Leg. 9.863b. 
69 Plato, Phd. 83c.  
70 Plato, Phd. 66c 
71 Plato, Phd. 94b-e. 
72 Plato, Phd. 62b, 67d, 81e, 82e, 92a. 
73 Plato, Phd. 64e, 66a, 67c-e, 81a, 82c, 83a. 
74 Philo, Leg. 3.69, 73; Post. 123; Gig. 31; Migr. 16. 
75 Philo, Sacr. 105; Det. 109. 
76 Philo, Leg. 3.76; Agr. 24. 
77 Philo, Leg. 3.20; Sacr. 49; Det. 9; Post. 123. 
78 Philo, Leg. 3.109-110, 220-1, 234; Deus 15; Det. 99; Spec. 4.188; Legat. 12. 
79 Philo, Opif. 155-7; Leg. 2.107-8; 3.61, 64, 66, 76; Agr. 24, 97; Mut. 112-3. 
80 Philo, Opif. 157; Leg. 2.73. 105; 3.66, 68, 76, 246; Agr. 97. 
81 Plato, Leg. 9.863b. 
82 Philo, Leg. 2.80; 3.41-2, 239; Gig. 61; Agr. 65; Her. 69; Spec. 1.206. 
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mind by treating the lower parts of the soul as continuous extensions of the mind 
and by glossing the bodily or external sources as antecedent causes. Psychic conflict 
is thus removed from within the soul as in the complex psychology of Plato’s 
triparte soul or Aristotle’s bipartite division to a struggle between a unitary soul and 
elements external to it such as the body and objects of the senses.  
The Stoic approach to impulse, nevertheless, was the more important influence 
in Philo’s biblical exegesis regarding the passions. In order to show how this was the 
case, we have to proceed in two stages. First we will briefly examine how Phlio 
could explicitly draw upon the Stoic monistic and intellectualist model of the soul 
for inspiration. Then, we will next look at how the Stoic concept of impulse itself 
significantly informed his thought. To state the conclusion in advance, both sets of 
evidence, especially given their frequency throughout Philo’s corpus, suggest that 
with regard to his approach to the passions, the Stoic influence proved normative, 
though couched in a body-soul dichotomy drawn from the Phaedo. Passages where 
Philo drew upon Plato’s tripartite soul, where he made a hard distinction between 
the rational and irrational parts of the soul, or where he posited conflict between the 
mind and passions must be interpreted in this light. We will return to discuss Philo’s 
use of these alternative approaches in detail in chapters three and four.  
To begin with, we find evidence that Stoic monistic model of the soul appealed 
to Philo. In his biblical commentary, Philo often resorted to utilizing elements from 
Stoic psychology when it suited his exegetical purposes, including his use of Stoic 
metaphors for the soul, their eightfold division, the four faculties of the soul, and 
pneumatic tension as a way to describe its constitution. We will briefly look at each 
of these below. 
First, throughout his corpus Philo commonly utilized a number of metaphors that 
closely match the basic shape of the Stoic conception of the soul as a single ‘centre’ 
that extends from the mind outward through a subordinate and instrumental part to 
the body’s sensory, reproductive and speech organs. Each of the images and 
metaphors in the list below calls to mind this same monistic, generative, and 
intellectualist psychology. For Philo, the soul is like:  
• a plant and its branches83  
• a puppeteer and a puppet as in a marionette show84  
                                                
83 Philo, Agr. 30-4. 
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• a fountain or spring and the water that cascades from it85  
• a heart with the rest of the body forming from it while in the womb86  
• a father and the children that he begets87  
• the formation of Eve (sense perception) from Adam’s (the mind) side,88 
which was his favourite biblical metaphor. 
When we compare these metaphors with the stock images that the Stoics used 
for the soul, we discover a substantial correspondence between the two. For 
example, the ancient handbooks on Stoicism reported the following: 
Chrysippus says: ‘…the soul’s parts flow from their seat in the heart, as 
if from the source of a spring (fontis), and spread through the whole 
body. They continually fill all the limbs with vital breath (vitalis 
spiritus), and rule and control them with countless different powers 
(virtutes) – nutrition, growth, locomotion, sensation, impulse to action. 
The soul as a whole dispatches the senses (which are its proper 
functions) like branches from the trunk-like commanding faculty to be 
reporters of what they sense, while itself like a monarch (rex) passes 
judgment on their reports’.89 
A second example:  
The Stoics say that the commanding faculty (τὸ ἡγεµονικόν) is the soul’s 
highest part, which produces impressions, assents, perceptions and 
impulses (φαντασίας, συγκαταθέσεις, αἰσθήσεις, ὁρµάς). They also 
called it the reasoning faculty (τὸ λογισµόν). From the commanding 
                                                                                                                                    
84 Philo, Abr. 72-3; Opif. 117. The image of the puppet is also of Platonic provenance. See Plato, 
Leg. 644d. In Plato, however, the emotions are strings or cords handled by the gods that ‘pull’ (σπάω) 
or ‘drag’ (ἀνθέλκω) a person to and fro across the line between virtue and vice. Plato there exhorts 
his readers to hold on to the golden cord of ‘calculation’ (λογισµός), which will drag one on toward 
virtue. In Philo, by contrast, all of the strings or cords are passive instruments in the hands of the 
ruling part (ἡγεµονικόν), which is much closer to the Stoic monistic conception of the soul’s lower 
parts as subordinated intermediaries and extensions of the hegemon itself. 
85 Philo, Leg. 2.41, 44-6, 3.185; Det. 40, 83-4; Post. 127; Migr. 71; Congr. 33; Fug. 177-82, 188-
93; Anim. 12.  
86 Philo, Leg. 2.6, 8.  
87 Philo, Migr. 3. 
88 Gen. 2:18, 21-3 (LXX); Philo, Cher. 58-60; Leg. 2.7-9, 14, 19-25, 35-9, 44-6, 73. Whittaker 
notes that this metaphor is related to one of Philo’s favorite triad of νοῦς/λόγος/αἴσθησις or the 
simplified duad of νοῦς/αἴσθησις. See J. Whittaker, ‘How to Define the Rational Soul’ (1998), 249-
53. 
89 Arnim, SVF (1903-5), 2.879. 
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faculty there are seven parts of the soul, which grow out and stretch out 
into the body like the tentacles of an octopus (πολύποδος).90  
In the passages above we see that the Stoics employ a number of images for the 
soul. The soul is like:  
• a heart and vital breath 
• a spring (and stream) 
• a tree and branches 
• a monarch and reporters 
• an octopus and tentacles 
When we compare the list of metaphors that the Stoics utilized with Philo’s, we find 
that nearly all the images overlap, with the exception of the octopus and tentacles. 
While the Torah never explicitly mentions the octopus, it does identify as unclean, 
and prohibit Jews from eating, anything that lives in the water and does not have 
‘fins and scales’ (πτερύγια καὶ λεπίδες).91 The octopus would thus have been treated 
as a food taboo. Philo knew of this prohibition92 and though he offered an allegorical 
interpretation of its meaning, much as he did with the rest of the Law, that did not 
preclude him from practicing its regulations literally. So, it comes as no surprise that 
Philo never once makes use of the octopus metaphor in his entire corpus, which 
indicates the selective power of his Jewish background in his choice of and reliance 
on Greek philosophical references. The animal is unclean to him, hence excluded 
from metaphorical comparisons. Nevertheless, though he often employeed these 
Stoic metaphors on the basis of the particular images available in the passages of 
Torah upon which he was commenting, he also employed them to emphasize a 
understanding of the soul that revolved around the Stoic metaphor of a single centre 
with one or more subordinate, substantially linked elements. 
Second, Philo’s embrace of the Stoic unitary metaphor for the soul was not 
limited merely to the basic metaphor, but also extended to the ‘structure’93 and 
                                                
90 Ibid., 2.836. See also Aët., Plac. 390.6-14. 
91 Lev. 11:9-12, 14:10 (LXX). 
92 Philo, Spec. 4.110. 
93 Following Gill, we use the term ‘structure’ in the more technical sense of characterizing the 
part-whole relationship as more holistically conceived. In contrast to the idea of ‘composition’, where 
the parts are identifiable independently of the whole, the ‘structure’ pattern focuses on the whole, 
where the parts are identifiable only in the context of the whole. Broadly speaking, the Platonic 
approach evidences a ‘composition’ pattern, whereas the Stoic approach displays a ‘structure’ 
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taxonomy of the various parts and functions of the soul. On many occasions Philo, 
like the Stoics, described the soul as divided into eight parts.94 For instance, Philo 
described the soul as follows: 
Our mind is indivisible (ἄτµητος) in its nature. For the irrational part 
(µέρος) of the soul received a sixfold division from its Maker who thus 
formed seven parts (µοίρας), sight, hearing, taste, smell, touch, voice and 
reproductive faculty (ὅρασις, ἀκοή, γεῦσις, ὄσφρησις, ἁφή, φωνή, 
γόνιµος). But the rational part (τὸ λογικόν), which was named mind 
(νοῦς), he left undivided (ἄσχιστος).95 
We can compare this with the quotation from Aëtius above, where in his 
summarizing of Stoic psychology he described the structure of the soul as consisting 
of a commanding faculty together with seven parts that grow out from it into the 
body like the tentacles of an octopus.96 Similarly, Diogenes Laertius offered the 
following description of the Stoic view of the soul in Vitae philosophorum: 
They [the Stoics] say there are eight parts (µέρη) of the soul: the five 
senses (αἱ πέντε αἰσθήσεις), the generative principle (σπερµατικοὺς 
λόγους), the faculty of speech (τὸ φωνητικόν), and the reasoning 
faculty (τὸ λογιστικόν).97 
Finally, Galen reported that Chrysippus divided the soul into eight parts, with the 
heart serving as seat of the soul like a spring and extending throughout the body.98 
Chrysippus wrote: 
The soul exists as pneuma (ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦµά ἐστι) connate with us, 
extending as a continuum through the whole body (συνεχὲς παντὶ τῷ 
σώµατι διῆκον) as long as the free-flowing breath of life is present in the 
body. Now of the parts (µέρα) of the soul that have been assigned to the 
several parts [of the body] (µόρια), that of them which extends (τὸ 
                                                                                                                                    
pattern. See C. Gill, Naturalistic Psychology (2010), 14-5, 78-80, 182-3; C. Gill, Structured Self 
(2006), 3-29. 
94 See also Philo, Opif. 117; Leg. 2.74; Det. 168; Her. 232; Agr. 30; Conf. 123, 194-5; Fug. 182, 
190-1; Mut. 111; QG 1.75. Philo lists six faculties and the hegemon at Abr. 29, but excludes 
reproduction.  
95 Philo, Her. 232. 
96 Aët., Plac. 399.3-5. 
97 Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 157. 
98 Compare also Galen, Plac. V 3.7. 
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διῆκον) to the trachea is the voice (φωνή); that to the eyes, sight (ὄψις); 
that to the ears, hearing (ἀκοή); that to the nostrils, smell (ὄσφρησις); 
that to the tongue, taste (γεῦσις); that to the entire flesh, touch (ἁφή); and 
that which extends to the testicles, possessing another such logos, is 
seminal (τὸ σπερµατικόν). That part where all these meet is in the heart, 
being the governing part (τὸ ἡγεµονικόν) of the soul.99 
When we compare the Stoic terminology and taxonomy of the soul quoted above 
with Philo’s, we find that Philo’s description of the soul commonly closely matched 
that of the Stoics in a number of ways. Philo likewise often divided the soul into 
eight ‘parts’, including the governing part (τὸ ἡγεµονικόν), sight (ὄψις), hearing 
(ἀκοή), smell (ὄσφρησις), taste (γεῦσις), touch (ἁφή), speech (φωνή), and the 
seminal part (τὸ σπερµατικόν). Philo and the Stoics always placed the mind in the 
centre and made the other seven parts peripheral and subordinate to it. In one place, 
Philo likened the mind to a stream that divides in many directions and then flows 
through a number of different conduits to the appropriate terminus in one of the 
senses.100 This corresponds to the clear connection between the lower parts and the 
sense organs as outlined in our quotation from Galen above. Conversely, Philo 
described the mind as indivisible and undivided. By so doing, he sought to indicate 
that each of the lower parts is similar to the others, but distinct from the mind. This 
points to the special status of the mind as the seat of reason, something that sets it 
apart qualitatively from the rest of the soul. Unlike animals, which possess ‘soul’, 
but not reason, humans are able to grasp abstract concepts such as the perception of 
the transcendent God, laws and state affairs, skills, practices, and knowledge.101 For 
this reason, both Philo and the Stoics could call the mind ‘the soul of the soul’.102 
Additionally, this use of the Stoic concept may indicate Philo’s opposition to 
Aristotle’s conception of the mind, since Aristotle divided the mind into a 
contemplative and a deliberative part.103 
Philo generally described each of these as ‘a part’ (µέρος or µόριον) of the soul, 
though sometimes he could also call all of the soul’s parts excepting the mind 
                                                
99 Galen, Plac. III 1.10-11. 
100 Philo, Post. 127. 
101 Philo, Anim. 85. 
102 For the two senses of ‘soul’ among the Stoics, see J. Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind 
(1992), 54-5. 
103 Arist., An. 2.2 413b. 
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‘faculties’ (δυνάµεις),104 or ‘seven growths’ (ἑπτὰ φύσεις) of the mind,105 or even 
‘organs’ (ὄργανον/ὄργανα).106 Philo’s biological description of the seven lower parts 
as ‘a growth’ or ‘an organ’ is not unlike Chrysippus’ explicit connection between 
the senses that extend from the heart, which houses the mind, and the several organs 
or ‘parts’ of the body connected to the senses, voice and reproduction.  
Thirdly, Philo followed the Stoics in generally distinguishing between the soul’s 
‘parts’ and its ‘faculties’. For the Stoics, whereas ‘the parts’ were distinguished 
according to mind’s pneumatic currents associated with the various bodily organs, 
‘the faculties’ were identified with the differing ‘qualities’ (ποιότητες) or ‘modes of 
operation’ of the same substrate, the single, commanding faculty itself.107 The Stoics 
likened this difference among the various faculties of the mind to the distinction 
between the qualities of fragrance and taste in an apple. In this example, the apple 
possesses a single body, but two different qualities –fragrance and taste. In the same 
way, the Stoics generally recognized four ‘faculties’108 of the ‘commanding part of 
the soul’ or ‘rational soul’: 109  
• impression (φαντασία) 
• impulse (ὁρµή)  
• assent (συγκατάθεσις) 
• reason (λόγος) 
Philo commonly recognized all of these Stoic faculties of the mind as 
‘faculties’.110 First, like the Stoics, he characterized ‘impression’ as the ability to 
                                                
104 Philo, Abr. 29; Cher. 59; Mut. 110; Plant. 83; Somn. 1.45; Leg. 2.22, 24, 35, 37, 44-5. 
105 Philo, Agr. 30. 
106 For examples of ‘the five senses’ as ‘organs’, see Philo, Abr. 147; Cher. 57, 66; Migr. 195; 
Mut. 7; Plant. 83; Post. 127; Somn. 1.42, 45, 55; Leg. 3.41; Det. 173. For the faculty of speech as ‘an 
organ’, see Philo, Opif. 117; Leg. 1.11, 104, 3.119; Det. 38, 68, 102, 127; Post. 103; Cher. 105; Conf. 
123, 150; Her. 4, 266; Congr. 33; Mut. 56, 69, 139; Somn. 2.278, 280; Abr. 29, 83; Mos. 2.274; Spec. 
1.272; Anim. 73, 98-9. For the generative faculty as ‘an organ’, see Philo, Agr. 30-8; Spec. 1.6, 9. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Long argues that since all activities of the hegemon are rationalized in humans, it would be 
more accurate to say that the human mind possesses three faculties: rational impression, rational 
impulse, and rational assent. See A.A. Long, ‘Stoic Psychology’ (1999), 573-5. Annas points out that 
scholars have differed on whether or not the Stoic hegemonikon actually possessed permanently 
differentiated powers to produce certain mental events. For further discussion, see J. Annas, 
Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (1992), 6565.  
109 Arnim, SVF (1903-5), 2.74, 826, 836, 839; Stob., Anth. I 49.33. Since the Stoics viewed 
reason as one of four faculties of the hegemonikon or ‘ruling part’ of the soul, as Boeri correctly 
notes, they consequently did not identify the hegemonikon with ‘the rational part’ as Galen had 
suggested. See M.D. Boeri, ‘Stoic Account of Akrasia’ (2005), 39946. 
110 Philo, Cher. 59, 63; Leg. 1.28; Deus 41; Congr. 98. Drummond enumerates a list of various 
faculties assigned to the rational part of the soul by Philo, without classifying them. See J. 
Drummond, Philo Judaeus (1888), I 343-4. 
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perceive one’s own body and things external to the body via the senses. Or, to put it 
in material terms, for Philo an external object ‘stamps’ (τυπόω) the mind through the 
senses.111 As such, anything with ‘soul’ is subject to suffering pain or experiencing 
pleasure through impression.112 Moreover, each impression is utterly unique, so that 
an impression of the same object will differ between two recipients or to the same 
person at different times.113 Second, similar to the Stoics, Philo understood 
‘impulse’114 as the self-extension of the mind toward external sense objects that it 
has become aware of through an impression.115 Third, though Philo seldom 
explicitly employed the specific term for ‘assent’ (συγκατάθεσις),116 he nevertheless 
everywhere recognized the power of the mind to grasp an object of sense, which 
results in ‘a cognition’ (κατάληψις) or ‘apprehension’ (ἀντίληψις) of the objects of 
sense.117 Moreover, he sided with the Stoics against the sceptical Academics in 
arguing that the human soul can receive impressions made by external objects ‘in 
their sheer reality’ (ἀκραιφνεστάτη).118 Finally, Philo could likewise refer to reason 
as a faculty of the soul.119  
Fourthly, Philo utilized the Stoic notion of pneumatic tension more than once to 
describe the powers of the mind. In his discussion of the origin of the soul in Legum 
allegoriae and in his excursus in Quod Deus sit immutabilis, where he described the 
constitution of the soul and its impulses, Philo differentiated among different types 
of ‘pneumatic cohesion’ (ἕξις) found in different bodies:120  
                                                
111 This is not to deny the likely Platonic provenance of the analysis of ‘impression’ as a literal 
printing on the soul, as in wax. Sedley points out that the origin of the Stoic use of the notion arises 
from Plato’s Theaetetus 191a-d. See D. Sedley, ‘Chrysippus on Psychophysical Causality’ (1993), 
329. 
112 Philo, Anim. 90. 
113 Ibid., 99.  
114 Gill suggests that ὁρµή may perhaps be better translated as ‘motive’. See C. Gill, ‘Stoicism 
and Epicureanism’ (2009), 145. I too like this translation, especially in a Stoic context where psychic 
motion and rationale intent are so closely linked. Nevertheless, I will continue to use the traditional 
translation of ‘impulse’, because it better indicates the sense of corporeal psychic movement implicit 
in the Greek term than ‘motive’ does. 
115 Philo, Opif. 166; Leg. 1.30, 3.60; Deus 42-4. Compare with Arnim, SVF (1903-5), 2.56, 58, 
59; Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.50. 
116 Philo, Post. 175; Congr. 98; Mos. 2.228. 
117 Philo, Leg. 2.17-8, 22-5. For an account of the Stoic conception of ‘assent’, see T. Brennan, 
Stoic Life (2005), 51-61. 
118 Philo, Opif. 150; Plant. 94; Spec. 4.108; Leg. 3.61; Deus 93. 
119 Philo, Leg. 1.28, 2.23. We should note also that Philo frequently described the senses as 
‘faculties’ of the soul or mind. See Philo, Abr. 29; Cher. 59; Mut. 110; Plant. 83; Post. 127; Somn. 
1.45; Leg. 2.22, 24, 35, 37, 44-5. The Stoics could likewise describe the senses and sense perception 
as powers. See Arnim, SVF (1903-5), 1.149; 2.860. 
120 Philo, Leg. 2.22-3; Deus 35-46. 
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The mind (νοῦς)…possesses many powers (δυνάµεις) – the power of 
cohesion, of nature, of conscious life, and of thought (ἑκτικὴν φυτικὴν 
ψυχικὴν λογικὴν διανοητικήν) – and countless other powers, varying 
both in species and genus. Lifeless things, like stones and blocks of 
wood, share with others the power of cohesion (ἕξις), of which the bones 
in us partake…Nature (φύσις) extends to plants (τὰ φυτά), and there are 
parts in us, such as our nails and hair, resembling plants; nature (φύσις) 
is coherence (ἕξις) capable of moving itself. Soul or conscious life 
(ψυχή) is the power to grow (φύσις) with the additional power of 
receiving impressions (φαντασία) and being subject to impulses (ὁρµή). 
This is shared also by creatures without reason (ἄλογος). Indeed our 
mind (νοῦς) contains a part that is analogous to the conscious life (ψυχή) 
of a creature without reason. Once more, the power of thinking (ἡ 
διανοητικὴ δύναµις) is peculiar to the mind (νοῦς), and while shared it 
may be by beings more akin to God, is, so far as mortal beings are 
concerned, peculiar (ἴδιος) to humans.121 
In the passage above, he outlined the same four types of pneuma as the Stoics, 
namely, ‘cohesion’ (ἕξις), ‘nature (φύσις), ‘soul’ (ψυχή), and ‘mind’ (νοῦς). He 
described each type of pneumatic tension as connected to the rest in a sort of 
continuous ‘scale of being’ or scala naturae,122 in which each level constitutes a 
higher degree of organizational and functional complexity than the previous. Like 
the Stoics, he described cohesion (ἕξις) as the type of pneumatic tension that 
sustains or gives unity to physical objects.123 We see this in Philo’s reference to the 
role of cohesion in lifeless things such as stones and bones.124 Next, he described 
‘nature’ (φύσις), as refering to the next higher degree of pneumatic tension, 
designated as the principle of biological life found in plants and animals. This 
followed the Stoics who likewise included the principles of nutrition and growth in 
the tenor of nature as opposed to that of soul.125 Indeed, he even followed their more 
restricted, technical use of the term as opposed to its more common alternative as a 
                                                
121 Philo, Leg. 2.22-3. 
122 J. Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (1992), 50-6; A.A. Long, ‘Stoic Psychology’ 
(1999), 574. 
123 Arnim, SVF (1903-5), 2.714, 716; Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.139.  
124 Inwood disputes Philo’s faithfulness to the Stoic account of lower forms of pneuma as 
‘slightly fanciful’. See B. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action (1985), 25-6. 
125 Arnim, SVF (1903-5), 2.710-2, 714-6, 718, 787. 
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term for God or the active principle in the universe.126 Ascending yet higher, the 
Stoics had identified a third type of pneuma called ‘soul’ (ψυχή) that designated a 
warmer, dryer, more rarefied and subtle state than nature, which was cooler and 
moister.127 This is the tenor of pneuma that accounts for the principle of perceptive 
life in animals, including the faculties of the senses, utterance, and reproduction.128 
In the passage above, Philo attributed this power to unreasoning creatures and 
associated it with the ability to receive impressions or be subject to impulses. 
Finally, the Stoics identified a fourth and highest type of pneumatic tension termed 
‘the commanding faculty’ (τὸ ἡγεµονικόν), ‘mind’ (νοῦς/διάνοια), or ‘power of 
reasoning’ (τὸ λογιστικόν). This faculty is found only in rational beings, whether in 
the human soul, the stars, or God.129 Philo similarly mentioned this fourth power, 
referring to it as ‘mind’ (νοῦς), and made it the sole possession of humans or beings 
more akin to God.  
Philo thus shared the Stoic and Aristotelian emphasis on the continuity between 
all forms of life,130 with each higher organism comprehending within itself the 
properties of all lower organisms,131 but followed the Stoics by defining soul more 
narrowly. Whereas Aristotle and Plato had argued that humans, irrational animals, 
and plants all possess ‘soul’, since he conceived of it as more or less synonymous 
with the generic, pre-cognitive ‘life’ common to both vegetation and animals,132 
Philo and the Stoics treated ‘soul’ as something possessed only by life forms higher 
in the biological hierarchy. Hence, humans and irrational animals, birds, reptiles and 
so forth all possess ‘soul’, while plants, vegetation, and embryos do not.133 
Conversely, both acknowledged that humans and irrational animals do share with 
                                                
126 Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.148, 156. 
127 Arnim, SVF (1903-5), 2.715, 780, 785, 787; Plut., Stoic. rep. 1052f. 
128 Arnim, SVF (1903-5), 2.459. 
129 Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.139; J. Sellars, Stoicism (2006), 91, 105; Sext. Emp., Pyr. 3.188. 
130 See for example Hierocles’ description of the transition from the physique (φύσις) of the 
embryo to the soul in the newborn baby in Hierocl., Eth. Stoic. 1.5-35. The emphasis throughout is on 
the chronological and biological continuity of the embryo and newborn. 
131 See Philo, Agr. 139, where he elaborated what Terian described as ‘the elaborate structure, 
which constitutes the metaphysical pyramid of his understanding of the universe’. In this passage, we 
see that ‘corporeals (σώµατα) proceed from inanimates (ἄψυχα) to animates (ψυχὴν ἔχοντα or 
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(θεῖα) or immortals (ἀθάνατα). A. Terian, Philonis Alexandrini De Animalibus (1981), 36. 
132 Arist., An. 1.1 402a, 2.1 413a; Plato, Phd. 70d, 71d; Tim. 77b; S. Goetz and C. Taliaferro, 
Brief History of the Soul (2011), 19. 
133 Arnim, SVF (1903-5), 2.716, 718; Hierocl., Eth. Stoic. 1.31-35; Plut., Stoic. rep. 1052F; Philo, 
Deus 41. At Congr. 136-8, Philo in his allegorical treatment of Ex. 21.22-3, which discsusses the 
fines for the miscarriage that results when striking a pregnant woman, referred to the embryo 
(ἔµβρυος) as a ‘plant’ (τὸ φυτόν). 
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plants ‘various processes of a vegetative kind’ (τινα φυτοειδῶς γίνεται), which 
sustain their lives.134 Philo, moreover, had argued with the Stoics that ‘soul’ differs 
from ‘growth’ in three principle ways: ‘sense perception’ (αἴσθησις), ‘impression’ 
(φαντασία), and ‘impulse’ (ὁρµή).135 The difference between plants and animals 
then, is that with the addition of ‘soul’, irrational animals are both aware of and 
capable of pursuing what is ‘appropriate’ (οἰκεῖος) to their own constitution, which 
implies at least some sort of non-linguistic cognitive mental processes that animals 
exploit during locomotion,136 whereas plants cannot: their biological processes run 
automatically by nature.137 As such, the ‘movement’ associated with ‘soul’ differs 
from that of inanimate plants. Whereas Philo characterized ‘cohesion’ (ἕξις) by its 
lack of motion (ἀκίνητος),138 the ‘growth’ (φύσις) of crops and trees ‘moves by 
expansion’ (αὐξητικῶς κινούµενα), ‘without changing its position’ (οὐ 
µεταβατικῶς),139 and the movement associated with impulse is connected to the 
ability to move the body or experience and react to presentations.140 
In common with Aristotle and the Stoics, Philo differentiated humans from 
irrational animals by their additional possession of ‘reason’ (λόγος).141 All sides 
differentiated ‘soul’ in humans from that in beasts by adding the adjective ‘rational’, 
so that they described humans as possessing ‘rational soul’ (λογικὴ ψυχή) rather 
than merely ‘soul’. With the Stoics, however, Philo argued that while the soul in 
both beasts and humans comprises the powers of sense perception, impression, and 
impulse, in the more highly developed humans, reason supervenes upon these 
powers, with the result that mind comes to direct and guide them.142 While they 
described ‘impression’ for all animals as an imprint upon the soul by an external 
                                                
134 Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.86; Philo, Leg. 2.22. 
135 Philo, Leg. 1.29-30, 2.22-25; Deus 41; Mut. 223, 257; Anim. 94. Hence, Philo conversely 
described plants as ‘without perception’ (ἀφάνταστος) at Philo, Opif. 73; Deus 41; Plant. 13; Her. 
136; Virt. 160; as ‘without impulse’ (ἀόρµητος) at Philo, Deus 41; as ‘unable to move from one place 
to another’ (µεταβατικῆς κινήσεως ἀµέτοχος), which is an alternative way of denying ‘impulse’ in 
plants, Plant. 13; or as ‘not participating in perception’ (αἰσθήσεως ἀµέτοχος), at Philo, Deus 41. 
136 M. Rescorla, ‘Chrysippus' Dog’ (2009), 53. Chrysippus famously showed that a dog displays 
genuine cognitive capabilities when it arrives at a spot where three ways meet; after sniffing at two 
by which the quarry did not pass, it immediately rushes off at once by the third without sniffing.  
137 Philo, Mut. 197. 
138 Philo, Somn. 136.  
139 Philo, Her. 137. 
140 Philo, Deus 41-4. 
141 Philo, Opif. 62, 66-7, 73; Leg. 1.30, 2.2-23; Deus 35-45; Plant. 13; Her. 137-8; Somn. 1.136; 
Aet. 75. 
142 Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.86. 
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image introduced through ‘sense perception’,143 in humans, sense perception and 
impression are both related to ‘the mind’ (ὁ νοῦς). As such, sense perception is an 
active extension of the mind’s pneuma toward what is external, and impression is 
the stamp on the mind of an object of impression.144 In the same way, whereas in 
animals impulse is an unthinking movement of the soul toward something, in 
humans it is exercised ‘according to the mind’s power of self-extension’ (κατὰ τὴν 
τοῦ νοῦ τονικὴν δύναµιν) toward an object it deems appropriate to pursue.145  
The monistic psychological elements show that Philo could often resort to the 
Stoics as a resource for commenting on Moses, but when we examine his treatment 
of impulse, we find particular dependence upon Stoic theory. Several lines of 
evidence support this claim: Philo’s treatment of impulse within the Stoic 
disposition of ‘first impulse’, his location of moral blame or praise in one’s use of 
impulse, his ascription of the cause of impulse to the mind, his treatment of the 
senses as an ‘antecedent cause’, and his division of impulse into the three Stoic 
classes of passion, selection, and eupatheia. We will discuss each of these in turn 
below. 
Philo defined impulse within the broader Stoic notion of ‘first impulse’. In Quod 
Deus sit immutabilis, he described ‘the condition’ (τὸ πάθος) out of which impulse 
arises in response to the mental presentation of sense perception in both rational and 
irrational creatures as ‘the first movement of the soul’ (πρώτη ψυχῆς κίνησις),146 a 
phrase nearly identical with the Stoic notion of ‘first impulse’ (πρῶτη ὁρµή).147 
Philo described this ‘first impulse’, whether in humans or animals, as the hormetic 
                                                
143 Arnim, SVF (1903-5), 1.58; Philo, Deus 43. 
144 Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.51; Philo, Opif. 166; Leg. 2.40, 44-5. 
145 Philo, Plant. 45; Leg. 1.29-30; Det. 127; Stob., Anth. II 7.9. 
146 Philo, Deus 44. See also Philo, Mut. 257; Mos. 1.26. Terian equates ‘impression’ (φαντασία) 
and ‘impulse’ (ὁρµή) with ‘the soul’s first movement’ (πρώτη ψυχῆς κίνησις) at A. Terian, Philonis 
Alexandrini De Animalibus (1981), 36. 
147 Philo here seems to be referring to the disposition of Stoic first impulse, which regulates and 
determines the kinds of impulse a soul may have rather than a pre-emotion or propatheia 
(προπάθεια), though he elsewhere showed familiarity with Stoic ‘first movements’ or ‘propatheia’ as 
our earliest certain Greek witness. See Philo, QG 1.55, 76, 79, 3.56, 4.15-7, 73; M. Graver, ‘Philo and 
Stoic Προπάθειαι’ (1999) 302-3, 316-8; B. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action (1985), 184-94. 
Regarding Stoic pre-emotion, Sorabji points out that Seneca sought to defend against Posidonius’ 
objections to Stoic intellectualism by distinguishing three stages of emotion. First, an appearance of 
harm or benefit could arouse a ‘first movement’ or initial shock in the soul. This is not yet an emotion 
since it lacks assent. Next follows a second movement of the soul, that is, the mistaken judgment or 
assent, which in turn leads to a third movement, where the soul is carried away and overturns reason 
and so is out of control. See R. Sorabji, ‘Emotion in Stoicism after 100 BC’ (2007), 166-70; R. 
Sorabji, ‘Chrysippus, Posidonius, Seneca’ (1998), 153-5; C. Gill, ‘Competing Readings of Stoic 
Emotions’ (2005), 447-8.  
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disposition that determines the effect of an impression of an object upon the soul, 
depending on the pain or pleasure it causes, in terms of either ‘an affinity’ 
(οἰκείωσις) toward the object or ‘an aversion’ (ἀλλοτρίωσις).148 In this way, he 
followed the Stoics in treating the soul’s impulse as always seeking those things that 
are most ‘suitable’, ‘fitting’ or ‘appropriate’ (τὰ οἰκεῖα) for its welfare, but avoiding 
those things that are a threat to it. 
For the Stoics, Nature/God uses immanent, teleologically-oriented natural 
processes to direct humans and animals toward their proper end.149 They taught that 
in both rational and irrational animals, ‘first impulse’ is initially directed ‘toward its 
own self-preservation’ (ἐπὶ τὸ τηρεῖν ἑαυτό).150 As a result, when seeking what is 
‘appropriate’ (οἰκεῖος)151 to their own survival, animals live in accordance with 
nature.152 Further, because humans are sociable creatures by nature according to the 
Stoic account, in them ‘first impulse’ also came to include a concern for others or an 
impulse toward sociability.153 Additionally, the Stoics argued that humans are 
distinguished from other animals by virtue of their possession of reason at maturity. 
In animals and children, a presentation of something in accord with nature 
automatically produces an impulse to pursuit behaviour, since they do not have the 
faculty of assent to evaluate the presentations rationally. As infant humans grow, 
their natural constitutions develop, their instinctive impulses are transformed into a 
faculty of reason itself,154 and as a result, they acquire the faculty of ‘assent’ 
                                                
148 Philo, Deus 44; Her. 154. 
149 B. Inwood, ‘Stoicism’ (1999), 240-1. 
150 Cic., Fin. 3.16; Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.85. For further discussion on ‘first impulse’ and 
orientation, see B. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action (1985), 184-201. 
151 Inwood and Gerson point out that this term is ‘difficult to translate’. Other terms or phrases 
proposed include: ‘affiliation’, ‘orientation’, ‘recognition and appreciation of something as belonging 
to one’. See B. Inwood and P. Donini, ‘Stoic Ethics’ (1999), 6778. 
152 Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.88; Inwood points out that the Stoic school was most associated with 
the concept of ‘Nature’ in antiquity, though it was a common feature in nearly all of the schools to 
some extent. The Stoics defined ‘Nature’ as ‘a craftsman-like fire, proceeding methodically to 
creation’, which is equivalent to a ‘fiery, fashioning pneuma or breath’. As such, it was identifed with 
the God who works immanently within creation as ‘the rational plan controlling the organization and 
development of the world’, but also the ‘godlike rationality’ that serves as a central feature of human 
nature’. See Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.85-6, 156; B. Inwood, ‘Stoicism’ (1999), 224. ‘Nature’ thus 
entailed living in accordance with our own human nature and also with the nature of the universe of 
which we are a part. See R.W. Sharples, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics (1996), 101. 
153 G. Striker, ‘Following Nature’ (1996), 250-1; G. Striker, ‘Greek Ethics’ (1996), 178-80. 
154 M. Frede, ‘Stoic Doctrine of Affections’ (1986), 108-9; C. Gill, ‘Competing Readings of 
Stoic Emotions’ (2005), 451; B. Inwood and P. Donini, ‘Stoic Ethics’ (1999), 679-80; A.A. Long, 
Hellenistic Philosophy (1974, repr. 1986), 173; A.A. Long, ‘Stoic Psychology’ (1999), 575; G. 
Striker, ‘Following Nature’ (1996), 271. 
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(συγκατάθεσις), which precedes any ‘impulse’ (ὁρµή) to act in a given way.155 
Hence, mature humans come to recognize that while it is ‘natural’ under normal 
circumstances to ‘select’ (ἐκλογή) that which is related to one’s self-preservation, 
such as health and wealth, and to care for and assist other humans,156 they ought to 
value order and harmony of conduct above all else and to consider moral virtue as 
the only truly noble or good object worth pursuing for its own sake; preservation of 
one’s rationality trumps self-preservation or sociability.157 Hence, ‘first impulse’ 
served as the starting point for their account of human action and emotion, while 
living ‘in accordance with nature’ (τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν) served as its ‘end’.158  
It is true that, on the one hand, Philo’s ethics denied the kernel of the Stoic 
theory of appropriation. As Lévy has rightly pointed out, Philo’s Middle Platonist 
and Jewish commitments to the transcendence of God imposed a strong 
discontinuity between God and the sensible cosmos, where Stoic immanentist 
theology rather posited fundamental continuity,159 since nature is identical with god 
or cosmic reason.160 In other words, the Platonist/Philonic emphasis on ‘likeness to 
God’ or homoiosis (ὁµοίωσις) introduced a ‘detachment between physis and theos’, 
whereas Stoic ‘appropriation’ or oikeiosis (οἰκείωσις) assumed the identification of 
the two.161 This detachment led to a Platonic disparagement of the body as a foreign 
place where the soul, and especially the mind, sojourns as an alien. Though Philo 
                                                
155 C. Gill, Naturalistic Psychology (2010), 202; A.A. Long, ‘Stoic Psychology’ (1999), 579. 
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537-9; T. Brennan, Stoic Life (2005), 157-9. 
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3.16-21, 31; Diog. Laert., Vit. Phil. 7.87-8; Stob., Anth. II 7.6a, e, 7b; R. Bett, ‘Stoic Ethics’ (2006), 
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apatheia. See G. Striker, ‘Following Nature’ (1996), 222. Additionally, scholars dispute whether to 
interpret Zeno’s formula, ‘τὸ ὁµολογουµένως ζῆν’, as a shorthand way of saying ‘to live in 
agreement [with nature]’ versus ‘to live consistently’ in the sense of leading a coherent and consistent 
life. For discussion, see T. Brennan, Stoic Life (2005), 138-41; J. Rist, Stoic Philosophy (1969), 15-6; 
G. Striker, ‘Following Nature’ (1996), 223-4; M. Schofield, ‘Stoic Ethics’ (2003), 241-2.  
159 C. Lévy, ‘Philo’s Ethics’ (2009), 146-8. See also R. Radice, ‘Philo and Stoic Ethics’ (2008), 
143. 
160 Sen., Lucil. 124.14. 
161 M. Bonazzi, ‘Towards Transcendence’ (2008), 247-50. 
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could think of the soul’s first impulse in terms of self-preservation, he argued that 
the fully rational sage would ‘alienate’ (ἀλλοτρίωσις) himself from the body and its 
needs, and instead seek to return to the heavenly realms, its true home, where it can 
once again fully enjoy the vision of God and his Logos.162 Philo could even treat 
‘appropriation’ as synonymous with ‘kinship’ (συγγένεια) or ‘likeness to God’ 
(ὁµοίωσις),163 another strongly Middle Stoic theme.164 The wise soul, in seeking true 
goodness, soars upward away from the earth and near to God, where the truly good 
things exist, that is, the virtues, with a soul characterized by the love of God.165 
On the other hand, Philo could also think of the life of the embodied mind, as 
well as that of irrational animals, in terms of Stoic ‘appropriation’, utilizing what 
Bonazzi described as a strategy of ‘subordination and appropriation’, as noted 
above. Rather than reject Stoic oikeiosis, he subordinated it to the Platonic-
Pythagorean telos of homoiosis, which further serves to ‘bring out Philo’s 
autonomy’.166 The Stoics too could speak of following God, though they placed it 
after following nature, which should serve as a caution against making too much of 
a homoiosis-oikeiosis antithesis.167 Without denying the fundamentally Platonic 
character of Philo’s favourite image in his moral psychology, of the ascending soul 
journeying back to God,168 the differences with Stoicism may not be as drastic as 
one might first imagine. For, in a similar way, the Stoic sage too dismissed the body 
and all externals as ‘preferred indifferents’ (προηγµένα);169 only the soul truly 
matters.170 Further, in the Stoic view, the sage might act against self-preservation in 
order to retain his full rationality.171 This gave rise to the Stoic insistence that the 
                                                
162 Philo, Gig. 23-9; Conf. 78-82. 
163 Philo, Fug. 62-3; Plato, Tht. 176a-b. 
164 C. Lévy, ‘Philo’s Ethics’ (2009), 148-9. 
165 Philo, Fug. 62-3, 79-81. 
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a journey motif of the soul’s ascension. See Sen. Lucil. 65.16, 21; 71.16, 27; 76.25; 78.10; 92.10; 
114.23, 25; 120-15-18. For further discussion, see G.J. Reydams-Schils, ‘Philo on Stoic and Platonist 
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171 Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.130. 
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sage might choose suicide in accordance with reason.172 As Winston points out, 
‘heaping pejoratives’ on the body was not an exclusively Platonic preserve; it was 
equally characteristic of later Stoic references to the body, though their dualism was 
ethical rather than metaphysical as in the case of Plato.173 As such, it is probably an 
overstatement to say that Philo rejected the grounding of ethics on the Stoic dogma 
of ‘appropriation’ as Lévy does.174 Instead, it is closer to the truth to say that Philo 
sought to integrate a Stoic ethic within a wider Middle Platonic physics and Jewish 
piety, in which the sage’s self-sufficiency is equated with an utter recognition that 
all things are a ‘grace of God’,175 and the sage’s zeal for following God is identified 
with the seeking of moral virtue alone as the one ‘good’,176 even if from our 
perspective such a ‘good’ is in fact a bifurcated one.177  
The Stoic character of Philo’s use of the notion of first impulse is especially 
clear in his discussion of Moses’ moral development to sagehood. At the beginning 
of De vita Mosis, Philo outlines how Moses showed great natural ability in his 
progress toward sagehood from an early age. Moses’ progress included learning how 
to restrain and direct his impulses, which reflected his growth in the virtue of 
‘temperance’ (σωφροσύνη). For, in Stoic parlance, temperance is precisely ‘the 
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Alexandria. See M. Bonazzi, ‘Towards Transcendence’ (2008), 246-7.  
177 Dillon suggests that Philo, in his ethics, may have followed a strategy similar to the 
‘Stoicizing synthesis’ of Antiochus, ‘duly modified in a transcendental direction’. See J.M. Dillon, 
‘Philo and Hellenistic Platonism’ (2008), 224-7. 
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stability of one’s impulses’ (ἡ τῶν ὁρµῶν εὐστάθεια), with the result that ‘one 
conducts oneself unerringly in one’s impulses’ (ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀδιαπτώτως ἐν ταῖς 
ὁρµαῖς ἀναστρέφεσθαι).178 Hence, Philo points out, while still a youth Moses 
‘watched the first directions and impulses of the soul’ (τὰς πρώτας τῆς ψυχῆς 
ἐπιβολάς τε καὶ ὁρµάς … ἐπετήρει) lest they should run away with reason.179 He 
then observes:  
For it is these impulses [ὁρµάς] which cause both good and bad (αἱ 
ἀγαθῶν αἴτιαι καὶ κακῶν) – good when they obey the guidance of reason 
(ἡγεµόνι λόγῳ πειθαρχῶσι), bad when they turn from their regular 
course into anarchy (εἰς ἀναρχίαν ἐκδιαιτῶνται).180 
In this passage, Philo clearly connects the origin of ‘first impulse’ with the origin of 
passion or virtue in the soul. He introduces his discussion by utilizing both the 
notion of the Stoic ‘impulse’ and the related term ‘inclination’ (ἐπιβολή), another 
technical Stoic term, which they had categorized as a species of ‘impulsion’ 
(ὄρουσις) and defined as ‘an impulse before an impulse’.181 Thus, in this passage, 
Philo is saying that Moses wisely watched over both the impulses themselves and 
the impulses that come before the impulses. Such was his great oversight of the 
motions of his soul.  
Oddly, Philo also described the soul’s movement away from an object unsuitable 
to it as ‘impulse’. This deviated from the strict Stoic terminology, since they would 
have normally called this movement ‘aversion’ (ἀφορµή). This difference, however, 
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is only superficial; Philo’s account here still fits within a broadly Stoic framework. 
The Stoics had divided ‘impulse’ in rational animals into several species, including 
‘pursuit’ (ὄρεξις), ‘aversion’ (ἀφορµή), and ‘impulsion’ (ὄρουσις).182 ‘Pursuit’ and 
‘aversion’ differed from generic Stoic impulse in rational animals in that ‘the object’ 
the mind is moving toward or away from is ‘something in the field of action’ (ἐπί τι 
τῶν ἐν τῷ πράττειν) in the present, rather than simply ‘something’ (ἐπί τι) as in the 
case of generic impulse, while ‘impulsion’ differed from ‘pursuit’ in that the mind is 
moving toward something in the field of action that is in the future. Hence, while in 
this passage Philo does not use the term ‘aversion’ to describe the soul’s movement 
away from that which might threaten its existence, his use of the generic term 
‘impulse’ to describe both movements fits within the wider Stoic system, since 
‘pursuit’, ‘aversion’, and ‘impulsion’ are all forms of impulse.  
Additionally, though Philo normally used the term ‘aversion’ in the non-
technical sense of ‘opportunity’ or ‘starting point’, he did once use it in the Stoic 
sense, showing that he had knowledge of the term.183 Further, elsewhere in his 
oeuvre Philo used each of the other technical Stoic terms for the various species of 
‘impulse’ outlined above. He consistently used ‘pursuit’ in relation to his definition 
of the cardinal passion of ‘desire’ (ἐπιθυµία) – exactly as the Stoics had done. He 
once even used the highly technical Stoic ‘impulsion’, defining it in Stoic manner as 
‘an impulse preluding another impulse’ (ὁρµή τις πρὸ ὁρµῆς). He then noted that the 
term came from those who practice word coining, which of course was something 
for which the Stoics were quite famous.184 Hence, we see that Philo demonstrated 
knowledge of the Stoics’ highly technical language for various types of impulse.  
Philo next observes that these impulses and inclinations are ‘the cause’ (αἴτιος) 
of either good or bad in the soul, depending on their relation to governing reason. 
This too reflects a distinctly Stoic orientation. For, as discussed above, the Stoics 
had argued that Nature had added reason to the natural endowments of impulse and 
perception in rational creatures. The life that ‘accords with nature’ thus consists of 
the mind overseeing and commanding impression and impulse. When the mind 
functions as it should, reason offers ‘a more perfect management’ (κατὰ τελειοτέραν 
                                                
182 Stob., Anth. II 7.9. 
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suggesting that it may be better interpreted rather as a type of ‘propatheia’. See M. Graver, ‘Philo and 
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προστασίαν) of impulse by supervening to ‘scientifically’ (τεχνίτης)185 guide or 
shape the rational creature’s first impulse in its quest to live in accordance with 
nature.186 Reason thus does not fundamentally change the direction of the soul’s first 
impulse. Rather, it oversees what the first impulse would do naturally and 
instinctually and ensures that it attains its proper ‘end’ (τέλος), namely, ‘the morally 
good and beautiful’ (τὸ καλόν). When it oversees the soul’s first impulse 
consistently, expertly, and with a firm disposition, then the soul acts with ‘moral 
virtue’ (ἀρετή). Hence, the Stoics treated virtue as a ‘craft’ or ‘skill’ (τέχνη) 
‘concerned with the selection of things according to nature’.187 For, in the Stoic 
view, virtue is nothing other than the natural perfection of a rational being ‘qua 
rational’ (ὡς λογικοῦ),188 which includes reason preserving its own rationality 
without error. 189 It is only when the mind is ‘perverted’ (διαστρέφεσθαι) from its 
right function by assenting to the wrong ends through ignorance or opinion that it is 
led into passion and vice.190  
In the same way, Philo notes in this passage that the soul’s impulses and 
inclinations can be the cause of either the good or the bad, that is to say, they are in 
themselves morally neutral. Philo further underscores the neutrality of these first 
impulses and inclinations when he describes their deviation into the anarchy of the 
passions using the term ‘depart from’ (ἐκδιαιτάω) in the middle voice. This term 
conveys the notion of departure from a normal habit or pattern. Since first impulse is 
always naturally oriented toward what is appropriate to the soul, Philo is suggesting 
that a turn of these impulses or inclinations toward passion is an unnatural deviation 
in the soul away from its normal orientation toward self-preservation. The origin of 
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passion thus lies precisely in this perversion of first impulse, when reason ceases ‘to 
guide’ (ἡνιοχέω) the soul’s first impulses and permits them to become like beasts 
without a herdsman.191 This contrasts strongly with the Platonic and Peripatetic 
position, which considered the natural course of the impulses of the irrational parts 
of the soul to be oriented toward the bad, unless reined in by reason.  
Philo normally argued for the Stoic single source of impulse originating in the 
mind rather than from multiple sources as argued by the proponents of the Platonic 
and Peripatetic positions.192 When Philo outlined in detail his foundational 
psychology in the Legum allegoriae, he argued for the Stoic notion of the mind as 
the single source or ‘spring’ (πηγή) whence impulse originates. This was the case 
not only for good and proper impulses, as one could likewise argue from a Platonic 
or Peripatetic perspective, but also for the irrational impulses of the passions 
themselves. He thus argued with the Stoics that irrational impulse ‘issues forth’ 
(ἐξέρχοµαι) ‘from our reasonings and from a mind that corrupts the truth’ (ἀφ’ 
ἑκατέρων τῶν τε λογισµῶν καὶ τοῦ νοῦ τοῦ διαφθείροντος τὴν ἀλήθειαν).193 Passion 
takes its start in the mind, not in an alternative source like Plato’s appetitive part of 
the soul. Thus, Philo invoked the husbandry metaphor of the passions as 
‘superfluous growths’ (αἱ περιττεύουσαι φύσεις) of the hegemon that need to be 
pruned away.194 His insistence that the passions are ‘superfluous’ and may be 
‘pruned’ again underscores that they are not necessary to the soul, as was the case 
for Plato’s spirited and appetitive parts of the soul. Further, he viewed the irrational 
impulses as arising as a result of ‘a corruption’ of the truth by the mind itself. This 
corresponds to the Stoic notion of passion as the mind’s perversion of impulse.195 In 
the same way, Philo elsewhere described passion as ‘an ugly spot’ (τι…αἶσχος) on 
‘the mind’ (ὁ νοῦς),196 again treating passion in the context of reason and mind 
itself, not a second source outside the mind. The one exception, as discussed in 
detail in chapters two and three of section one, occurs in those places where Philo 
made explicit use of Plato’s tripartite theory of the soul. In those instances, we see 
Philo appearing to treat the impulses of the passions of desire and anger outside the 
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mind in accordance with the metaphor, though he sought to revise these in the 
direction of Stoicism, as we have already shown.197  
On one occasion, Philo described sense perception as ‘the cause of the passions’ 
(ἡ παθῶν αἰτία).198 Although at first glance, this might appear to contradict Philo’s 
assumption that passion originates as a perversion of the impulse of the mind, this 
instance still fits within a wider Stoic psychology inasmuch as the senses provide the 
fodder for the mind to inappropriately pursue objects of sense; the origin of the 
impulse toward those objects still remains with mind. This corresponded to the 
technical Stoic distinction between perceptual and other appearances as ‘antecedent 
causes’ (causae antecedentes) and assent as the ‘sufficient and principal cause’ 
(causa perfecta et principalis) of an impulse.199 The two causes differed in terms of 
their relative proximity to the impulse and whether or not they are within one’s 
power. If someone perceives something and receives an impression, it still depends 
on their willingness to give assent to this impression before the impulse occurs, 
which in turn underscores their responsibility for the action. Though the external 
impression actuates (commoveo) the assent to action as the ‘antecedent cause’, it 
cannot by itself necessitate the action without the mind’s assent.200 We should first 
note that Philo was arguing in this section of the Legum allegoriae for a monistic 
psychology. Indeed, in this passage he framed his entire discussion of the origin and 
nature of the soul after the manner of the Stoics by arguing that ‘the cohesive’, 
‘growing’, ‘conscious’, ‘rational’ and ‘thinking powers’ (ἑκτική, φυτική, ψυχική, 
λογική, διανοητική δυνάµεις) of the soul all belong to the mind.201 Consequently, 
the mind likewise serves as ‘the font’ (πηγή) or ‘origin’ (ἀρχή) of sense 
perception.202 Hence, when Philo attributed the cause of passion to sense perception, 
he was in no way contradicting the idea that passion has its origin in the mind, since 
he understood sense perception itself to be nothing other than the activation of a 
faculty and condition already dormant in the mind.203 When activated and set into 
motion, the power of sense perception extends out from the mind to reach the 
surface of the flesh and the perceptive organs, which enable the mind to make 
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contact with the flesh and external objects.204 In this way, sense perception, which is 
neutral in itself, becomes the gateway for the mind to experience bodily pleasure or 
pain.205 The way things look to the agent in turn tempts the mind to count these 
bodily objects as goods or evils worthy of impulse or repulsion, which gives rise to 
the passions.206 In this way, Philo married a Stoic conception of the passions as 
perverted turns of the mind with the Socratic body-soul dualism that pervades his 
moral psychology.207 
Philo closely connected the occurrence of the passions to objects furnished by 
the senses. He often used the image of ‘the nine kings’ vanquished by Abraham on 
the plain of the Jordon when he rescued Lot as an allegory of the powers of the four 
passions and five senses within us.208 Philo pointed out that the five kings of the 
senses are often subject to the four kings of the Stoic cardinal passions because they 
pay tribute to the passions by furnishing them with the objects of sense: 
Griefs and pleasures and fears and desires (λῦπαι, ἡδοναί, φόβοι, ἐπιθυµίαι) 
arise (συνίστηµι) out of what (ἐξ ὧν) we see or hear or smell or taste or touch, 
and none of the passions would have any strength of itself (µηδενὸς τῶν παθῶν 
καθ’ αὑτὸ σθένοντος) if it were not furnished (χορηγέω) with the senses 
supply.209 
In this passage, Philo connects the existence of the passions to the perceptual objects 
that the senses supply. The senses convey to the soul bodily and external objects, 
which is in itself a neutral process. However, once these objects are present to the 
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soul, this gives occasion for the passions to ‘arise’ or ‘be constituted’ (συνίστηµι). 
Without sense perception and the objects that it furnishes to the mind, there would 
be no opportunity for the passions to come into existence. The mind would only be 
able to contemplate the noetic forms proper to itself, since it would be cut off from 
the body and external world, which are full of objects subject to contingencies 
beyond the mind’s control. However, when the senses begin to furnish the mind 
with objects of sense, it is then that the passions ‘arise’ (συνίστηµι). Hence, Philo 
argues in Platonic manner210 that the senses and passions both serve as ‘sources of 
corruption’ (φθορᾶς αἴτιαι), since they tempt the mind away from the contemplation 
of the immortal, divine realm to focus instead on the body and external, which are 
by nature mortal, changing, and contingent. As such, they are necessarily bound up 
with the passions and vices, since they take their start in what is unstable and 
uncertain.211 Although Philo does not spell out in detail how the objects furnished by 
sense perception give rise to the passions in the soul, aside from the fact that they 
take their start from the mortal and corruptible sphere of the senses, he made it clear 
elsewhere that it had to do with how the mind welcomes each of the objects of sense, 
whether in addition to attributing truthfulness or falsehood to the sensory data it also 
ascribes value to the object as a good, an evil, or something indifferent.212 Thus, the 
senses are ‘the cause’ of the passions in that they present to the mind indifferent 
objects such as pleasure or wealth, which it mistakenly pursues as the highest good. 
If the mind had never been extended to the flesh through the senses, it would never 
have been tempted by mortal existence to mistake the indifferent for the good.213  
This identification of the origin of the passions in the senses, moreover, provided 
Philo with a way to overlay the alternative Platonic tripartite approach onto his 
otherwise monistic moral psychology. While he could account for the origin of the 
passions on the basis of the mind’s valuation of the objects of the senses as worthy 
of pursuit or avoidance, he could simultaneously account for their origin in created 
objects outside of the mind and reason. As discussed previously, Plato had located 
the appetitive part of the soul in the region near the navel. In its more base forms, its 
objects were especially associated with food, drink, and sex, while in its more 
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refined forms, it would seek wealth and the life associated with acquisition. In the 
same way, Philo argued that the senses of touch and taste descend to the lowest 
recesses of the body.214 By inference, taste corresponds to food and drink, which 
find their way to the stomach, while touch corresponds especially to the sexual 
organs. Hence, Philo located these two senses, not in their obvious locations of 
throughout the body for touch, and the mouth for taste, but in the same general 
region of the body as Plato’s appetitive part. Philo did not extend this process of 
correspondence to Plato’s spirited part. However, he did elsewhere relate Plato’s 
spirited part to the senses, through his connection between the senses and pleasure. 
He observed that since each of the five senses and their objects occasion various 
pleasures, the mind is tempted by their allure. While the good mind ‘cleanses’ itself 
by turning away from the objects of the senses altogether,215 lovers of pleasure come 
to desire through their love of pleasure, but grow bitter and angry when deprived of 
their pleasures.216 Philo then added that pleasure thus makes its abode in breast and 
belly, the same two regions as Plato’s spirited and appetitive parts. Thus, his 
identification of the senses as ‘a cause of the passions’ provided Philo with an 
avenue to broadly identify Plato’s appetitive part of the soul with the senses of touch 
and taste and the lower regions of the body, and the spirited part with the pleasure-
loving mind’s frustration at being unable to attain its desired pleasures. While this 
correlation between Stoic monism, the senses, and Plato’s psychic tripartism was at 
best inexact and only hinted at, it did afford Philo room to make use of the Platonic 
alternative when the biblical text or terminology seemed to require the metaphor. 
Philo followed the Stoics in dividing impulse into three classes, depending on 
the end toward which it is oriented: ‘the passions’ or ‘bad emotions’ (τὰ πάθη), ‘the 
eupatheia’ or ‘proper feelings’ (αἱ εὐπαθείαι), and ‘selections’ or ‘rejection’ 
(ἐκλογή/ἀπεκλογή). Each of the basic types of impulse corresponds to one of the 
three ethical classes outlined above. The eupatheia refers to those rational, smooth 
and measured impulses that are directed toward the morally good and genuinely 
true, or away from vice, rather than toward indifferents,217 and are possessed by the 
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sage alone.218 Philo consistently recognized this category of virtuous impulse,219 
likewise locating it in the sage alone. The passions, by contrast, correspond not only 
to those irrational impulses that are directed toward what is morally bad or false,220 
but also to those that result from treating something as a good or an evil that is in 
fact an indifferent. Again, as we will show in detail in the chapters that follow, Philo 
closely followed the Stoic approach to passionate impulse. Selections, finally, 
correspond to those impulses toward or away from an object that the mind 
accurately judges to be indifferent and considers it appropriate to pursue or avoid, 
whether in the fool or in the sage.221 Philo likewise implicitly recognized this 
category of impulse,222 though it did not feature prominently in his writings in the 
same way that the passions or even the eupatheia did.223  
Philo thus sided with the Stoics against the Platonic and Peripatetic traditions. In 
accordance with their twin doctrines of the triple good, and metriopatheia or 
moderation of the passions, the Peripatetic and Platonic traditions argued that certain 
moderate forms of passion were in fact appropriate evaluative responses to good or 
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evil bodily and external circumstances.224 As constituent elements of the soul, the 
passions were thus construed as natural. When appropriately exercised, they were by 
definition not excessive as such, but rather liable to excess when not directed by 
right reason.225 Though irrational, the passions could be construed as in accord with 
reason, when tamed and trained by the charioteer reason. In keeping with his 
adherence to the Stoic doctrine of virtue as the only good, Philo rejected all forms of 
passion as wrong, by reference not so much to their outcomes or effect, if they have 
any, but to both the basic character of their movement and the object in view at their 
inception.226 Hence, as we will discuss further below, Philo followed the Stoics in 
treating all forms of passion as essentially blameworthy in themselves, always 
worthy of censure, universally excessive, and unnatural movements of the soul.  
In keeping with his fundamental Stoic psychological monism, Philo argued that 
in rational animals impulse finds its origin in the mind alone. By making reason the 
source and guide of all other powers of the soul, Philo thus followed the Stoics in 
making the mind responsible both for its rejection of or assent to presentations as 
good, bad, or indifferent, and for its consequent impulsive response.227 Depending 
on the character of the mind’s judgments, the impulse that followed could be a 
passion, a eupatheia, or a selection. If the mind moves the soul toward an object 
with knowledge, as exemplified in the sage, the soul experiences eupatheia. If the 
mind itself has been corrupted and malfunctions, and so erroneously evaluates an 
indifferent as good or bad, then excessive, irrational, and unnatural impulses of the 
passions will necessarily follow. If a mind of either a sage or a fool correctly 
recognizes something to be indifferent, but accurately judges that there is something 
about the object and its circumstance that still provides some reason to move toward 
or away from it, then it will make a selection. In this study, we will focus on Philo’s 
treatment of the passions. 
The passions as opinions or judgments 
Given Philo’s overall preference for the Stoic monistic and intellectualist account of 
the soul’s impulse, it comes as no surprise that he closely correlated the origin of the 
passions to the mind’s judgments, assents, and opinions. As we have shown in the 
                                                
224 M.C. Nussbaum, Therapy of Desire (1994), 94-6. 
225 Stob., Anth., II 7.1; R.W. Sharples, ‘Peripatetic School’ (1999), 166. 
226 Cic., Fin. 3.32. 
227 Origen, Princ. III 1.3; W.T. Wilson, ‘Sin as Sex and Sex with Sin’ (2002), 153-4. 
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previous section, for Philo, the mind serves as the sufficient cause for an impulse of 
the soul. This impulse is natural and appropriate so long as assent accords with 
nature and follows right reason, but when it deviates, impulse becomes a passion. 
Hence, the origin of the passions depend on the character of the mind and its 
judgments about what is good, since the orientation of the mind is what determines 
the direction of its impulses.  
In this respect, Philo again sided with the Stoics against the Platonic and 
Peripatetic traditions, which argued that passion’s origin lies outside the mind. To be 
sure, in the Platonic and Peripatetic account a sick or vicious mind will allow the 
passions to run riot and disturb the soul, whereas the healthy and virtuous mind will 
moderate and control them. Nevertheless, just as the two horses in Plato’s charioteer 
metaphor are necessary to the composition of the chariot-team, so the Platonic and 
Peripatetic traditions viewed the passions as fundamental to the soul. Wrong 
thinking and poor judgments will exaggerate or misdirect the soul’s passionate 
movements, but they do not ultimately account for their origin. The passions arise 
instead as expressions of alternative parts that are natural to the soul. 
While we can characterize Philo’s conception of the relation of the passions to 
the mind’s judgments or opinions as Stoic, from what we can gather from the extant 
sources,228 there appears to have been disagreement among the early Stoics as to the 
precise nature of this relation.229 According to Galen, the early Stoics – namely, 
Zeno and Chrysippus – understood the nature of passion in two distinct ways.230 
                                                
228 See E. Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics (1870), 245. 
229 The Stoic analysis of passions as opinions, using the metrics of pleasure and pain, present and 
future, may go back to Socrates’ efforts to discuss emotions in relation to opinion. See Plato, Phlb. 
36c-38b. Socrates even proposed the distinction of emotion as ‘following’ (ἕποµαι) true or false 
opinion, at Plato, Phlb. 38b. The Stoics, of course, would not have accepted the notion of ‘right 
opinion’. See also W.W. Fortenbaugh, ‘Aristotle and Theophrastus on the Emotions’ (2008), 30-1. 
230 Scholars dispute the veracity of Galen’s claim. For criticism of Galen’s claim, see M.D. 
Boeri, ‘Stoic Account of Akrasia’ (2005), 393-5; J.M. Cooper, ‘Posidonius on Emotions’ (1998), 71-
110; C. Gill, ‘Competing Readings of Stoic Emotions’ (2005), 445-70; T. Tieleman, Chrysippus’ On 
Affections (2003), 284-7; E. Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics (1870), 2463. Support for 
making a fundamental distinction between the two has been argued most forcibly by Sorabji. See R. 
Sorabji, ‘Chrysippus, Posidonius, Seneca’ (1998), 149-69; R. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind 
(2000), 55-61; C. Gill, ‘Did Galen Understand’ (1998), 124-30; id., ‘Competing Readings of Stoic 
Emotions’ (2005), 448-910. Others accept it as at least reflecting some difference in emphasis between 
the two Stoic fathers, with Chrysippus perhaps reformulating Zeno’s ideas in a more systematic form. 
See ibid., 44911; B. Inwood and P. Donini, ‘Stoic Ethics’ (1999), 699; A.C. Lloyd, ‘Emotions in Stoic 
Psychology’ (1978), 240-1; A.W. Price, ‘Zeno and Chrysippus at Odds?’ (2005), 373-4; J. Rist, Stoic 
Philosophy (1969), 28-36; J. Sellars, Stoicism (2006), 115. Sharples suggests that Posidonius’ 
‘departure’ from orthodox Stoicism may in fact have turned on some sort of difference between 
Zeno’s and Chrysippus’ accounts. Posidonius ‘may have felt that he was giving a better interpretation 
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Galen claimed that Chrysippus identified the passions with judgments or opinions 
themselves,231 whereas, though Zeno rooted the passions in mental error, he 
nevertheless equated the passions themselves rather with the movements in the soul 
that follow from opinion or judgment as a matter of temporal sequencing: 
Chrysippus attempted to show that the passions are judgments of the 
rational part (κρίσεις τινὰς εἶναι τοῦ λογιστικοῦ τὰ πάθη), but Zeno 
considered the passions to be, not the judgments themselves (οὐ τὰς 
κρίσεις αὐτάς), but the supervening contractions, dispersions, risings, 
and dejections of the soul (τὰς ἐπιγιγνοµένας αὐταῖς συστολὰς καὶ 
χύσεις ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ ταπεινώσεις τῆς ψυχῆς).232 
Reportedly, then, two leading Stoics disagreed as to whether a passion is ‘a 
judgment’ (κρίσις) or the supervening movement that ‘follows upon the judgment’ 
(ἐπιγιγνοµένη κρίσις).233 Galen described these supervening psycho-physical 
movements as ‘contractions, dispersions, risings, dejections of the soul’, which as 
we will discuss in greater detail below, as the four psychic changes associated with 
the four Stoic cardinal passions of desire’(ἐπιθυµία), ‘pleasure’ (ἡδονή), 
‘fear’(φόβος), and ‘grief’ (λύπη).234 
Diogenes Laertius indirectly alluded to the disparity between Zeno and 
Chrysippus, though he did not actually say that they diverged from one another. In 
line with Galen above, he explicitly identified Chrysippus with the view of the 
passions as judgments: 
They [the Stoics] hold (δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς) the passions to be judgments (τὰ 
πάθη κρίσεις εἶναι), as is stated by Chrysippus in his treatise On the 
Passions: avarice (φιλαργυρία) being a supposition (ὑπόληψις) that 
                                                                                                                                    
of the original Stoic position than Chrysippus had done’. R.W. Sharples, Stoics, Epicureans and 
Sceptics (1996), 71-2. See also C. Gill, ‘Competing Readings of Stoic Emotions’ (2005), 457-8. 
231 Nussbaum agrees that the crux of the matter turned on Chrysippus’ radical identifying of 
passion and belief. In an alternative way of thinking about their differences, she points out that both 
Chrysippus and Zeno held that beliefs are 1) necessary for a passion, 2) a constituent element of a 
passion, and 3) sufficient for the passion. Chrysippus distinguished his position by going one step 
further by marking 4) belief identical to passion. Nussbaum adds that all the key Greek traditions 
(Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and Stoic) held (1), and that Aristotle held both (1) and (2). The Stoics 
went further by adding (3) and (4). See M.C. Nussbaum, Therapy of Desire (1994), 370-2. 
Fortenbaugh likewise argues that for Aristotle cognition is (1) necessary and (2) a constituent element 
of the emotions. See W.W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion (1975), 11-5. 
232 Galen, Plac. V 1.4-5. See also Galen, Plac. IV 3.3. For Chrysippus, see also Galen, Plac. IV 
1.17, 3.7. For Zeno, see also Galen, Plac. IV 3.2.  
233 Also κρίσεσιν ἑπόµενα Galen, Plac. IV 3.1. 
234 Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.110-1. 
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money is a good (τὸ ἀργύριον καλὸν εἶναι), while the case is similar 
with drunkenness and profligacy and all the other emotions.235 
He likewise explicitly identified Zeno with the conception of the passions as 
irrational and unnatural movements or excessive impulse:  
Passion (πάθος) is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural 
movement in the soul or again as impulse in excess (ἡ ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ 
φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις ἢ ὁρµὴ πλεονάζουσα).236  
According to Diogenes Laertius, Zeno identified the passions with ‘irrational 
movement’ (ἄλογος κίνησις) and ‘excessive impulse’ (ὁρµὴ πλεονάζουσα), not 
judgment as did Chrysippus. He did not indicate, as Galen had done, that two 
leading Stoics were at odds with one another on the question of the definition of a 
passion. Rather, he sought to conflate or harmonize the two perspectives. Hence, 
even though he directly quoted Chrysippus when equating the passions with 
judgments, he introduced the sentence by saying that ‘they’ (αὐτοί), that is, the 
Stoics in general, hold this view. The same could be said of his quotation of Zeno 
above. Nevertheless, in the direct allusions themselves, Galen’s putative division is 
apparent. Chrysippus equated the passions with judgments. Hence, in the case of 
avarice, Chrysippus identified it with the supposition that money is a good. In 
Zeno’s account, by contrast, the passions ‘arise’ (βλαστάνειν) from the perversions 
of the mind brought about by accepting falsehoods. These perversions of mind, in 
turn, are ‘the cause of instability’ (ἀκαταστασίας αἴτια) in a person’s impulses, but 
the actual passions themselves are identified with the movements, impulses and 
feelings that follow the judgment, assent, or opinion. 
The difference between Chrysippus’ and Zeno’s conceptions of passion seems to 
have been rooted in slightly different accounts of the cognitive process that 
eventuates in an impulse.237 Both Stoics recognized that not every ‘impression’ 
(φαντασία) of ‘an external object’ (αἰσθητός) leads the soul to an action, but only 
those impressions that the Stoics termed ‘an impulsive impression’ (ὁρµητικὴ 
                                                
235 Ibid., 7.111. 
236 Ibid., 7.110. 
237 Rist argues that the difference was rooted rather in an insistence on the simultaneity of the 
judgment, movement, and feeling-tones against a Zenonian temporal sequencing of these elements. 
See J. Rist, Stoic Philosophy (1969), 33-5.  
   
66 
φαντασία).238 When the mind receives the sensory data in the impressions, it 
immediately interprets them in the form of an interpretive statement239 concerning 
the meaning of the sense data received called ‘a proposition’ (ἀξίωµα), which the 
mind must either ‘assent’ (συγκατάθεσις) to or reject as an accurate representation 
of reality.240 The Stoics called this mental event, this assent regarding the veracity or 
falsehood of the proposition, ‘a judgment’ (κρίσις).241  
The Stoics classed judgments as either an episode of ‘knowledge’ (ἐπιστήµη) if 
true, or as ‘an opinion’ (δόξα) if false, or if true but possessed by a fool or 
progressor. Judgments are ‘opinions’ when the mind assents to unclear impressions, 
yields to false impressions, or erroneously assents in instances where it ought to 
have suspended judgment.242 In these cases, the opinion is a false assent. When the 
mind assents to what genuinely corresponds to a real object or state of affairs, that 
is, to a ‘kataleptic impression’, it experiences what the Stoics called a ‘cognition’ or 
‘katalepsis’ (κατάληψις). Sages only assent to these ‘kataleptic impressions’ with 
‘strong assent’, that is, with the kind of assent that ‘cannot be reversed or overturned 
by any amount of rational questioning’ or ‘by any amount of emotional or 
psychological pressure’.243 Hence, sages only experience episodes of knowledge. 
Non-sages can assent both to non-kataleptic true impressions, and to kataleptic 
impressions. However, their judgments remain ‘opinions’ because they can do so 
only with ‘weak assent’ or ‘assumption’ (ὑπόληψις), that is to say, their grasp or 
endorsement of the truth of the impression lacks the stability and irreversibility of 
the sage.244 For this reason, the Stoics, following Chrysippus, often equated passion 
not only with ‘judgment’, but also interchangeably with ‘opinion’, ‘feeble 
                                                
238 T. Brennan, ‘Stoic Moral Psychology’ (2003), 266-7; A.A. Long, ‘Stoic Psychology’ (1999), 
579. 
239 The Stoics called these ‘statements’, of which a ‘proposition’ is but one species, ‘complete 
lekta’ or ‘sayables’. See A.A. Long, ‘Stoic Psychology and Language’ (2006), 240-5. 
240 For ἀξίωµα, see Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.65-6. For συγκατάθεσις, see Sext. Emp., Math. 
7.154; Stob., Anth. II 7.9b. For further discussion on Stoic epistemology in relation to presentation, 
assent, and judgment and knowledge, see T. Brennan, Stoic Life (2005), 49-81; A.A. Long and D.N. 
Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers (1987), 236-59; J. Sellars, Stoicism (2006), 64-74. 
241 For further discussion regarding the relation of ‘assent’, ‘impression’ and ‘belief’, see T. 
Brennan, Stoic Life (2005), 51-66. 
242 A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers (1987), 258; Sext. Emp., Math. 7.151; 
Stob., Anth. II 7.11m. 
243 T. Brennan, Stoic Life (2005), 69-70. 
244 Cic., Tusc. IV 7.15; Stob., Anth. II 7.10. For further discusison, see T. Brennan, Stoic Life 
(2005), 66-73; C. Lévy, ‘Concept de Doxa’ (1993), 254-60. For a helpful table outlining the relations 
of true and false, kataleptic and non-kataleptic impressions versus strong and weak assents, see T. 
Brennan, ‘Old Stoic Theory of Emotions’ (1998), 27.  
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assumption’ or ‘weak assent’.245 Hence, unlike Plato and Aristotle, who associated 
‘opinion’ with distinct parts of a complex soul, the Stoics made no room in their 
epistemology for ‘opinion’ as a normal, even if lower, form of knowing. Rather, in 
the Stoic view, ‘opinion’ always represents an abnormal deviation of the mind, a 
malfunction of the mind in its effort to grasp reality.246  
Impulsive impressions differ from simple impressions in that they contain two 
distinct, but interrelated propositions. The first proposition contains a value-neutral 
statement regarding the truthfulness or falsehood of the sensory data in view, while 
the second contains an additional value-significant proposition that stimulates ‘an 
impulse’ (ὁρµῆς) or ‘an aversion’ (ἀφορµῆς κινητικά) in the soul.247 This second 
proposition is thus a mental statement that includes both an ascription of the 
value/disvalue to the object in view together with its worthiness of 
pursuit/avoidance, and a description of how to go about accomplishing the proposed 
action or ‘proper function’ (καθῆκον).248 So, the first value-neutral proposition 
might look like, ‘this is x’, but the second, evaluative proposition, ‘this x is a 
good/bad/valued/disvalued and one ought to pursue/avoid it in such and such a 
manner’. As a consequence, the Stoics viewed every action in rational creatures as 
the result of an assent to both propositions contained in the impulsive impression; 
involuntary psycho-physiological phenomena called ‘first movements’ or 
‘propatheia’ (προπάθεια, prima agitation or primus motus) such as tickles, twinges, 
blushes, pangs that do not involve any assent leading to action do not constitute 
genuine emotions.249 The hegemon judges the first to be true or false and the second 
to be appropriate or inappropriate for the soul to act upon.250  
                                                
245 Cic., Tusc. III 11.24, IV 14.7; Cic., Fin. 3.35; Plut., Virt. mor. 447a; Stob., Anth. II 7.10. See 
L.C. Becker, ‘Stoic Emotion’ (2004), 39-40 for further discussion regarding Chrysippus’ definition of 
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246 C. Lévy, ‘Concept de Doxa’ (1993), 252-3. 
247 Stob., Anth. II 7.7c. 
248 The Stoics defined καθῆκον as an action which, when it is done, has a defensible reason. See 
Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.107; Stob., Anth. II 7.8. For discussion, see R. Bett, ‘Stoic Ethics’ (2006), 
541; T. Brennan, ‘Stoic Moral Psychology’ (2003), 268-9; A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, Hellenistic 
Philosophers (1987), 420. 
249 Sen., Ira II 1.3-4.2; M.D. Boeri, ‘Stoic Account of Akrasia’ (2005), 400; M.C. Nussbaum, 
Therapy of Desire (1994), 374-8; R.W. Sharples, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics (1996), 68; J. 
Sellars, Stoicism (2006), 65-7; R. Sorabji, ‘Emotion in Stoicism after 100 BC’ (2007), 164-6. 
According to Galen, Posidonius attacked Chrysippus’ theory as insufficient because it was unable to 
explain how emotions such as distress fade over time, even when both judgments remain intact, or 
how wordless music can elicit emotion apart from any judgment of the mind. Chrysippus had already 
argued that the second judgment that the feeling was appropriate had simply faded. See Galen, Plac. 
IV 7.13, 37, V 6.21-2, 31-2; R. Sorabji, ‘Emotion in Stoicism after 100 BC’ (2007), 164-6; C. Gill, 
‘Competing Readings of Stoic Emotions’ (2005), 446-7. Seneca would later deny that wordless 
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This brings us to the differences between Zeno’s and Chrysippus’ accounts of 
the cognitive process and its relation to impulse and passion. According to Galen, 
Chryssipus had putatively departed from Zeno by equating a passionate impulse 
with the mind’s assent whereas Zeno had accounted the impulse to be a by-product 
of assent.251 The table below outlines the difference between the two accounts. Each 
row details each stage of the cognitive process in chronological order. An equal sign 
(=) indicates when the philosopher treated tems as equivalent to one another and 
hence occurring at the same juncture of the process. The approximately equals sign 
(≈) indicates irregular, but simultaneous occurance: 
Table 1: Zeno’s and Chrysippus’ accounts of the passionate cognitive process 
Zeno's account Chrysippus’ account 
Impulsive impression Impulsive impression 
Weak/false assent  
= bad judgment  
= opinion 
Weak/false assent  
= bad judgment  
= opinion  
= passionate impulse (≈ psychosomatic 
epiphenomena) 
Passionate impulse (≈ psychosomatic 
epiphenomena) 
 
 
                                                                                                                                    
music, theatre, painting, staged executions, etc. give rise to genuine emotions, arguing instead that 
they arouse only ‘first movements’ or ‘propatheia’ as a part of his three-stage account of emotion. 
Sen., Ira II 2.1-4.2; A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers (1987), 65Y 419; R. 
Sorabji, ‘Emotion in Stoicism after 100 BC’ (2007), 166-70; R.W. Sharples, Stoics, Epicureans and 
Sceptics (1996), 68-9. Similarly, Philo assumed that the ‘propatheia’ could be called upon to ‘explain 
away apparent exceptions to the posited incompatibility of emotion and virtue’ by ‘taking advantage 
of the theoretical timelag between impression and assent’. Like Seneca, Philo emphasized the 
involuntary and non-culpable character of the pre-emotions. See M. Graver, ‘Philo and Stoic 
Προπάθειαι’ (1999), 304-12. Scholars are divided on the question of whether the doctrine of 
‘propatheia’ was a later Stoic innovation or whether it belonged to the old Stoa. For those who 
suggest that it is a later innovation, possible candidates include Posidonius, Panaetius, Sotian, and 
Seneca. See M. Graver, ‘Philo and Stoic Προπάθειαι’ (1999), 3024, 321-3. We should not overlook 
its origins in Aristotle’s analysis either. Though he did not coin the terminology, in his insistence on 
the role of beliefs in constituting genuine emotions Aristotle made the distinction between fear and 
being startled or sexual arousal and erotic love. See Arist., An., 3.9 432b; Motu an., 11; M.C. 
Nussbaum, Therapy of Desire (1994), 83-5. 
250 See L.C. Becker, ‘Stoic Emotion’ (2004). 
251 For further discussion, see R. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind (2000), 29-41. 
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The Stoics had defined ‘assent’ (συγκατάθεσις) as ‘a sort of motion of the soul 
toward the proposition contained in an impression’.252 Zeno, as Galen would have us 
believe, differentiated between judgment, assent or opinion, and passionate impulse. 
This accounts for his addition of the adjectives ‘supervening’ (ἐπιγιγνοµένη) or 
‘following’ (ἑπόµενα) to the term ‘judgment’ (κρίσις). For Zeno, the judgment or 
opinion initiates the impulse that follows but is not to be equated with it. Hence, the 
table above divides his account of the cognitive process that leads to a passion into 
three distinct stages. 
Chrysippus, by contrast, had made the inference that the motion associated with 
the assent to both propositions in the impulsive impression is equivalent with the 
passionate impulse itself. Thus, like the Socrates of Plato’s early dialogues, he 
insisted that all motivations be analysed as forms of belief, a highly intellectualist 
approach.253 Chrysippus characterized the passions as mental perversions, rooted in 
the mistaken judgments or beliefs of the commanding faculty itself and formed as a 
by-product of the process of the soul’s rational comprehension and response to 
impressions that gives rise to an impulse. Since Chrysippus reduced the number of 
phases from three to two when he equated the passionate impulse with assent or 
opinion, the table above divides his account into two stages.  
It is unclear from the extant sources exactly how Zeno conceptualized the details 
of psychic process from impression to judgment to impulse. Did he envision it as 
two subsequent impulses, with the mental motion associated with assent culminating 
in a judgment that in turn initiates a second passionate impulse toward the object in 
question? Or, did he construe it as different elements of a single impulse, such that 
the assent or judgment serves as the ground or point of initiation of the same 
impulse that follows? However one might understand Zeno’s approach, Galen 
argued that he clearly sought to draw a boundary between the judgment or opinion 
and the passionate impulse that follows. 
                                                
252 Stob., Anth. II 7.9b. 
253 J. Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (1992), 75-8; T. Brennan, ‘Stoic Moral Psychology’ 
(2003), 259-60. See Plato, Prt. 352b-354a, 358d-e. Gill suggests that the Stoics also picked up the 
‘strand’ of Platonic thinking in the Republic that sometimes ‘posited two competing sets of beliefs 
and (correlated emotions or desires’. See C. Gill, ‘Did Galen Understand’ (1998), 114-5. Irwin argues 
that though ‘assent’ is an activity of the mind, the Stoics still sought to retain some sense of passivity 
in their conception of passions by suggesting that ‘when we act on passion we fail to interfere with or 
to question the suggestion that the appearance makes’. See T.H. Irwin, ‘Stoic Inhumanity’ (1998), 
222. 
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In terms of the Stoic definition of the passions, the difference between the two 
approaches becomes apparent when we look at various components for the passions 
in the Stoic accounts. For instance, the Stoic definition of the passions could be 
divided into the following components within the cognitive process that eventuates 
in an impulse:  
(a) an impulsive impression arising from an object 
(b) the assent to the proposition that the object is good or bad; because it is 
incorrect or weak, it is an opinion or wrong judgment 
(c) the simultaneous judgment that one ought to pursue or avoid the object, 
which amounts to the impulse 
(d) the supervening irrational appetency or pursuit, which includes a concurrent 
change in the shape of the soul itself and possible simultaneous physical 
manifestations or epiphenomena such as a quickening of the heart or flushing of 
the cheeks.254 
According to Galen’s account, then, Chrysippus would have identified a passion 
with (b) and (c) above, while Zeno would have opted for option (d) alone.255  
In the Chrysippian view, the mind first wrongly attributes a good or evil 
valuation to an object of impression – that is, it makes a judgment that is incorrect 
about the reality of the object in view, which results in an opinion. Additionally, this 
opinion includes the subsequent determination that one ought to respond 
accordingly, regardless of what qualitative feeling-tone one may or may not actually 
                                                
254 Price offers a similar outline of the structure of the emotional event as impression-assent-
impulse-action, but he does not distinguish the concomitant change in psychic shape that occurs with 
the impulse, which he later discusses in relation to the assent in any case. See A.W. Price, ‘Zeno and 
Chrysippus at Odds?’ (2005), 472, 474-7; Gill notes that the concurrent change in the soul’s shape, 
together with possible bodily feeling-tones, reflects their effort to synthesize elements drawn from 
each branch of philosophy, including in this case, physics. The concurrent contractions and 
expansions of the soul, in other words, are the physics flip-side to viewing impulse in terms of Stoic 
logic. See C. Gill, ‘Competing Readings of Stoic Emotions’ (2005), 454-5. Lloyd notes that nearly all 
of these elements can be viewed as a development of Aristotle’s account of the emotions. As such, 
both accounts include a number of common features: presentation, an object toward which the 
emotions are directed, appetition (or its opposite), the necessity of assent to a ‘practical predicate’ to 
produce action, beliefs about the past or future, physiological conditions. Key differences exist as 
well: Stoic materialism versus Aristotle’s hylomorphism, Aristotle’s insistence on an irrational source 
of impulse, his combining pleasure, pain, or desire within a single passion as opposed to the Stoic 
approach of identifying a passion with just one cardinal state. See A.C. Lloyd, ‘Emotions in Stoic 
Psychology’ (1978), 235-7. Frede offers an alternative, three part outline of the emotional event as 1) 
the judgment or belief, which includes an assent to an evaluative proposition implicit in an 
impression, 2) the corresponding physiological state, 3) one’s awareness of this state and belief. See 
M. Frede, ‘Stoic Doctrine of Affections’ (1986), 102-3. 
255 See also Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.111. 
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experience.256 These two judgments are solely sufficient and necessary to constitute 
a passion.257 So, by way of illustration, Chrysippus understood the passion of desire 
to be fully constituted as soon as the soul arrives at the opinion that an impression of 
some prospective object is a good, when in fact it is not, and then determines to 
pursue it. Similarly, as soon as the mind assents to the proposition that it is 
appropriate to contract, the passion of grief is fully constituted.258 The movement of 
mind associated with the process of coming to an opinion and making the judgment 
was adequate for Chrysippus to satisfy the Stoic description of passion as a type of 
mental impulse or movement. Any feeling of craving or elation or contraction was 
thus conceived of as an asymmetrical physical-correlate with the passion, 259 either 
of the pre-emotional, initial impulsive impression or the invariable concomitant 
physical movement of the mind the follows the judgment.260 By arguing in this 
manner, he sought to establish, against the Platonic model of which Galen was so 
fond, that all of the passions are in our control, underscoring the priority given by 
Chrysippus’ model to one’s motivation over the phenomenology of emotions.261  
Alternatively, Zeno had identified desire with the feeling that supervenes upon 
the belief, opting for option (d) alone. Zeno, then, would have accepted (b) and (c) – 
the opinion and the simultaneous judgment to act – as causes of the passions, but 
would have identified the passion itself with the feeling of irrational craving or 
dejection or elation that supervenes or follows from the mind’s prior judgment.262 
Hence, the passion itself is not in our control, insofar as it comes about reflexively, 
consequent upon the prior judgment of the mind concerning the goodness or badness 
of the object in question and the appropriateness to react. Nevertheless, Zeno still 
ultimately held the individual responsible for his or her feelings because though a 
person may not be able to control the consequent contractions or elations of the soul 
(d), one can make right judgments about what is good or evil (b) and what one 
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should pursue (c), out of which either feeling-tones arise or continue from the pre-
emotional initial impulsive impression now assented to.263 And, just as importantly, 
both Stoics attributed this entire process to a single part of the soul, not multiple 
centres as in the Platonic and Aristotelian accounts. 
Just as it was axiomatic for both Stoics that the passions ‘arise’ (βλαστάνω) out 
of ‘a perversion of the mind’ (διαστροφὴ ἐπὶ τὴν διάνοιαν),264 so Philo traced the 
soul’s generation of the passions back to what he referred to as ‘a wretched mind’ 
(ἄθλιος νοῦς).265 He linked this sort of mind with that of the fool, whose contours 
reflected a Stoic conception as detailed previously.266 However, as we have outlined 
above, the two leading Stoics differed in their accounts of what constituted the 
passion itself.267 Chrysippus opted for a more intellectualist understanding of 
passion as identical with the mind’s wrong judgments, but Zeno treated the mind’s 
judgments and opinions as the causes of the passions, while identifying the passions 
themselves with the subsequent psychic movements. Philo consistently refrained 
from outright identification of the passions with judgments themselves, though he 
clearly knew of the Chrysippian position. Rather, in practice he opted for choice (d) 
above, that is, Zeno’s identification of the passions with the psychic movements that 
result from the mind’s judgments.  
Though Philo’s psychology was essentially Stoic, his explanation for how the 
passions arise in the mind reflected a mixture of Stoic, Platonic, and New 
Academic/Sceptic influences. Philo denigrated the value of bodily and external 
things on Platonic or Socratic grounds,268 since in his view both only participate in 
the sensible realm of shadowy, transitory existence.269 For this reason, he argued 
that the man of worth purifies his soul of its passions and sicknesses precisely when 
he sets up a wall between it and any opinion that things external to the soul are 
genuine goods.270 The changing character of the sensible realm, moreover, led Philo 
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to draw upon the Sceptic notion of the uncertainty of the mind’s comprehension of 
and reasoning about the universe, arguing instead that the soul should only trust in 
God, the font of its existence and source of its virtue. To trust in anything else, 
including its own reasoning, inevitably leads the soul into opinion, conjecture, 
wrong judgments, and the passions that follow. Finally, from an ethical point of 
view, Philo argued that the passions take their start from ‘a wretched mind’ that 
makes a wrong moral valuation concerning what is in fact good or evil. The mind 
counts as worthy of pursuit or avoidance things that in reality are not. For this 
reason, Philo argued that passions such as grief are caused by ‘our own hands’, that 
is, by a voluntary movement of our minds toward ‘what is inferior’ (πρὸς τὸ 
χεῖρον).271 While the inferiority of sensible and noetic objects was due to their 
contingent character as created things, Philo also argued with the Stoics from the 
first principle that virtue is ‘the only good’, which entailed the attendant notion that 
bodily and most external realities are not true goods.272 In each of these cases, 
passions arise in the mind when it counts as good or evil what is in fact not, and 
responds accordingly. We will look at each of these elements in greater detail below. 
While Philo was at one with the Stoics in deriving the passions from a mind that 
misconstrues what is true and good, he diverged from them with regard to the 
ontological and epistemological grounds for his conclusion. The Stoics had argued 
that the sensible world was a realm of real objects that the mind is naturally able to 
grasp by means of sense impression. They guaranteed the veracity and certainty of 
the mind’s apprehension by posing a controversial ‘criterion of truth’ (κριτήριον 
ἀληθείας), which they called ‘a cognitive impression’ (καταληπτικὴ φαντασία).273 
The Stoics argued that, under normal circumstances, real objects give to the natural 
mind impressions that are ‘of such a kind as could not arise from what is not’.274 As 
such, a cognitive impression is a type of automatic, self-authenticating impression 
that genuinely corresponds to a real object or state of affairs.275 It includes three 
                                                                                                                                    
that bodily and external goods can in some manner contribute to one’s happiness in some way at QG 
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elements – the reality of the object or state of affairs in view, the impression or 
stamp on the soul itself that correctly corresponds to the object, and the inimitable 
manner of the impression that guarantees its truth.276 By contrast, the Stoics 
characterized ‘an incognitive impression’ (ἀκατάληπτος φαντασία) as imprecise, 
obscure, internally contradicted, and false.277 Consequently, for the Stoics, the 
sensible world is a source of the truly real that the mind can genuinely grasp through 
cognitive impressions. This focus on the material and sensible as the locus of reality 
proceeded from their materialistic physics, which ascribed corporeality not only to 
the cosmos, but also to the soul and to God.  
Philo, in contrast, opted for a ‘Platonically inspired’278 conception of the 
universe that entailed an uncertainty in the mind’s comprehension of the sensible 
realm. He deemed the sensible realm to be a region of uncertainty since it is a mortal 
and changing copy, while the noetic world of the ideas, forms, souls, and the divine 
is the archetypal, eternal and unchanging place of certainty, and truly real. He 
argued that the soul grasps real existences when it is most disassociated from the 
body and its senses, since no created thing is ever firm, immutable, fixed, or 
permanent; only God is.279 Consequently, Philo could adopt the Stoic notion of 
‘cognitive impressions’,280 though he could likewise insist with the Sceptic tradition 
on ‘the indiscriminability’ (ἀπαραλλαξία) of cognitive and incognitive 
impressions.281 The earlier proponents of scepticism, namely, the New Academics, 
had done so on a dogmatic basis, whereas the later Sceptics refused to be dogmatic 
about even the doctrine of indiscriminability.282 The resulting uncertainty about 
human apprehensions led to the New Academy’s assertion that one could only 
affirm ‘the probability’ (πιθανός)283 of one’s judgment that a thing is good or evil 
and the Middle Academic and Sceptic ideal of the philosopher’s ‘suspension of 
judgment’ (ἡ ἐποχή).284 They argued that there is no impression from something true 
in the sensible world that could not also be exactly identical to another impression 
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that comes from something false.285 Moreover, they marshalled a number of 
arguments to demonstrate how the mind might mistake a false impression for a true 
one or vice versa. For instance, it might mistake identical twins, confuse the 
impressions of vivid dreams with reality, or be unable to distinguish two identical 
statues, even though they are metaphysically dissimilar in some way.286 In similar 
fashion, Philo could argue that the soul ought ‘to suspend judgment’ (τὸ ἐπέχειν) 
because of the uncertainty of its comprehension.287 Indeed, he even invoked and 
summarized the Sceptic ten ‘modes of suspension’288 in support of his contention 
that the mind ought not to trust its own judgments, whether concerning sensible 
things or objects of thoughts.289  
Philo nevertheless diverged from both the Academics and Sceptics in asserting 
both that the soul can possess ‘knowledge’ (ἐπιστήµη) and that it must fully trust in 
God, underscoring the presence of his Jewish and religious commitments. While 
Philo conceded the Sceptic insistence on the uncertainty of the knowledge derived 
from our senses, he nevertheless still held out the possibility that the soul can come 
to possess genuine, secure knowledge. After arguing, for instance, that the lower 
school course or encyclical education served as a proper preparation for philosophy, 
he held out the possibility that the soul can come to possess knowledge, which he 
defined in Stoic manner as ‘a sure and certain apprehension, which cannot be shaken 
by argument’.290 Like the Stoics, he then asserted that both philosophy and the 
virtues are forms of knowledge.291 His definition of knowledge, equation with virtue 
and identification with the study of philosophy touched on the two sides of the Stoic 
conception of ‘knowledge’. On the one hand, his definition and equation with virtue 
treated ‘knowledge’ as ‘an event’ or ‘episode of knowing’.292 On the other hand, his 
identification of knowledge with the study of philosophy highlighted its 
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comprehensive and systematic character.293 Hence, one of the central characteristics 
of his sage, as a true philosopher, was the possession of Stoic knowledge, not 
Sceptic suspension of judgment.294 Philo considered the soul possessed of ‘a 
wretched mind’ to be fundamentally foolish and atheistic.295 He described it as the 
sort of mind that trusts in its own empty ‘reasonings’ (λογισµοί), rather than in God. 
Since the mind cannot know for certain if its thoughts and impressions are 
ultimately true, Philo argued that its calculations are consequently full of 
‘uncertainty’ (ἀσάφεια), ‘guesswork’ (αἴνιγµα), and ‘conjecture’ (εἰκασία). For 
example, he pointed out that a doctor can prescribe a regimen for recovery, but the 
program often proves unhelpful. Similarly, a farmer may draw up a schedule for 
planting and harvesting a crop, only to be frustrated by unforeseen changes in the 
weather. 296 For Philo, the only true dogma is to trust in God, the First Cause, and 
not in one’s own insecure reasonings.  
Philo went on to point out that the passions arise precisely from this ‘wretched 
mind’ that trusts in its own reasonings and conjectures, rather than God: 
An irrational impulse (ἄλογος ὁρµή) issues forth (ἐξέρχοµαι) and goes 
its rounds (φοιτάω) both from our reasonings (λογισµοί) and from mind 
that corrupts the truth (ἀπό...τοῦ νοῦ τοῦ διαφθείροντος τὴν ἀλήθειαν) 
… in this way, it is irrational to trust in plausible reasonings or in mind 
corrupting that which is true (ἄλογον τὸ πιστεύειν ἢ λογισµοῖς πιθανοῖς 
ἢ νῷ διαφθείροντι τὸ ἀληθές).297 
As we have already shown, Philo had everywhere equated ‘irrational impulse’ with 
passion. In this passage, he sought to show how the irrationality of a passionate 
impulse is grounded in the fundamentally irrational character of a mind that trusts in 
its own deliberations and assents rather than in the truly Existent One. The source of 
the impulses is not the Platonic or Peripatetic alternative parts of the soul exterior to 
the mind, but rather the reasoning and mind that corrupt the truth. This corruption of 
truth arises precisely when the mind trusts in its own apprehensions, rather than in 
God. When mind trusts in its own perceptions and reasonings, it loses touch with 
ultimate reality, which is identical with the truly existent God in whom the 
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governing reason of the universe abides. As a result, the mind falls into unreason 
and corruption of truth and its impulses likewise begin to move in an irrational 
manner.  
For Philo, the reasonings, conjectures, and guesswork that ‘the wretched mind’ 
takes to be true, are in fact ‘false opinion’ (ἡ ψευδὴς δόξα).298 It can take many 
forms, but at bottom, Philo argued that ‘the wretched mind’ counts as a good or as 
an evil something that is in fact not. Such a mind thus mistakenly reckons as true, 
good, or evil many things that come to it through the senses, but which in reality are 
only mortal and mutable created objects.299 As a result, the fool’s perverted mind, 
kindled by these objects of sense, is set on fire, which in turn ignites its passions.300 
Though Philo consistently anchored the passions in the mind’s erroneous moral 
valuations, he did not follow Chrysippus in identifying the passions with its 
judgments or opinions. Philo never once identified passion with ‘opinion’ (δόξα), 
‘weak assumption’ (ἀσθενὴς ὑπόληψις), or ‘assumption’ (ὑπόληψις). Instead, like 
Zeno, he pictured the passions as following opinion. In the one instance where he did 
closely link opinion and the passions, when reflecting on the song of Moses in 
Exodus 15:1-21, which praises the Lord for his destruction of Pharaoh and his army, 
Philo described the Pharaoh as ‘the imperial opinion of the passions’ (ἡγεµονὶς τῶν 
παθῶν δόξα). In this text, he thus allegorically identified Pharaoh with godless 
opinion, but the passions, by inference, with the army the followed.301 
Philo never unambiguously identified the passions with judgment either. Though 
he did closely relate passion and judgment in several texts,302 the question of 
Chrysippian equation is open to dispute. Winston suggests that Philo is 
noncommittal at Legum allegoriae 2.6 about Chrysippus’ view that the passions are 
judgments.303 In his discussion of the creation of the soul, Philo suggested that the 
mind is older than the irrational parts of the soul, which include the senses and their 
‘offspring’ the passions. He defended this thesis by adding that it is unquestionably 
the case ‘if they are not the result of any choice of our own’ (εἰ µὴ κρίσεις εἰσὶν 
ἡµέτεραι). In this instance Philo signalled his unwillingness to commit to 
Chrysippus’ proposition by his use of the conditional particle ‘if’ (εἰ). In Legum 
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allegoriae 3:116 Philo likewise spoke of ‘our faculty of judgment’ and the passion 
being found in the irrational part of the soul.304 As in 2.6 above, Philo envisioned the 
mind going out from the purely intellectual realm, which is ‘proper to it’ (οἰκεῖος) 
and giving itself over to what is inferior. In 2.6, what is ‘inferior’ refers to irrational 
sense, whereas in 3:116-7 it refers to the breast and belly, where pleasure dwells. 
Nevertheless, Philo did not explicitly equate passion and judgment, nor did he 
outline in detail the relation of the two. The notion of the mind giving itself up to 
what is inferior as both a poor judgment and cause of the passions could certainly fit 
within a Zenonian perspective.  
In De specialibus legibus 2.89, Philo described ‘painful feelings’ (τὰ ὀδυνηρά) 
caused by the harsh burdens placed on slaves by masters as ‘stamped’ (ἐντυπόω) 
‘with more vivid impressions’ (τρανοτέραις φαντασίαις) on reason than ‘sense 
perception’ (αἴσθησις).305 Pohlenz cited this text as another candidate for identifying 
passion with judgment.306 Again, Philo did not explicitly identify the vivid mental 
impressions that are stamped on the mind as judgments. It highlights the corporeal 
character of the soul, basic to Stoic psychology, when Philo describes the painful 
feelings as ‘vivid impressions’ stamped on the mind. The mind is passive here in 
that the painful feelings have impressed themselves on it from outside without 
without the mind’s power. If anything, these painful feelings rather exhibit the 
character of Stoic propatheiai, which reflect an impact of an impression on the 
physical soul as well as the body before the mind assents. This description, however, 
would hold true for both Zeno and Chrysippus. Neither do the two remaining 
passages offer anything definitive. In his philosophical reflection on the Stoic theme 
that ‘only the wise man is free’, Philo argued that the evils of vice and passion find 
their source within the soul and its judgments.307 Similarly, in De Abrahamo Philo 
argued that our passions prevail depending on one’s decision about what constitutes 
the soul’s true good.308 In neither passage did Philo explicitly identify passion and 
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judgment. Instead, he argued only that the passions are grounded in one’s judgments 
and, as such, are voluntary movements originating in the mind.  
By contrast, Philo did repeatedly and explicitly identify the passions with 
impulse and movement. We see this, above all, in his formal definition of passion in 
De specialibus legibus 4:79 quoted at the beginning of the chapter. There, he 
defined passion as ‘inordinate and excessive impulse’ and as ‘an irrational and 
unnatural movement’ of the soul. Moreover, he repeatedly equated the passions with 
impulse or movement of the soul throughout his corpus. On numerous occasions he 
treated passion and ‘impulse’ (ὁρµή) interchangeably or in apposition to one 
another.309 He often modified impulse in keeping with his formal definition of 
passion as well. Hence, he described passion(s) as ‘irrational impulse’ (ἄλογος 
ὁρµή),310 ‘random impulse’ (ἄκριτος ὁρµή),311 ‘inordinate and excessive impulse’ 
(ἄµετρος καὶ πλεονάζουσα ὁρµή),312 ‘unmeasured impulses’ (αἱ ἄµετροι ὁρµαί),313 
and ‘violent and irresistible’ (ὀξύς and ἀνεπίσχετος) impulse.314 Finally, he also 
identified the passions with ‘the movement’ (κίνησις) of the soul.315  
Conclusion  
Philo followed the Stoics in treating passion as a type of impulse or psychic 
movement. He located the source of passionate impulses in the mind insofar as the 
perversion of the impulse arises from its erroneous moral valuations of sensible 
pleasure and pain as worthy of pursuit or avoidance and from its internal weakness 
and instability. Regarding the appropriate telos of impulse, he followed the Stoics in 
treating virtue as the only good, the body-soul dualism of especially Plato’s Phaedo 
in assigning an inferior ontological status to the changing realm of body and sense, 
and his Jewish religious conviction in insisting upon the soul’s dependence on God. 
Within the intra-Stoic debate regarding the exact character of the passions, Philo 
appears to have sided with Zeno’s putative identification of passion with the psychic 
impulse or movement that follows from opinion and false judgment, against 
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Chrysippus’ identification of passion with opinion itself. While we have 
overwhelming evidence for Philo’s equation of the passions with excessive impulse 
and unnatural psychic movement, he never once explicitly identified passion with 
opinion.  
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Chapter 2: The characteristics of passion 
Having discussed passion as a type of impulse in the previous chapter, we now turn 
to how Philo modified the concept of this impulse. For the sake of convenience, let 
us recall Philo’s formal definition of a passion: 
Every passion (πάθος) is blameworthy (ἐπίληπτον). This follows from 
the censure due to every inordinate and excessive impulse (ἄµετρος καὶ 
πλεονάζουσα ὁρµή) and to irrational and unnatural movements (ἡ 
ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν κίνησις) of the soul, for both these are nothing 
else than the opening out of a longstanding passion (παλαιὸν πάθος 
ἐξηπλωµένον).1 
In this definition, as we briefly noted at the beginning of the previous chapter, Philo 
uses four key descriptors to characterize passion. This impulse is inordinate and 
excessive, irrational, contrary to nature, and blameworthy. We will now explore 
each of these modifiers in detail. 
When we compare these four elements of Philo’s characterization of the 
passions to Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, we find that although he did draw on 
Plato and Aristotle, he remained fundamentally Stoic. While Plato and Aristotle had 
discussed the passions in terms of these four descriptors, this particular make up was 
Stoic. Moreover, as we will see in this chapter, when we investigate further what 
Philo meant by each of these terms, we find that his understanding remained broadly 
Stoic. We do, however, have to view the irrationality and excessiveness of the 
passionate impulse in the light of the latter two elements – its unnatural and 
blameworthy character – because on their own merits, it is difficult to make a 
conclusive judgment. This ambiguity arises from the fact that all parties described 
passion as irrational and excessive. The difference in their understanding of these 
terms depended firstly, on their portrayal of the soul as either complex, as was the 
case for the Platonic and Peripatetic traditions, or simple, as was the case for the 
Stoa. Secondly, it depended on how they handled the question of whether or not a 
passion is natural and, to a lesser degree, blameworthy.  
In this chapter, we will begin by outlining how each philosophical school 
understood the irrationality and excessiveness of passion, and briefly show how 
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Philo compares with each. Since these first two descriptors are inconclusive on their 
own inasmuch as all parties described passion as irrational and excessive, we will 
explore them together. We will then look at the naturalness and blameworthiness of 
passion separately. These two latter descriptions will help us evaluate Philo’s own 
understanding of passion, since in both cases the Stoics diverged widely from the 
Platonic and Peripatetic traditions. Again, we will first review how each of the three 
philosophical traditions handled these two descriptions and then conclude each 
section by situating Philo among them, before concluding the chapter with a 
summary evaluation of Philo’s conception of the passions.  
Irrational and excessive 
Philo, the Stoics, Plato and Aristotle all characterized the passions as ‘irrational’ and 
‘excessive’. All parties ascribed a similar overall outcome to the notion of 
irrationality; that is, that irrational passions are impulses that move against right 
reason in relation to things external and beyond our control. The differences among 
the parties came rather as a result of how they treated passion’s irrationality in 
relation to the other elements and to the composition of the soul itself. Here the 
Stoics diverged significantly from Plato and Aristotle, given their distinct psychic 
monism. The Stoics conceived of the irrationality of the passions paradoxically as a 
perversity in reason itself, whereby it either assents to impressions as good or bad 
when they are in reality indifferent, or it assents from a weak and unstable 
disposition.2 By contrast, both the Platonic and Peripatetic traditions understood the 
irrationality of the passions as the variable, disorderly, and natural working of a 
separate part of the soul that is inherently resistant to modification by teaching and 
oriented toward an inadequate view of things, although such irrationality did not 
exclude a certain awareness and inadequate or false beliefs about the worth of the 
objects of emotion.3 Since this other part of the soul cannot be expunged, it needs 
reason to direct, check, and guide it toward right reason.4  
Similarly, all parties could describe the passions as excessive with more or less 
the same sense, namely, that an impulse is too strong. Again, each tradition’s 
treatment of passion’s excessiveness depended on other principles. For Plato, the 
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passions are inherently irrational and chaotic. Like irrational animals, their 
irrationality will often result in wild and excessive movements, unless trained and 
tamed by reason. Aristotle accepted Plato’s basic characterization, but modified it 
with his doctrine of the mean. Passions can be excessive, but are not necessarily so. 
They can also be too weak. Neither type of impulse is ideal. Instead, the virtuous 
soul must aim for the mean in her expression of the passions. While Plato’s doctrine 
was subject to such an interpretation, this was nevertheless an innovation unique to 
Aristotle. Unlike Plato and Aristotle, the Stoics considered all passions to be 
excessive. Moreover, they rejected the notion of taming the passions or seeking 
moderation in their expression. Their impulse should be neither excessive, nor 
deficient, nor moderate. Instead, passion should not exist in the soul at all! The 
question before us is where to situate Philo among these traditions, even as we 
recognize that he did not see himself as an adherent of any of these schools, but 
rather of Moses. Let us first look more closely at how the schools handled the 
irrationality and excessiveness of the passions, before attempting to situate Philo 
among them. 
With regard to the irrationality of the passions, it is important to remember that 
both Plato and Aristotle treated the soul as fundamentally complex, although in the 
details they did divide the irrational parts or functions of the soul differently. For 
Plato, as we will discuss in greater detail in chapters three and four of section two, 
the soul is divided into three parts. For Plato, the mind is by nature rational, divine, 
immortal and orderly, housed in the head as in a citadel, while the ‘spirited’ (τὸ  
θυµοειδές, θυµικόν) and ‘appetitive’ (τὸ ἐπιθυµητικόν) parts are of a different 
quality – mortal, irrational, and disorderly. Both are housed in the trunk of the body, 
separated from the mind by the neck as a sort of isthmus, with the spirited part 
lodged in the heart and the appetitive in the region of the stomach.5  
Additionally, Plato closely linked the two lower parts to ‘sense perception’ 
(αἴσθησις). He did not treat sense perception as a part of the soul, but rather as an 
affection of the soul alongside and coextensive with the two irrational parts, and 
closely linked to the body. For him, both sense perception and the irrational parts of 
the soul were added ‘later’ as a consequence of the pre-existent mind or soul’s 
                                                
5 Plato, Tim. 69c-72d, 89e-90d. 
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embodiment.6 As such, he described sense perception as ‘fused’ or ‘mixed’ 
(συγκεράννυµι) with the lower parts of the soul.7 By sense perception then, the 
disorderly, random and irrational external commotions of the six motions8 are 
conducted through the body to the soul and ‘strike against’ (προσπίπτω) it, 
producing disorder or ‘disturbances’ (παθήµατα), pleasures or pains within the soul 
itself.9  
Plato associated the spirited part especially with anger and courage, making it 
out to be a natural ally to reason,10 though it is susceptible to corruption by bad 
education and outside influences so that it can become a collaborator with the 
appetitive part.11 Finally, he linked the appetitive part especially to the desire for the 
manifold kinds of bodily pleasures. As such, he characterized it as the most unruly 
part of the soul, the least receptive to reason, multiform due to the wide variety of 
pleasures that it seeks, and the largest part of the soul.12 Consequently, we see that 
Plato made a close correlation between the spatial composition of the tripartite soul, 
the location of the psychic parts in the body, and the passions. Indeed, he essentially 
identified the two lower parts, the spirited and appetitive, with the passions of anger 
and desire. One is hardly able logically to distinguish the two.  
Aristotle preferred to conceive of the soul’s ‘parts’ (µόρια) as several ‘faculties’ 
or ‘powers’ (δυνάµεις),13 though he retained elements of Plato’s putative homunculi 
                                                
6 Ibid., 42a. 
7 Ibid., 42a, 69d, 77b. 
8 For Plato, the six motions referred to motions in any of six directions. The first and second 
motions are those that go forwards or backwards, the third and fourth are those that move to the right 
and the left, and the fifth and sixth motions are those that travel up and down. Plato associated these 
motions with chaos, disorder and wandering. See Plato, Tim. 43b. Plato equated the seventh motion, 
that of a sphere turning continuously in the same place, with understanding and intelligence (περὶ 
νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν). See Plato, Tim. 34a. For Aristotle’s criticism, see Arist., An. 1.3 407a. 
9 Plato, Tim. 43c, 44a, 64b, 65a. 
10 See Sedley’s discussion on the spirited part’s role in the soul in Resp. 4.439e-441 as an 
‘internal police force’ akin to what philosophy later identified as the will. D. Sedley, ‘Commentary 
on Mansfeld’ (1991), 147-8. 
11 Plato, Resp. 4.440b-d, 442c, 9.580d. 
12 Ibid., 4.436a, 439d, 442a, 9.580d; Plato, Tim. 69d-e, 77b. 
13 Arist., An. 2.4 415a, 416a; 3.9 431a-b. Aristotle was aware of Plato’s tripartite division, but 
found this division of the soul into ‘parts’ (µόρια) unsatisfactory. See Arist., An. 3.9 432a-b; J. 
Moline, ‘Plato on the Complexity of the Psyche’ (1978), 12. Treatment of the parts of the soul would 
continue as ‘orthodox Aristotelianism’ thereafter. Stob., Anth. I 49.37; R.W. Sharples, ‘Peripatetics 
on Soul and Intellect’ (2007), 61536. Nevertheless, Aristotle continued to call these faculties ‘parts’ 
(µόρια) or ‘principles’ (ἀρχή), but redefined as distinct psychic powers. For Aristotle’s use of ‘parts’ 
(µόρια), see Arist., An. 1.2 406b, 1.5 411b, 2.2 413b, 3.4 429a. For his use of ‘principle’ (ἀρχή), see 
Arist., An. 1.5 411b. The Peripatetic tradition too continued to conceive of the soul’s divisions as 
‘parts’ (µέρη) or (µόρια), though the writer of the Magna moralia also makes a bipartite division of 
those elements of the soul that account for human conduct, into τὸ λόγον ἔχον and τὸ ἄλογον. As 
such, it does not try to account for those non-rational elements or powers such as nutrition, sensation, 
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theory, as we will show below. These included the nutritive, the perceptive – which 
accounts for touch, sight, smell, taste, and hearing, the appetitive, imagination, and 
the mind, which he divided into contemplative and deliberative faculties.14 Though 
he distinguished these parts, principles, or faculties from one another, he eschewed 
associating them with a specific region of the body as Plato did.15 Further, Aristotle 
formally assigned Plato’s spirited part to ‘the desiderative part’ (τὸ ὀρεκτικόν) of the 
soul on the ground that ‘wrath’ (θυµός) is a sort of ‘appetition’ (ὄρεξις) along with 
‘wish’ (βούλησις) and ‘desire’ (ἐπιθυµία),16 although in practice he often continued 
to recognize Plato’s distinction between the two.17 Hence, Aristotle (and the 
Peripatetic tradition that followed) rejected the independent status of the ‘spirited 
part’, together with ‘the distribution of desiderative elements among the three soul 
parts’ of Plato’s tripartite psychology.18 
Additionally, in his ‘hylomorphic’ and non-personalist account of ‘the soul’, 
Aristotle rejected Plato’s treatment of the emotions or passions as activities of the 
soul as a separable inner agent, which can have experiences independently of the 
body. For Aristotle, to attribute emotional phenomena to the soul alone disregards 
the bodily apparatus or matter as instrument or tool through which the relevant 
capacities must be displayed.19 Hence, the passion of anger can be viewed 
physiologically in terms of its ‘matter’ as ‘a boiling of the blood and warm 
substance surrounding the heart’, but philosophically in terms of its ‘form’ as ‘the 
appetite for returning pain for pain’.20 In order to fully understand a passion, one 
must take into account both the feeling and its bodily responses as an overall pattern. 
                                                                                                                                    
or imagination. See Arist., Mag. mor. 1.1 1182a, 1.4 1185a, 1.5 1185b, 1.34 1196b, 2.7 1204b, 2.7 
1206b, 2.10 1208a, 2.11 1211a; Asp., In Eth. Nic. 44. Provenance for Peripatetic terminology for the 
bipartite division can be found in Aristotle. See Arist., Eth. Nic. 1.12 1102a-1.13 1103a; An. 3.9 432a; 
Pol. 7.15 1334b; P.A. Vander Waerdt, ‘Aristotle’s Criticism of Soul-Division’ (1987), 6285, 630. 
Vander Waerdt argues that a bipartite division of the soul was well established in the Academy in 
Plato’s lifetime. See id., ‘Peripatetic Interpretation of Plato’s Psychology’ (1985), 2832. 
14 Arist., An. 2.2 413b, 3.4 429a; Eth. Eud. 2.1 1219b-1220a; S. Goetz and C. Taliaferro, Brief 
History of the Soul (2011), 19-20. 
15 Arist., An. 1.3 407b, 1.5 411b, 2.2 413b. 
16 Ibid., 2.3 414b; Vander Waerdt shows that this collapse of the spirited and appetitive parts into 
a single, irrational, desiderative part became fixed in the Peripatetic tradition, as shown in the Magna 
moralia, in later doxographers such as Arius Didymus, and in the Middle Platonic movement. See 
P.A. Vander Waerdt, ‘Peripatetic Interpretation of Plato’s Psychology’ (1985), 286-7, 294-301; id., 
‘Peripatetic Soul Division’ (1985), 373-82. 
17 See for example, Arist., Eth. Nic. 7.6 1149a-b; Arist., Rh. 1.10 1369a. 
18 P.A. Vander Waerdt, ‘Peripatetic Interpretation of Plato’s Psychology’ (1985), 300-1. 
19 Arist., An. 1.1 403a; D. Gallop, ‘Aristotle’ (1999), 94-5. 
20 Arist., An. 1.1 403a. 
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In spite of his ‘hylomorphism’,21 Aristotle, like Plato, made ‘agent intellect’ (ὁ 
νοῦς) to be qualitatively different from the other psychic powers inasmuch as it 
alone is eternal and separable from the body, pure form without the need of matter.22 
Unlike Plato, however, Aristotle further divided reason into two elements – ‘the 
scientific’ (τὸ ἐπιστηµονικόν) faculty, which he also called ‘the contemplative’ (τὸ 
θεωρητικόν), and ‘the deliberative’ (τὸ βουλευτικόν) faculty, which he also referred 
to as ‘the calculative’ (τὸ λογιστικόν) or ‘practical’ (πρακτικός) faculty of the 
mind.23 For Aristotle, the mind’s scientific faculty contemplates unchanging 
principles (αἱ ἀρχαὶ µὴ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν) or ‘objects of thought’ (τὸ νοητόν) 
and is thus oriented exclusively toward ‘knowledge’ (ἐπιστήµη) of what is true or 
false, while the calculative deliberates about those things that can be ‘otherwise’ (τὰ 
ἐνδεχόµενα), that is, ‘objects of perception’ (τὸ αἰσθητόν), forms opinions and is 
oriented toward truth that is in agreement with right desire.24  
In spite of their differences regarding how to characterize the soul’s ‘parts’ or 
faculties, and in their enumeration of the divisions in the soul, Plato and Aristotle 
both made the same dualistic division between rational and irrational elements, 
which further underscored the soul’s basic complexity.25 For both Plato and 
Aristotle, the mind served as the rational part of the soul. Whereas Plato identified 
the ‘spirited’ (τὸ θυµοειδές, θυµικόν) and the ‘appetitive’ (τὸ ἐπιθυµητικόν) parts as 
irrational, Aristotle counted only a single ‘desiderative part’ (τὸ ὀρεκτικόν) as 
irrational, comprehending within itself the parts associated with ‘desire’ (ἐπιθυµία) 
and ‘wrath’ (θυµός) that Philo had divided into two separate parts. In a manner 
reminiscent of Plato, Aristotle viewed perception and desire as intimately and 
                                                
21 Gallop rightly notes that Aristotle’s insistence on the non-embodied and immortal character of 
the mind runs counter to ‘the generally monistic tenor of Aristotle’s psychology’. See D. Gallop, 
‘Aristotle’ (1999), 102-3. 
22 Arist., An. 1.4 408b; 2.2 413b, 3.4 429a, 3.5 430a. Caston points out that the identity of this 
‘agent intellect’ has occasioned significant controversy over the last 2,300 years. Interpretations 
include assigning an ‘agent intellect’ to each individual soul, thus ensuring some form of personal 
immortality; assigning it only to souls more generally by connecting it to one or more of the higher 
intelligences or to God Himself; or characterizing it as a non-literal way of speaking of a higher kind 
of understanding shorn of any dualistic innuendos. See V. Caston, ‘Aristotle’s Psychology’ (2006), 
238-41. 
23 Vander Waerdt points out that the writer of the Magna moralia used λογιστικόν as a general 
term for the rational part of the soul, a term that has no parallel in Aristotle. Rather, it shows a 
conflation of Plato’s tripartism with his own bipartite doctrine and terminology, since λογιστικόν was 
Plato’s term for the rational part of the soul as a whole. See P.A. Vander Waerdt, ‘Peripatetic 
Interpretation of Plato’s Psychology’ (1985), 289-90. 
24 Arist., Eth. Nic. 6.1-2 1139a-b, 6.5 1140b; Arist., Mag. mor. 1.34 1196b. 
25 Arist., Eth. Eud. 2.1 1219b; Arist., Mag. mor. 1.5 1185b; 1.1 1182a; Arist., Pol. 1.5 1254b, 
1.13 1260a, 7.14 1333a, 7.15 1334b. 
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‘necessarily’ (ἐξ ἀνάγκης) connected with one another, though distinct.26 He argued 
that all animals must have at least the sense of touch, which includes at the 
minimum the capacity for pleasure and pain. Whatever possesses these capacities 
will in turn have objects that are pleasant or painful to it, and whenever there exists a 
capacity for pleasure, desire will also be present. For, Aristotle concluded, ‘desire’ 
(ἐπιθυµία) is ‘the appetition’ (ὄρεξις) for what is pleasant.27  
Aristotle made an additional distinction between irrational and non-rational 
elements in the soul. By incorporating his moral psychology into the framework of 
his scala naturae, in addition to the irrational appetition and perception he 
introduced ‘the nutritive’ (τὸ θρεπτικόν) or ‘vegetative’ (τὸ φυτικόν) and ‘the 
perceptive’ (αἴσθησις) ‘parts’ or ‘powers’ of the soul as non-rational. The difference 
is that while the irrational faculties participate in reason inasmuch as they can obey 
or disobey reason and possess certain beliefs, even if they are by nature unruly, the 
nutritive element does not participate in either reason or moral virtue at all.28 The 
non-rational, nutritive portion instead functions in an automatic, unthinking manner 
as the principle of growth, nourishment, and reproduction in both animals and 
plants. For this reason, Aristotle identified the nutritive part as the only kind of soul 
found in plants.29  
For both Plato and Aristotle, the parts of the soul are hierarchically organized 
with the rational elements at the top and the irrational at the bottom. For Plato, this is 
reflected in the dwelling place of each of the parts of the soul in the upright body. 
Situated at the apex of the body, the mind is thus its most sovereign part, overseeing 
and directing the rest of the soul.30 The two lower parts of the soul – the spirited and 
appetitive – are housed below the head and mind in the trunk of the body. But, of the 
two, the spirited part is superior to the appetitive since it is housed in the chest rather 
than in the abdominal region.31  
Aristotle conceived of the hierarchy of the soul’s parts or powers more in terms 
of biological complexity, by relating the ‘forms’ of the soul to those functionalities 
                                                
26 Arist., An. 2.2 413b, 2.3 414b. 
27 Ibid., 2.3 414b. 
28 Arist., Eth. Eud. 2.1 1219b; Arist., Eth. Nic. 1.13 1102a-b; Arist., Mag. mor. 1.4 1184a.  M. 
Vinzent, ‘Von der Moralität des Nichtmoralischen’ (1999), 197-231. 
29 Arist., An. 1.5 411b, 2.2 413a, 2.5 416b-417a, 3.12 434a-b. 
30 Plato, Tim. 69c. 
31 Ibid., 69e. 
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of the body, which served as their ‘matter’.32 Like Plato, Aristotle argued that the 
mind and reason is a different kind of soul from the lower parts. As such, only the 
most complex, rational creatures such as humans and gods fully share in reason and 
thought.33 Irrational animals and ‘beasts’ (θηρίον) share with humans in the 
irrational parts of the soul.34 This applies especially to sensation and its necessary 
derivative, appetition.35 Finally, at the bottom of the biological chain as the most 
primitive and widely distributed power of soul, humans, irrational animals and 
plants share in the non-rational nutritive part.36 Hence, we see Aristotle could 
continue to follow Plato in identifying the passions of desire and anger with the 
appetitive (and sometimes spirited) part of the soul, though he added significantly 
more complexity and detail to the soul by dividing reason into several elements, 
formalizing perception as a distinct element alongside the others, structuring the 
entire discussion around the entelechistic orientation of his psychology, adding a 
non-rational nutritive part to the soul, and rejecting Plato’s assertation in the 
Timaeus that plants share in ‘sense perception’ (αἴσθησις) and desires (ἐπιθυµία).37 
For both Plato and Aristotle, the irrationality of the lower parts of the soul was 
further reflected in their intimate connection with and orientation toward that which 
is bodily and earthly. The rational part of the soul – the mind – is directed toward 
heaven and the divine, while the lower parts are directed toward the earth and what 
is mortal. For Plato, as the divine root in us that is born of ‘heaven’ (οὐράνιος), the 
mind actually ‘raises [us] up’ (αἴρειν) toward its origin and ‘suspends’ 
(ἀνακερµάννυµι) our heads above the earth. By so doing, the mind keeps our entire 
body erect.38 While both of the mortal parts of the soul – the spirited and appetitive 
– are irrational, the appetitive is more so, since in Plato’s scheme, as each part 
comes nearer the ground, its orientation is increasingly earthly and bodily and 
simultaneously less rational. Indeed, since the appetitive part is so near to the 
ground, Plato theorized that it is devoid of understanding and thus barely able to 
comprehend the directives of reason.39 As a consequence, the gods constructed and 
                                                
32 Arist., An. 2.1 412a-413a, 3.1 242b-425b. 
33 Ibid., 4.3 414b.  
34 For further discussin, see R. Sorabji, Animal Minds (2000), 12-6; Arist., An. 2.1 4.2 413b. For 
further discussion, see R. Sorabji, Animal Minds (2000), 97-98. 
35 Arist., 4.2 413b. 
36 Ibid., 4.3 414b, 4.4 415a. 
37 Plato, Tim. 77a-b. 
38 Plato, Tim. 90a. 
39 Ibid., 71a, 77b. 
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placed the liver (ἧπαρ) near the appetitive part, constructing the liver in such a 
manner that the mind can control it by using the liver’s natural capacities for 
bitterness and sweetness to threaten and soothe it into compliance.40  
Aristotle made the same distinction as Plato between the divine and theoretical 
orientation of the mind and the earthly and base orientation of the ‘desiderative part’ 
(τὸ ὀρεκτικόν) of the soul. Indeed, Aristotle stressed the close nexus between the 
irrational, desiderative part of the soul and bodily pleasure. In a manner that recalls 
Plato,41 Aristotle argued that the desiderative part is especially directed toward the 
primary brute, bodily pleasures associated with touch, which he identified as food, 
drink and sexual intercourse. This is why Aristotle identified ‘self-indulgence’ or 
‘intemperance’ (ἀκολασία) as the slavish exercise of the desiderative part of the soul 
with reference to these pleasures.42 
In spite of Aristotle’s greater orientation toward a faculty psychology, like Plato 
he could attribute agent-like characteristics to the irrational parts by describing them 
as able to heed and obey the discourses of the reasoning faculty, which implies at 
least a limited participation in reason. Aristotle argued that the irrational and 
desiderative part of the soul ‘shares’ (µετέχει πως) in reason insofar as it is able to 
listen to and obey reason, and has the ability to possess beliefs.43 He likened ‘the 
possession of reason’ (ἔχειν λόγον) by the irrational parts of the soul to the manner 
in which we speak of someone when he listens to a father or friend, but not after the 
manner in which we speak of ‘the rational’ in mathematics. As a consequence, the 
irrational parts, while unruly, are capable of being persuaded, as is indicated by the 
power of admonition, censure, and exhortation to check the desires of the 
desiderative element.44 This is reminiscent of the ‘psychologically sophisticated 
rhetoric’ that Plato envisioned the reasoning part employing to convince the other 
parts to obey its directives.45 It was on this basis, too, that Aristotle argued at length 
in the Rhetoric for the manipulation of an audience’s emotions. Emotions, though 
they usually involve factual or evaluative thought, goal-directed behaviour, feelings, 
                                                
40 Ibid., 71b-e. 
41 Ibid., 69e-70b, 70e-71b. 
42 Arist., Eth. Nic. 3.10 1118a-b; Arist., Mag. mor. 1.21 1191b. 
43 M.C. Nussbaum, Therapy of Desire (1994), 80-1. 
44 Arist., Eth. Nic. 1.13 1102b-1103a; W.W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion (1975), 28-30. 
45 J. Moline, ‘Plato on the Complexity of the Psyche’ (1978), 16. 
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and even bodily change as a necessary and constituent condition for their existence, 
both precede a judgment and can change it.46 
Both Plato and Aristotle thus portrayed the irrationality of the passions as a 
natural aspect of the separate, irrational element in the soul. As such, the irrationality 
of the passions was conceived as none other than the functioning of the irrational 
element of the soul, which is disorderly by nature. Additionally, this irrationality 
was characterized as unruly inasmuch as the irrational part of the soul is able to obey 
reason, but instead follows its disorderly nature. This, in turn, gives rise to an 
internal conflict between the rational and irrational parts, with the irrational part 
disobedient to and fighting against the part that possesses reason. Consequently, 
Plato and Aristotle characterized the irrationality of the passions as the disorderly, 
unruly and disobedient working of the irrational parts of the soul.  
The Stoics, in contrast, treated the soul as fundamentally simple, though they did 
recognize several distinct, but indivisible, elements of the soul. As we may recall 
from our discussion earlier in the previous chapter, the Stoics divided the soul into 
eight parts. The hegemon or mind served as the rational centre of the soul and was 
located in the heart. The other seven, lower parts, comprising the five senses and the 
powers of utterance and reproduction, were all considered ‘irrational’. Additionally, 
like Aristotle, the Stoics recognized a power of growth and nutrition shared by 
plants and animals alike. But in contrast to Aristotle, the Stoics did not count this as 
a part or power of the soul because they ascribed these functions instead to ‘nature’ 
(φύσις). 
Though one might be tempted to say that the Stoics likewise divided the soul 
into rational and irrational elements, this would be incorrect. Given the Stoic 
commitment to a monistic conception of the soul, they rejected the Platonic and 
Peripatetic notion of opposing centres of impulse, one rational and the other 
irrational.47 Rather, the Stoics construed the irrationality of the lower parts of the 
soul as non-rational in a manner that was more akin to Aristotle’s nutritive element, 
                                                
46 W.W. Fortenbaugh, ‘Aristotle and Theophrastus on the Emotions’ (2008), 34-5, 41-3. 
47 Sedly argues that the Stoics looked to Socrates, not Plato, as the revered absolute authority for 
their psychology. He adds that while figures like Chrysippus openly opposed Plato’s tripartite 
psychology developed in the Republic, Phaedrus, and Timaeus, they were nevertheless sympathetic 
to the ‘Socratic’ psychology found elsewhere in Plato’s dialogues, such as that developed in the 
Protagoras, Phaedo and possibly the Theaetetus. See D. Sedley, ‘Chrysippus on Psychophysical 
Causality’ (1993), 313-4. For further discussion of the ‘Socratic psychology of action’, see T. Penner, 
‘Plato’s Ethics’ (2006), 154-5; G.J. Reydams-Schils, ‘Philo on Stoic and Platonist Psycho-
Physiology’ (2002, repr. 2008), 171. 
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inasmuch as the seven lower parts of the soul possess no share in reason at all. 
Additionally, the seven lower parts do not contain any irrational element within 
themselves that is disorderly and unruly by nature as separate spheres of ‘appetition’ 
(ὄρεξις).48 Instead, they function instrumentally as extensions of the mind itself, like 
the legs of the octopus. As such, in the Stoic system the mind had complete control 
over every part of the soul. The seven lower parts were viewed as morally neutral in 
themselves since they were not responsible for the soul’s movements. Instead, moral 
accountability accrued to the mind alone as the sole governing part of the soul and 
source of impulse.  
The Stoics thus paradoxically understood the irrationality of the passions to be a 
function of a perverted and intemperate reason that is disobedient to nature. This 
logically followed from the Stoic insistence upon the unitary constitution of the soul. 
Impulse originates, not in a separate, unruly, and disobedient part of the soul as is 
the case with Plato and Aristotle, but in the assent of the mind to an incognitive 
impression, which results in a perverse judgment of an opinion,49 where the mind 
causes itself to go beyond its own powers of recovery.50 Even more paradoxically, 
the Stoics could describe the irrationality of the passions as the equivalent of being 
‘disobedient to reason’ (ἀπειθὴς τῷ λόγῳ).51 How can reason be ‘disobedient’ to 
itself?!52 The phrase had two implied connotations for the Stoics. More narrowly, it 
meant that the mind is acting in a way that is ‘inconsistent with correct and natural 
reasoning’ (παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν λόγον), as one would expect for 
instance in a sage.53 It is not that the mind does not evaluate an impression and 
assent accordingly, but that it does so in a manner that a truly knowledgeable mind 
would not. In a wider, normative sense,54 it also implied that by accounting objects 
to be good or bad which are in reality indifferent, the hegemon of an individual fool 
is making choices that are not in keeping with the Reason that guides the universe. 
                                                
48 Plut., Virt. mor. 441c.  
49 Ibid., 441d, 446e-447a. Although the genuineness of this passage in Plutarch is questioned, 
Boeri rightly points out that the the depiction of a passionate person in terms of a ‘vacillating mind’ is 
properly Stoic. See M.D. Boeri, ‘Stoic Account of Akrasia’ (2005), 39534. 
50 B. Inwood, ‘Why do Fools Fall in Love?’ (1997), 66. 
51 Stob., Anth. II 7.10a. For further discussion, see G. Striker, ‘Following Nature’ (1996), 273-4. 
52 Long suggests that it was precisely this issue that accounted for Posidonius’ revision or 
restatement of Chrysippus’ theory of the emotions. See A.A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy (1974, 
repr. 1986), 219-20. 
53 A.J. Pomeroy and Arius Didymus, Epitome of Stoic Ethics (1999), 118128; C. Gill, ‘Did Galen 
Understand’ (1998), 116-7. 
54 J. Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (1992), 105. 
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Hence this could be construed as another way of saying that the fool is making 
assents that are ‘contrary to nature’ (παρὰ φύσιν). Arius Didymus suggested as 
much when he equated the soul’s irrationality, disobedience to reason, and 
disagreement with nature.55 
Like both Plato and Aristotle, Stoic authors sometimes illustrated passion’s 
irrational impulse using the familiar Platonic metaphor of the disobedient horse(s). 
While Plato and Aristotle used the metaphor of irrationality as ‘disobedience’ to 
illustrate a conflict between the mind and the lower parts of the soul, which pose as 
alternative centres or sources of impulse to the mind,56 the Stoics used the image to 
describe how the mind itself has strayed in its own beliefs, judgments, and impulses. 
Arius Didymus described the Stoic experience of passion in relation to the 
disobedient horse simile as follows: 
… every passion is overpowering (βιαστικόν), just as when those in the 
grips of passion often see that it would be useful not to do this, but 
carried away by its violence (ὑπὸ τῆς σφοδρότητος ἐκφεροµένους), as if 
by some disobedient horse (καθάπερ ὑπό τινος ἀπειθοῦς ἵππου), are led 
(ἀνάγεσθαι) to doing this. As a result, often people even confess to this, 
uttering this commonly repeated line: ‘Although I have (better) 
resolution (γνώµη), nature (φύσις) forces me to do this.’57  
One might assume that the disobedient horse simile of passion would necessarily 
imply some sort of psychological dualism similar to the Platonic conception of the 
soul, where the rational part of the soul is unable to control the appetitive part with 
its own, separate impulses.58 Nevertheless, as we can see in the quotation from 
Stobaeus above, the Stoics could utilize the disobedient horse image in a manner 
consistent with their principles. Whereas Plato, Aristotle, and Posidonius had treated 
the horse as an alternate source of impulse that has overpowered the rational part of 
the soul, the Stoics rather considered passion to be a competing opinion or mistaken 
judgment about an impression that goes against what the mind already knows to be 
                                                
55 Stob., Anth. II 7.10a. 
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57 Stob., Anth. II 7.10a. 
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right.59 Arius Didymus was quick to point out that this conflict was between two 
competing judgments in the mind. He added that it is different from simple 
deception. When someone is simply mistaken, once they have been shown the truth 
they will often immediately abandon the erroneous judgment. In the case of the 
passions, by contrast, the mind switches back and forth between two opposing 
judgments, each of which will result in an impulse once settled upon. If the mind 
assents to a judgment that something is good or evil and worthwhile to act upon, 
when it should not, it makes an error. Yet, the mind may either know that it should 
not count it as a good or evil, or that it should only make a selection ‘with 
reservation’ (µεθ’ ὑπεξαιρέσεως),60 but instead assents anyway because its grasp of 
right reason is still weak.61 Unlike the Stoic sage, whose convictions are settled and 
firm, the fool may know the good, but be unable to hold on to these principles 
because he is still grasping false convictions. As such, the horse simile highlighted 
the second characteristic of the Stoic notion of irrationality of the passions – the 
weak and vacillating character of the foolish mind’s assents that often take it in the 
wrong direction.62 
For this reason the Stoics rejected Aristotle’s description of incontinence or 
akrasia as the experience of the internal conflict between a desiderative part (τὸ 
ὀρεκτικόν) of the soul and reason. The Stoics instead insisted that the experience 
that Aristotle described as a conflict between two parts of the soul,63 was in fact ‘a 
fluttering’ (πτοία) of the same part – the mind – as it rapidly switches back and forth 
between two alternating opinions or judgments,64 that of ‘right reason’ and some 
sort of erroneous opinion, with its concurrent irregular physical movements of the 
                                                
59 Sen., Ira II 3.1-4.2. 
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soul.65 In other words, what feels like internal conflict of psychic parts is in fact 
indecision on the part of the hegemon, since their monistic psychology precluded 
‘the possibility of any conflict between two antagonistic parts of the soul’.66 Hence, 
in the Stoic view, as Gill rightly observes, ‘all cases of pathos involve a certain type 
of akrasia’.67 This akratic fluttering of the foolish mind reflects both its inherit lack 
of stable pneumatic tension and lack of a consistent plan of action in life, on the one 
hand, and its oscillation between an erroneous judgment and right reason, which it 
knows, but disregards, on the other hand.68 
This discussion of the Stoic conception of the irrationality of the passions leads 
next to the essentially excessive character of the passions.69 For the Stoics, once the 
mind assents to the passionate judgment, the violence (βία) of the impulse is such 
that it becomes very difficult to halt. According to Galen, Chrysippus thus defined 
‘excessive impulse’ (ὁ πλεονασµὸς τῆς ὁρµῆς) as ‘a runaway movement’ (ἐκφόρου 
κινήσεως)70 of the mind, or movement that ‘exceeds the measure that accords with 
[itself] and with nature’ (τὸ τὴν καθ’ αὑτοὺς καὶ φυσικὴν τῶν ὁρµῶν συµµετρίαν 
ὑπερβαίνειν).71 Chrysippus illustrated the idea using his famous simile of a person 
who is running hard (ὁ τρέχοντες φοδρῶς) and is unable to stop. When the 
movement of the legs is in accord with reason, the runner can stop or change his 
pace whenever he wishes. On the other hand, when the movement of the legs 
exceeds the impulse, they are carried away and do not obediently (µὴ εὐπειθῶς) 
change their pace.72 Consequently, Chryssipus could even liken an excessive 
impulse as disobedient, but only metaphorically as in the manner of the fast-moving 
legs to the mind’s directives.73  
Platonists like Galen, on the other hand, similarly described the passions as 
‘runaway movements’ (κίνησις ἔκφορος) or ‘violent motions’ (κίνησις σφοδρά), but 
                                                
65 T. Tieleman, Chrysippus’ On Affections (2003), 104-5. 
66 M.D. Boeri, ‘Stoic Account of Akrasia’ (2005), 384-5. 
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of the irrational parts of the soul, not of the mind.74 Galen argued in defence of his 
Platonic account of the soul that the appetitive and spirited parts should be likened to 
the weight of the runner as he runs down a hill, and the movement of the legs to the 
impulses of the mind. Hence, there are two sources for the movement forward: the 
impulse of the mind to set the legs into motion and the gravitational pull on the 
runner’s body. On this account, ‘the excess’ in the runner’s movement comes from 
the weight of the runner, which in turn renders the runner unable to stop, not the 
impulse that causes the legs to move.75 As was the case with the passion’s 
irrationality, in his rebuttal to Chrysippus’ running metaphor, Galen sought to 
emphasize that the excess comes from a source other than the mind.  
The Stoics also characterized the excessive or inordinate movements of the soul 
as a loss of proper tension in the soul. This related to their conception of the soul as 
corporeal, in contrast to Plato and Aristotle, for whom it was incorporeal. For the 
Stoics, the psychic pneuma, centred in the region around the heart that constitutes 
the mind or commanding faculty, could be viewed in physical or materialist terms as 
‘shrinking or rising up’, or experiencing ‘contractions or expansions’ (αἱ µειώσεις 
καὶ αἱ ἐπάρσεις καὶ αἱ συστολαὶ καὶ αἱ διαχύσεις) as it pursues an object that it 
desires or moves away from something unwanted or rejected.76 These 
‘psychophysical’ movements were understood to be either equivalent with or 
supervening upon the mind’s judgment.77 In itself, this could be quite orderly and 
appropriate. However, in the case of a passion, the tension of the soul’s pneuma 
slips into a state of disequilibrium as it pursues or avoids something that it ought not 
pursue or avoid.78  
Aristotle, in contrast to both the Stoic and Platonic accounts above, approached 
the excessiveness of the passions from a completely different perspective. For 
Aristotle, the passions are natural expressions of the desiderative part (τὸ ὀρεκτικόν) 
of the soul. However, they can be experienced with too much strength, or too feebly, 
depending on the circumstance. Aristotle then argued that the passions could be 
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exercised virtuously, so long as a person aims at ‘the mean’ (µεσότης) in their 
expression. Hence, the virtuous exercise of the passions would be to feel the 
passions at ‘the necessary times’ (τὸ … ὅτε δεῖ), ‘with reference to the right objects’ 
(ἐφ’ οἷς) or ‘toward the right things’ (πρὸς οὕς), ‘to the right extent’ (τὸ … ὅσον), 
‘with the right aim’ (οὗ ἕνεκα) and ‘in the appropriate way’ (ὡς δεῖ).79 For this 
reason, Aristotle acknowledged that it is quite difficult to attain to excellence in 
one’s actions and passions, since hitting the mean in each of these ways leaves little 
room for error.80 
Conversely, the vicious exercise of the passions can come about in myriad ways. 
One can feel the passions at the wrong time, with reference to the wrong object or 
for the wrong purposes. Alternatively, one might feel a passion with reference to the 
right objects, toward the right things, or with the right aim, but still fail in that one 
may feel it more violently and swiftly or more weakly and slothfully than the case 
demands.81 Thus, for instance, in the case of the appetite for pleasure, when a person 
moderately desires those things that make for health and wellbeing, or moderately 
desires pleasant things that are in no way contrary to what is ‘noble and good’ (τὸ 
καλόν), and does not feel pain or craving when those pleasant things are absent, he 
hits the mark with regard to desire and possesses the virtue of ‘temperance’ 
(σωφροσύνη).82 ‘The temperate person’ (ὁ σώφρων) thus ‘craves’ (ἐπιθυµεῖ) for the 
things ‘that he ought, as he ought and when he ought’ (ὧν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε) – 
something that is hard to do well.83 When a person engages in excessive indulgence 
in pleasure, takes pleasure in the wrong things or is pained when he fails to obtain 
the pleasurable objects of his craving, he suffers the vice of ‘intemperance’ 
(ἀκολασία). On the other hand, the person who shuns every pleasure and admits of 
no desire for even the things that are necessary, which one would naturally crave – 
such as food or drink – suffers from the vice of ‘insensibility’ (ἀναισθησία).84  
Philo likewise repeatedly described passion as irrational.85 This in itself tells us 
little since we have already shown above that Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics had 
each done this in their respective ways. When we look more closely at how Philo 
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82 Arist., Eth. Nic. 3.11 1119a. 
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described the irrationality of the passions, the evidence is still inconclusive. Like the 
Stoics, Philo recognized the distinction between irrational and non-rational elements 
in the soul.86 Like both Plato and the Stoics, he identified the disobedience of the 
passions with the simile of the horse or beast. He even argued in Platonic manner 
that the passions must be guided by reason just as a charioteer might direct stiff-
necked and restive horses,87 a helmsman a ship, or a governor a city.88 We discussed 
this previously in relation to his use of Plato’s charioteer metaphor. He could also 
characterize the relation of the passions to reason as a sort of internecine war 
between the lower parts, after the manner of Plato.89 Yet, when he formally defined 
passion, he clearly opted for orthodox Stoic definitions.90 Likewise, he generally 
preferred terminology redolent of Stoicism with reference to passion’s irrationality. 
He commonly described passion as ‘irrational impulse’ (ἄλογος ὁρµή).91 
Sometimes, he sought to emphasize the irrationality by calling it ‘irrational passion’ 
(ἄλογος πάθος),92 another Stoic phrase.93 Finally, Philo also found biblical witness 
to the irrational character of passion by allegorically interpreting Nod as ‘tossing’ 
(σάλος).94 For Philo, this referred to ‘the wavering and unsettled’ (ἄστατοι καὶ 
ἀνίδρυτοι ὁρµαί) impulses reminiscent of the ‘oscillation theory’ of psychic conflict 
of the Stoic fool, where the Stoics offered ‘a diachronic model of turning’ in which 
the mind,95 due to its weaknesses and instability, rapidly wavers between competing 
judgments.96 This tossing of the soul no doubt accounted for that ‘random’ (ἄκριτος) 
and ‘disordered’ (ἀκοσµέω) character of the irrational impulses of a passion,97 rather 
than it moving in a smooth and straight moral direction as would be the case for the 
Stoic sage. This, in turn, also accounts for the undisciplined and chaotic life of the 
                                                
86 Philo, Sacr. 47-48. 
87 Ibid., 45, 49; Philo, Spec. 79; Virt. 13; Leg. 3.118, 123, 127-128, 136, 138, 223.  
88 Philo, Leg. 3.222-224. 
89 Most notably, see Philo, Leg. 3.116-7; compare also Philo, Ebr. 98-9. 
90 Philo, Spec. 4.79; see also Philo, Leg. 3.185. 
91 Philo, Conf. 90; Post. 74; Sacr. 81; Spec. 4.79; Leg. 3.185, 248-9. 
92 Philo, Mos. 2.139; Leg. 3.116; Her. 192; Det. 46. 
93Arnim, SVF (1903-5), 3.462; Galen, Plac. IV 2.19. Again, we cannot make too much of this 
since the phrase was by no means limited to the Stoics. Aristotle, for instance, used the phrase once at 
Arist., Eth. Eud. 1111b. I could find no evidence of this phrase in Plato. 
94 Philo, Post. 22. 
95 M.D. Boeri, ‘Stoic Account of Akrasia’ (2005), 396 
96 T. Brennan, ‘Stoic Moral Psychology’ (2003), 274; M.C. Nussbaum, Therapy of Desire 
(1994), 383-6; R.W. Sharples, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics (1996), 70-1; R. Sorabji, Emotion and 
Peace of Mind (2000), 56-7. Chrysippus apparently offered Euripides’ Medea as a literary model of 
the conflicted, weak-minded agent to illustrate the Stoic conception of akrasia. See Galen, Plac. III 
3.13-24, IV 6.19-22; M.D. Boeri, ‘Stoic Account of Akrasia’ (2005), 405-6. 
97 Philo, Migr. 60; Leg. 3.128. 
   
98 
fool as a whole. Of course, it also calls to mind Plato’s depiction in the Timaeus of 
the unstable and chaotic movements associated with the lower, mortal parts of the 
soul, which were imperfectly constructed by the subordinate gods, though Plato had 
located these precisely outside of the mind.  
Similarly, Philo everywhere and consistently portrayed passion as an excessive 
movement of the soul.98 As evidenced in his definition quoted at the outset of the 
chapter, Philo often portrayed passion as ‘an inordinate and excessive impulse’ 
(ἄµετρος καὶ πλεονάζουσα ὁρµή),99 or more simply, as ‘unmeasured impulses’ (αἱ 
ἄµετροι ὁρµαί).100 He illustrated this excessiveness on two occasions by likening it 
to a fire raging out of control and consuming everything in its wake, an apt way of 
portraying ‘the runaway’ character of a passionate impulse.101 Philo’s definition and 
phraseology is Stoic and so are both terms, though the Stoics seemed to have 
preferred to modify impulse with the term ‘excessive’ (πλεονάζουσα) rather than 
‘inordinate’ (ἄµετρος), judging from their much greater use of the former compared 
to the latter. The Peripatetic tradition could also use almost the exact same language, 
but with one crucial difference. Unlike the Stoics, the Peripatetics argued that the 
passionate impulse could also be ‘deficient’ (ἐλλείπω).102 On this score, Philo 
clearly sided with the Stoics, if we wish to use an argument from silence, inasmuch 
as he never once described a passion as wanting. We might add, finally, that Philo 
could speak of the passionate impulse ‘shaking’ (σείω) the soul.103 This metaphor 
was a particularly apt way of describing the impact of passion’s irrationality and 
excessiveness. The chaos and ‘tossing’ introduced by the irrationality of the 
impulse, coupled with the violence and force of the passion once unleashed, would 
thus shake the soul. 
None of these facts in themselves tell us definitively whether Philo conceived of 
the irrationality of the passions in a Platonic or Stoic manner. As we have shown 
above, the idea of passion as an irrational, unbridled impulse could fit into any of the 
Platonic, Peripatetic or Stoic schemes, depending on how he used the metaphor. The 
question must be settled by whether he viewed excessive, irrational passion as 
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natural or unnatural, or as fundamentally blameworthy or not. It is to this that we 
turn next. 
Unnatural 
Whereas in the previous section we were unable to definitively locate Philo’s 
philosophical position among Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, in this section we are 
able to differentiate his allegiance. Plato and Aristotle considered the passions to be 
natural and useful,104 but Philo sided with the Stoics in treating them as contrary to 
nature and always destructive. This serves as a second, key line of demarcation 
between the Stoic and Platonic-Peripatetic conceptions of the passions. For both 
Plato and Aristotle, the passions were closely connected with the lower, irrational 
parts of the soul as natural expressions of their normal function from birth.105 This is 
yet another consequence of their conception of the soul as a fundamentally complex 
entity. The Stoics, in contrast, treated all passions as unnatural perversions or 
deviations of the impulses that originate in the hegemon. This followed as a 
consequence of their monistic psychology, with its rejection of the notion of an 
alternative and irrational source of impulse in the soul in preference for ‘a doctrine 
of temporal complexity’ of the soul’s processes, which were divided into the 
sequence: presentation-assent-impulse-action.106 When we examine Philo, we will 
find that he consistently adhered to the Stoic conception of the passions as unnatural.  
We have already discussed in detail Plato’s depiction of the soul and need not 
repeat that material here except to briefly summarize his understanding of the 
passions as innate to the soul. For Plato, the passions are essentially natural, even if 
they can often run riot. Plato even went so far as to more or less identify the two 
lower parts of the soul with two passions, that is, the appetitive part with desire and 
the spirited with anger. We should add, however, that Plato also stressed the close 
connection between pleasure and the appetitive part. The appetitive part’s basic 
orientation is the satisfaction of its lust for the more bodily and base pleasures 
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associated with food, drink, and sex. He also stressed the division among the parts of 
the soul by locating each in different parts of the body: the reason inhabits the head, 
anger the breast, and desire the abdominal region. While he assigned construction of 
the different parts to different architects, all three are fundamental elements of the 
human soul. In the Timaeus, he argued that the Demiurge directly created the mind, 
stamping it with a divine and immortal character. However, the Demiurge handed 
over the job of constructing the mortal elements of the cosmos to the subordinate 
gods, who were responsible for the creation of not only the body, but also the lower 
parts of the soul. Since the lower parts were created by the subordinate gods, who 
had been instructed to copy the Demiurge’s own work, they were imperfectly 
created and consequently mortal, irrational, and prone to chaotic movements. For 
this reason, Plato believed that the mind must govern the other parts of the soul if it 
is to experience harmony and live virtuously. His moral psychology was predicated 
on the innate and continued existence of the spirited and appetitive parts in the soul 
at least until the death of the body. 
Aristotle similarly argued that there exists in the soul ‘another natural element 
beside reason’ (ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκός), that fights against reason and 
resists it so that its impulses move ‘in a contrary direction’ (ἐπὶ τἀναντία) to 
reason.107 Aristotle identified this other constituent element with the desiderative 
part of the soul in general and with ‘desire’ or ‘appetite’ (ἐπιθυµία) in particular. 
Though he treated both anger and desire as passions of the desiderative part of the 
soul, in contrast to Plato who treated them separately, he did continue to utilize 
Plato’s distinctions between the two. Thus while both passions are irrational, 
appetite is the more irrational since anger obeys reason ‘in a sense’ (πως) as a sort of 
ally, while desire does not.108  
According to Aristotle, humans possess both reason and desire ‘by nature’ 
(φύσει), but these elements are also subject to growth and maturation.109 In the case 
of animals, all their constituent psychic powers exist by nature from birth.110 
Rational creatures share the irrational psychic elements, but only an embryonic 
reasoning capability subject to a natural growth process.111 Hence, for Aristotle both 
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appetite and reason are present from birth in the human soul, reason requires more 
grooming in order to fully mature. For this reason, Aristotle argued that we see 
appetite present in children from the outset, but full rationality only later when they 
have reached adulthood.112 
Aristotle, moreover, distinguished between passions, capacities, and 
dispositions. He understood ‘the passions’ (πάθη) to be those feelings in the soul 
that are accompanied by pleasure and pain, such as desire, anger, and fear. One 
cannot assign a ‘quality’ (ποιότης) to someone merely on the basis of knowing that 
they are undergoing a passion, unless one also knows the manner in which they are 
feeling it.113 ‘Capacities’ (δυνάµεις) refer to that in the soul by virtue of which we 
are capable of experiencing the passions in the first place. This ‘capacity for 
passion’ (τὴν τοῦ παθητικοῦ δύναµιν) serves as the starting point or basis for the 
passions.114 ‘Dispositions’ (ἕξεις), on the other hand, refer to the settled tendency of 
the soul to exercise the passions too violently, too weakly or moderately.115 They 
result from the habitual exercise of the passions over time.116 
A sort of circularity holds among the relations of the soul’s passions, capacities 
and dispositions. While the capacity for passion is natural,117 it can be shaped by the 
manner in which one exercises the passions. If habitually exercised in a certain 
manner, the capacities will come to have a certain ‘quality’ (ποιότης). The soul 
might become for instance irascible, amorous, or bashful.118 These capacities, when 
hardened, thus become dispositions; that is to say, dispositions are capacities for 
passion that have come to take on a certain settled character in a specific direction, 
whether of excess, deficiency or moderation, with regard to a given passion.119 
Aristotle identified these settled capacities or dispositions with virtue and vice.120 
These dispositions then in turn affect how the soul normally exercises its passions, 
which further shapes its capacities. As such, capacities and dispositions mutually 
affect and mould one another.  
                                                
112 Arist., Eth. Nic. 3.12 1119b; Pol. 1.13 1260a. 
113 Arist., Eth. Nic. 2.15 1105b; Arist., Eth. Eud. 2.2 1220b. See also Plut., Virt. mor. 443d. 
114 Arist., Eth. Nic. 2.5 1105b-1106a; Arist., Mag. mor. 1.7 1186a. See also Plut., Virt. mor. 
443c-d; Stob., Anth. II 7.20. 
115 Arist., Eth. Nic. 2.5 1105b. 
116 R.J. Rabel, ‘Diseases of Soul’ (1981), 386-7. 
117 Arist., Eth. Nic. 2.5 1106a. 
118 Arist., Eth. Eud. 2.2 1220b. 
119 Plut., Virt. mor. 443d. 
120 Arist., Eth. Eud. 2.5 1222a-b. 
   
102 
For Aristotle, the difference between the capacity for passion and the passions 
themselves refers to the distinction between their inactivity in the case of the 
capacities versus their activation or exercise in the case of the passions themselves. 
Aristotle argued that we must first acquire the potentiality for something before we 
can exhibit the activity that follows. For instance, in the case of the senses it is not 
by often seeing or by often hearing that we come to possess sight or hearing, but 
rather we see and hear because we first possess the abilities to do so.121 Similarly, 
the capacity for passion might be described as an ability of the soul to become 
angry, feel desire or be afraid in the first place, while the passions are the stirring of 
these capacities in the form of anger, desire, fear and so forth.122 Consequently, in 
Aristotle’s view, the soul must first possess a capacity for the passions before it can 
exercise them. 
The soul thus possesses capacities and passions by nature, while dispositions 
come about only ‘by choice’ (προαίρεσις)123 and ‘by habit’ (ἐξ ἔθους).124 For 
Aristotle it was axiomatic that we possess anything natural first as a potentiality and 
only later do we exhibit it as an activity.125 In the case of the passions, the soul 
possesses the capacity for passion from birth, and then later exercises that capacity 
as some form of a passion in response to various circumstances.126 Since capacities 
and passions are natural, their existence is not a matter of choice. Rather, the soul is 
constructed in such a manner that it will automatically be moved toward a passion 
when it encounters a circumstance that calls for such movement. The mind in adults 
only has control of the manner in which the passions are exercised, but not that they 
are exercised. Hence, the soul is called neither good nor evil on account of its simply 
feeling anger, desire, or fear, or for its capacity for passion.127 Finally, for Aristotle, 
since both the capacity for passion and the consequent passions are innate, they 
cannot be removed from the soul. In his view, the irrational passions of anger and 
appetite are ‘no less human’ (οὐχ ἧττον ἀνθρωπικά) than reason. Consequently, for 
Aristotle, humans cannot live an apatheiac life as the Stoics later proposed in their 
ideal of the sage. Instead, he regarded the emotions as ‘essential constituents of the 
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good life’, which must be educated through proper moral instruction and 
habituation.128 
Dispositions, by contrast, are a matter of choice. As such they are concerned 
with virtue since virtue is concerned with the proper exercise of both actions and 
passions. For Aristotle, virtue comes about by the observance of what he called ‘the 
mean’ (µεσότης), that is, what is proportionate, ‘fitting’ or ‘exactly suitable’ 
(σύµµετρος) for a passion or for an action in a given situation. As the mean, virtue is 
thus situated between a vice of ‘excess’ (ὑπερβολή), on the one hand, and a vice of 
‘deficiency’ (ἔλλειψις) on the other.129 And since the passions are natural to the soul, 
they too can be exercised either virtuously or viciously, depending on the 
circumstances. As such, Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean is not a doctrine of 
moderation in all situations. For instance, one’s angry response will vary according 
to circumstances. In the case of a mild slight, mere crossness might be appropriate, 
whereas absolute fury might be appropriate in an instance of terrible injustice.130 
Aristotle’s more positive assessment of the passions is made clear especially by 
his doctrine of virtue as the mean, in which he characterizes the passions not only as 
natural, but also as necessary and useful. Rather than advocate the removal of 
passions from the soul, as did the Stoics, he argued instead for the elimination of 
defects and excess in the passions.131 By thus moderating and limiting the 
movements of the passions, reason trains and educates them by practice until a firm 
disposition or state is established in the irrational part of the soul, which is precisely 
what he understood moral virtue to be.  
For Aristotle, then, and the Peripatetic tradition that followed, the right exercise 
of the passions and irrational part of the soul is necessary for virtue.132 There can be 
no virtue of temperance without the passion of desire for pleasure. For, he defined 
temperance precisely as the moderation of the appetites for food, drink and sex 
found in the irrational parts of the soul.133 Similarly, to be ‘gentle’ (πραότης) is a 
virtuous disposition relative to the passion of anger. Aristotle could define 
‘gentleness’ (πράυνσις) as the opposite of anger inasmuch as he could view it as the 
calming or cessation of anger in those cases when we believe someone has slighted 
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us involuntarily, when the offender is apologetic, when time has passed, or when we 
have taken vengeance on the person. In these instances, calm and gentle people no 
longer feel anger, but ‘freedom from pain’ (ἀλυπία) and ‘inoffensive pleasure’ 
(ἡδονή ὑβριστική).134 However, a gentle person is precisely also one who is angry at 
the right things or right people ‘as he ought, when he ought and as long as he ought’ 
(ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὅσον χρόνον).135 Similarly, Aristotle argued that there could be 
no virtue of ‘courage’ (ἀνδρεία) without ‘fear’ (φόβος) and ‘confidence’ (θάρσος) 
since it is the virtue relative to each.136 So, for Aristotle, humans not only cannot live 
out the Stoic ideal of the apatheiac sage, but they ought not even to try, since the 
virtues themselves depend on the moderate exercise of the passions of anger, desire, 
fear and so forth. 
Aristotle also argued that moderated passions are morally useful in that they 
often aid reason in acting virtuously. In a manner redolent of Plato’s description of 
the spirited part of the soul as ‘an ally’ (σύµµαχος or ἐπίκουρος) to reason,137 
Aristotle similarly described ‘wrath’ (θυµός) as ‘assisting’ (συνεργεῖ) reason in 
acting courageously.138 In this same vein, Peripatetics like Plutarch later conceived 
‘righteous indignation’ (νέµεσις) as helping the soul rise up and oppose those who 
have gained prosperity through illegitimate means, or pity as aiding a person in 
treating others with humanity.139 Thus, while it is true that excessive or defective 
passions lead the soul into moral destruction, Aristotle argued conversely that the 
moderate passions are not only a necessary ingredient to many of the virtues, but 
that they can also help the mind to act virtuously. 
For the Stoics, in contrast to the Peripatetics, all passions, without exception, are 
unnatural.140 As discussed earlier, the Stoics understood ‘first impulse’ to be in itself 
a natural and appropriate expression of the soul.141 It is, in part, what distinguishes 
‘soul’ (ψυχή) from ‘cohesion’ (ἕξις) or ‘growth’ (φύσις), and animals, whether 
rational or irrational, from plants. Moreover, the Stoics considered psychic 
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movement or impulse to be a constitutive power of the mind, along with 
‘impression’ (φαντασία), ‘assent’ (συγκατάθεσις), and ‘reason’ (λόγος).142 The 
Stoics did envision rational impulses that result in action in their ideal sage, but 
these good impulses, as noted previously, were called eupatheia rather than 
‘passions’. Eupatheia, as rational psychic impulses, are ‘natural’ in the sense that 
they represent the sort of affections that the perfect rational human being, fully 
developed as intended by nature, would experience. Eupatheia thus reflect the 
‘natural’ working of the sage’s hegemonikon, untainted by excess, which results 
when it is properly oriented toward the true good of moral virtue.143 
When the soul moves in a manner that is ‘contrary to nature’ (παρὰ φύσιν), that 
movement or impulse is by definition a passion. For, when the soul’s impulse is 
‘contrary to nature’ – meaning in the case of the Stoics not what is given at birth, but 
what accords or does not accord with Nature or Reason or god in a mature human – 
the movement itself becomes perverted and the object of the movement no longer 
accords with the soul’s proper ‘end’ (τέλος).144 Hence, passionate psychic 
movements come to be characterized by irrationality, chaos, excessiveness and 
violence, and are directed toward or away from something it mistakenly counts as a 
good or evil or worthy of selection. As perversions of the mind, these movements 
arise ‘contrary to correct and natural reasoning’ (παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν 
λόγον).145 The inappropriateness of their object and the excessive and irrational 
character of their motion also meant that for the Stoics the passions were never 
useful or expedient under any circumstance. Since the goal of the philosophical life 
is to live according to nature, which necessarily leads to ‘a smooth flow of life’ 
(εὔροια βίου),146 the passions, as irrational and excessive movements of the soul that 
are contrary to nature, are necessarily harmful to the soul. 
Zeno insisted that these excessive impulses of the soul are best characterized as 
‘activities’ (ἐνέργεια) of the soul rather than a natural ‘faculty’ (δύναµις).147 The 
passions are activities inasmuch as they reflect ‘movements’ (κίνησις) of the soul, 
which have gone awry, but they are not capacities since such movements represent a 
                                                
142 See pages 43-4 above. 
143 T. Brennan, ‘Old Stoic Theory of Emotions’ (1998), 34-5; M. Frede, ‘Stoic Doctrine of 
Affections’ (1986), 94-5, 107-110. 
144 Stob., Anth. II 7.6e. 
145 Ibid., II 7.10a. 
146 Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.88; Stob., Anth. II 7.6e. 
147 Sext. Emp., Math. 11.30; Stob., Anth. II 7.1. 
   
106 
perversion of the otherwise natural and appropriate impulses of the mind. This ran 
counter to Aristotle’s contention that ‘a capacity for passion’ resides in the lower 
parts of the soul as a basic element of its constitution as outlined above.  
Later Platonic and Peripatetic writers recognized this fundamental difference 
between their respective traditions and that of the Stoics by treating the passions as 
capacities that can be useful when under the control of reason. Plutarch, for instance, 
argued against the Stoics and for Aristotle’s notion of an innate capacity for the 
passions in the soul, describing it as ‘the starting point’ (ἀρχή) and ‘raw material’ 
(ὕλη) of passion.148 He punctuated his insistence on the innate character of this 
capacity for passion in the irrational parts of the soul by referring to them as 
‘emotional faculties’ (παθητικαὶ δυνάµεις).149 He argued that Aristotle first 
introduced the notion of ‘an emotional faculty’ as a single, distinct power of the soul 
when he subordinated and redefined anger as a type of desire, an ordering that the 
Old Stoa later incorporated into their system. By treating anger as a type of desire, 
according to Plutarch, Aristotle effectively identified a single faculty of the soul 
responsible for all the passions that was simultaneously distinct from the rational, 
perceptive, nutritive, and vegetative parts of the soul.150 None of these other parts in 
Aristotle’s purported revised taxonomy of the soul served as a cause of any of the 
passions. Whether or not Aristotle was in fact responsible for this revision as 
outlined by Plutarch, this approach became common property of both the Peripatetic 
and Platonic traditions. While the Peripatetics might speak simply of the emotional 
faculty, so too could the Academy, even as they continued to recognize the further 
division of the emotional part into Plato’s appetitive and spirited parts. Hence, we 
find Middle Platonists such as Plutarch, Galen, and Albinus all referring to Plato’s 
spirited and appetitive parts in common as ‘the emotional part’ (τὸ παθητικόν) of the 
soul.151 Indeed, according to Galen, even the putatively unorthodox Stoic 
Posidonius, in recognition of his rejection of Chrysippus’ psychic monism for 
Plato’s tripartite division of the soul, customarily called anger and desire ‘the 
passionate part’ (τὸ παθητικόν) of the soul.152 By identifying ‘an emotional faculty’ 
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in the soul, all these authors sought to underscore the innate character of the 
passions and their source in a part of the soul alternative to the mind. 
Moreover, since the passions are fundamental capacities of the soul and not 
merely perverted psychic activities, Plutarch argued that it is ‘neither possible nor 
expedient’ (οὔτε γὰρ δυνατὸν οὔτ’ ἄµεινον) for reason to ‘completely eradicate 
passion’ (τὸ πάθος ἐξαιρεῖν παντάπασιν).153 In defence of his contention, he noted 
the usefulness of anger for combat.154 This line of argumentation was a 
commonplace in the Peripatetic and Platonist traditions. Anger was frequently cited 
as an aide to soldiers to fight bravely in battle.155 The Stoics, by contrast, never 
envisioned a circumstance in which fear or anger or any other passion would serve 
to help the soul in some manner, as the Peripatetics and Platonists characteristically 
argued.156 
Like the Stoics, Philo treated the passions as unnatural, both in the narrow sense 
of the quality of the psychic movement itself and in the general sense that they 
oppose the life that accords with nature.157 In his formal definition of passion quoted 
at the beginning of the chapter, Philo followed the Stoics in referring to ‘an 
unnatural movement of the soul’ (παρὰ φύσιν κίνησις). In this passage, Philo 
emphasized the character of the psychic movement itself. He situated the phrase 
among several descriptors that underscored his contention that all passions are 
blameworthy and that desire in particular threatens the soul. He described the 
passionate impulse as ‘inordinate’ (ἄµετρος) and ‘excessive’ (πλεονάζουσα). 
Additionally, he invoked Plato’s chariot-team metaphor and likened their motion to 
that of ‘rebellious horses’ (ἀφηνιασταὶ ἵπποι) careening out of control with the result 
that they carry the entire chariot team to its destruction.158 Elsewhere, Philo similarly 
described the psychic movement associated with pleasure as uplifting the soul in a 
manner that is ‘contrary to nature’. In this context, he argued that pleasure’s 
uplifting motion distorts the soul in such a way that it becomes ‘ugly’ (αἶσχος). By 
connecting unnatural psychic motion to the notion of ‘beauty’ (κάλλος)/ugliness, he 
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emphasized its character as exceeding the bounds of propriety and proportion.159 
Philo did not reject the idea that the mind ought to be uplifted per se, since he 
likewise conceived of the eupatheia of joy as the rational uplifting of the soul 
experienced by the sage.160 The ugliness resides in the soul expanding overmuch or 
too quickly, rather than in a smooth and controlled manner. In both of these 
passages, Philo emphasized the bad character of the passionate movement itself. 
Against Plato and Aristotle, consequently, Philo never treated the passions as 
natural to the soul. He acknowledged that the soul does indeed have ‘a capacity’ for 
passion inasmuch as a fundamental characteristic of soul is its capacity for impulse, 
of which passion is a species.161 A rock, by contrast, has no capacity for passion, 
since it possesses no ‘soul’ (ψυχή) or ‘physic’ (φύσις). Hence, it never evinces 
growth, impulse, or impression.162 Unlike other Middle Platonists and Peripatetics of 
his era, however, Philo never described the lower parts of the soul together as ‘the 
emotional part’ (τὸ παθητικόν), whether the Stoic five senses and faculties of speech 
and generation, or Plato’s appetitive and spirited parts. Instead, Philo described the 
passions as ‘bastards’ (νόθα) and ‘foreigners’ (ξένα) to the mind.163 Both metaphors 
emphasized their unnatural status in the soul. 
Philo also correlated the unnatural character of passionate psychic motions with 
an unnatural orientation of the soul in general that runs counter to ‘the smooth 
movement of life’ associated with the Stoic sage. In De ebrietate Philo pointed out 
that the sage Abraham’s routing the nine kings not only highlighted the unnatural 
character of passion’s motion, but also showed that the cause of such passions is 
found in an improper and impure orientation of the mind.164 Philo allegorically 
identified the nine kings in the Gen. 14 account with the four cardinal passions of 
desire, pleasure, fear, and grief, and the five senses. By extending unnatural 
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movement to the senses, Philo connected the prompting of the passions with the 
kind of mind that lives for the body and things external to the body. He argued that 
bodily existence is full of all sorts of mortal and created voices that summon and 
arouse passions in the foolish soul by means of the senses.165 The mind of a fool 
impiously deifies mortal existence and exchanges honouring the Existent God for 
idols, polytheism, and ultimately, atheism.166 This fundamental religious and 
philosophical failure accounts for the rise of the passions of the soul, because it 
mistakenly looks to created order for its good rather than to the Cause of all things. 
The mind of the sage, by contrast, leaves behind the camp of the body in order to 
embark on the contemplation of the incorporeal ideas in the presence of the Existent 
Himself.167 The sage understands and acknowledges that God alone is the true 
source of all things, while the senses are mere instruments.168 By ignoring the cries 
associated with the mortal life of the body and fixing its hopes on God alone, the 
sage Abraham came to experience quietness and peace of soul, untroubled by the 
confusions of mortal existence that introduce chaotic motions in senses and mind 
when accepted.169 As a consequence, Philo characterized the Abraham sage as ‘a 
reasonable and happy soul’ (λογικὴ καὶ εὐδαίµων ψυχή) with ‘a pure’ 
(καθαρώτατος), ‘unalloyed’ (εἱλικρινέστατος), and pious mind.170 By representing 
the sage as the model soul that lives according to nature, but the fool as 
fundamentally misdirected, Philo thus anchored the unnatural psychic motions of the 
passions within the general orientation of the fool, whose life does not accord with 
nature. 
Philo argued that the unnatural motions of the passions also result in both a 
distorted character and vicious deeds. In De decalogo, after noting again that all 
passions shake and stir the soul in a manner that is contrary to nature, he added that 
they also ‘do not permit [the soul] to continue in health’ (ὑγιαίνειν οὐκ ἐῶντα).171 
Here, Philo correlated the passions to the Stoic moral maladies of ‘soul-sickness’ 
(νόσηµα) or ‘soul-infirmity’ (ἀρρώστηµα).172 Although he never explicitly 
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acknowledged the Stoic distinction between psychic sickness, on the one hand, and 
psychic infirmity as an extra-weak form of soul-sickness on the other, he 
nevertheless throughout his corpus did commonly use both terms in conjunction 
with the passions.173 Like the Stoics, he treated both psychic sickness and infirmity, 
which he likened to ‘harsh mistresses’ (δέσποινα),174 as a settled or ingrained 
weakness of soul (ἕξεις) that results from long-term participation in particular 
passions,175 although he sometimes identified the diseases with the passions,176 a 
confusion apparent also in the Stoic sources.177 As a result, such persons become 
defined by that particular psychic and moral weakness. Many of the names for the 
various kinds of soul-sickness or infirmity derive from objects of desire, though one 
could also cast them in terms of an adjective to describe the person stricken by the 
malady rather than as a noun to name each disease state. For instance, he argued 
elsewhere that the passion of desire ‘produces a change for the worse’ (µεταβολὴν 
ἀπεργάζεται τὴν πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον) in the soul such that, if it is directed toward money, 
it makes a person a thief or fraud; if toward reputation, proud or inconsistent; if 
toward office, factious or tyrannical; if toward bodily beauty, an adulterer or 
pederast, or if toward the belly, insatiable and gluttonous.178 ‘Avarice’ or ‘the love 
of money’ (φιλαργυρία) could be construed either as a passion or as a sickness, 
depending on the context, but if a person becomes defined by the passion over time, 
he or she becomes ‘a lover of money’ (φιλάργυρος) and, as such, sick and infirm. 
Consequently, Philo argued that the various sicknesses or infirmities of the soul are 
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produced from the passions.179 Such sicknesses, if untreated by philosophical 
reason, spell the soul’s death.180 
Later in his discussion of desire in De decalogo, Philo argued that the passions 
not only generate sickness of soul, but often result in evil actions. Since one would 
expect that the unnatural character of the soul’s motions should culminate in vicious 
actions that likewise defy nature, it comes as no surprise that Philo would make this 
claim. Indeed, Philo elsewhere explicitly asserted that vicious actions are inherently 
chaotic and contrary to nature.181 In De decalogo, he argued that philosophical 
reasoning must check the passion of desire; otherwise it will, of necessity, ‘distort 
all of life’s affairs’ (πάντ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ τοῦ βίου πράγµατα κινηθήσεται παρὰ 
φύσιν).182 In other words, the unnatural movements of the soul, if not controlled and 
made natural, will ultimately result in unnatural movements of the body, namely, 
deeds and vicious actions. To support his contention, he cited how the love of 
women, glory, and pleasure, all of which he counted as forms of desire, had caused 
estrangement between kinsmen, war among Greeks and Barbarians alike, and 
ultimately disaster to the human race.183 As discussed above, this connection 
between the unnatural character of passionate impulses and the unnatural life overall 
was a common Stoic theme. 
Finally, in light of the unnatural character of all the passions, Philo likewise 
joined the Stoics in describing the passions as necessarily harmful at all times. As 
noted above, the Platonic and Peripatetic traditions had affirmed that, when under 
the control of reason, the passions could actually help the soul. Anger, for instance, 
might goad a soldier to meet the danger of battle with boldness. Against this, Philo 
affirmed their essential harmfulness. In Legum allegoriae, he noted that Moses 
described the beasts of the field, which Philo allegorically identified with the 
passions, as ‘helpers’ (βοηθοί) of the mind.184 He initially acknowledged that the 
passions could help the soul in a certain sense: 
… pleasure (ἡδονή) and desire (ἐπιθυµία) contribute to the permanence 
of our kind (πρὸς διαµονὴν τοῦ γένους ἡµῶν): pain (λύπη) and fear 
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(φόβος), biting the soul (δάκνοντα τὴν ψυχήν) turn it to treating nothing 
carelessly: anger (ὀργή) is a weapon of defence, which has conferred 
great benefits on many (µεγάλα πολλοὺς ὠφέλησε): and so with the 
other passions.185 
Philo listed a number of benefits that arise from the soul. The connection of 
pleasure and desire to ‘the permanence’ (πρὸς διαµονήν) of the human species 
relates especially to the desires for food, drink and procreation. Fear and pain protect 
the species from death and destruction, and anger evokes the audacity to fight in 
combat. Philo’s connection between anger and battle recalled both the standard 
Peripatetic argument that anger serves as ‘a goad’ to battle and Plato’s connection of 
anger to the ally to the mind – the spirited part of the soul. In all of these instances, 
Philo suggested that the passions contribute to the permanence of the species, but 
not toward virtue as the Platonic and Peripatetic traditions had argued. 
Philo observed that Moses next corrected any real positive assessment of the 
passions by adding that these ‘helpers’ (βοηθοί) were not suitable to the soul.186 For 
this reason, Moses stated that God created a second ‘helper’ (βοηθός) and ‘ally’ 
(σύµµαχος) to the mind that is ‘suitable’ (βοηθὸς κατ’ αὐτόν),187 that is, woman or 
sense perception.188 On this basis, Philo argued that while one could describe the 
passions as ‘helpers’ in a sense, one could only do so ‘by a straining of language’ 
(καταχρηστικῶς). In fact, the passions are ‘actual foes’ (πρὸς ἀλήθειαν πολέµιοι) to 
the soul in the manner that allies of the state sometimes turn out to be traitors or 
deserters, or in friendships flatterers prove to be enemies rather than comrades.189 
Thus, although Philo initially conceded that the passions could be construed to be 
‘useful’ as the Peripatetic tradition taught,190 he was only able to say as much by 
way of ‘a straining of language’. Like the Stoics, he viewed the passions to be ‘in 
reality’ harmful and destructive to the soul, but approved the selection of food, 
drink, or sex by the sage as matters of indifference.191 Nevertheless, Philo could also 
ascribe a strong ascetic orientation to his sage in a manner reminiscent of the ideal 
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philosopher in Plato’s Phaedo when Philo argued that the sage counts as ‘disdainful’ 
(καταφρονητικός) and even ‘disregards’ (ἀµελέω) if possible ‘bodily necessities’ (τὰ 
ἀναγκαῖα) in order to contemplate the divine.192  
Philo’s preference for the Stoic treatment of the passions as fundamentally 
harmful was further underscored by regular treatment of the passions as such 
elsewhere in his corpus. To begin with, he never once qualified the passions as 
‘useful’ (χρήσιµος) or ‘serviceable’ (εὔχρηστος) in his writings. Rather, he 
consistently depicted the passions as ‘harmful’ (βλάβος), a favourite Stoic term to 
describe what is evil.193 Moreover, he argued that it is ‘always’ (ἀεί) profitable to  
‘lag behind’ (ὑστερίζω) in vice and passion;194 that is to say, Philo did not admit of 
any circumstance in which the passions would be good, useful, or profitable to the 
soul. Finally, he described the sage’s removal or cutting off of the passions as 
‘expedient’ (συµφέρον) and ‘profitable’ (λυσιτελής) to the soul.195 Taken altogether, 
Philo clearly and consistently insisted on the harmful character of the passions, even 
in those instances where their presence might be construed as somehow helping the 
human species. This in turn further emphasized the Stoic manner of his treatment of 
the passions as unnatural to the soul. 
Blameworthy 
When we come to the last element in Philo’s description of passion – its culpability 
– we find that Philo again followed the trajectory of the Stoic account against both 
Plato and Aristotle.  
For Aristotle, the passions can be ‘blameworthy’ (ψεκτός), but not in the Stoic 
sense. While for the Stoics the passions are always blameworthy in all 
circumstances, for Aristotle the passions can be blameworthy, but are not 
necessarily so.196 The fact that for both Plato and Aristotle the passions of the 
irrational parts of the soul are natural, as discussed above, does not necessarily rule 
out the possibility that they are inherently blameworthy. Like Plato, who 
characterized the appetitive faculty as naturally disobedient and unruly, Aristotle 
also portrayed the desiderative part of the soul as oriented toward the irrational and 
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bodily, especially towards food, drink and sexual activity. In Plato’s case, this 
portrayal corresponded well with his broader conception of the formation of the 
world-soul out of primordial chaotic material – all of which is ‘natural’ per se. 
Aristotle likewise saw the passions as unruly and erratic by nature. Nonetheless, 
both Plato and Aristotle also characterized the lower part(s) as naturally capable of 
obedience to reason.197 This dual characterization of the appetitive or desiderative 
part of the soul as both unruly and obedient thus meant that its passions are not 
inherently blameworthy since they can be obedient to reason, though they can be 
blameworthy since they are also capable of unruly, disobedient, chaotic movements. 
For Aristotle, the culpability of the passions turned on the questions of whether 
or not they are ‘voluntary’ (ἑκούσιος) and the manner in which they are exercised, 
even if they are unavoidable because natural.198 Aristotle identified what is 
accounted as ‘voluntary’ with the principle that the action or psychic movement is 
‘up to us’ (ἐπ’ ἡµῖν).199 Aristotle suggested that it would be odd to describe the 
things that we ought to desire or be angry at as somehow involuntary, since such the 
‘cause’ (αἴτιος) and ‘source’ (ἀρχή) of the movements originate from within the 
soul.200 For this reason, Aristotle was willing to extend the voluntary to children and 
animals.201 Moreover, since what is voluntary did not require the contribution of 
reason, only its origin within the soul, Aristotle was willing to also extend the 
attribution of emotions to irrational animals,202 which lack reason and belief.203 
Nevertheless, the culpability for or praise of the exercise of the passions in humans, 
as noted above, derived from their adherence to his doctrine of the mean.  
The Stoics accepted Aristotle’s assertion that only voluntary movements are 
worthy of blame or praise, but differed from him on how to determine what is 
voluntary. The Stoics agreed with Aristotle that any movement compelled by an 
external source is involuntary. Since all passions are impulses that originate in the 
mind, they would not be categorized as involuntary. As discussed earlier, Stoic 
monistic psychology, with its assertion of a hegemon or mind as the single centre of 
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the soul, precluded Aristotle’s suggestion that the passions arise out of the lower 
parts of the soul apart from reason. For the Stoics, this is impossible since no second 
centre of psychic movement exists in the soul: all passions, without exception, are 
voluntary.204 
For the Stoics, however, voluntary movements are accompanied with ‘assent’ 
(συγκατάθεσις) of the mind. Cicero, for instance, described the Stoic conception of 
the passion of grief as a ‘judgment’ (iudicium) and ‘belief’ (opinio) that does not 
originate in nature, but is rather ‘wholly an act of will or impulse’ (totum 
voluntarium).205 In so doing, he sought to show that the passion does not find its 
origin in nature, as proponents from the old Academy such as Crantor had argued, 
when they put forward a complex psychology in the tradition of Plato and 
Aristotle.206 Rather, he sought to show with the Stoics that this passion is the product 
of the mind alone, and underscored this by connecting judgment, belief, and will. In 
the wider context of book three of Disputationes Tusculanae, moreover, Cicero was 
exploring the various remedies proposed to address grief by the philosophical 
schools. While he acknowledged that one must employ a number of remedies to deal 
with the passion, he believed that Chrysippus’ remedy of removing the judgment 
that a dispreferred indifferent is genuinely bad is the most reliable, even if rather 
difficult to accomplish in the moment of distress.207 Chrysippus’ treatment, 
however, is only intelligible on the assumption that it is an assent of the mind and 
voluntary. Cicero made this assumption explicit in the following book of 
Disputationes Tusculanae, when he stated flatly that ‘the whole train of reasoning 
which is concerned with disorder of the soul turns upon the one fact that all passions 
are ‘within our control (in nostra potestate), are all acts of judgment, are all 
voluntary’.208 Against the Peripatetic and Platonic assertion that the passions are 
natural and voluntary, but not necessarily under the control of reason, the Stoics 
argued that the passions are, rather, entirely within the control of the mind. Seneca 
summarized the Stoic position nicely when he quipped, ‘anything that the mind 
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commands itself, it can do.’209 This paved the way for their ideal of the Stoic sage, 
impervious to circumstance, self-sufficient, living free from all passions or apatheia.  
The Stoics rejected Aristotle’s idea that the soul can act voluntarily without the 
mind’s assent. Since they asserted that all human moral action originates in the 
ruling part of the soul by means of assent and impulse, they did not envision any 
moral action existing apart from the mind’s rational activity. As discussed earlier, 
their ethics turned on the question of properly distinguishing what is good, evil, or 
indifferent. The good is always ‘worth choosing’ (αἱρετός), the bad ‘worth avoiding’ 
(φευκτός),210 and the indifferent is worthy of neither choice nor avoidance in itself, 
but may have ‘selective value’ (ἀξία ἐκλεκτική) or ‘disselective disvalue’ (ἀπαξία 
ἀπεκλεκτική) and accordingly is ‘worth acquiring’ (ληπτός) or ‘worth shunning’ 
(ἄληπτος),211 depending on whether or not the soul judges the object in question to 
be ‘preferred’ (προηγµένα), or ‘dispreferred’ (ἀποπροηγµένα) or utterly 
indifferent.212 Both what is worth choosing and what is worthy of selection stimulate 
impulse and their opposites, ‘repulsion’ (ἀφορµή).213 Accordingly, the sage is 
distinguished from the fool in part by his knowledge and ability to distinguish what 
is worth choosing, what is worth avoiding, and what is neither, so that he is able to 
conduct himself unerringly in his impulses.214 The fool, by contrast, likewise makes 
judgments and choices, but does so erringly. The fool’s mind still functions, even 
though it operates from ignorance, but it has been perverted by its own turning 
(τρέπω) and changing (µεταβάλλω) with the result that its choices and selections 
with regard to what it regards to be good, evil, or indifferent, and the impulses that 
follow, likewise fall into error.215 The Stoics, consequently, regarded the passions to 
be voluntary movements of the mind that result from mistaken judgments. For this 
reason, the Stoics regarded passion to be ‘an error’ (ἁµαρτία) of a certain kind.216 
Since these assents are always movements of the mind and since, moreover, the 
Stoics envisioned the passions as always moving in an unnatural or excessive 
manner, unlike the Peripatetic and Platonic ideal of the moderation of passion’s 
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movements, the Stoics consequently considered the passions to be always culpable 
in all circumstances. 
Finally, the Stoics emphasized the voluntary character of the passions by 
describing them as morally vile and abominable in themselves. Such a designation 
only applied to those motions that are within the mind’s control and thus susceptible 
to blame or praise, which of course included all passions. The Stoic practice of 
condemning the passions as fundamentally vile not only emphasized the moral 
degradation of the passions, but also served as a remedy for them. If the Stoic 
preacher could convince the hearer that the good or evil objects in view are not as 
supposed, but also that they are in themselves vile movements of the soul, then a 
person would be more likely to set himself on the Stoic path toward rooting out the 
passions in their entirety. While Cicero explicitly approved of this approach in 
Disputationes Tusculanae,217 it was best illustrated by Seneca in his Ad Novitus de 
ira, one of the few Stoic pamphlets on an individual passion that we possess. 
Throughout the book Seneca made every effort to depict the passion of anger in the 
absolute worst light as something fundamentally ugly and abhorrent, with the aim of 
engendering in the reader such distaste for the passion that he would flee even its 
very germ. Seneca described anger as a savage, ruinous fault, vile, inhuman, mad, 
and deserving of chastisement.218 He likened its hideousness to the manner in which 
gout or malignant sores are abject, foul, and low conditions.219 He depicted its 
foulness as similar to wild animals dripping with slaughter, the monsters of hell 
wreathed in serpents and breathing fire, or the ghastliest goddesses of the 
underworld riding out to raise war.220 He even noted that its essential ugliness 
expresses itself physically – the loveliest face becomes grim, hairs stands on end, 
veins swell, breathing becomes rapid, limbs tremble, eyes become aflame, and the 
voice hisses, bellows or groans.221 Against the Peripatetics, he sarcastically 
conceded that the passion of anger may prove beneficial in some circumstances, in 
the same manner that poison, a fall, or a shipwreck might.222 Hence, though Seneca 
offered a number of pieces of advice to remedy the passion of anger, the overall 
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impression of the book was that anger is in itself something to be avoided at all 
costs. His advice offered guidance on how to expunge the soul of the passion.  
Stoic ethics emphasized the responsibility of the soul for its passions, since in 
their system all impulses, including passionate impulses, derive from the mind and 
are under its control.223 Their notion of apatheia or freedom from all passions 
depended on the ability of the agent to control their emotions in their entirety. The 
Peripatetic and Platonic traditions similarly made the mind responsible for its 
passion, but not entirely so, inasmuch as they posited an alternative source of 
impulse that often moves contrary to its judgments. Indeed, it was precisely this 
assumption of conflict among reason, anger, and appetite that served as the basis for 
Plato’s partitioning of the soul into three parts in the Republic and in the charioteer 
myth of the Phaedrus – Annas’ principle of opposites.224 This conflict likewise 
served as the assumption behind Plato and Aristotle’s notion of akrasia where a soul 
fails to do what it believes is best. Rather than focus primarily on an individual 
moment when the soul experiences the conflict, Aristotle expanded the notion into a 
habitual category akin to virtue and vice, where a soul comes to be characterized as 
consistently wishing to do one thing, but ends up doing another. Again, as in the 
case of Plato, the source of the conflict arises from psychic elements outside the 
mind. The mind, as the agent’s centre, is responsible to assert control over these 
chaotic elements, but is not ultimately responsible for their existence in the first 
place. 
As was the case with the other characteristics of passion, Philo’s conception of 
their blameworthiness aligned most closely to that of the Stoics. Philo too 
underscored the voluntary character of the passions together with the soul’s 
responsibility for their impulse by describing ‘every passion’ as ‘blameworthy’, a 
claim that fits well with the Stoic conviction concerning the voluntary character of 
all the passions as judgments.225 On this score, Philo was even more Stoic than the 
Stoics! While the blameworthy character of the passions was implicit in the Stoic 
assertion of the soul’s complete accountability for its passionate impulses, the Stoics 
in fact seldom made explicit mention of it. We find very few occurrences of any 
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description of the passions as blameworthy, vile, or cursed among our extant sources 
for ancient Stoicism. Ironically, the primary source for such descriptors is none other 
than Philo!  
Philo was unique among Stoic theorists in the degree to which he stressed the 
passions’ blameworthiness and guilt. He was the only author to describe passion as 
‘blameworthy’ (ἐπίληπτος) in his formal definition.226 Nor was that an isolated 
occurrence. Philo elsewhere found fault with the passions on several occasions in his 
writings, describing them as ‘blameworthy’ (ἐπίληπτος),227 ‘guilty’ (ὑπαίτιος),228 
‘base’ (αἰσχρός),229 and ‘vile’ (µοχθηρός).230 In the case of the latter two terms, like 
the Roman Stoics Seneca and Cicero discussed above, Philo described the passions 
as vile and base to underscore their immoral character as well as to prod the soul to 
seek to eradicate them, just as it ought in the case of the vices. Nevertheless, 
favourite among these characterizations was his description of passion as 
‘blameworthy’ (ἐπίληπτος) and ‘guilty’ (ὑπαίτιος). He commonly used both terms in 
connection with one another and always in relation to the fool or vicious soul.231 
Indeed, he appears to have used these two terms in preference to other options when 
discussing the passions. Though he used the synonyms ‘accursed’ (κατάρατος or 
ἐπάρατος)232 and ‘blameworthy’ (ψεκτός)233 in other contexts, he never used them to 
describe the passions. Similarly, he never described the passions as ‘worthy of 
censure’ (ἐπίµοµφος or κατάµοµφος) or ‘reprehensible’ (ἐπιλήψιµος).  
Curiously, Philo appears to have been the first to describe the passions as 
‘blameworthy’ (ἐπίληπτος) and ‘guilty’ (ὑπαίτιος) in the history of Greek thought. I 
have found no evidence that the Old Stoa, Plato, or Aristotle used either term in 
connection to the passions. Musonius Rufus used it once in relation to passion 
among the later Roman Stoics, but he post-dates Philo. I found no evidence that the 
later Stoics used the term ‘guilty’ in connection with the passions at all. Frankly, it is 
unclear what sources Philo may have drawn this description from, or whether he 
made the connection himself for the first time. It does not appear to derive from 
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Moses, since the Septuagint never uses either term. Nor is there any evidence of its 
use in the various philosophical traditions that precede Philo. Whatever his source of 
inspiration, Philo’s purpose in describing the passions as worthy of blame and 
censure is clear enough, namely, to underscore their voluntary character and the 
soul’s responsibility for their expression.  
This connection between the blameworthiness of the passions and the moral 
responsibility of the soul is best illustrated in his reflections in Quod Deus sit 
immutabilis upon the Lawgiver’s attribution of ‘wrath’ (θυµόω) to God in Gen. 6:6-
7.234 In his exposition, Philo distanced God from any ‘real’ attribution of anger, 
arguing that scripture attributed this emotion to God metaphorically as a way of 
speaking of God’s judgment of sin and evil deeds. Instead, he sought to show that 
humans alone experience anger in reality. Moreover, wrath, as well as all the other 
passions, is actually a source of sin and vice. As such, it is liable to God’s judgment 
since it is a voluntary expression of the freedom of creatures made in the likeness of 
God. Let us explore his argument in greater detail. 
Philo supported this linking of anger and judgment by first establishing humans’ 
moral freedom on the basis of their possession of mind and reason. He observed that 
unlike the irrational animals and plants, God had supplied humans with ‘mind’ (νοῦς 
or διάνοια), which endowed them with ‘liberty’ (ἐλευθερία). For mind ‘alone’ 
(µόνος), he observed, possesses freedom and is able to ‘range as it lists’ (ἄφετος), 
having been liberated from the fetters of necessity. He argued that this moral liberty 
of mind is ultimately rooted in its ‘voluntary’ (ἑκούσιος) character, by which 
humans are able to act ‘willingly’ (ἑκών), from 'spontaneous and self-determined' 
(ἐθελουργός καὶ αὐτοκέλευστος) 'intention' (γνώµη), with ‘deliberate choice’ 
(προαιρετικός). Unlike plants and other animals, whose movements and psychic 
changes arise ‘without deliberate choice’ (ἀπροαίρετος) of their own and from 
‘involuntary’ (ἀεκούσιος) movements,235 humans have a great degree of moral 
freedom that subjects them to ‘blame’ (ψόγος) or ‘praise’ (ἔπαινος).236 In this way, 
Philo repudiated Aristotle’s insistence that animals can act voluntarily (ἑκουσίως),237 
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and thus are liable to praise or blame,238 and instead sided with the Stoic denial of 
voluntary movement in animals.239 Ironically, he invoked the Aristotelian notion of 
‘deliberate choice’ (προαιρετικός)240 – a choice of means that reason has determined 
to be conducive to an end in humans alone241 – in support of his Stoic claim, rather 
than advance the Stoic argument that animals lack the ability to without assent.242 
Philo elsewhere argued that in the case of animals, what passes for skill and design, 
for instance a spider’s weaving of a web, the making of the honeycomb by bees, the 
flight of birds, or the tunnelling of a mouse; what passes for vice, such as the story 
of Aristogiton’s horse who limped without an injured leg, the ostentation of 
peacocks or the rage of the elephant; what passes for virtue, such as the devotion of 
animals to their offspring, the craftiness of a fox, or the household management of 
ants, are all only apparent.243 Against the view that animals possess skill, virtue and 
vice, espoused especially by the New Academy against the Stoics,244 Philo flatly 
asserted their lack of the reasoning faculty.245 He argued with the Stoics, on the 
contrary, that animals and plants do whatever they do spontaneously or instinctively 
through the particularity of their design.246 Similarly, Philo excused little children 
from blame for their actions until they have reached an age of accountability,247 
since the reasoning faculty within them has yet to develop.248 
After arguing that the gift of mind and reason sets humans apart from plants and 
other animals by making them morally free, Philo next asserted that Moses only 
‘metaphorically’ (τροπικώτερον) ascribed anger to God in this passage. His 
argument essentially amounts to this: just as Moses had attributed to God hands, 
feet, eyes, the use of weapons such as the sword, and passions such as jealousy or 
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anger elsewhere in the scriptures, so in this passage he was doing the same with 
regard to wrath.249 Philo sought to ground his rejection of any attribution of 
anthropomorphic images to God on the basis of God’s simple, incorporeal existence 
outside of and above creation. Since He is not composed of parts, He does not need 
any bodily organs to serve as instruments to engage the cosmos. Further, as the 
Creator, He stands outside of and above creation. As a consequence, He is 
everywhere and nowhere at once, whereas corporeal existence supposes some sort of 
special limit. Further, He is likewise unencumbered by time. What is future and past 
to us is always present to God. This freedom with respect to body, space, and time 
renders any attribution of anthropomorphisms such as eyes or weapons of war or 
passions metaphorical by definition. 
Philo next argued that Moses’ purpose in using anthropomorphisms to describe 
God was to train ‘the fool’ (ὁ ἄφρων) to pursue virtue and avoid vice by means of 
fear (φόβος),250 a strategy similarly employed by the Stoics.251 The use of metaphor 
is a necessary first step in reforming fools since they are lovers of the body and 
otherwise unable to draw a right conception of God, though the Lawgiver’s ultimate 
pedagogical goal was nothing less than to entirely ‘cut off’ (ἐκτέµνω) ‘the diseases 
of the mind’ (αἱ τῆς διανοίας νοῦσοι) from the soul. Thus, we find Philo 
paradoxically arguing that the Lawgiver advocated the use of fear as a remedy for 
eradicating vice and passion in the soul of the fool, which presumably included the 
passion of fear! While on the surface this may appear to be incoherent, it is 
reminiscent of Philo’s concession in Legum allegoriae that Moses had described the 
four Stoic cardinal passions as ‘helpers’ (βοηθοί) of the soul by way of ‘a straining 
of language’ (καταχρηστικῶς) inasmuch as they sometimes do contribute to the 
permanence of the race or as a weapon of defence in the case of secondary passions 
such as anger.252 The difference is that while the passions in general might provide 
some unintended benefits for the maintenance of the human race, Philo here was 
calling for the therapeutic use of fear to aid the soul in its progress. Thus, the 
physician of the soul utilizes fear as a means of excising other vices and passions 
from the soul in the fool. So long as the soul is burdened with an anthropomorphic 
conception of the Existent, the doctor is forced to resort to placing before the fool 
                                                
249 Philo, Deus 52, 57-60. 
250 Ibid., 51-68, 71. 
251 For further discussion, see R. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind (2000), 51-2. 
252 Philo, Leg. 2.7-10. 
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representations of God as dealing in threats and showing indignation and implacable 
anger. ‘For’, Philo concluded, ‘this is the only way in which the fool can be 
admonished’ (µόνως γὰρ οὕτως ὁ ἄφρων νουθετεῖται). In this way, the passion of 
fear can serve a role in the spiritual progress of the fool, at least for a time. 
Ultimately, however, in order for the fool to pass over into sagacity and arrive at the 
complete excision of all ‘diseases of the mind’, including fear, the fool must come to 
conceive God without any human attributes at all and be motivated only by ‘love’ 
(ἀγάπη), which Philo elsewhere identified as a species of the proper feeling ‘wish’ 
(βούλησις).253 Though the Stoic, Epictetus, could advocate the temporary use by the 
novice of passions such as distress254 or shame,255 or the possible improper use of 
caution,256 Philo’s proposal to use fear may represent a small expansion on their 
approach. 
Having established the pedagogical utility of the passions for fools, who cannot 
but experience otherwise, Philo next asserted, rather incoherently, that the text ‘I 
was wroth in that I made them’ should be understood not only metaphorically of 
God, but also as an injunction against the passions themselves in humans. He 
summarized his interpretation of this text succinctly in the following doctrine:  
Wrath (θυµός) is the source of misdeeds (ἁµάρτηµα), but the reasoning 
faculty (λογισµός) of right actions (κατόρθωµα).257  
To this summary he added that ‘by general consent’ (ὁµολογουµένως) every ‘action’ 
(πρᾶγµα) done on account of fear, anger, grief, pleasure or any other passion is 
‘worthy of blame and censure’ (ὑπαίτια καὶ ἐπίληπτα), but if done through ‘rectitude 
of reason and knowledge’ (µετ’ ὀρθότητος λόγου καὶ ἐπιστήµης) then it is ‘worthy 
of praise’ (ἐπαινετός).258  
In this passage Philo offered several contrasts, including ‘blameworthy’ or 
‘censurable’ versus ‘praiseworthy’, the passions of fear, anger, grief, or pleasure 
versus ‘rectitude of reason’ or ‘knowledge’, ‘wrath’ versus ‘the reasoning faculty’, 
and ‘misdeeds’ versus ‘right actions’. If one were to draw up a moral ledger, each 
set of contrasts would be placed in one of two opposing columns. On one side would 
                                                
253 Philo, Migr. 169. 
254 Epic., Diatr. 3.23.30, 37. 
255 Epic., Diatr. 3.7.27; Ench. 33.16. 
256 Epic., Diatr. 2.12.12; 3.16.3. 
257 Philo, Deus 72. 
258 Philo, Deus 71-3. 
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be morally positive attributes such as praiseworthiness, right reason, knowledge, the 
reasoning faculty and right actions, while on the other, morally negative attributes 
such as blameworthiness, censure, the passions, wrath, and misdeeds. Each set of 
terms represented an entire constellation of interrelated elements that turned on the 
manner with which the mind uses its innate gifts of freedom, voluntary movement, 
and deliberate choice. Significantly, Philo included wrath, anger, fear, grief, 
pleasure, and the other passions unequivocally within the column of morally bad 
attributes.  
This series of contrasts also suggested a process of moral progress or regress for 
the soul. On the one hand, the reasoning faculty functions in accordance with right 
reason and knowledge to execute right actions that are worthy of praise. On the 
other hand, passions such as wrath serve as a font of misdeeds in accordance with 
the soul’s implied ignorance, which in turn leads to blame and censure. In this 
schema, one can draw a direct line from passions to vicious deeds to censure. Thus, 
while Philo faulted the passions on the basis of their origin as free and voluntary 
movements of the mind, he also took pains to condemn them for the vicious deeds 
that often result as their fruit. 
Though one might be tempted to understand Philo’s contrast between ‘wrath’ 
(θυµός) and ‘the reasoning faculty’ (λογισµός) in a Platonic manner, such an 
interpretation would be misguided. In a Platonic reading, the two terms are 
understood as opposed to one another as separate sources of virtue or vice, from 
different places in the soul. This is precisely the line of argument that Plato had used 
for anger as a distinct part of the soul apart from reason, though he had treated anger 
and wrath normally as allies to the mind against the appetitive part of the soul. 
Philo’s description of the reasoning faculty ‘as an incorruptible judge’ (ὥσπερ τις 
δικαστὴς ἀδωροδόκητος) that will accept whatever ‘right reason’ suggests might 
appear to further support this, since the Stoic understanding of anger is precisely the 
corruption or perversion of the reasoning faculty or process.259 
The context, however, does not support this reading for several reasons. Firstly, 
all the terms mentioned above from this passage were Stoic. Secondly, there is no 
mention of the appetitive part of the soul anywhere. The disparaging treatment that 
Philo accorded to anger and wrath in this passage would, in a Platonic framework, 
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have been reserved for desire; anger was normally reason’s ally. Thirdly, against a 
threefold treatment of the passions, the entire tone of this passage was instead 
dualistic, as witnessed to by the series of contrasts noted above, which better fits a 
Stoic moral sensibility, though it could also reflect developments in the Peripatetic 
and Middle Platonist traditions, and in Posidonius, where Plato’s tripartite soul was 
interpreted in a bipartite manner with ‘the spirited part’ of the soul rather aligned 
with ‘the appetitive part’ against reason.260 Fourthly, Philo observed that these 
passions are judged blameworthy by ‘common consent’ (ὁµολογουµένως).261 Such a 
doctrine was ‘common’ only to the Stoics, while both the Platonic and Peripatetic 
traditions explicitly rejected a universal condemnation of the passions. Aristotle’s 
doctrine of the means made room for an appropriate use of most of the passions, and 
Plato’s treatment of anger as an auxiliary to reason certainly placed it in a more 
positive light. Fifthly, Philo had already indicated that his goal was the eradication 
of the passions altogether, since all were nothing less than ‘diseases of the mind’, 
which was another way of speaking of the Stoic ideal of apatheia. Hence Philo’s 
closing remarks that the emotional goal of the wise soul was to love God, not to fear 
Him or be angry. Finally, this particular use of the term ‘reasoning faculty’ 
(λογισµός) in the doctrine quoted above, should be understood to mean not the 
faculty itself, but rather the process of reasoning. Philo had already indicated that 
this was his intention a few lines previously, when he described actions as 
praiseworthy when done with ‘rectitude of reason and knowledge’, but blameworthy 
when done from wrath.262 As such, Philo emphasized the kind of reasoning 
employed, not the fact of its employment. A simple employment of the faculty does 
not ensure praiseworthy actions unless done ‘with correctness’ (µετ’ ὀρθότητος) of 
reason and knowledge. If they are perverted through fear, anger, grief, or pleasure, 
the actions will result in vicious deeds worthy of blame or censure.  
Consequently, Philo described passions, as well as the vicious or wrong deeds 
that arise from them, as ‘blameworthy’ and ‘censurable’ on the basis of their 
voluntary character as free movements of the mind. This, as we have argued, 
corresponded to the Stoic conception of the passions as perverse movements of the 
mind. Nevertheless, Philo differed from the Stoics in that he placed more stress on 
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their blameworthiness. This emphasis certainly served to further underscore their 
voluntary character against involuntary theories of emotion found in the other 
philosophical traditions, most notably the Platonic and Peripatetic. Though we do 
not have space to develop it here, we should note that his emphasis on the voluntary 
and culpable character of the passions also fit his Jewish and religious legal instinct, 
which insisted on God’s praise of those creatures who obey His ‘command’ 
(πειθαρχία), but punishment through His Powers of those who do not.263  
Conclusion 
Philo characterized passion as excessive, irrational, unnatural, and voluntary, and as 
a consequence, deserving of censure and blame. While the Platonic and Aristotelian 
traditions could describe passion as an impulse that is irrational and or excessive, 
both considered passion’s irrationality to be natural. Similarly, although both 
traditions could condemn some passions as excessive, not all were worthy of 
censure. In their view, only when the lower parts of the soul disobediently move 
against reason and beyond the mean should they receive censure. A passion in itself, 
however, is inherently natural, and is often useful or appropriate.  
Philo, by contrast, consistently drew upon the Stoics’ depiction of all passions as 
irrational, excessive, unnatural, and consequently worthy of censure and extirpation 
– not moderation. In his view, passion’s irrationality results from the mind’s 
instability and false orientation and its excess results from the soul’s loss of control. 
Since passion is an unnatural psychic movement and harmful to the soul, Philo 
everywhere argued for its removal. The Platonic and Aristotelian accounts, by 
contrast, considered passion’s elimination impossible. Further, like the Stoics, Philo 
considered all passions to result from voluntary movements of the hegemon and 
hence to be morally vile per se. Indeed, he highlighted passion’s blameworthiness 
more than the Stoics did. This again contrasted with the Platonic and Aristotelian 
traditions, which recognized many emotions to be involuntary movements of the 
soul. Taken altogether, Philo’s depiction of the passions represented a Stoic 
approach to the passions.  
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Section 2: Platonic features and alternatives 
Chapter 3: The Platonic tripartite model for the soul 
Plato’s tripartite metaphor in Philo  
As detailed in the previous section, Philo drew heavily upon the the Stoic approach 
to the passions associated with Zeno, which identified a passion as a type of impulse 
that follows from a wretched mind’s assent to a false judgment regarding what is 
good or evil to pursue or avoid, though he sought to adapt it to a Platonic body-soul 
dualism associated with the Phaedo. With the Stoics, moreover, Philo characterized 
the passions as irrational, excessive, unnatural, fluttering, and, to a degree unique to 
Philo, worthy of censure. On a few occasions, in his exposition of scripture Philo 
could instead utilize the Platonic tripartite model outlined in the Republic and 
Timaeus and the myth of the charioteer recounted in the Phaedrus,1 the 
philosophical alternative and competitor to the Stoic approach. We will discuss 
Philo’s use of Plato’s tripartite model of the soul, as he understood it, in this chapter, 
and his employment of the charioteer myth in the next.  
Philo employed the tripartite Platonic alternative in two ways. In a few instances, 
he opted for a wholesale use of Plato’s tripartite metaphor of the soul. More often, as 
we have already hinted at several times in the preceding section, Philo chose rather 
to modify the Stoic elements of his psychology in subtle ways. Hence, we see a dual 
approach. In his efforts to provide an account of Moses’ moral psychology in his 
exposition of Torah, Philo felt free to modify the Stoic psychology he found in 
scripture to make it better fit within his overall Platonic outlook, even as he 
                                                
1 Scholars dispute whether or not Plato’s tripartism extends also to the Laws. For instance, 
Saunders argues that the state and soul continue to envision a tripartite structure in the Laws, even 
though no explicit evidence exists for the doctrine. See T.J. Saunders, ‘Structure of the Soul and the 
State in Plato’s Laws’ (1962). Bobonich, by contrast, argues that Plato abandoned the tripartite, 
agent-like partition of the soul in Plato’s Laws. C. Bobonich, ‘Akrasia and Agency in Plato’s Laws 
and Republic’ (1994), 17-32. Rees, while not excluding the possibility of tripartition, suggests that 
the Laws are marked rather by a tendency toward a bipartition of the soul. D.A. Rees, ‘Bipartition of 
the Soul in the Early Academy’ (1957), 113, 116. Vander Waerdt argues that the evidence is too 
ambiguous to make a certain determination. P.A. Vander Waerdt, ‘Peripatetic Interpretation of 
Plato’s Psychology’ (1985), 2856. Relevant texts include especially Plato, Leg. 1.644c, 9.863b. 
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simultaneously modified the Platonic psychological elements in a Stoic direction to 
make them better correspond with the tenets of his Stoic moral psychology.2 
Philo employed Plato’s tripartite psychology as his leading metaphor for the soul 
on a number of occasions throughout his corpus.3 Indeed, he twice explicitly 
endorsed Plato’s tripartite description of the soul without repudiating the Stoic 
monistic alternative in any way.4 For instance, in Legum allegoriae Philo argued: 
Our soul consists of three parts (τριµερῆ), and has one part (µέρος… ἕν) 
given to reasoning (τὸ λογιστικόν), a second to the spirited part (τὸ 
θυµικόν), a third to the desiring part (τὸ ἐπιθυµητικόν). Some 
philosophers (ἔνιοι…τῶν φιλοσόφων) have distinguished these parts (τὰ 
µέρη) from one another in regard to function (δυνάµει), some in regard 
also to the places (τόποι), which they occupy. These have gone on to 
assign to the reasoning part the region (χῶρος) of the head (κεφαλή), 
saying that, where the king is, there are also his bodyguards 
(δορυφόρος), and that the senses (αἱ αἰσθήσεις) which are in the region 
of the head are bodyguards of the mind (νοῦς), and that it follows that 
the king must be there too, having had it allotted to him, like a castle in a 
city, for his dwelling. To the spirited part they assign the breast (στέρνα) 
... to the desiring part of the soul they assign the quarter about the 
abdomen (ἦτρον) and the belly (κοιλίαν), for there it is that lust 
(ἐπιθυµία), irrational appetite (ὄρεξις ἄλογος), has its abode.5 
This description represents a conflation of Plato’s portrayal of ‘the soul’6 in the 
Republic and Timaeus and, as we will discuss in greater detail in the next chapter, 
                                                
2 As we will discuss in the last section of this chapter, this is not necessarily evidence of 
‘eclecticism’ in Philo. As Dillon observed, such a variation in the use of different schemes of the soul 
by the same writer were quite permissible within contemporary Platonism so long as a polemical 
controversy was not being conducted. The broad division of the soul into a higher (rational) part and 
a lower (irrational) part was the main thing. See J.M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (1977), 144. 
3 Philo, Leg. 1.68-73, 3.113-49; Agr. 67-123; Conf. 21-5, 112; Migr. 64-8; Her. 132, 225; Sobr. 
14; Spec. 1.146-8, 192, 4.79-99; Virt. 13; Praem. 59.  
4 Philo, Leg. 1.70, 3.115. 
5 Philo, Leg. 3.115. See also Philo, Virt. 13; Leg. 1.71. 
6 A number of difficulties surround Plato’s generic conception of psyche or soul. Depending on 
the context, Plato could make soul ‘responsible for the life of plants, the orderly movements of the 
heavenly bodies, the immortal feature of human beings, and everything mental’. This accounts for 
various difficulties that scholars have had in reconciling Plato’s doctrines of soul, including the 
‘personalist and non-personalist functions in his concept of psyche’, the soul’s unity versus 
tripartition, and its partial versus complete immortality. A.A. Long, ‘Platonic Souls as Person’ 
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the Phaedrus,7 a tendency common among Middle Platonists.8 In contrast to his 
early dialogues, Plato sought to establish a ‘positive’9 account of justice in the 
Republic by adopting a method of investigation of examining the larger, namely the 
polity, first, before proceeding to the smaller, that is, the individual soul, on the 
analogy of reading small, distant letters with the benefit of having read large ones 
first,10 establishing what Moline called a ‘structural and functional isomorphism’ 
between the two.11 Utilizing what Woods called the ‘principle of univocity’, 12 
Plato’s analogy thus rested upon the recognition of the same ‘natural tendency or 
capacity’ in both the individual and the community.13 Within this wider discussion 
regarding justice, in book four he argued that just as his city is divided into three 
classes – ‘the money-making’, ‘auxiliary’, and ‘guardian classes’ (χρηµατιστικός, 
ἐπικουρικός, φυλακικός γένος) – so likewise the embodied human soul is divided 
into three natural or basic parts, namely, ‘the rational’, ‘appetitive’, and ‘spirited’ (τὸ 
λογιστικόν, τὸ ἐπιθυµητικόν, τὸ θυµοειδές).14 Later, in books eight and nine, Plato 
outlined how the varying relations of each of these three parts of the soul result in 
five types of character, just as the varying relations of each of his three classes of 
citizen lead in turn to five forms of constitution (aristocratic or kingly, timocratic, 
oligarchic, democratic, and tyrannical).15 Throughout the Republic, Plato 
characterized the three parts of the soul in the manner described in the following 
passage:  
The first, we say, is the part with which a person learns (τὸ...ᾧ 
µανθάνει), and the second the part with which he gets angry (τὸ...ᾧ 
θυµοῦται). As for the third, we had no one special name for it, since it is 
                                                                                                                                    
(2005), 173-4, 1731, 1743. We will primarily focus on Plato’s tripartism in this and the next chapter, 
though we will touch on the issues cited above as necessary.  
7 As a consequence, the development in Plato’s psychology over his lifetime, together with the 
related question of the ordering of his writing, while important for a comprehensive study of Plato, 
has little bearing on this study. 
8 J.M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (1977), 8, 174.  
9 T. Penner, ‘Plato’s Ethics’ (2006), 151-2. 
10 Plato, Resp. 2.368d-369a, 4.434d-435b, 441a, 8.545b; Socrates’ fundamental presupposition 
appears to be that justice is one thing, but it manifests itself in many different ways. In this case, Plato 
is arguing that justice in the soul and justice in the polis can be taken as two manifestations of justice 
proper. See I.D. Evrigenis, ‘Psychology of Politics’ (2002), 593; B. Williams, ‘Analogy of City and 
Soul in Plato’s Republic’ (1997), 49. 
11 Plato, Resp. 4.441c; J. Moline, ‘Plato on the Complexity of the Psyche’ (1978), 2-7. 
12 M. Woods, ‘Plato’s Division of the Soul’ (1987), 26-8. 
13 Plato, Resp. 4.441c. 
14 Ibid., 4.439d-442c; M. Woods, ‘Plato’s Division of the Soul’ (1987) 29. 
15 Plato, Resp. 8.544e-545c, 9.580b, 587c. 
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multiform (πολυειδία), so we named it after the biggest and strongest 
thing (ὃ µέγιστον καὶ ἰσχυρότατον) in it. Hence we called it the 
appetitive part (ἐπιθυµητικόν), because of the intensity of its appetites 
(διὰ σφοδρότητα τῶν ἐπιθυµιῶν) for food, drink, sex, and all the things 
associated with them …16 
In the Timaeus, Plato outlined a mythical account of the construction of this cosmos 
in which ‘soul’ features as a central element in the narrative. This was true at the 
cosmic level where Plato conceived of the universe as ‘a single living animal’ (ζῷον 
ἔν), endowed with ‘soul and intelligence’ (ἔµψυχον ἔννουν τε), which contains 
within itself all living things, and is immortal.17 It was also true at the level of 
anthropology, where the parallel between ‘World Soul and individual soul is a 
remarkably close one’.18 In the last section of the Timaeus, Plato argued that the 
Demiurge first fashioned the divine progeny and then assigned to them the task of 
imitating him in making mortal elements of the cosmos, including the lower parts of 
the human soul and body: 
…having taken the immortal origin of the soul, they proceeded next to 
encase it within a round mortal body [the head], and to give it the entire 
body as its vehicle. Within this body they built another kind of soul as 
well, the mortal kind (τὸ θνητόν), which contains within itself those 
dreadful but necessary disturbances [pleasure, pain, boldness and fear, 
anger (ἡδονή, λύπη, θάρσος, φόβος, θυµός)] … Now the part of the 
mortal soul that exhibits manliness and spirit (ἀνδρεία, θυµός), the 
ambitious part (φιλόνεικος), they settled nearer the head, between the 
midriff (φρήν) and neck (αὐχήν), so that it might listen to reason (τοῦ 
λόγου κατήκοον) and together with it restrain by force (βίᾳ) the part 
consisting of appetites (τὸ τῶν ἐπιθυµιῶν γένος), should the latter at any 
time refuse outright to obey (πείθω) the dictates of reason coming down 
from the citadel.19 
A little later, Plato added this concerning the appetitive part of the soul: 
                                                
16 Ibid., 9.580d-e. 
17 Plato, Tim. 30c-d, 69c. 
18 T.M. Robinson, Plato’s Psychology (1995), 106; Dillon characterizes the individual soul as a 
‘microcosm’ of the World Soul in the Timaeus. J.M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (1977), 6. 
19 Plato, Tim. 69c-d, 70a. 
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The part of the soul that has appetites for food and drink (τὸ... σίτων τε 
καὶ ποτῶν ἐπιθυµητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς) and whatever else it feels a need for, 
given the body’s nature, they settled in the area between the midriff 
(φρήν) and the boundary toward the navel (πρὸς τὸν ὀµφαλόν). In the 
whole of this region, they constructed something like a trough (φάτνη) 
for the body’s nourishment. Here they tied this part of the soul down like 
a wild beast (ὡς θρέµµα ἄγριον), but one they could not avoid sustaining 
along with the others if a mortal race were ever to be … They knew that 
this part of the soul was not going to understand (οὔτε συνήσειν 
ἔµελλεν) the deliverances of reason (λόγος) and that even if it were in 
one way or another to have some awareness of them, it would not have 
an innate regard for any of them (οὐκ ἔµφυτον αὐτῷ τὸ µέλειν τινῶν 
ἔσοιτο λόγων)…20 
When we compare these texts drawn from both Philo and Plato, we see that although 
Philo does not identify ‘the philosophers’, his description of their opinions closely 
matches those of Plato,21 both in terms of his terminology and in his characterization 
of each part of the soul. The fact that Philo refers to ‘philosophers’ in the plural need 
not trouble us, given the wide popularity of Plato’s psychology in antiquity.  
To begin with, Philo and Plato schematized the tripartite soul in the same 
manner. They organized the soul hierarchically into what amounted to the shape of a 
pyramid:22 
 
                                                
20 Ibid., 70d-71a. 
21 Philo’s reference to the three parts as ‘functions’ could point instead to Posidonius as Lévy 
suggests. See C. Lévy, ‘Philon et les Passions’ (2006), 28. 
22 Warne makes the Platonic tripartite division Philo’s primary structure of the soul. G.J. Warne, 
Philo and Paul (1995), 139-41. Though he recognizes Philo’s description of sense-perception in 
terms of ‘seven senses’, surprisingly, he completely misses the Stoic connotations of this image as 
discussed in chapter 1, as well as the strongly monist character of Philo’s treatment of the mind as the 
‘ruling part’, which again is Stoic.  
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Figure 1: Schematization of the soul in Plato and Philo 
As this illustration shows, both Philo and Plato divided the soul into the same three 
parts, namely, the rational, appetitive, and spirited, and simultaneously stressed the 
bipartite division between mortal and immortal elements.23 They placed the rational 
part at the top nearest the divine and the appetitive at the base closest to the mortal 
and earthly, while the spirited part was sandwiched between them. Further, both 
treated the rational part and mind as ‘divine’ and ‘immortal’, but the two lower parts 
as mortal, irrational and earthly.24 Their mutual description of the mind as ‘a king’ 
further reinforced its superiority over the other parts of the soul. Hence, they both 
always placed each of these respective parts in the same hierarchical order – the 
rational first, the spirited second, and the appetitive third. Finally, they treated the 
rational part as the smallest and the appetitive as the largest, with the spirited in the 
middle. As we will see in a moment, this related in part to their spatial relations to 
the human body, but it also had to do with the number of desires associated with 
each part. In contrast to the rational and spirited parts, which were each associated 
primarily with a single function – reasoning and anger – the appetitive part is filled 
with a host of bodily desires for food, drink, sex and so forth, that all clamour for 
satisfaction. 
                                                
23 Robinson characterizes Plato’s tripartite division as ‘in fact more fairly described as bipartition 
with a further subdivision within it’. T.M. Robinson, Plato’s Psychology (1995), 121. Runia notes 
that bipartition was ‘faithful to the spirit of the Timaeus’, citing Plato, Tim. 61c7, 65c5, 69c7, d5, e1, 
72d4, and 41d1. See D.T. Runia, Philo and the Timaeus of Plato (1986), 305. 
24 Plato, Tim. 69c-70b, 90a-c. Strictly speaking, Plato’s positing of the two lower parts within the 
tripartite scheme as ‘mortal’ derives from the Timaeus. The Republic and Phaedrus, by contrast, treat 
all three parts as immortal, permanent parts of the soul that cohere even apart from embodiment. For 
further discussion, see T.M. Robinson, Plato’s Psychology (1995), 106, 120. 
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Philo and Plato used nearly identical terminology for the three parts of the soul.25 
Both described the divisions as ‘parts’ (µέρει), ‘classes’ (εἴδη) or sometime ‘kinds’ 
(γένη).26 Both called the part of the soul that reasons or calculates ‘rational’ 
(λογιστικόν). Both associated the second part especially with ‘spirit’ or ‘anger’ 
(θυµός). As such, both used various cognates of anger to name the second part. Philo 
normally used ‘high spirit’ or ‘spirited’ (θυµός or θυµικόν), but never ‘spirited part’ 
(τὸ θυµοειδές), a change in terminology that reflects a Peripatetic and later Middle 
Platonic reading of Plato, as Vander Waerdt notes.27 Plato in contrast normally 
preferred ‘spirited part’ (τὸ θυµοειδές) in the Republic, but ‘high spirit’ (θυµός) 
throughout his corpus. Both philosophers connected the third part of the soul with 
‘desire’ (ἐπιθυµία) for the pleasures of food, drink, and sex. Hence, both called the 
third part that embraces the wide assortment of desires connected to the sphere of 
the abdomen ‘the appetitive’ (ἐπιθυµητικόν). The respective names of each part 
indicated their basic activities. As such, both philosophers distinguished among the 
three parts by their basic functions.  
The division of the soul into parts also possessed strong spatial overtones for 
Philo and Plato. Philo noted in the passage above that some ‘philosophers’ 
distinguished the parts of the soul ‘by function’ (δυνάµει), while other did so ‘by 
places’ (τόποις). Philo himself opted to appropriate both approaches, just as Plato 
had done. We have already noted how they connected each of the parts to specific 
functions. With regard to ‘place’, in the Timaeus28 Plato had originally assigned the 
                                                
25 Moline observed that scholars have proposed a number of English terms for the ‘parts’ of 
Plato’s tripartite division of the soul, including ‘faculties’, ‘principles’, ‘activities’, ‘aspects’, 
‘instances’, and ‘levels’. See J. Moline, ‘Plato on the Complexity of the Psyche’ (1978), 1. 
26 For instance, for ‘parts’ (µέρει), see Plato, Resp. 4.442b, c, 444b, 9.577d, 583a, 586e; Philo, 
Leg. 1.70-1, 3.115; for ‘classes’ (εἴδη), see Plato, Resp. 4.435c, 439e, 440e, 6.504a, 9.580d; Tim. 89e-
90a; Philo, Mut. 119; for ‘kinds’ (γένη), see Plato, Resp. 4.441c; Tim. 70a, e; Philo, QG 179. In terms 
of his overall usage, Philo clearly preferred to think of the tripartite soul in terms of ‘parts’ (µέρος). 
Robinson points out that Plato tended to associate ‘kinds’ (γένη) with the divisions of the city or 
when using the city analogy of the divisions of the soul, but ‘parts’ (µέρει) and ‘classes’ (εἴδη) with 
the divisions of the soul, though not exclusively so. To see this subtle distinction in practice, see for 
instance, Plato, Resp. 4.435b-c; R. Robinson, ‘Plato’s Separation of Reason and Desire’ (1971), 44-
55. Moline argues that εἴδη implies that each part is characterized by a certain paradigmatic kind of 
‘purity’ corresponding to their respective names in keeping with Plato’s notion of εἴδη as ‘forms’ 
elsewhere. See for instance, Plato, Phd. 79a-d. This protects against the danger of an infinite regress 
of parts-within-parts. See J. Moline, ‘Plato on the Complexity of the Psyche’ (1978), 24-5. For the 
Peripatetic and Academic terminology for the divisions of the soul, see P.A. Vander Waerdt, 
‘Peripatetic Interpretation of Plato’s Psychology’ (1985), 2869. 
27 P.A. Vander Waerdt, ‘Peripatetic Interpretation of Plato’s Psychology’ (1985), 2869; id., 
‘Peripatetic Soul Division’ (1985), 374-6. 
28 Scholars debate whether or not Plato envisioned specific bodily locations for each part of the 
soul in the Republic as he clearly did in the Timaeus. See D.A. Rees, ‘Bipartition of the Soul in the 
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reasoning part and senses to the head or brain.29 This contrasted with the Stoics, who 
had located the commanding part in the heart, as we may recall from our discussion 
in the previous section. Instead, Plato located the spirited part in ‘the breast’ 
(στέρνα) – that is, the region between ‘the midriff’ (φρήν) and neck where the heart 
is located. In a manner not unlike the commanding part of the soul for the Stoics, the 
spirited part of the soul uses the blood vessels that emanate from the heart as 
channels to communicate ‘exhortations’ (παρακελεύσεις) and ‘threats’ (ἀπειλαί) to 
other bodily parts.30  
Plato assigned the appetitive part to ‘the area’ (τόπος) between the midriff 
(φρήν) and navel (ὀµφαλός) near the organs of nourishment.31 As such, he primarily 
associated it with the desires for food and drink.32 He never explicitly connected the 
appetitive part to sexual desire in the Timaeus. Indeed, throughout the Timaeus he 
tended to treat sexual desire separately from the appetitive, although he never called 
it a fourth part, nor did he connect it with either the spirited or reasoning parts. In the 
Republic, however, Plato did make the connection clear in that he explicitly included 
‘sex’ (ἀφροδίσια) or left-handed ‘erotic love’ (ἔρως) among the desires of the 
appetitive part.33 Indeed, he went so far as to treat erotic desire as the leader of the 
appetites, especially in the tyrannical type of soul in whom the appetitive part of the 
soul has gone out of control.34 With Robinson, we should note that Plato’s 
confinement of the three psychic parts to certain regions of the soul was qualified to 
an extent in the Timaeus when he added that the marrow of the bones contains some 
soul and intelligence and so extends throughout the body as a sort of ‘life principle’ 
and anchor.35  
Philo located each part of the soul in the same ‘regions’ (χῶροι) of the body as 
Plato. He assigned the reasoning part and the senses to ‘the head’ (κεφαλή) or 
                                                                                                                                    
Early Academy’ (1957), 113. For our purposes, the question is of little import since Philo tended to 
read the Republic and Timaeus synoptically.  
29 For the brain, see Plato, Tim. 73d, 76a-d. 
30 Plato, Tim. 70a-b. 
31 Ibid., 70e. 
32 Ibid., 70e, 88b. 
33 Plato, Resp. 3.402e-403b, 4.436a, 4.439d, 9.572e, 9.573d, 9.575a, 9.580e. See my comments 
in the next chapter regarding Plato’s distinction between a left-handed and right-handed form of 
‘erotic love’ in the Phaedrus. Moreover, Plato also depicted the desire of the rational part for 
knowledge of the good and beautiful as associated with his philosopher-king as a type of ‘erotic 
love’. See Plato, Resp. 5.474b-e, 5.475b-c, 6.485a-e; L.D. Cooper, ‘Beyond the Tripartite Soul’ 
(2001), 348. 
34 Plato, Resp. 9.573e. 
35 Plato, Tim. 73b-d, 75a; T.M. Robinson, Plato’s Psychology (1995), 106-7. 
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‘brain’ (ἐγκέφαλος),36 though he allowed for the possibility that the rational part 
might be located in ‘the heart’.37 Like Plato, he also assigned high spirit to ‘the 
chest’ (στέρνα) or ‘breast’ (στῆθος).38 He derived the second term, ‘breast’, from 
biblical texts upon which he was commenting.39 Additionally, in his sevenfold 
division of the body into its external parts Philo had identified the head and chest as 
the two top parts.40 Finally, Philo assigned desire to the same basic region of the 
body as Plato, though he used different terminology. He located the appetitive part 
in ‘the belly’ (κοιλία), ‘maw’ (ἤνυστρον), or ‘abdomen’ (ἦτρον). For instance, in the 
passage from the Legum allegoriae quoted above, Philo opted for the term ‘belly’.41 
His choice of terminology here clearly derived from the passage upon which he was 
commenting, namely, Gen. 3:14 of the LXX. It reads: ‘On your “breast” (στῆθος) 
and “belly” (κοιλία) you shall go.’42 For Philo, the terms ‘breast’ and ‘belly’ recalled 
Plato’s location of the two lower parts of the soul in these regions of the body, while 
the biblical text controlled the exact terminology in those passages.  
Philo elsewhere used only the terms ‘abdomen’ (ἦτρον) 43 or ‘maw’ (ἤνυστρον)44 
for the location of the appetitive part of the soul. The three terms – belly, abdomen, 
and maw – refer to adjacent regions of the body that house the two key sets of 
desires that both he and Plato associated with the appetitive part of the soul – the 
desire for food or drink and sexual desire. In his delineation of the external members 
of the body, Philo listed ‘the belly’ (κοιλία or γαστήρ) after the head and breast, but 
he placed the abdomen below the belly nearer to the feet.45 As such, the belly would 
be more associated with Plato’s ‘trough’ for food and drink, while the abdomen 
would be closer to the sexual organs. Philo explicitly associated the appetitive part 
of the soul and the belly and maw, which referred to the fourth stomach of 
ruminating animals, with the passions of ‘wine bibbing’ (οἰνοφλυγία) and ‘gluttony’ 
(ὀψοφαγία or λαιµαργία). He treated these passions as desires for drink and food 
                                                
36 Philo, Leg. 1.70, 3.115; Conf. 21; Migr. 66-67; Spec. 1.146, 4.92-4; QG 1.5; QE 2.100, 124; 
compare with Plato, Tim. 69e-70a.  
37 Philo, Leg. 1.59, 2.6; Spec. 4.69. 
38 Philo, Spec. 1.146. For futher discussion, see D.T. Runia, Philo and the Timaeus of Plato 
(1986), 302-3. 
39 For ‘breast’ (στῆθος), see Gen. 3:14 (LXX); for the diminutive form (στηθύνιον), see Lev. 
7:31-4 (LXX). 
40 Philo, Opif. 118. 
41 Philo, Leg. 3.115-6. See also Philo, Migr. 66. 
42 Gen. 3:14 (LXX). 
43 Philo, Leg. 1.70-1. 
44 Philo, Spec. 1.148. 
45 Philo, Leg. 1.12. 
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respectively.46 Philo even invoked Plato’s imagery of the belly as ‘a manger’ 
(φάτνη) from which ‘the irrational animal’ (ἄλογος θρέµµα) of desire eats.47 Hence, 
Philo connected the appetitive part of the soul to both parts of the external body – 
the desires for food and drink to the belly, but sexual desire to the abdomen.  
Plato’s three parts of the soul as distinct ‘agent-like’ elements 
Plato’s tripartism envisioned a soul that is fundamentally complex, but in what 
sense? Plato had initially proposed his division of the individual soul into three parts 
as analogous to his threefold separation of the political and social classes in his 
hypothetical city-state as the basis for the interlocutors’ definition of justice,48 
whatever its inconsistencies.49 Plato’s analogy of the tripartite soul with the tripartite 
class ‘composition’50 of his city-state, together with his akratic language of different 
parts usurping or obeying, corrupting or bettering one another imply that we ought 
to think of the soul’s parts in some sense as an internal community of agents. Yet, 
Plato’s insistence that the soul acts as a single, unified person,51 that it is ‘non-
composite’ (ἀσύνθετος),52 that it is perhaps unitary in its true and purified nature 
after all,53 on the ‘co-consciousness of each of the parts’,54 and on the Orphic-style 
pre/post-existence of the soul identified with what Robinson calls the ‘counter-
person’ or ‘true person’,55 cautions us against overstressing the independent 
                                                
46 Philo, Spec. 1.148-50. 
47 Ibid., 1.148; Plato, Tim. 70e. Note that Plato in this passage described the appetitive animal as 
‘wild’ (ὡς θρέµµα ἄγριον) rather than ‘irrational’ (ἄλογος) as in Philo’s case. 
48 Plato, Resp. 4.434d-435b. See also Plato, Resp. 2.368d-e, 4.441a, 8.545b. I.D. Evrigenis, 
‘Psychology of Politics’ (2002), 590.  
49 See for instance, B. Williams, ‘Analogy of City and Soul in Plato’s Republic’ (1997) and J. 
Annas, Introduction to Plato’s Republic (1981), 148. 
50 ‘Composition’ is used here in Gill’s sense of an atomistic conception of the part-whole 
relationship. See C. Gill, Naturalistic Psychology (2010), 14-5, 78-80, 180, 182. 
51 Plato, Resp. 4.436a, 439a-b, 9.571d-572a; A.W. Price, ‘Are Plato’s Soul-Parts Psychological 
Subjects?’ (2009), 12; J. Moline, ‘Plato on the Complexity of the Psyche’ (1978), 8. Long argues for 
a normative ‘personalist’ understanding of psyche throughout Plato’s writings, and its rough affinity 
to the modern notion of ‘person’. See A.A. Long, ‘Platonic Souls as Person’ (2005). 
52 Plato, Phd. 78c. 
53 Plato, Resp. 10.612a; T.M. Robinson, Plato’s Psychology (1995), 43, 51-4. 
54 A.W. Price, ‘Are Plato’s Soul-Parts Psychological Subjects?’ (2009), 10. 
55 T.M. Robinson, Plato’s Psychology (1995), 20, 25, 37, 46. Robinson points out that in this 
strain of Platonic thought, the soul is described as a sort of ‘duplicate self with all of the 
characteristics which we normally attribute to standard human beings’, but quite apart from the body. 
This ‘soul-as-the-real-person’, moreover, is complex, composed of at least ‘reason and impulse’. 
Warne adds that Plato attributed ‘the soul with a new status, with an ontological order of its own’, 
which he identified, following Socrates, with what he called the ‘inner person’ as distinct from the 
body. It is immaterial, incorporeal, and intelligible, belonging to the highest order of reality where 
God and the Forms dwell, and, as such, has a natural kinship with this reality. See G.J. Warne, Philo 
and Paul (1995), 105-10.  
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subjectivity of each part. As a consequence, scholars differ on how best to interpret 
Plato. Price called the emphasis on the parts as three distinct psychological subjects 
a ‘strong reading’ of Plato’s argument in book four of the Republic, as opposed to 
his own interpretation of the parts as ‘aspects of ourselves’, identified by 
characteristic mental states, as a ‘weak reading’.56 The more one stresses the agent-
like character of the three parts, the more one emphasizes cognitive and evaluative 
elements in the so-called ‘irrational’ parts. Both perspectives, however, underscore a 
cognitive element in the emotions themselves, since they assume that emotions have 
a ‘propositional core: one is angry, say, that so-and-so has acted unjustly’.57 
Similarly, in the case of ‘desire’ (ἐπιθυµία), Plato argued that when someone wishes 
something be given him that he wants, his ‘soul’ (ψυχή) nods assent (ἐπινεύω) as ‘if 
answering a question’ (ὥσπερ τινὸς ἐρωτῶντος).58 Though Plato does not detail the 
exact cognitive process at work, he clearly envisions emotions such as anger or 
desire including some sort of proposition – ‘so-and-so acted unjustly’ or ‘a question’ 
– as part of their basic constitution. 
Whatever the best reading may be, this ambiguity surrounding how to 
understand Plato reappears in Philo’s own treatment of the tripartite soul. The main 
drift of Philo’s appropriation of Plato’s psychic tripartism was in the direction of an 
instrumental conception of the parts, which is in keeping with Price’s ‘weak 
reading’, as one would expect of a moral psychology that viewed Plato through 
Aristotle and shaped by Stoicism. For, in the Stoic monistic model, the mind alone 
possesses the power of reasoning, motivation and impulse, and in the Peripatetic 
model, psychic complexity consists of conflicting functionalities shorn of most of 
                                                
56 A.W. Price, ‘Are Plato’s Soul-Parts Psychological Subjects?’ (2009), 1. See also S. Goetz and 
C. Taliaferro, Brief History of the Soul (2011), 16; T.M. Robinson, Plato’s Psychology (1995), 56. 
Price expounded on his ‘weak reading’ in A.W. Price, Mental Conflict (1994). Moline points out that 
this weaker reading, which ascribes to Plato what he calls a ‘faculty psychology’, enjoys a long 
history. See J. Moline, ‘Plato on the Complexity of the Psyche’ (1978), 12, 2343. For recent 
proponents of the ‘strong reading’, see J. Moline, ‘Plato on the Complexity of the Psyche’ (1978); J. 
Annas, Introduction to Plato’s Republic (1981); C. Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast (2002); and H. 
Lorenz, ‘Brute Within’ (Oxford, 2006). 
57 A.W. Price, ‘Emotions in Plato and Aristotle’ (2009), 122-6. Price argues later that emotions 
involve an interaction between perception, imagination, involving both memory and expectation, and 
belief. A.W. Price, ‘Emotions in Plato and Aristotle’ (2009), 133-40. Their precise relations to one 
another and to emotion in Aristotle are unclear. Knuuttila divides Aristotle’s theory of emotion into 
the following components: 1) an evaluation that something positive or negative is happening, 2) a 
pleasant or unpleasant feeling about the content of the evaluation, 3) a behaviour suggestion or 
impulse toward action, and 4) bodily changes. See S. Knuuttila, Emotions (2004), 32-42. For further 
bibliographic references, see note 3255. We see here most of the key components that would later go 
into the Stoic theory of the emotions, but with much less clarity with regard to their exact relations. 
58 Plato, Resp.  
   
138 
Plato’s agent-like characteristics,59 both of which are closer to Price’s ‘weak 
reading’. Yet Philo also appeared to be aware of a possible stronger reading, so that 
he sometimes drew upon those elements in Plato that account for the depiction of the 
parts as agents. This was exemplified above all in his extensive utilization of Plato’s 
charioteer metaphor from the Phaedrus, which we will explore further in the next 
chapter, as well as his occasional personification of the parts in his biblical 
commentaries. 
As proponents of the ‘strong reading’ point out, Plato often treated the three 
parts as if they were three different agents. In this view, the reasoning, spirited, and 
appetitive parts each possesses its own ‘psychic states, activities and capacities 
normally attributed to the whole person’.60 Bobonich summarized the agent-like 
character of each part by noting that each has its own ‘pleasures and desires’ (ἡδοναί 
and ἐπιθυµίαι),61 and its own ‘cognitive and linguistic capacities’, including the 
ability of each part ‘to want and wish’ (βούλεσθαι and ἐθέλειν),62 to possess separate 
beliefs,63 and to engage in forms of communication, persuasion, and reasoning.64  
                                                
59 This tendency toward functionalism in Aristotle must not be overstated. In his explication of 
incontinence or akratic conflict in the soul, for instance, he could still attribute some participation in 
reason by the appetitive parts of the soul such that they are able to obey or resist reason and be 
persuaded by reason through advice, reproof, and exhortation. See Arist., Eth. Nic. 1.13 1102b-
1103a. In this regard, Posidonius likewise took over Plato’s tripartite structure, but treated the ‘parts’ 
as functions devoid of the agent-like characteristics, if he had in fact returned to Platonic tripartism. 
See C. Lévy, ‘Philo’s Ethics’ (2009), 155.  
60 C. Bobonich, ‘Akrasia and Agency in Plato’s Laws and Republic’ (1994), 4. Knuuttila notes 
that this has given rise to the so-called ‘homuncular theory’ with regard to the status of Plato’s parts 
of the soul. Proponents of this theory argue that Plato’s parts all essentially act as ‘little people’ 
(homonculae), with the result that the soul ceases to be a true unity. See S. Knuuttila, Emotions 
(2004), 9. 
61 Plato, Resp. 9.580d-587e. Woods observes that Plato did not explicitly state that each part has 
its own kind of desire until Book 9 of the Republic. M. Woods, ‘Plato’s Division of the Soul’ (1987), 
257. Nevertheless, Plato’s entire argument for the distinction of parts of the soul put forward in Book 
4 hinges on the assumption on the conflict among differing desires.  
62 Plato, Resp. 4.437b-c, 439a-d. 
63 Ibid., 4.442b-d, 9.574d-575a. Sim suggests that the beliefs of each of the respective parts 
correspond to some extent with the four states of knowing (knowledge, thought, belief, and 
conjecture) in the simile of the divided line in Book 6 of the Republic. See M. Sim, ‘Divided Line 
and United Psychê in Plato’s Republic’ (2008), 98-9; Plato, Resp. 6.509-11. 
64 C. Bobonich, ‘Akrasia and Agency in Plato’s Laws and Republic’ (1994), 4; J. Moline, ‘Plato 
on the Complexity of the Psyche’ (1978), 14-22. For instances of persuasion and agreement, see 
Plato, Resp. 4.442b-d, 9.554c-e, 589a-b. We should note that Plato’s metaphors in Book 4 of the 
Republic do not consistently support this strong social understanding of the soul. For instance, Plato 
offers the images of the archer pulling and pushing the same string, the spinning top, and the case of a 
person moving his head and arms while standing still, all of which point to a single subject or 
unifying centre over and above the parts, which are treated instrumentally. By contrast, his images of 
the conflicting desires in Book 9, for instance, treating the desire of the appetitive part as a drone, 
better support the social interpretation of the parts of the soul.  
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Plato argued for the agent-like distinction among the parts of the soul on the 
basis of the akratic experience of acting against one’s better judgement.65 At the 
beginning of his discussion of the tripartite soul in the Republic Plato explicitly 
raised the question as to whether we learn, feel anger and desire food, drink and sex 
with ‘the same part’ (τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ) or ‘with three parts’ (τρισίν).66 He opted for 
the second option and then argued that our soul is composed of multiple parts on the 
basis of what Annas calls ‘the principle of conflict’, which holds that two opposed 
states cannot hold of the same entity at the same time.67 While Plato did not state 
what exactly this ‘same entity’ is, the immediate context implies that he equated it 
with the parts of the soul, but without ever stating what exactly they are either.68 He 
next sought to distinguish the reasoning and appetitive parts by citing a special case 
of a morbid, akratic craving where the human soul is affected in opposite ways.69 
Utilizing the example of thirst for drink, he argued that the ‘same entity’ cannot 
impel and restrain, bid and forbid, act and be acted upon, with regard to the same, in 
relation to the same object and at the same time. The conflict is akratic because it is 
‘between two fundamentally opposed impulses that cannot be traced to a common 
source’: one impulse has its origin in the rational calculation of the good, the other 
                                                
65 J. Moline, ‘Plato on the Complexity of the Psyche’ (1978), 6; T. Penner, ‘Plato’s Ethics’ 
(2006), 156. Boeri offers a helpful definition of akrasia, incontinence, or weakness of will as follows: 
‘an agent [is] inclined to perform an action that, although he knows it to be incorrect, he performs 
anyway against his own better judgment’. See M.D. Boeri, ‘Stoic Account of Akrasia’ (2005), 384. 
For further discussion of the development and evolution of akrasia in Plato and in comparision with 
Aristotle and the Stoics, see R. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind (2000), 304-15. 
66 Plato, Resp. 4.436a. 
67 J. Annas, Introduction to Plato’s Republic (1981), 137. Plato stated the principle of conflict as 
follows: ‘It is obvious that the same thing will not be willing to do or undergo opposites in the same 
respect, in relation to the same thing, at the same time, so that if we find these things happening we 
shall know that it is not the same object at the same time, but more than one’ (Δῆλον ὅτι ταὐτὸν 
τἀναντία ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν κατὰ ταὐτόν γε καὶ πρὸς ταὐτὸν οὐκ ἐθελήσει ἅµα, ὥστε ἄν που 
εὑρίσκωµεν ἐν αὐτοῖς ταῦτα γιγνόµενα, εἰσόµεθα ὅτι οὐ ταὐτὸν ἦν ἀλλὰ πλείω). Plato, Resp. 4.436b; 
R.F. Stalley, ‘Plato’s Argument’ (1975), 115. Scholars have proposed various names for the 
principle. Robinson called it ‘the principle of opposites’. See R. Robinson, ‘Plato’s Separation of 
Reason and Desire’ (1971), 38-9; R.F. Stalley, ‘Plato’s Argument’ (1975), 110-7; Price called it ‘the 
principle of non-contrariety’ or ‘PNC’. See A.W. Price, ‘Are Plato’s Soul-Parts Psychological 
Subjects?’ (2009), 2. Sim called it the ‘principle of non-contradiction’ or ‘PNC’. See M. Sim, 
‘Divided Line and United Psychê in Plato’s Republic’ (2008), 87. We should note that this occurs 
only in the Republic. Bobonich points out that Plato did not invoke the principle of conflict as a 
rationale for partitioning the soul in either the Phaedrus or the Timaeus. C. Bobonich, ‘Akrasia and 
Agency in Plato’s Laws and Republic’ (1994), 2343. Sorabji points out, however, that Plato’s theory 
does not adequately address the possibiliy of simultaneous potentialities or capacities; opposite 
desires might be more akin to opposite readinesses or capacities than opposite activities. See R. 
Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind (2000), 304-5. 
68 R. Robinson, ‘Plato’s Separation of Reason and Desire’ (1971), 38-48. 
69 R.F. Stalley, ‘Plato’s Argument’ (1975), 117. 
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in the pursuit of an alternative object irrespective of its value.70 It is morbid because 
the agent does not view its indulgence as a good in the slightest degree.71  
To establish the existence of the appetitive part, Plato described the case of a 
thirsty person who does not wish to drink. He argued that if the same soul can 
simultaneously desire and reject drink, then there must be at least two parts of the 
soul. The appetitive part ‘wishes’ (βούλοµαι), ‘wants’ (ὀρέγοµαι) and is ‘impelled’ 
(ὁρµάω) toward drink; the rational part ‘draws back’ (ἀνθέλκω) the soul and 
‘forbids’ (κωλύω) it to drink.72 He next sought to establish the third division in the 
soul – namely, the spirited part – by citing the story of a morbid craving to see 
corpses, an appetitive desire, and one’s anger at it. He offered as evidence the story 
of King Leontius and the executed convicts:73  
I once heard a story which I believe, that Leontius the son of Aglaion, on 
his way up from the Peiraeus under the outer side of the northern wall, 
becoming aware of dead bodies that lay at the place of public execution 
at the same time felt a desire (ἐπιθυµέω) to see them and a repugnance 
(δυσχεραίνω) and aversion (ἀποτρέπω), and that for a time he resisted 
and veiled his head, but overpowered (κρατούµενος) in despite of all by 
his desire (ἐπιθυµία), with wide staring eyes he rushed up to the corpses 
and cried, ‘There, you wretches, take your fill of the fine spectacle!’ 
Plato concluded:  
… surely, this anecdote signifies that the principle of anger (ὀργή) 
sometimes fights (πολεµέω) against desires (ἐπιθυµία) as an alien thing 
against an alien.74 
Plato used the story of Leontius to illustrate and posit this third part of the soul, 
which he designated ‘the spirited part’ (θυµός or τὸ θυµοειδές). In the story, the 
reasoning part of Leontius’ soul did not wish to see the dead bodies and felt ‘a 
repugnance and aversion’ towards them, perhaps out of a sense of what is right and 
                                                
70 M. Woods, ‘Plato’s Division of the Soul’ (1987), 44. If this interpretation of Plato is correct, 
he is here opposing the Socratic, and later Stoic principle, that unjust, passionate, or vicious action 
originates in false opinions about the good. 
71 M. Woods, ‘Plato’s Division of the Soul’ (1987), 41-5. 
72 Plato, Resp. 4.439a-c. 
73 As further support for the distinctiveness of the spirited part, Plato also briefly reminded the 
reader of Homer’s description of Odysseus’ rebuking himself for his anger at the suitors. Plato, Resp. 
4.441b-c. 
74 Plato, Resp. 4.439b-440a. 
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decent, yet the appetitive part of his soul continued to long to see the executed 
criminals. When Leontius did look at the bodies, he became angry with himself for 
giving into his whims. Once again utilizing Annas’ ‘principle of conflict’, Plato 
argued that this demonstrated that the soul possesses a third part distinct from both 
the reasoning and appetitive parts. Since the spirited part ‘fought’ against the 
appetitive part of the soul as ‘an ally’ of the reasoning part, this signified that the 
spirited part is ‘alien’ to the appetitive and, as such, is a distinct part of the soul. Just 
as the fact that some can thirst and yet refuse a drink is evidence of two conflicting 
parts of the soul, so also Plato argued that the existence of the spirited part of the 
soul is demonstrated by the fact that Leontius was angry with himself for giving in 
to the temptation to view the victims of execution. Each of these conflicts of motive 
distinguishes the various parts of the soul from one another.75 
In such instances of akratic action, Plato suggested that the soul undergoes two 
distinct, but interrelated experiences. First, the person experiences simultaneously 
something in his soul that ‘bids’ him to drink and something that ‘forbids’ him to.76 
Second, the person experiences something in his soul that ‘impels’ (ὁρµάω) him 
toward the drink and something that ‘draws him back’ (ἀνθέλκω). Plato likened this 
‘push-pull’ experience of internal psychological conflict to an archer who is 
‘pushing away’ (ἀπωθέω) the bow with one hand while ‘pulling’ (προσέλκω) it with 
the other.77 Bobonich termed the first, bid-forbid, description of the conflict the 
‘Command Model’ and the second, push-pull, description the ‘Force Model’.78 In 
the ‘Command Model’, the wisdom-loving part of the soul seeks to ‘persuade’ 
(πείθω) the other parts of its judgment of the best action for attaining what each part 
loves, so that they will follow or obey it,79 whereas in the ‘Force Model’, the agent 
                                                
75 Commentators have observed that the spirited element always stood in an ambiguous position 
vis-à-vis the other two elements, which perhaps explains why the later Academic and Peripatetic 
traditions moved toward a bipartite model where reason takes over complete rule of the soul and 
anger or spirit joins the ranks of appetites and desires. D.A. Rees, ‘Bipartition of the Soul in the Early 
Academy’ (1957), 114, 117; F.M. Cornford, ‘Psychology’ (1912), 263. 
76 Plato, Resp. 4.4369c. The addressee(s) of the imperatives appear to be the other parts of the 
soul. See Plato, Resp. 442b-d, 589a-b. C. Bobonich, ‘Akrasia and Agency in Plato’s Laws and 
Republic’ (1994), 11. 
77 Plato, Resp. 4.439a-c. 
78 C. Bobonich, ‘Akrasia and Agency in Plato’s Laws and Republic’ (1994), 5. 
79 Plato, Resp. 4.442b-d; 9.554c-e; 589a-b; Tim. 70a; Phdr. 253d-e; 254b, d; C. Bobonich, 
‘Akrasia and Agency in Plato’s Laws and Republic’ (1994), 11-4, 25; J. Moline, ‘Plato on the 
Complexity of the Psyche’ (1978), 13-22. 
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will act in accordance with whatever agent-like part exerts the strongest pull.80 
Though it is not specifically mentioned in the Republic, Sorabji observes that Plato 
later added deception (ἀπάτη) as a third option in the Laws.81 In the ‘Deception 
Model’ Plato argued that ‘pleasure’ (ἡδονή) persuades reason using ‘forcible 
deception’ (µετὰ ἀπάτης βιαίου). He contrasted this power of pleasure with the 
‘brute force’ (ἀλόγιστος βία) sometimes exercised by ‘wrath’ (θυµός) upon reason.82 
By so doing, he seems to associate with the appetitive part. Whatever the 
distinctions, however, Plato often employed primarily the Command and Force 
models in conjunction with one another. For instance, in the Timaeus, Plato argued 
that the spirited part is situated closer to the mind and helps it ‘restrain by force’ 
(κατέχω βίᾳ) the appetitive part, should it at any time ‘refuse outright to obey’ 
(µηδαµῇ πείθεσθαι ἑκὸν ἐθέλω) the dictates of reason coming down from the citadel 
of the mind.83 Here we see the reasoning part persuading the spirited part to combine 
forces to subjugate the appetitive part, which refuses to obey reason’s dictates, 
underscoring Plato’s conviction that the appetitive part had at least some 
understanding, despite his equivocations later in the passage.84 Thus, although Plato 
characterized the two lower parts of the soul as ‘irrational’, this did not exclude 
some reasoning capability as in Stoicism. Instead, each part can, to varying degrees, 
possess conflicting opinions about the proper objects of desire. Further, for Plato this 
akratic experience showed that his tripartite schematization of the soul was not 
merely a threefold classification of psychic phenomena. Rather, it established each 
part as a distinct source of moral action.85 It also accounted for how reason, which is 
naturally disposed toward seeing what is truly good, can become corrupted and thus 
seek that which is not genuinely good,86 a state Aristotle later called ‘wickedness’ 
(ἀκολασία).87 
                                                
80 C. Bobonich, ‘Akrasia and Agency in Plato’s Laws and Republic’ (1994), 6-10; J.M. Cooper, 
‘Plato’s Theory of Human Motivation’ (1999), 120-6; S. Knuuttila, Emotions (2004), 10.  
81 R. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind (2000), 309. 
82 Plato, Leg. 9.863b. 
83 Plato, Tim. 70a. 
84 For Plato’s later uncertainty regarding the appetitive part’s ability to understand the 
deliverances of reason, see Plato, Tim. 71a. Bobonich denies reasoning capacities to the desiring part 
in the Timaeus on the basis of this passage. Plato, however, had explicitly stated in the previous 
sections that it could ‘be persuaded’ (πείθεσθαι). See Plato, Tim. 70a; C. Bobonich, ‘Akrasia and 
Agency in Plato’s Laws and Republic’ (1994), 26. 
85 M. Woods, ‘Plato’s Division of the Soul’ (1987), 25, 46-7. 
86 Plato outlines this process especially in Books 8-9 of the Republic. 
87 T. Penner, ‘Plato’s Ethics’ (2006), 156. 
   
143 
Nevertheless, although Plato attributed the agent-like cognitive capacities, 
opinions, desires, and pleasures to each part of the soul, he simultaneously assigned 
a set of characteristic natural tendencies or capacities to each on the basis of what 
each part primarily loves,88 though not exclusively so.89 When one of these drives 
predominates in the soul, moreover, Plato correlated them with three ways of life.90 
He identified the mind with the part of the soul that reasons, thinks, decides, 
believes, seeks the welfare of the entire soul,91 and pursues truth and knowledge. As 
such, though the smallest part of the soul, it is the part that is divine, immortal, and 
naturally sovereign. When this part prevails, Plato linked it with the first and best of 
the three prominent forms of life of his day,92 his ideal guardian. The spirited part 
can ‘learn’ (µαθόντε) things from reason, can choose ‘to be subject to’ (ὑπηκόῳ 
εἶναι) reason, and can ‘be educated’ (παιδευθέντε) by reason to preside with reason 
over the appetitive part of the soul as its natural ally.93 As the seat of courage, Plato 
associated the spirited part of the soul with the emotion anger, especially at what it 
perceives as an injustice, as well as the quest for honour or public distinction. When 
it predominates, Plato correlated it with the military or auxiliary class within his 
imaginary polis. Finally, the appetitive part, as the largest part of the soul,94 is 
especially oriented toward the earthly and sensual pleasures of the body or material 
gain, likened by Plato to irrational ‘beasts’ that live for the trough. Though it shares 
in reason, it does so to a lesser degree than the other parts inasmuch as it only 
displays a form of ‘means-end reasoning’ as it seeks after sensual pleasure and gain 
in wealth. When it takes a lead, Plato connected it with the lowest classes of his 
ideal polis, which he equated with the artisans.  
In the sections that follow, we will look at how Philo appropriated and utilized 
both the agent-like elements for each part, the leading characteristics for each, and 
their inter-relations. We will first explore each of the three parts individually before 
                                                
88 M. Woods, ‘Plato’s Division of the Soul’ (1987), 26-7; L.D. Cooper, ‘Beyond the Tripartite 
Soul’ (2001), 346. 
89 B. Williams, ‘Analogy of City and Soul in Plato’s Republic’ (1997), 598; J. Moline, ‘Plato on 
the Complexity of the Psyche’ (1978), 10-1. See for instance, Plato, Resp. 4.429a. According to Plato, 
the guardians ‘partake’ (µεταλαγχάνω) of wisdom; it is not theirs exclusively. 
90 D.A. Rees, ‘Bipartition of the Soul in the Early Academy’ (1957), 112. 
91 T. Penner, ‘Plato’s Ethics’ (2006), 158. 
92 See for instance, Arist., Eth. Nic. 1.5 1095b. 
93 Plato, Resp. 4.441e-442a. Aristotle similarly described the irrational element of the soul as 
capable of learning to obey the rational element of the soul at Arist., Eth. Nic. 1.13 1102b. 
94 It is no accident that Plato’s description of this part of the soul as the ‘largest’ is likewise 
associated with the ‘masses’ of uneducated women, children, and slaves that generally made up the 
larger, uneducated class of his state. 
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looking at how they relate among themselves. We will find that when Philo utilized 
Plato’s tripartite model, he took over most of its leading elements, attributing to each 
part many of the agent-like characteristics mentioned above as well as the Force and 
Deception models of inter-relation. Nevertheless, Philo shows a tendency, not only 
to read Plato’s three accounts of the tripartite soul in the Republic, Timaeus, and 
Phaedrus synoptically, but also to modify his tripartite accounts in a manner that de-
emphasizes the agent-like characteristics of each part, without completely removing 
them, in preference for a more functional view that better accorded with his Stoic 
leanings in his own approach to the passions.  
‘The rational part’ of the soul 
As its name suggests, Plato equated the rational part with that element of our soul 
that ‘reckons and reasons’, and with it ‘we learn’ (µανθάνοµεν) the truth of things.95 
For this reason Plato argued that this part of the soul is most suitably designated the 
element that is ‘fond of learning’ (φιλοµαθές) and ‘philosophical’ (φιλόσοφος) by 
nature. 96 In its relations with the other parts, the rational part exercises forethought 
on behalf of the entire soul like the guardians do the city-state, directing the soul 
toward what is truly good.97 Philo likewise everywhere assumed that the mind 
houses that part of the soul that reasons, learns, calculates, and is able to pursue 
philosophy, though this notion in itself was common to both Platonic and Stoic 
traditions. What distinguished the two was Plato’s treatment of the lower parts of the 
soul as alternative sources for impulses that might oppose or ally with the mind. 
Also, in keeping with his Judaism, Philo emphasized the mind’s capacity ‘to 
worship the Existent One’ (θεραπεύειν τὸ ὄν) by honouring the Father with hymns, 
praises, and blessings.98 Plato, by contrast, had de-emphasized the role of piety in 
the soul or his ideal polis.99  
Both Philo and Plato made a bipartite division between the rational part and the 
two lower parts of the soul.100 In this division, both highlighted the mind’s 
fundamental orientation toward contemplation by utilizing the metaphor of 
                                                
95 Plato, Resp. 4.436a, 9.581b. 
96 Ibid., 9.581b-e. 
97 Ibid., 4.441e; M. Sim, ‘Divided Line and United Psychê in Plato’s Republic’ (2008), 98. 
98 Philo, Somn. 1.34-6. See also Philo, Fug. 89-92; Contempl. 2-8. 
99 Plato, Resp. 4. 427b-c, e. 
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nourishment to describe the sort of objects most proper to each part by nature. For 
Plato, the rational part partakes, above all, in ‘knowledge’ (ἐπιστήµη), ‘true belief’ 
(ἀληθὴς δόξα), ‘understanding’ (νόος), and ‘virtue’ (ἀρετή),101 while the appetitive 
part fills itself with the shadowy and passing pleasures of the mortal body, often 
grouped under the rubric of food, drink, and sex, and the spirited part seeks the 
satisfactions of anger, honour and victory with little understanding,102 though it is 
capable of false opinions. As such, the proper subjects of the mind are those things 
that are always the same, uniform, immortal, invisible, pure and most real, namely, 
the intelligible and divine realm of the forms, not the changing, mortal, and impure 
pleasures, pains and desires connected to the sensible realm of the body.103 It attends 
to the desires of the appetitive part only to the degree that is necessary to the well-
being and health of the body.104 Hence, Plato endorsed contemplative withdrawal 
from the ordinary concerns of life as the human’s most virtuous activity.105 This 
opposed the Stoic tradition, which argued that since virtue alone is one’s proper end, 
is unaffected by external contingency, and is not connected even instrumentally to 
any particular activity, and that to the extent that humans are naturally political 
animals, the sage would normally select the pursuit of a political end,106 so the sage 
would normally participate in ordinary activities. This also opposed the Epicurean 
tradition, which held that pleasure alone is valuable for its own sake; contemplation 
as such is merely a reliable instrument toward that end and not a good in itself.107  
In like manner, Philo believed that ‘the immaterial’ (ἀσώµατος) and ‘intelligible 
forms’ (τὸν νοητόν) of the intelligible realm are ‘the proper’ (οἰκεῖος) food for the 
rational part of the soul.108 He argued that the mind should feed on ‘the divine food’ 
                                                
101 I will follow the traditional translation of ἀρετή as ‘virtue’ throughout this study, though as 
Crisp observed, ἀρετή in Greek culture extended beyond ethics. It referred to any sort of ‘excellence’, 
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T.J. Saunders, ‘Aristotle’ (1999), 110. 
102 Plato, Resp. 9.585b-586a. 
103 Ibid., 10.611e; Plato, Phd. 78c-e, 79d, 83a-84a. 
104 Plato, Resp. 8.558d-559c. 
105 Note that withdrawal, however, did not extend to suicide for Plato. In the Phaedo, Socrates is 
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of a god and thus not his own to dispose of as he will. See, Plato, Phd. 61-2.  
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Therapy of Desire (1994), 359-60. 
107 E. Brown, ‘Contemplative Withdrawal in the Hellenistic Age’ (2008), 84-6, 88. 
108 Philo, Leg. 3.117-8, 186. 
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(θειοτέρα τροφή) of knowledge, but it should ‘disregard’ (ἀµελεῖ) the flesh except to 
the extent that is necessary for the body’s sustenance.109 Philo cited two texts to 
support these Platonic claims regarding the mind’s proper orientation in the sphere 
of the ideas, both from the Torah, not Plato. First, he quoted Exodus 16:16: ‘This 
bread, which the Lord has given us to eat, is this “word” (τὸ ῥῆµα), which the Lord 
has prescribed’, to which he added Deuteronomy 8:3: ‘… not on bread alone shall 
man live, but “on every word” (ἐπὶ παντὶ ῥήµατι) that proceeds through the mouth of 
God.’ Philo equated the term ‘word’ (τὸ ῥῆµα) mentioned in both passages with ‘the 
word of God’ (ὁ θεοῦ λόγος), which he understood to be the first born, eldest 
brother, and most generic form that encapsulates all other species of ideas in the 
intelligible realm.110 Like Plato, Philo went on to argue that the philosophical and 
prudent mind turns away from the sensible and mortal sphere of the body and 
devotes itself instead to that which is most suitable to it, namely, the noetic sphere. 
When a person does this perfectly, he ‘cuts off’ (ἀποκόπτω) anger entirely and 
attends to the cravings of the appetitive part for food and drink only as far as is 
necessary to nourish the body.111 This movement of the rational part of the soul 
away from the mortal and corporeal sphere of the senses to the incorporeal and pure 
sphere of the forms results in a cleansing of the mind that eventually leads to what 
Philo called a ‘purified reason’ (κεκαθαρµένος λόγος).112 Its purity arises from its 
Platonic contemplation of that which is truly suitable for it, that is, the truly existent 
God and the intelligible ideas. As a result, material and sensible concerns do not 
contaminate it. This notion in turn formed the basis of the theme of the soul’s 
migration toward the visio dei that is threaded through the entirety of Philo’s 
writings.113 Whether or not Philo successfully integrated his lionization of 
contemplation with his commitment to the Stoic understanding of virtue as the only 
good is a different matter. 
Along with the basic function of the mind as the part of the soul that reasons, 
learns, and knows, both Philo and Plato attributed to the mind three key additional 
properties:  
• divinity 
                                                
109 Ibid., 3.151-2, 161. 
110 Ibid., 169, 173, 175; Philo, Deus 31. 
111 Philo, Leg. 129, 134 147, 151. 
112 Ibid., 127, 129. 
113 Runia terms this entire moral journey, ‘the allegory of the soul’. See D.T. Runia, Philo and 
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• immortality 
• sovereignty 
Divinity: First, Plato described the rational part of the soul as ‘divine’ (θεῖος).114 For 
Plato, the Maker and Father of the cosmos directly created both the gods and the 
individual minds. He argued that the Father first created the gods and stars using the 
purest ingredients. Then, God formed a number of souls equal to the quantity of 
stars in the heavens out of ingredients of a lower purity. On the one hand, these pre-
existent souls were similar to the gods in that, although they had been created, they 
were participants in the divine. On the other hand, they differed from the gods in 
that their divinity was of a lower quality. This in turn ensured that they were 
subordinate to the gods.115 In this pre-existent state, these souls consisted only of the 
rational element. Nevertheless, Plato often referred to them simply as ‘souls’ rather 
than as ‘minds’.116 
Philo likewise described the mind as the most God-like element in the soul, 
whose divinity stands on a continuum with the divine host in the heavenly and 
intelligible realms, though thrice removed as a copy of a copy.117 While he insisted 
that the ultimate cause of the entire universe is the Father and Maker of all things,118 
he likewise argued that God also created a number of divine offspring.119 These 
included, first, the various powers of God – namely, the creative, royal, gracious, 
and legislative powers, justice, and ‘the divine word’ (λόγος θεῖος), the chief among 
the powers. All of these beings participate in the divine, while remaining 
subordinate, lieutenants of God. Second, he also included ‘the heavenly bodies’ (οἱ 
ἀστέρες), who dwell in the heavens, and ‘the angels’ (ἄγγελοι), who dwell in the air. 
Both of these are composed of ‘mind in itself’ (νοῦς αὐτὸς ἕκαστος) and likewise 
possess a divine and imperishable nature.120 Hence, at the upper end of the divine 
hierarchy, both Plato (and Aristotle) and Philo conceived of the stars as divine 
                                                
114 Plato, Resp. 9.590d. 
115 Plato, Tim. 41b-42e, 69c-e. 
116 This is particularly evident throughout the Phaedo, where Plato does not invoke the tripartite 
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148 
beings.121 Moreover, both identified a number of other divine beings beyond the 
stars. Philo referred to these later as ‘powers’, but Plato referred to them as ‘gods’. 
These higher divine beings had a hand in the creation of the mortal elements of the 
cosmos, as we will see below.  
At the lower end of the divine hierarchy, Philo spoke of various incorporeal 
‘angels’ that at times roughly correspond to Plato’s ‘daemons’ (οἱ δαίµονες).122 On 
the one hand, Philo equated the angels with Plato’s pre-existent, disembodied, and 
blessed souls. He argued that some of them had descended into mortal bodies and 
become humans.123 Moreover, he even reflected Plato in saying that the number of 
souls is equal to the number of stars in heaven.124 On the other hand, Philo also 
explicitly equated ‘the angels’ of the LXX with ‘the daemons’ of ‘the 
philosophers’.125 Like Plato, Philo identified them with those good men who had 
loved philosophy in life and, as a result, returned to the higher immortal and 
incorporeal existence in the afterlife,126 ranked in closer intimacy with God 
according to their degree of ethical advancement in this life.127 This corresponds to 
Plato’s insistence that the daemons live ‘in between’ the gods and humans, which is 
the region of ‘air’.128 For this reason, Philo added that they have their abode in ‘the 
air’ in contrast to the stars, who reside in the heavens, and to humans, who live on 
the earth. Finally, both Plato and Philo described those ‘in between’, as beings that 
carry messages between God/gods and humans.129  
Like Plato, Philo argued finally that God directly made the human mind, using 
his Word as ‘the pattern’ (παράδειγµα) for each one that successively comes into 
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existence.130 This follows from his identification of ‘the rational spirit-force’ 
(λογικὸς πνεῦµα) of the human soul with the pre-existent angels that God had 
directly created. Philo found biblical support for this, citing Gen. 2:7 (LXX), which 
states that God ‘breathed’ (ἐνεφύσησε) the breath of life into the face of Adam.131 
Philo then noted that the source of the breath in this passage was none other than the 
Father and Ruler of all, not one of his subordinates. Inasmuch as this breath had its 
source in God’s breath, human minds were thus likewise participants in the divine 
along with the stars and bodiless angels.132 As a consequence, as Warne rightly 
observes, this innate relationship between the Mind of the universe and the human 
mind as its image, copy, fragment, or ray, forms the basis for Philo’s metaphor of 
the soul’s ascending journey away from the body and back to heaven, the noetic 
realm of the Logos, and the vision of God.133 
 
Immortality: Plato had described the soul as immortal in the sense that it had both 
an ‘Orphic-style’ pre-existence prior to embodiment, that it comprised reasoning and 
impulsive elements, and that it would continue its existence indefinitely after its 
departure from a mortal body.134 As such, he had construed the soul’s immortality 
using the Orphic scheme of pre-existence, embodiment, 
reincarnation/transmigration, and return of the soul to the heavenly realm.135 Hence, 
after Plato discussed the direct creation of the minds by God as pre-existent souls, as 
outlined above, he next recounted how the lower divinities took these souls and 
implanted them into bodies by encasing them in the head. The gods imitated the 
Father and Maker’s creative activities by fashioning the remaining elements of 
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creation, at His behest, in order to bring it to completion. They were especially 
responsible for making those elements in the soul that are mortal. The gods then 
constructed the spirited and appetitive parts of the soul and housed the spirited part 
in the breast and the appetitive part in the region of the stomach. If these souls lived 
justly, then upon the death of the body they would return to their companion star in 
the heavens and cast off all that is mortal. If they lived unjustly, Plato argued that 
they would be reborn a second time as a woman or wild animal or insect. Their next 
reincarnation would reflect the sort of lives they had lived as men.136 Consequently, 
these unjust souls are bound once more to the mortal elements of the soul each time 
they are imprisoned in a body. 
Philo everywhere assumed Plato’s basic scheme for the ‘immortality of the soul’ 
outlined in the Phaedo,137 but deviated by rejecting Plato’s doctrine of 
reincarnation.138 Like Plato, Philo argued that God’s subordinate powers fashioned 
the lower parts of the soul.139 In support of this claim, Philo cited Gen. 1:26 (LXX): 
‘Let us make man after our image and after our likeness.’ Like Plato’s gods whom 
the Father and Maker had charged with fashioning the mortal body and mortal 
elements of the soul in the Timaeus,140 Philo argued that the use of the second 
person plural in this passage pointed to the fact that the Existent One also had ‘co-
workers’ (συνεργοί)141 in the fashioning of humans. In Platonic fashion,142 he argued 
that although God did not need help in creating, he utilized these ‘co-workers’ so 
that he could not be held responsible for making those elements in the soul that are 
capable of evil or sin.143 Moreover, likeness to God has nothing to do with human 
form, since God is incorporeal, for ‘neither is God in human form, nor is the human 
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body God-like’.144 Rather, Philo repeatedly identified ‘the mind, the ruling part of 
the soul’ (ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεµὸν νοῦς) with that which is divine and immaterial. This 
mind was made after the pattern of the ‘Mind of the Universe’, namely, the divine 
Logos, which serves as its ‘archetype’ (ἀρχέτυπον).145 For, Philo observed, Moses 
did not say that man is ‘the image of God, but that he is after the image of God’ 
(οὐχὶ εἰκόνα θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ κατ’ εἰκόνα).146 God first made an image of Himself – the 
Logos – then man, referring especially to the mind, after that image, so that man is 
‘third hand from the Maker’.147 This mind is ‘imprisoned’ in the body and wed with 
the lower part(s) of the soul after embodiment.148  
Finally, Philo appeared to envision a new or second birth (παλιγγενεσία) into an 
incorporeal life for the soul after death.149 This drew upon the theme of the soul’s 
‘migration’150 toward perfection before death, a Platonic-Pythagorean doctrine 
outlined in Phaedo’s myth of Er.151 He nevertheless diverged significantly from 
Plato in that he seemed to envision a single, permanent post-mortem existence, not a 
series of reincarnations that evolve away from or toward perfection as in the case of 
Phaedo’s myth of Er. As such, he never contemplated Plato’s notion of 
reincarnation or metempsychosis of souls into animals or insects,152 inasmuch as his 
account of animals followed that of the Stoics, which expressly excluded any 
participation of reason in animals.153 Philo rather explicitly linked the soul’s post-
mortem immortality to its return to its source in the breath of God at its creation as 
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described in Gen. 2.7,154 when the wise soul at a minimum,155 having attained virtue 
and perfection, once again becomes pure mind.156 It is unclear, however, what 
precisely Philo believed happened to souls that have fallen short of perfection in this 
life, whether they somehow continued to make progress in a disembodied state or 
were instantly perfected.157 The question of whether or not the soul retains its 
individual personality after death or is reabsorbed into its divine source, as such, has 
been a matter of dispute.158 Further, Philo explicitly rejected the soul’s ‘extinction’ 
(σβέσις) following death.159 By so doing, he firmly rejected the Chrysippian view 
that the souls of the sages are preserved only until the ‘conflagration’ 
(ἐκπύρωσις).160 He also rejected Stoic materialism in preference for Platonic 
incorporealism inasmuch as he proposed that after death, the soul would be not only 
disembodied, but also without composition and without quality, a basic 
characteristic of Stoic bodies.161 Here again, once removed from the body, any Stoic 
elements in Philo’s psychology give way to broadly Middle Platonic conceptions. 
As we will discuss in detail below, throughout his corpus Philo reinforced this vision 
of the virtuous migration of the soul to the heavens or noetic realm by his near 
ubiquitous use of Plato’s metaphor of the charioteer.  
 
Sovereignty: Given this divine and immortal status, both Philo and Plato argued 
that ‘the mind and reason’ (νοῦς καὶ λόγος) thus assigned reason to the highest place 
in the soul.162 For this reason, in the Timaeus, Plato called it ‘the sovereign part of 
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the soul’ (τὸ κυριωτάτου ψυχῆς εἶδος).163 To reinforce its leading status both 
invoked images that called to mind rule and power. In the Republic, Plato likened 
the role of the mind in the soul to the guardians of his city, while Philo likened the 
mind to a king sitting in a citadel with a host of senses as bodyguards.164 As the king 
or guide, both argued that it should thus exercise forethought for the entirety of the 
soul.165 Consequently, when reason does rule, an individual becomes wise, but when 
one of the other parts rules, a person becomes a fool.166 Whereas Plato argued that 
one or both of the lower parts could overcome reason’s supremacy using violence 
(βία) in accordance with the ‘Force Model’,167 persuasion in keeping with the 
‘Command Model’,168 or pleasure’s deception in the ‘Deception Model’,169 Philo 
opted for either the Force or Deception models to account for reason’s failure, but 
not the Command. In nearly all cases, Philo envisioned reason in the role of ruling 
the other parts with force, but he could entertain the overthrow of reason by desire 
and wrath:  
Whenever…wrath (θυµός) and desire (ἐπιθυµία) turn restive and get out of 
hand (ἀφηνιάζω καὶ ἀναχαιτίζω), and by the violence of their impulse (ἡ 
βία τῆς ὁρµῆς) drag the driver (ἡνίοχος), that is the reason (λογισµός), 
down (κατασύρω) from his seat and put him under the yoke (ὑποζεύγνυµι), 
and each of these passions (ἑκάτερον πάθος) gets hold of the reins, injustice 
prevails. For it cannot but be that owing to the badness and inexperience of 
the driver (ἀπειρία καὶ κακία τοῦ ἡνιόχου), the team is swept down 
precipices and gullies…170 
Here, Philo followed Plato in utilizing the charioteer myth with a driver and two 
horses, one identified with desire and the other wrath. Like Plato’s account of the 
fall of the souls from the heavenly circuits, but unlike his description of the two 
horses in relation to the driver and boy later in the Pheadrus, Philo pitted both 
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horses against the driver.171 Though he infused his own account with Stoic language 
by framing the horses motions in terms of ‘impulse’ (ὁρµή), a post-Plato 
development, he nevertheless cast the entire story in strongly Platonic lines by 
making the horses not only lead the entire chariot to destruction by their restiveness, 
but more fantastically, he made the horses ‘drag down’ (κατασύρω) and ‘yoke’ the 
mind and the horses take the reins!172 Presumably, the horses then goad and direct 
the mind toward their mutual destruction over the precipice. Though both attributed 
reason’s failure to maintain supremacy to the driver’s lack of skill,173 Plato ascribed 
it to the ‘forgetfulness and wrongdoing’ (λήθη τε καὶ κακία) that results from the 
soul’s inability to see the forms and ideas, 174 whereas Philo attributed the failure to 
rebelling and restiveness (ἀφηνιάζω καὶ ἀναχαιτίζω) of the horses in the passage 
quoted above, but the rider’s ‘foolishness’ (ἀφροσύνη) and ‘lack of learning’ 
(ἀµαθία), ‘cannot keep hold of the reins’ (κρατεῖν ἀδυνατεῖ τῶν ἡνιῶν) in the 
alternative passage.175 While in On Husbandry, ‘the rider’ (ὁ ἀναβάτης) is clearly at 
fault, in the passage above, however, it is unclear to whom Philo is referring to in the 
final sentence when he mentioned the ‘inexperienced driver’. While he could be 
referring to the mind, whose ineptness at handling ‘the violence of [the horses’] 
impulse’ (βία τῆς ὁρµῆς) allowed them to take over the reins, he could have been 
alternatively referring to the horses’ own inexperience and badness when they took 
over as drivers. Whatever the case, Philo nevertheless clearly invoked Plato’s ‘Force 
Model’ in both of these accounts of reason in relation to wrath and desire. We will 
return to further examine Philo’s use of the charioteer metaphor in greater detail in 
the next chapter. 
In general, Philo preferred rather to frame the opposition between reason and the 
deceptive and cunning machinations of ‘pleasure’ (ἡδονή). Though this recalls 
Plato’s ‘Deception Model’ noted earlier,176 Philo invoked this image instead within 
                                                
171 See also Philo, Agr. 75-7. 
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his widely utilized Adam-Eve-serpent typology.177 Like Plato, Philo makes pleasure 
‘persuade’ (πείθω)178 and, as a consequence, ‘subjugate’179 the mind through 
‘deception’ (ἀπάτη).180 Moreover, both personify pleasure. Plato treats pleasure as 
‘wishing’ (βούλησις) things, while Philo sometimes describes pleasure as a ‘serpent’ 
(ὄφις)181 and at other times a ‘harlot’ (πόρνη) or ‘coutesan’ (χαµαιτύπη).182 Philo, 
though, expands the metaphor to include the senses, which are made to serve as 
beguiled ‘handmaidens’ (θεραπαινίς) or, more darkly, ‘panders’ (µαστροποί) 
through whom it seeks to ‘entice’ (δελεάζω) and enslave the mind.183 By so doing, 
Philo is able to place ultimate responsibility upon the mind, when it ‘departs’ 
(ἐκβαίνω) from the noetic sphere (νοητός), which is proper to it, and instead ‘gives 
itself up’ (ἐκδίδωµι) to the inferior things offered by pleasure. When it does so, 
Philo observed, the mind becomes a peaceful ‘prisoner of war’ (δοριάλωτος).184 This 
description recalls the deceptive role of pleasure in the body-soul anthropology of 
Plato’s Pheado discussed earlier where Plato spoke of the deceptive character of 
bodily pleasure and senses and the mind’s duty to despise the body and seek rather 
the intellectual and invisible.185 
‘The appetitive part’ of the soul 
Both Plato and Philo often grouped the appetitive and spirited parts of the soul 
together, differentiating them from and treating them as inferior to the mind. As 
discussed above, both philosophers located anger and desire in the regions of the 
chest and stomach, parts of the body lower than the head, in which the mind resides. 
Secondly, Philo followed Plato as outlined in the Timaeus, in arguing that both of 
the lower parts came into existence later than the mind. Hence, the mind is the oldest 
part of the soul and worthy of the honour accorded to elders. Thirdly, in contrast to 
the mind, the subordinate gods or powers formed the lower parts of the soul 
imperfectly. Consequently, both Plato and Philo considered the lower part of the 
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soul to be mortal and irrational. For this reason, they both often referred to the two 
lower parts collectively as the irrational or mortal part of the soul. They then further 
distinguished the two lower parts from one another not only by their distinctive 
functions, but also by the manner and degree of irrationality and subordination that 
characterized each, which recalls their agent-like elements. We now turn to explore 
Plato and Philo’s characterization of these two, lower, mortal, and irrational parts of 
the soul in the order outlined in the Republic. 
At the outset of his discussion concerning the individual soul in the Republic, 
Plato had introduced a second part of the soul, namely, the appetitive, opposite to 
the rational part. On the one hand, with regard to the parts of the soul, he 
characterized this part as full of certain ‘desires’ (ἐπιθυµίαι) oriented toward the 
lower pleasures of nutrition and generation, including love, hunger, thirst and 
titillation.186 For this reason, he located this part of the soul in the region of the 
stomach and sexual organs. On the other hand, with regard to the classes of the city-
state, the lowest class are characterized not by the capacity for various desires, since 
the guardians and auxiliaries also possess their own set of desires,187 but by the 
absence of those characteristics most distinctive of the other two classes, namely, 
reason, courage and honour, and above all, education.188 Hence, given the 
orientation of the appetitive part/artisan class to the earthly, sensible, and corporeal, 
as opposed to the divine and intelligible, Plato treated it as ‘shameful’ (αἰσχρός), 
‘savage’ (ἄγριος), ‘the most godless’ (ἀθεώτατος), and ‘the most polluted’ 
(µιαρώτατος) part of the soul or class of the city.189  
Philo’s conception of the appetitive part of the soul strongly reflected Plato’s 
influence. Philo explicitly equated ‘the belly’ (κοιλία) with ‘desire’ (ἐπιθυµία).190 
Further, like Plato, Philo associated it with food, drink, and sex and located it in the 
region of the stomach and sexual organs. Like Plato, Philo characterized the 
appetitive part as that which participates in reason the least, citing the fact that its 
abode, the belly and parts below it, are most distant from the head and from 
reason.191 Finally, Philo also treated the appetitive part as polluted, calling it 
‘profane, impure, and unholy’ (βέβηλος καὶ ἀκάθαρτος καὶ ἀνίερος). However, he 
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used cultic descriptive terminology drawn from the Torah’s legal regulations upon 
which he was commenting (Lev. 7, Deut. 18) to describe it. To emphasize just how 
unseemly and base this part of the soul is, in Jewish fashion he went on to compare 
desire with ‘a pig’ or ‘sow’ (ὗς), which was numbered among the Jewish food 
taboos.192  
Plato also connected the appetitive part of the soul with a set of more complex 
desires, describing it as ‘money-loving’ (φιλοχρήµατος) and ‘profit-loving’ 
(φιλοκερδής).193 Though he described the appetitive part as irrational, this did not 
preclude some reasoning capabilities. The appetitive part as he described it does 
appear capable of means-end reasoning, since it can perform quite sophisticated 
calculations regarding how to obtain what it wants. Consequently, its irrationality is 
rooted in its blindness to wider considerations beyond the object of gratification 
rather than an inability to reason at all.194 Plato connected these more sophisticated 
types of desire to the simple lusts for nourishment and love by arguing that money is 
the chief instrument for the gratification of the appetites.195 As such, the appetitive 
part may participate in ‘right opinion’ (ὄρθη δόξα) like the spirited part, but it differs 
in that it lacks any sort of paedeia, with the result that it becomes ‘slavish’ 
(ἀνδραποδώδης).196 
Philo also hinted at Plato’s more sophisticated characterization of the appetitive 
part as gain-loving in that he characterized it as not only ‘gluttonous’ (λαιµαργία), 
but also ‘greedy’ (ἀπληστία). Nevertheless, even in those instances the accent 
continued to be on the more functional view of greed as insatiate desire, since he 
used the term in the context of the stomach and its tendency toward ever wanting 
more. For this reason, he elsewhere called it most ‘insatiable’ (ἀπληστότατον) and 
‘incontinent’ (ἀκολαστότατον).197 As such, Philo generally eschewed the more 
sophisticated, agent-like conception of the appetitive part of the soul as the money-
loving part that deliberates how best to secure gain, even in those places where he 
alluded to it. 
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Finally, to illustrate the character of the appetitive part Plato compared the soul 
to those creatures composed of several different animals, such as the mythical 
Chimera, Scylla, or Cerberus. In this illustration, he equated each of the three parts 
of the soul to a different animal. Plato depicted the appetitive part of the soul as a 
giant, ‘many-headed beast’ (πολυκέφαλος θρέµµα), the spirited part as a lion, and 
the mind as a miniature human being. Of these three animals, he portrayed the 
multiform beast as the largest, the human as the smallest, and the lion in between the 
two. Plato conjoined the three animals into a single creature and enclosed it inside a 
human being so that it is not visible to an observer.198  
Each of the heads of the beast in this Chimera-like soul has a distinctive 
character. Plato described some as gentle and others as savage. Nevertheless, he 
insisted that all the heads are capable of growing and changing. If a person feeds and 
tends to the miniature human being within, further domesticates the gentler heads of 
the beast, but checks and starves the savage heads, then he will be able to control 
and guide the many-headed beast. If he instead feeds the savage heads, but starves 
the miniature human, the beast will become large and terrible, with the result that 
reason will be unable to control it. In such cases, the soul becomes licentious.199 
Philo never explicitly invoked the Chimera-soul illustration, but he did allude to 
it by treating the appetitive part of the soul as ‘a beast’ (θρέµµα) after the manner of 
Plato’s metaphor. Once, Philo explicitly referred to desire as a many-headed 
beast,200 alluding to his awareness of Plato’s Chimera-soul illustration. Similarly, 
Philo elsewhere alluded to the metaphor when he described the unjust man as ‘a 
beast in human’ form in contrast to the just Noah-like soul, who is truly ‘a man’.201 
This reflected Plato’s contrast between just and unjust souls in his comparison of the 
soul to a Chimera-like creature. As mentioned above, Plato had argued that in the 
just soul, the miniature man within is in control and the many-headed beast is 
domesticated, whereas in the unjust man the many-headed beast grows strong and 
enslaves the mind. Philo’s contrast between the two types of soul reflects rather the 
part of the Chimera-like creature that is asserting control. In the case of a soul that is 
‘a beast in human form’, the beast-part of the soul rules, whereas in the case of the 
soul that is truly ‘a man’, the mind rules.  
                                                
198 Plato, Resp. 9.588c-d. See also Plato, Tim. 70e. 
199 Plato, Resp. 9.589a-b, 591b. 
200 Philo, QE 1.19. 
201 Philo, Abr. 32-3. Compare also Philo, Agr. 9. 
   
159 
Nevertheless, in most instances, Philo simply compared desire to ‘an irrational 
beast’ (ἄλογος θρέµµα) without clearly linking it to Plato’s Chimera-soul 
metaphor.202 This allowed him greater latitude to treat the image elastically. In some 
cases, Philo opted to equate the appetitive part of the soul with other kinds of beasts. 
Sometimes he identified the beasts of the lower part of the soul with the unclean 
animals of the food taboos of his Jewish and religious background. Hence, as 
already mentioned above, he expressly identified desire especially with swine. This 
transference works well because swine were considered ‘unclean’ in Judaism, hence 
capturing Plato’s characterization of the beasts of the Chimera-like soul as godless 
and polluted. Additionally, Philo’s identification of the appetitive part of the soul 
with swine that gorge themselves from ‘a manger’ (φάτνη) also fits nicely with 
Plato’s description in the Timaeus of desire as beasts that feed from the trough of the 
stomach.203 This represents a Stoicizing tendency in Philo’s thought, which excluded 
reason in animals and, as a result, rejected Plato’s agent-like conception of the 
appetitive part of the soul.  
On other occasions, Philo’s comparison of the appetitive part of the soul to a 
beast blended with Plato’s charioteer metaphor. In this metaphor, Plato had 
described desire as an unruly and ugly horse, which constantly forces its way ahead 
of the other horse, anger, to gorge at the trough. While Plato had described both 
anger and desire as ‘horses’, when invoking this metaphor Philo sometimes referred 
to them rather as beasts, thus allowing the notion to do double-duty. We will discuss 
Philo’s use of Plato’s metaphor of the charioteer in relation to the parts of the soul in 
the next chapter. 
‘The spirited part’ of the soul 
As noted above, Plato located the spirited part of the soul in the breast or chest and 
treated it as at first synonymous with simple ‘anger’ (ὀργή) or ‘rage’ (θυµός);204 but 
it then ‘takes on the colour of something more morally ambitious’ than mere anger 
or rage, namely, courage, the quest for honour, and war.205 Unlike Philo, for Plato 
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anger did not necessarily have a negative connotation. Since the seat of anger often 
sided with the rational part of the soul as a sort of ‘ally’ (ἐπίκουρον) in the fight 
against the desires, Plato normally gave a positive evaluation of the spirited part of 
the soul,206 though with some exceptions.207 Like a watchdog, spiritedness is 
regulated by, and so serves to protect, reason.208 Hence, it is the part of the soul from 
which springs the noble wrath or righteous indignation that is necessary to combat 
injustice.209 As such, the spirited part is set upon predominance, victory, and good 
repute. Plato believed that it is best designated ‘the ambitious’ (φιλόνικον) part of 
the soul that is ‘covetous of honour’ (φιλότιµον) as well as the seat of ‘courage’ and 
‘bravery’ (ἀνδρεῖον/ἀνδρεία). All of these attributes were especially necessary to 
military service. For this reason, Plato connected the spirited part with the auxiliary 
class of his ideal city.210  
Plato viewed the spirited part of the soul as a sort of ally to reason, but one that 
is liable to corruption. Consequently, it is not immune to more base tendencies:  
... in the soul there exists a third kind, this principle of high spirit (τὸ 
θυµοειδές), which is the helper (ἐπίκουρον) of reason by nature unless it 
is corrupted by evil nurture (ὑπὸ κακῆς τροφῆς διαφθαρῇ).211 
For Plato, the spirited part of the soul can have either a positive or a negative 
function in the soul. When a person properly educates and trains the spirited part, it 
will join reason in ruling over the mass of appetitive desires. If it is poorly trained, 
there are two possible outcomes. First, it might succumb to the appetitive part along 
with reason in accordance with the ‘Force Model’.212 Due to poor training, the 
spirited part becomes lax and soft, which in turn produces cowardice and slavishness 
in the soul.213 Second, if someone feeds and strengthens it through his inordinate 
love of honour and victory without calculation or understanding, anger usurps 
reason’s rightful rule of the soul and makes a person envious, violent, stubborn, and 
                                                                                                                                    
reverence, the desire for recognition, pride, vanity, contempt, envy, idealism, and fanaticism’, though 
he acknowledged that anger is its ‘primary expression’. L.D. Cooper, ‘Beyond the Tripartite Soul’ 
(2001), 36340. 
206 For instance, see Plato, Resp. 4.440b-c, 441e; Phdr. 253d, 254a, c; Tim. 70a. 
207 Plato, Resp. 9.586c-d. 
208 S. Rosen, ‘Role of Eros in Plato’s Republic’ (1965), 470. 
209 Plato, Resp. 4.440b-e. 
210 Ibid., 4.429b, 4.442b-c, 9.581b. 
211 Ibid., 4.441a. 
212 Ibid., 4.442b.  
213 Ibid., 9.590b. 
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irritable, again in keeping with the ‘Force Model’.214 Plato offered as evidence the 
case of young children and animals. In his view, both are full of spirit from birth, yet 
neither fully participates in reason. As such, we often witness a sort of uncalculating 
anger motivating violence, aggression, and uncontrolled rage.215 Consequently, for 
Plato anger is in fact a natural ally to the rational part of the soul, since it possesses a 
greater share in reason.216 Nevertheless, if left to its own devices shorn of reason’s 
guidance, it too can become a tyrant in the soul. This recalls Plato’s description of 
the spirited part as a lion in his Chimera-soul metaphor discussed above. For all of 
these reasons, Plato assigned the spirited part to the second place, behind the rational 
part, but before the appetitive.217  
As was the case with the appetitive part of the soul, so also Philo’s account of 
the spirited part closely followed Plato in those places where he invoked Plato’s 
tripartite theory of the soul.218 Firstly, Philo likewise called the third part ‘the 
spirited element’ (τὸ θυµικόν) or ‘anger’ (θυµός) and located it in the breast. We 
have already discussed these details at the beginning of this chapter. 
Secondly, Philo could likewise characterize anger in both positive and negative 
terms. Negatively, it can align with desire as ‘a brother’ (ἀδελφός) and ‘resist’ 
(ἀντισπάω) the impulses of the mind,219 bringing forth instead all sorts of impulses 
that Philo identified as ‘evil children’ of the spirited part of the soul, such as ‘raging 
furies’ (λυσσάς).220 In such instances, Philo described anger as ‘warlike’ 
(πολεµικός) since it fights against the bidding of the rational part of the soul.221 
These examples recall Plato’s ‘Force Model’ above, but against the rational part 
rather than the appetitive. Positively, Philo also tended to associate the spirited part 
of the soul with military imagery,222 which in turn evoked the notion of ‘courage’ or 
‘bravery’ (ἀνδρεία).223 Moreover, Philo likewise noted its proximity to the mind and 
                                                
214 Ibid., 9.586d, 9.588e, 9.590a; Leg. 9.863b. 
215 Ibid., 4.441b. At Resp. 554c-d, Plato insinuated that the ‘taming’ associated with one’s 
paideia is connected with a long-term process of persuasion. Consequently, his use of the ‘Force 
Model’ in the instances cited above presumes one’s failure to properly implement the ‘Command 
Model’ in one’s training. 
216 Plato, Resp. 4.441a. 
217 Ibid., 9.583a. 
218 Philo, Agr. 17,72, 78; Conf. 21-2; Migr. 66-67; Spec. 1.146, 4.92-4; Virt. 13; Leg. 1.70-3, 
3.115, 118, 130; Her. 64. 
219 Philo, Migr. 66-7. 
220 Philo, Conf. 21-2. 
221 Philo, Leg. 3.130. 
222 Philo, Migr. 67; Spec. 4.93; Leg. 3.115. 
223 Philo, Leg. 1.70-1. 
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suggested that, therefore, the spirited part of the soul shares in reason to an extent, is 
capable of domestication, and can help the mind.224  
Nevertheless, although Philo followed Plato in placing anger midway between 
reason and desire, he preferred to treat it as a subordinate class of desire (ἐπιθυµία) 
that opposed reason, under Stoic influence, rather than as a subordinate kind of 
desire (ἐπιθυµία),225 alternative to the desires of the appetitive part of the soul and a 
natural ally to reason as in Plato.226 This was due in part to the biblical images or 
words that called forth his Platonic allegorical reading in the first place. For 
instance, he identified anger and desire with the breast and belly of the serpent that 
God cursed in Gen. 3:14 (LXX). The negative portrayal of the serpent and its parts in 
the text led to his unfavourable characterization of both the appetitive and spirited 
parts of the soul. His treatment of anger or wrath as both types of desire reflects a 
Stoic taxonomy of the passions, but could also reflect the wider trend in the Middle 
Platonists, Peripatetics, or Posidonius to conflate desire and anger under one part of 
the soul, as Vander Waerdt shows.227 The influence of the Stoic ethical ideal of 
apatheia also accounts for Philo’s tendency to treat the spirited part of the soul 
negatively. Whereas Plato called for the moderation of anger and desire, which 
resulted in a subordination of the parts with reason at the helm, Philo called for the 
extirpation of anger altogether, at least in his ideal sage.228 This is a notion that was 
foreign to the ethics of Plato and, later, his student Aristotle.  
Conclusion 
Philo occasionally employed Plato’s complex, tripartite model of the soul outlined in 
the Republic, Timaeus, and Phaedrus as an alternative to his customary Stoic 
approach to the passions, usually when the biblical text suggested it to him. Drawing 
upon Plato, he could likewise divide the soul into rational, spirited, and appetitive 
parts, but with important modifications. Firstly, Philo’s terminology reflected later 
                                                
224 Philo, Spec. 4.93; Leg. 3.128. 
225 Philo was not always consistent on subordinating wrath to desire, as is so often the case in his 
writings. Philo could sometimes describe wrath as a ‘brother’ (ἀδελφός) to desire, which could 
suggest coordinate status. See, Philo, Migr. 66. Philo elsewhere treated as ‘brothers’ elements that he 
clearly understood hierarchically such as the body and soul. See, for instance, Philo, Ebr. 70, Fug. 90. 
226 Plato, Resp. 9.571a-b; 580d-e. 
227 P.A. Vander Waerdt, ‘Peripatetic Soul Division’ (1985), 373, 392. Note also that in spite of 
Plato’s treatment of desire, anger, and reason as three distinctive parts of the soul, Plato’s description 
of wrath as a kind of desire in Book 9 of the Republic could have lent additional support to Philo’s 
approach. See Plato, Resp. 9.571a-b; 580d-e. 
228 See Philo, Leg. 3.129-37, 147. 
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Peripatetic and Middle Platonic readings of Plato. While he could follow Plato in 
locating mind, spirited and appetitive parts in the head, chest, and abdomen 
respectively, or in attributing characteristics of cognition and desire to each part 
when personified, he nevertheless showed a tendency to follow Posidonius’ ‘weak 
reading’ of Plato that emphasized the functions of each part and downplayed the 
agent-like characteristics of the parts. Moreover, Philo treated the spirited part as the 
natural ally to the appetitive part, not to the mind as in Plato.  
Philo could, like Plato, relate the three parts of the soul to the four virtues, 
though he preferred the Stoic technical definitions. In this account, internal 
psychological harmony results when reason rules; when the lower parts usurp reason 
the result is civil war. Yet, even here, Stoicizing interpretations insert themselves. 
This is most profoundly the case when Philo makes the mind ultimately responsible 
for the soul’s passions as their source. 
Alongside this tripartite conception, Philo also made a more fundamental 
bipartite division between rational and irrational parts of the soul. Drawing 
especially upon Plato’s Timaeus, Philo likewise depicted the mind as rational, 
immortal, and superior, created directly by God as a copy of the Logos. By contrast, 
he considered the lower parts of the soul to be the work of the subordinate divine 
powers. As a result, these parts are irrational, mortal, akin to the body, and inferior.  
Philo construed the soul’s immortality in terms of the Orphic scheme, outlined 
especially in the Phaedo, of the pre-existence, embodiment, and return of the soul to 
the heavenly realm, though he rejected Plato’s doctrine of reincarnation, including 
the metempsychosis of souls into animals. Given its kinship to the divine, he time 
and again argued that the mind should turn away from the prison of the body and 
instead contemplate the ideas and powers of the intelligible world. It falls into 
passion precisely when it willingly leaves its proper orientation toward the 
intelligible for the pleasures of the body. This scheme formed the basis of Philo’s 
narrative of the soul’s spiritual journey toward the vision of God. 
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Chapter 4: Stoic, Platonic, and biblical metaphors 
Philo repeatedly invoked Plato’s myth of the charioteer and horses found in the 
Phaedrus to illustrate the internal relations of the tripartite soul, though he utilized it 
for his own purposes.1 While Buccioni is certainly correct in cautioning us against 
too quickly identifying the tripartite soul of the Republic with the winged chariot 
ensemble in the Phaedrus,2 what is important for this study is that Philo essentially 
conflated the two metaphors. In so doing, he drew upon details from both accounts 
in his description of the tripartite soul, supplementing these with descriptions in the 
Timaeus as well. In the sections that follow, we will look at the similarities and 
differences between Philo’s account and Plato’s, before noting important Stoicizing 
deviations in Philo. Next, we will explore Philo’s use of Plato’s tripartite psychology 
in relation to his narrative of the progress of the soul on its journey to God. We will 
show that his extensive use of the charioteer metaphor together with the herdsman 
and creatures similes3 further demonstrates both his broad reliance upon elements of 
Plato’s psychology, on the one hand, and his willingness to intermingle it with 
biblical, Stoic, and Peripatetic elements, on the other.  
Philo’s use of Plato’s charioteer simile 
Similarities between Plato and Philo’s portrayals of the chariot metaphor 
Philo retains a number of the key elements in Plato’s charioteer myth in his own 
exposition of the soul and its parts. For both philosophers, the mind serves as the 
chariot-driver and the spirited and appetitive parts as the two horses. Each of the 
horses, moreover, possesses distinct, contrasting characteristics, which we will 
discuss in detail in a moment. Both authors omit the second person that commonly 
stood beside the driver in ‘the chariot box’ (παραιβάτης), since in neither exposition 
is there any second element in the soul that assists the mind in its governing 
capacity. Philo likewise includes in his exposition many of the paraphernalia related 
to charioteering. Both mention ‘the chariot’ (ἅρµα),4 though Philo often prefers the 
                                                
1 See Philo, Agr. 72-7; Migr. 67; Sacr. 45, 49, 104-6; Spec. 2.142, 163, 4.79; Virt. 13-4; Mos. 25-
8; Leg. 1.72-3, 3.109, 118, 123, 127, 132, 134, 136-7, 223-4. 
2 E.M. Buccioni, ‘Psychical forces in Plato’s Phaedrus’ (2002), 331, 337-41. Robinson likewise 
questions the identification. See T.M. Robinson, Plato’s Psychology (1995), 122-3. 
3 See Philo, Agr. 48. 
4 Philo, Leg. 3.223; Plato, Phdr. 246e. 
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more generic term, ‘vehicle’ (ὄχηµα).5 Both also reference other accoutrements, 
including ‘the reins’ (ἡνία),6 ‘whip’ (µάστιξ),7 and ‘bit’ or ‘bridle’ (χαλινός).8 Philo 
mentions items of equipment that Plato omits in the Phaedrus, including ‘the chariot 
box’ (δίφρος),9 ‘spurs’ (µύωψ),10 and ‘chariot team’ (ἅρµατα),11 while Plato refers to 
‘a goad’ (κέντρον), something Philo does not mention.12 Most of these paraphernalia 
appear to be incidental to the metaphor, used primarily to colour the exposition.  
However, the bit and reins are closely connected to the charioteer/mind’s 
management of the two horses and the spiritual status of the soul. Finally, both 
authors situate the chariot-metaphor within a wider narrative of the mind’s quest to 
ascend back to a purely intellectual existence, which in turn requires therapy for the 
soul. 
We can note a number of commonalities between Plato’s and Philo’s treatment of 
the driver. For both, the mind has the same basic role, namely, to ‘drive’ (ἐλαύνω) 
and to ‘guide’ (ἡνιοχέω) the soul. Both authors also invoke the parallel nautical 
description of the mind as ‘a steersman’ (κυβερνήτης) to characterize its proper role 
in guiding the soul-chariot.13 Their common approach is further reinforced by the 
fact that both liken the role of the mind/charioteer in the soul to that of God/Zeus in 
the cosmos. For Plato, Zeus is ‘the great commander in heaven’ ‘who looks after 
everything and places [all things] in order (διακοσµῶν πάντα καὶ ἐπιµελούµενος)’, 
while for Philo, God ‘guides’ (ἄγω, ἡνιοχέω) the entire universe,14 directing it ‘in 
safety’ (σωτηρίως).15  
Philo generally also follows Plato’s characterization of the two horses in the 
chariot-team, though he draws a different conclusion with regard to the relations of 
the horses/lower psychological parts and the mind/charioteer. Compare Plato and 
Philo’s descriptions of the two horses: 
• The spirited part of the soul 
                                                
5 Philo, Agr. 76,77; Plato, Phdr. 247b. 
6 Philo, Agr. 73; Mos. 1.25; Leg. 1.72, 3.223; Plato, Phdr. 254c. 
7 Philo, Agr. 71; Plato, Phdr. 253e, 254a. 
8 Philo, Agr. 69, 70; Spec. 4.79; Plato, Phdr. 254c-e. 
9 Philo, Agr. 75. 
10 Ibid., 71. 
11 Philo, Spec. 4.79. 
12 Plato, Phdr. 253e. 
13 Philo, Agr. 69; Sacr. 45, 51, 105; Spec. 4.96; Leg. 3.118, 223-4; Det. 53; Plato, Phdr. 247c. 
14 Philo, Migr. 186; Opif. 46; Somn. 1.157; Her. 301. 
15 Philo, Abr. 70; Decal. 60-1; Praem. 34. 
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o Plato: ‘The [good (ἀγαθός)] horse that is on the right, or nobler, side 
[of the chariot-team] is upright in frame and well jointed, with a high 
neck (ὑψαύχην) and a regal nose; his coat is white, his eyes are black, 
and he is a lover of honour (τιµή) with modesty (αἰδώ) and self-
control (σωφρόσυνος); companion to true glory, he needs no whip, 
and is guided by verbal commands alone.’16 
o Philo: ‘The one [high spirit, θυµός] prances and wants to be free 
(ἐλεύθερος) and at large (ἄφετος) and has a high neck (ὑψαύχην), as 
you might expect of a male (ἄρρην).’17 Elsewhere, however, he 
describes high spirit as like a ‘restive’ (ἀφηνιαστής) and ‘stiff-
necked’ (σκληραύχην) horse.18 
• The appetitive part of the soul  
o Plato: ‘The other [bad] horse is a crooked great jumble of limbs with 
a short bull-neck, a pug nose, black skin, and bloodshot white eyes; 
companion to wild boasts (ὕβρις) and indecency (ἀλαζονεία), he is 
shaggy around the ears – deaf as a post – and just barely yields to 
horsewhip and goad combined.’19  
o Philo: ‘The other [desire, ἐπιθυµία] is mean (ἀνελεύθερος) and 
slavish (δουλοπρεπής), up to sly tricks (πανουργία), keeps her nose in 
the manger and empties it in no time, for she is a female (θῆλυς).’20 
In the comparisons above, Plato and occasionally Philo place the horse representing 
the spirited part of the soul in a better light. Both depict it as possessing ‘a high 
neck’, which was regarded as a desirable characteristic in a horse in antiquity.21 
Philo’s depiction of the better horse prancing about and desiring freedom and Plato’s 
portrayal of the white horse’s upright and well-built frame, regal nose, and love of 
honour both further detail what one would expect of a high-necked horse. Plato’s 
description of the white horse includes other positive moral qualities – love of 
honour, modesty, and responsiveness to the charioteer – all of which correspond to 
‘the right-handed’ features of erotic love in the Phaedrus. Philo, in contrast, does not 
                                                
16 Plato, Phdr. 253d. 
17 Philo, Agr. 73. 
18 Philo, Leg. 3.136. 
19 Plato, Phdr. 253e. 
20 Philo, Agr. 73. 
21 For instance, note Xenophon’s positive characterization of a ‘high’ or ‘arched’ neck in a horse. 
See, Xen., Eq. 1.8; 10.3-4. 
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mention any of Plato’s positive moral characteristics, but he does portray the horse 
as male. For Philo, this was not merely a physical characteristic. Rather, throughout 
his corpus, the masculine quality always possessed positive moral and spiritual 
connotations, associating the masculine principle with healthy movements in the 
soul, good affections, and the virtues.22  
In contrast, both Plato and Philo portray the horse that symbolizes the appetitive 
part of the soul in an inferior light to the good/male horse. Physically it is of poorer 
stock. Each of the poor features that Plato lists corresponds to a good feature in the 
white horse: a short, bull neck, not a high neck; a pug-shaped nose, not a regal one; 
black skin, not white; white bloodshot eyes, not black eyes. Similarly, its moral 
character is degraded. Rather than obedient, it is deaf to the commands of the driver 
and instead of loving ‘honour’ (τιµή) and ‘modesty’ (αἰδώ), it is given to ‘insolence’ 
(ὕβρις) and ‘imposture’ (ἀλαζονεία). Finally, possibily alluding to Plato’s 
description of pleasure as deceptive in the Laws, Philo described the female horse as 
‘up to sly tricks’ (πανουργία).23 All of these features correspond to Plato’s ‘left-
handed’ portrayal of erotic love in the first speech of the Phaedrus.  
Philo likewise contrasts the appetitive horse with the spirited, placing it in a bad 
light. Physically, rather than possessing a high neck, it is slavish (δουλοπρεπής) and 
mean (ἀνελεύθερος). Morally, it is given to ‘sly tricks’ (πανουργία). Additionally, 
Philo’s portrayal draws upon elements from Plato’s description of the appetitive part 
of the soul outside the charioteer myth. In the Timaeus, Plato had described the 
appetitive part of the soul as tied down like ‘a wild beast’ near the stomach, ever 
feeding as at a trough.24 In a similar manner, Philo emphasizes the base orientation 
of the appetitive horse toward consumption, describing it as ‘a devourer of its own 
house’ (οἰκόσιτος and οἰκοφθόρος). Finally, Philo reinforces his negative moral 
characterization of the appetitive horse by depicting it as a female. Throughout his 
corpus Philo generally associated the feminine principle with those qualities 
opposite to the male, namely, sickly movements of the soul, the passions, and vice.25 
                                                
22 See especially Philo, Leg. 2.97; Sacr. 103, 106; Spec. 1.200-1; QG 4.15. Compare also Philo, 
Agr. 140; Migr. 140. 
23 Plato, Leg. 9.863b. 
24 Plato, Tim. 70e. 
25 Philo, Leg. 2.97; Sacr. 103,106; ; Spec. 1.200-1; QG 4.15. For further discussion, see R. Baer, 
Categories Male and Female (1970), 40-44; J.E. Taylor, Jewish Women Philosophers (2003), 251-2; 
G.J. Warne, Philo and Paul (1995), 142. Note also Philo’s negative portrayal of the female element 
in his strong censure of the effeminate role of a male partner in homosexual relations, which he based 
on his reading of Deut. 23:1 (LXX) and Lev. 20:13 (LXX). Philo, Abr. 135-6; Spec. 1.325, 3.37-42; 
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Differences between Plato and Philo’s portrayals of the chariot metaphor 
In spite of the many similarities between the two philosophers’ use of this metaphor, 
Philo’s description of the horses diverges significantly from Plato’s. Whereas the 
horses in Plato’s chariot team are both male, Philo’s team is composed of one male 
and one female horse. Philo’s differentiation between the horses’ gender likely 
arises from the gender difference of the two terms for the passions, with the 
masculine term, ‘high spirit’ (ὁ θυµός), bringing to mind a male horse and and the 
feminine word, ‘desire’ (ἡ ἐπιθυµία), the female horse. This in turn permitted Philo 
to draw upon the symbolic interpretive scheme that he applied to male and female 
elsewhere in his corpus, as noted above, though with modifications that nearly undo 
its significance in this particular application, as we will discuss in a moment. 
In addition, while both Plato and Philo differentiate the two horses from one 
another in a similar manner, they diverge in their treatment of the relation of the 
better horse to the mind. Whereas Plato treats the white horse as a partner and ally to 
the mind/charioteer, Philo opposes both horses to the mind/charioteer. In so doing, 
Philo transmutes the high neck of the male horse into a stiff neck, his own 
terminology, as explained before. For instance, returning to the passage where he 
discusses the overthrow of reason by desire and wrath, he describes the interaction 
between both horses and the driver as follows: 
Whenever … high spirit (θυµός) and desire (ἐπιθυµία) turn restive and 
get out of hand (ἀφηνιάσῃ καὶ ἀναχαιτίσῃ), and by the violence of their 
impetus drag (τῇ βίᾳ τῆς ὁρµῆς κατασύρω) the driver (ἡνίοχον), that is 
the reason (λογισµός), down from his seat and put him under the yoke 
(ὑποζεύγνυµι), and each (ἑκάτερος) of these passions gets hold of the 
reins, injustice prevails. For it cannot be but for the badness and want of 
skill (ἀπειρίᾳ καὶ κακίᾳ) of the driver, the team is swept down precipices 
and gullies, just as by experience and skill (ἐµπειρίᾳ καὶ ἀρετῇ) it must 
needs be brought safely through.26 
In this passage both horses – high spirit and desire – oppose and overthrow the 
charioteer. Philo states that ‘high spirit and desire’ turn ‘restive’ in defiance of the 
                                                                                                                                    
Contempl. 59-62. For discussion of Philo’s principles of sexual conduct, see K.L. Gaca, ‘Philo’s 
Principles of Sexual Conduct’ (1996), 21-34. 
26 Philo, Leg. 1.73. 
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driver. He goes on to exaggerate the metaphor such that he poses the fantastical 
image of the two horses dragging the chariot driver off the chariot and placing him 
under the yoke. The two horses then climb on to the chariot and ‘each’ (ἑκάτερος) 
horse takes over the reins. By descibing both horses in this manner, Philo glosses 
over the differences between the male and female horses mentioned in the 
previously quoted passage. Whatever distinctions there might be between them, 
Philo’s description of their character and actions here is more or less identical. 
Moreover, the horses work in tandem with one another as close associates. Rather 
than high spirit siding with the mind as an ally, it conspires with desire to force the 
mind under the yoke. Consequently, ‘injustice’ results from the two horses joining 
forces to overthrow the charioteer and take control of the chariot. 
In contrast, Plato attributes the source of the difficulty in driving the chariot to 
the black horse alone, although both authors cite want of skill in the driver to 
properly control the horse(s) as a contributing factor.27 Early in the chariot story, 
Plato describes the black horse as ‘heavy’ (βρῖθος µετέχων). As a consequence, it 
pulls the entire chariot-team downward as they strain to ascend to the huperanion 
realm when they are processing with the gods.28 These inferior chariots, unable to 
keep up with the gods, descend into a chaotic competition with one another as they 
try to reach the upper surface of the heavens. In their clamouring to get ahead, their 
horses pull violently in different directions, causing injury to the chariot wings.29 
Given the consistently violent portrayal of the black horse throughout the story, 
moreover, Plato’s reference to the horses in the plural probably refers to the various 
black horses among the competing chariot teams. Finally, in Plato’s further 
description of the two horses in greater detail later in the narrative, it is again the 
black horse alone that lunges forward, ‘throwing back’ (ἀναπεσών) the driver and 
dragging him and the white horse toward the boy.30  
Moreover, notwithstanding the relative superiority of the male horse to the 
female horse as noted above, Philo consistently depicts both horses as violent or 
excessive in their movements. His favourite way to characterize both horses is to 
describe them as ‘restive’ (ἀφηνιάζω)31 and ‘rearing up/back’ (ἀναχαιτίζω) in an 
                                                
27 Plato, Phdr. 246b, 247b; Philo, Leg. 1.73; Agr. 77. 
28 Ibid., 247b. 
29 Ibid., 248a-b. 
30 Ibid., 254e. 
31 Philo, Leg. 1.73; 3.136, 223; Agr. 74, 84; Spec. 4.79, 99; Virt. 14; Mos. 1.26. 
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effort to throw the charioteer or rider.32 Both of these notions, moreover, carry in 
their train a constellation of related ideas. Hence, Philo also describes the horses as 
‘neighing’ (χρεµετιστικός),33 ‘stiff-necked’ (σκληραύχην),34 ‘disturbed’ 
(παρακινέω) or ‘maddened’ (οἰστράω),35 and ‘unruly’ or ‘skittish’ (σκιρτητικός).36 
Plato, in contrast, never describes either horse as restive, stiff-necked, distracted, or 
maddened, though he does once depict the black horse as rearing up, neighing, and 
‘leaping forward violently’ (σκιρτῶν βίᾳ),37 before it shamelessly ‘drags’ (ἕλκω) the 
white horse and charioteer toward the beautiful boy.38 Further, Philo identifies the 
movements of the male and female horses in the myth with unruly ‘impulses’ in the 
soul. He describes ‘the impulses’ of both high spirit and desire as ‘strong’ (δύναται 
ὁρµή) or ‘random’ (ἀκρίτοις ὁρµαῖς), and in need of a charioteer to ‘curb’ or ‘bridle’ 
(ἐπιστοµίζει) them.39 Even in the case of De agricultura 72-77, after initially 
following Plato in offering a more positive chacterization of the male horse, Philo 
immediately describes both animals (τὰ ζῷα), when failed to be properly reined in, 
as ‘rebelling’ (ἀφηνιάζω), ‘disturbed’ (παρακινέω), ‘mad’ (οἰστράω), ‘erratic’ 
(πληµµελῆ), and ‘disorderly’ (ἄτακτον).40 Hence, both Philo’s male and female 
horses require spur and bridle to keep them under control, whereas Plato’s black 
horse needs spur and goad, but the white horse does not since it listens to the 
charioteer.  
The differences between Plato’s and Philo’s employment of the chariot metaphor 
for the soul do not end with divergences in the way they portrayed the horses. 
Rather, the differences extend to other parts of the metaphor. Firstly, and 
significantly, Philo nowhere connects the charioteer metaphor to erotic love. This is 
especially surprising given his near ubiquitous employment of the theme of the 
journey or migration of the soul back to God, a theme that he closely linked with 
erotic flight of the soul. In this case, the absence of eros is probably due in large part 
to the fact that Philo uses the metaphor as a device for characterizing the relations 
among the parts of the soul, not, as was the case for Plato, in order to discuss how 
                                                
32 Philo, Agr. 70; Spec. 4.99. 
33 Philo, Agr. 67, 72; Plato, Phdr. 254d. 
34 Philo, Leg. 3.136. 
35 Philo, Agr. 75. 
36 Ibid., 68, 83; Philo, Leg. 2.99. 
37 Plato, Phdr. 254a. 
38 Ibid., 254d. 
39 Philo, Leg. 3.118, 128. 
40 Philo, Agr. 74-76. 
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erotic love and philosophical friendship could serve the soul in its quest to 
contemplate true being or reality, a theme Philo did take up elsewhere in a modified 
form. As such, his use reflects a simplified appropriation of the metaphor in keeping 
with the approach of other Platonic philosophers of his day.41  
Secondly, Philo never mentions the chariot’s wings in his discussion of the 
human soul. We know that he knew of the image, because he twice refers to God as 
riding ‘a winged chariot’ like a charioteer.42 In both cases, he relates this metaphor 
to the notion of God’s ‘government’ (ἀρχή) of the universe.43 In one instance, he 
describes the cosmos itself as the winged chariot and the horses as those who set 
themselves to oppose divine virtue by teaching the creed that nothing exists beyond 
this world, so that the universe is without guardian, helmsman, or protector. Similar 
to his description of the chariot horses that represent anger and desire, Philo likewise 
describes these horses as ‘restive’ (ἀφηνιαστής) and ‘stiff-necked’ (σκληραύχην), 
always ‘prancing about’ (σκιρτάω). The horses take on anthropomorphic attributes 
in as much as they also falsely believe that they are ‘independent’ (ἐλεύθερος), ‘a 
law unto themselves’ (αὐτόνοµος), and ‘rulers of others’ (ἑτέρων ἡγεµόνες).44 Philo 
does not explicitly specify who ‘the others’ in the metaphor are, and we would be 
wise not to press the details too far. Based on the context, we can surmise that ‘the 
others’ refers to other people and creatures, since throughout this passage Philo 
describes these people as thinking of themselves more than they ought, and as 
rejecting any sort of deity.  
Philo thus sought by this description of the horses as restive and stiff-necked to 
highlight the pride of such people. This interpretation finds support first in the fact 
that Philo invoked the chariot metaphor when he was commenting on the phrase, ‘all 
the earth was one lip’, which begins the tower of Babel story that tells how certain 
people banded together as one to build a tower that would reach to heaven, and so 
make a name for themselves.45 Philo consistently reads this as a story about the 
pride and hubris of fools and the wicked. Interestingly, this portrayal corresponds 
                                                
41 For instance, like Philo, on several occasions Galen dropped any references to erotic love or to 
the chariot wings when he utilized the chariot metaphor in his defence of Plato’s psychology. This 
was the case in every instance where he employed the metaphor casually. See Galen, Plac. III 3.6, 12, 
15, V 5.34-5, VI 1.17. He even failed to mention either the wings or erotic love when he explicitly 
referred to the metaphor in Plato’s Phaedrus. See Galen, Plac. VI 2.4.  
42 Philo, Somn. 2.294; Her. 301. 
43 Philo, Somn. 2.285, 290. 
44 Ibid., 2.277, 283, 291, 293. 
45 Gen. 11:1-9 (LXX). 
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more closely with the insolent character of the black horse in Plato’s Phaedrus 
discussed earlier than it does with Philo’s characterization of the male and female 
chariot horses that represent anger and desire. In those cases, the horses’ restiveness 
refers primarily to the violent and excessive character of the passions. This also 
accounts for Philo’s identification of the bridle, whip, and spur with the punishments 
that God employs to remind these people of His true status as ruler of the universe 
and of their inferior position.46  
In the second case, Philo compares God’s ‘rule’ (βασιλεία) of ‘the entire 
universe’ (ὁ ὅλος) after ‘the manner of a charioteer’ (ἡνιόχου τρόπος) or ‘pilot’ 
(κυβερνήτου τρόπος).47 He then associates each driving term with different parts of 
the cosmos. He uses the boating analogy to describe God’s action in relation to the 
lower world. Hence, he refers to that world as ‘a boat’ or ‘hull’ (σκάφος). He 
describes ‘the entire heavens’ (σύµπας οὐρανός) as a winged chariot that God drives 
with absolute authority and sovereignty. This description of the chariot as ‘winged’ 
follows from the elevated position of the heavens above the earth. In this second 
case, he makes no effort to fill out the details of the metaphor. If God is the 
charioteer or pilot, and one part of the cosmos is a ship and the other a winged 
chariot, both of which combine to form ‘the whole’, what do the horses symbolize? 
Philo does not say.  
Given Plato’s connection between the wings and erotic love, it is not surprising 
that Philo eschewed any reference to the wings when he utilized the chariot 
metaphor to describe the soul, since in his use of the myth he removed any direction 
associated with erotic love. This impression is reinforced by the fact that Philo 
makes no connection between God’s chariot wings and erotic love in the two 
instances discussed above either. Nevertheless, one might wonder why he did not 
include the chariot wings, but perhaps in an alternative non-sexual manner. He had 
already demonstrated that he was quite happy to creatively employ other elements of 
the metaphor for his own purposes! Aside from Philo’s tendency to simplify the 
metaphor in general, the best explanation for the omission resides in the fact that the 
biblical contexts upon which he was commenting failed to provide an image or term 
that he might associate with the chariot wings of Plato’s original narrative, hence, he 
modified it for his own purposes. 
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Philo’s biblical and Stoic transformations of the chariot metaphor 
As long as the chariot metaphor contained the image of ruling and subordinate, 
rational and irrational elements in the soul, Philo could treat most of its other facets 
rather elastically. This contrasted with Plato in a couple of ways. On the one hand, 
the chariot functions as the central metaphor in the Phaedrus, comprehending the 
entirety of Socrates’ second speech in which he seeks to offer to Phaedrus a right-
handed account of erotic love. Hence, each detail plays an important role in bringing 
out the nuances and subtleties of Plato’s overall argument about how the madness of 
erotic love can serve the philosopher’s quest to return to a true knowledge of what is 
most real. As a consequence, the details of the myth’s narrative are much less 
flexible, since they carry more freight. On the other hand, Plato did not use the 
chariot metaphor at all in his other discussions of the tripartite soul, in the Timaeus 
and in the Republic. Instead, he utilized other analogies that were completely 
unrelated to the notion of charioteering, such as likening the mind, spirited, and 
appetitive parts to a man, lion, and many-headed beast respectively, as discussed 
above. Thus, while the chariot metaphor is indispensable to the Phaedrus, as a key 
element in a larger, central myth, in the Republic and Timaeus it is unimportant.  
We can observe Philo’s flexible treatment of the chariot metaphor in his creative 
extension of it in a number of directions throughout his corpus. For instance, instead 
of Plato’s two horses that represent the spirited and appetitive parts of the soul, Philo 
could refer rather to a single horse of ‘sense perception’ (αἴσθησις).48  
Philo often coupled the chariot metaphor with other analogies, treating them as 
interchangeable. Hence, in a number of instances he paired it with that of ‘a pilot’ 
(κυβερνήτης) and his boat,49 and on one occasion with the image of ‘a monitor’ 
(βραβευτής) and desire and anger.50 Each of these analogies highlight the mind’s 
guiding role in the soul. He also correlated it with the metaphor of a king and his 
country, or ‘a ruler’ (ἡγεµών) and his city, to underscore the mind’s ruling function 
in the soul.51 In all these cases, with the exception of the monitor analogy, the 
inferior elements – boat, city, and country – lacked detail. Philo aimed at the basic 
analogy and no more. 
                                                
48 Philo, Leg. 3.222-4. 
49 Philo, Agr. 69; Migr. 67; Sacr. 45, 51, 105; Spec. 4.96; Leg. 3.118, 223-4; Det. 53. 
50 Philo, Migr. 67. 
51 Philo, Leg. 3.224; Sacr. 49. 
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At other times, Philo extended the metaphors in new directions as a result of the 
words or imagery found in the biblical texts upon which he was commenting. For 
instance, in the De agricultura, Philo relates the soul to images drawn from 
agriculture, in this exposition of Gen. 9:20 (LXX): ‘Noah began to be a husbandman, 
and he planted a vineyard.’ Taking his start from Moses’ identification of ‘righteous 
Noah’ as a husbandman, Philo goes on to contrast the righteous sage’s care of the 
soul with that of the wicked fool under three separate headings,52 each of which 
denote the same underlying comparison: a husbandman and plants, various types of 
herdsman and animals, and a horseman and horse(s).53 He introduces the chariot 
metaphor under the third of those headings. As such, the chariot is not the 
controlling metaphor for Philo in the De agricultura, but this makes sense in light of 
the fact that he was seeking to expound the underlying meaning of a particular 
biblical text under the first heading of husbandman – Gen. 9:20. Philo’s 
identification of the two subsequent headings – the herdsman and horseman – was a 
result of ‘a careful search’ of scripture.54 Accordingly, the biblical text served as the 
reservoir of images from which Philo took his start. He introduced additional similes 
and figures, including the chariot metaphor, when he set about unpacking the 
underlying meaning of each of the three comparisons. 
In all three of the comparisons in De agricultura, moreover, Philo uses two 
variant terms for each figure to contrast, in Stoic fashion, the sage versus the fool. 
Hence, for the first simile, he calls the sage ‘a husbandman’ (γεωργός), but the fool 
‘a worker of the soil’ (γῆς ἐργασία);55 in the second simile, he identifies the sage 
with ‘a shepherd’ (ποιµήν) or more generally, ‘a herdsman’ (νοµεύς),56 but the fool 
with ‘a cattle rearer’ (κτηνοτρόφος),57 while in the final simile, he calls the sage ‘a 
horseman/chariotman’ (ἱππεύς)58 or ‘a charioteer’ (ἡνίοχος),59 but the fool ‘a rider’ 
(ἀναβάτης).  
                                                
52 Philo, Agr. 26, 67, 124. 
53 Ibid., 1-25 (husbandman), 26-66 (herdsman), 67-119 (horseman). 
54 Ibid., 26. 
55 Ibid., 2. 
56 Ibid., 48. 
57 Ibid., 27. 
58 Ibid., 67. 
59 Ibid., 72. 
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Transformation #1: The horseman/rider metaphor  
Philo treats the metaphor of the charioteer/rider and two horses, and the figure of the 
horseman/rider and a single horse, in a coordinated manner. We see this in the 
seamless shift from his use of the first figure to the second in the course of his 
exposition. Philo introduces his third heading by observing that the lawgiver 
(Moses) distinguishes the horseman and rider, not only with regard to the actual 
practice, but also in relation to ‘the reasoning process’ (λογισµός) that they signify.60 
He then discusses the difference between a horseman and a rider. The horseman is 
‘skilled in horsemanship’ (ἱππικὴ τέχνη), hence ‘an expert’ (ἐπιστήµων). As such, he 
places a bit into the mouth of the horse to force it to go the way he wishes and uses a 
whip and spur to discipline it when it is unruly.61 The rider, conversely, is unskilled. 
He is unable to guide the beast, but rather has ‘given himself over’ (ἐκδέδωκε 
ἑαυτόν) to ‘the irrational and capricious beast’ and is carried wherever it goes. 
Ultimately, the irrational beast will end up carrying him to their mutual 
destruction.62 Next, Philo moves from the material example to the soul, explicitly 
comparing the constitution of the soul to a charioteer and two horses. After 
describing the horses, he again reminds the reader that the unskilled charioteering of 
a foolish driver eventually results in the destruction of the entire team. In the 
following section, Philo quotes a selection of biblical texts, each of which invokes 
the imagery of a horse and rider.63 Holding fast to the language of the text, he then 
subtly shifts from the figure of one charioteer and two horses, which he had used to 
introduce this section on horsemanship generally, to that of one horseman and one 
horse. For instance, Philo quotes Deuteronomy 20:1: 
If you go out to war against your enemies and see horse and rider and 
many people (ἐάν … ἴδῃς ἵππον καὶ ἀναβάτην καὶ λαὸν πλείονα), you 
shall not be afraid, because the Lord your God is with thee. 
He then explains its allegorical meaning:  
For high spirit (θυµός) and desire (ἐπιθυµία) and all passions generally 
(συνόλως ἅπαντα πάθη), and the whole array of reasoning faculties 
seated upon each of them as upon horses (ἐποχούµενοι ὥσπερ ἵπποις 
                                                
60 Ibid., 67. Compare with Philo, Agr. 26-8.  
61 Philo, Agr. 67-71; Leg. 2.103-4. 
62 Philo, Agr. 67-71. 
63 Gen. 49:17 (LXX); Deut. 17:15f, 20:1 (LXX); Ex. 15:1, 21 (LXX). 
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ἑκάστοις λογισµοί) … may be disregarded by those who have the power 
of the great God acting … as their shield and champion.64 
We can see the influence of the passage from Deuteronomy upon Philo’s shift. 
Rather than treating high spirit and desire as two horses under the direction of a 
single charioteer as in the general introduction to the horsemanship section of De 
agricultura, he separates the horses from the chariot team and places each under the 
direction of a single rider. In Deuteronomy, the horse and rider are both in the 
singular, signifying a horse and rider, not charioteer and chariot-team. Consequently, 
on the one hand, in order to provide continuity between his commentary here and 
the introductory passage, he expressly mentions again the two horses from the 
chariot team, high spirit and desire. On the other hand, in order to maintain the sense 
of the Deuteronomy passage, he treats the two horses as separate, rather than yoked 
together as a team. Hence, he describes the foolish reasoning faculties as seated 
upon ‘each’ of the horses.  
Philo further modifies the metaphor by shifting from treating high spirit and 
desire as two concrete parts of a tripartite soul as in the chariot metaphor, to 
presenting them as two examples of myriad passions. This too is a result of his 
reading of Deuteronomy. The text mentions not only ‘a horse and rider’, but rather 
‘a horse and rider and many people’. Philo interprets ‘the many people’ to refer to 
other riders or reasoning faculties in addition to the two reasoning faculties riding 
high spirit and desire. However, rather than treating the other riders as also riding 
other instances of high spirit or desire, he instead takes each horse to be a different 
passion, each with its own rider. Philo erases any distinctions between a superior 
and inferior horse, as mentioned in his introductory section;65 all the enemy horses 
are equally bad. While this is certainly a significant move away from Plato’s chariot 
metaphor, it is not beyond the scope of Plato’s psychology. As discussed above, 
Plato had seen desire as composed of myriad distinct passions or desires. Hence, he 
could call it a many-headed beast in the Republic or portray it as a bunch of desires 
in the belly clamouring for gratification in the Timaeus. Nevertheless, as we will see 
in a moment, this erasure of the distinctions between the horses in fact signals the 
influence of a Stoic conception of the soul and passions. The juxtaposition of sage 
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and fool, and the flattening of the two horses into the general category of horses, that 
is, the passions, all of which are more or less equally bad, move these Platonic ideas 
in the direction of Stoicism.  
The Stoicizing direction of Philo’s transformation of the chariot metaphor 
becomes more apparent when we examine the details of another horseman/rider and 
horse variation – the Dan-biting-the-horse-heels allegory. On two occasions Philo 
relates the poetic prophecy in Gen. 49:17 about Dan, to the horseman/rider variation 
of the chariot metaphor.66 The Gen. text reads:  
Let Dan become a serpent in the road (ὁδός), seated on the beaten track 
(τρίβος), biting the horse’s heel, and the horseman (ἱππεύς) shall fall 
backward (εἰς τὰ ὀπίσω), waiting for the salvation of the Lord. 
As was his practice, Philo reads this text allegorically. He assigns each of the key 
terms a similar symbolic meaning, both in Legum allegoriae and in De agricultura. 
He identifies ‘the road’ in the first line of the Genesis poem with ‘the soul’ (ψυχή) 
and its ‘movements’ (κινήµατα), and ‘the beaten track’ with the well-trodden path of 
vice and passion.67 The serpent of Dan he likens to ‘endurance’ (καρτερία) or 
‘temperance’ (σωφροσύνη). In De agricultura, he also compares the serpent of Dan 
to the brass serpent of Moses, which he says likewise symbolizes endurance and 
temperance.68 As such, for Philo, the serpent of Dan – temperance – opposes and 
cures another serpent, the serpent of the woman/Eve. This is the serpent from the 
garden that deceived Eve, which Philo understood to stand for pleasure.69  
Dan symbolizes the soul’s ‘judging faculty’ (κρίσις). This is ‘the faculty’ 
(δύναµις) in the soul that is able to distinguish among different types of existences 
that travel on the road or in the soul. In other words, it is able to distinguish between 
those movements of the soul that are lifeless, incomplete, diseased, enslaved, 
female, and sickly, in contrast to those that are living, whole, healthy, free, male, 
                                                
66 Ibid., 94-119; Philo, Leg. 2.94-102. 
67 In Philo, Agr. 102-4. Philo identifies ‘the beaten track’ with life oriented toward indulgence in 
pleasure. The apparent difference is rather minor given the intimate connection for Philo between 
pleasure, passion, and vice.  
68 Philo, Agr. 79-80, 95-8. We should note that Philo does discuss Moses’ brass serpent at length 
in the section immediately preceding the text under discussion. See Philo, Leg. 2.79-93. 
69 Philo, Agr. 98-9, 106, 109; Leg. 2. 81, 84, 98, 106. For Platonic background, see Plato, Leg. 
9.863b. Bréhier argues that the contest between the two serpents, especially in its form of two 
maidens at Sac. 20-36, is reminiscent of Xenophon’s fable of Hercules’ choice to follow the maidens, 
Virtue or Vice. In the fable, Vice offers every form of ease, luxury, and pleasure, but Virtue the path 
of labour (πόνος), and true happiness. É. Bréhier, Philon d’Alexandrie (1950), 265. Xen., Mem., II 
1.20-34. 
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and good.70 Philo then explains the significance of the symbols that follow in the 
remaining lines of the poem in Genesis: 
The passions are likened to a horse (τὰ πάθη δὲ ἵππῳ ἀπεικάσθη). For 
passion (τὸ πάθος), like a horse, is a four-legged (τετρασκελές) creature, 
impulsive (ὁρµητικός), full of wilfulness (αὐθάδεια), and naturally 
skittish (σκιρτητικὸς φύσει), but the principle of self-mastery (ὁ 
σωφροσύνης λόγος) loves to bite (δάκνω) and wound and destroy 
(ἀναιρεῖν) passion. When passion with its heel bitten has stumbled, ‘the 
horseman shall fall backwards (εἰς τὰ ὀπίσω)’. We must understand by 
the horseman (ἱππεύς) the mind (νοῦς) that is mounted on the passions, 
which falls off (ἀποπίπτω) the passions when they are brought to a 
reckoning (συλλογίζοµαι) and overthrown (πτερνίζω).71 
Having already established the symbolic identity of Dan, the serpent, the road, and 
the trodden path in the poem, Philo next explains the allegorical meaning of the 
horse and the horseman. Philo equates the horse with the passions.72 He describes it 
both in the plural (τὰ πάθη) and in the singular (τὸ πάθος); it is singular inasmuch as 
it refers to passion according to its genus, but plural when viewed in accordance 
with its several species. Philo adds that the passions, like a horse, are ‘four-footed’. 
This matches the classic Stoic classification of passion as a genus into four cardinal 
passions: fear, desire, pleasure, and grief. All the descriptive terms that follow, 
namely, that the horse is wilful, impulsive and skittish, correspond with Philo’s 
description of the horses in the chariot-metaphor above. In both cases the horse is 
described as ‘skittish’, and in a parallel description it is ‘unruly’ (τὸ ἀφηνιάζον).73 
Though we do not find an exact match for his description of the passion-horse as 
‘wilful’ (αὐθάδεια) or ‘insolent’ (ὑπέραυχος) in the parallel text, it still fits Philo’s 
characterization of the chariot-horses as ‘stiff-necked’ (σκληραύχην) and deaf to the 
commands of the charioteer/rider. Similarly, although he never describes the chariot-
horses as ‘impulsive’ (ὁρµητικός), Philo clearly counts it as another synonym to his 
description of the horses as skittish (σκιρτητικός). In any case, the immoderate and 
unruly character of the passion-horse certainly fits a Stoic characterization of 
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72 Compare also Philo, Migr. 62. 
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passion, albeit not conclusively so inasmuch as the horse is still treated as separate 
from the mind and an alternative source of impulse.  
Philo next identifies the horseman with the mind. Again he invokes the 
distinction between a horseman, who is skilled in ‘horsemanship’ (ἱππεύς), and ‘a 
rider’ (ἀναβάτης), who is not. He notes that since Moses called the rider ‘a 
horseman’, this type of mind is not ‘a passion-lover’ (φιλοπαθής) and does not wish 
to continue to ride the passion-horse. If such a soul correctly distinguishes by its 
judgment (Dan) the difference between what is beneficial and what is not, and so 
determines to be ‘a lover of temperance’ (σωφροσύνης ἐραστής), it will then employ 
the serpent of Dan, temperance, to bite the heel of the horse. The horseman then falls 
backwards from the passion-horse and awaits the salvation of the Lord.74 While 
Philo’s treatment of Dan retains the Platonic role of reason in overcoming the 
distinct agency of the horse, it ultimately leads to horselessness inasmuch as the 
horseman dismounts from the horse altogether.  
Philo then puts into non-allegorical language his understanding of the 
significance for the soul of the rider falling backward (εἰς τὰ ὀπίσω) from the horse, 
and its subsequent overthrow (πτερνίζω). Here again we see the Stoicizing direction 
of Philo’s thought in this transformation of the chariot metaphor to the 
horseman/rider figure:  
… if the mind, after starting out to do wrong (ὁρµήσας ὁ νοῦς ἀδικῆσαι), 
drops behind and falls backwards (πίπτω εἰς τὰ ὀπίσω), it will not do the 
wrong deed; and if, after moving toward an irrational passion (ἐπὶ πάθος 
κινηθεὶς ἄλογον), it does not follow it up (οὐ ἐπεκτρέχω), but stays 
behind (κατόπιν µένω), it will reap the fairest reward, even freedom 
from passion (ἀπάθεια). This is why the prophet, understanding the 
falling backwards to be escape from the passions, adds the words, 
‘waiting for the salvation of the Lord’;75 for he is indeed saved by God 
who falls away from the passions and comes short of realizing them in 
act (ὑστερίζων τῆς ἐνεργείας αὐτῶν) … This explains why Moses in the 
Song praised God, that ‘He cast horse and rider (ἵππος καὶ ἀναβάτης) 
into the sea’.76 He means that God cast to utter ruin and the bottomless 
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abyss the four passions (τὰ τέσσαρα πάθη) and the wretched mind 
mounted on them (ὁ ἐἐποχούµενος αὐτοῖς ἄθλιος νοῦς) … for if the soul 
be won by freedom from passion (ἐὰν ἀπάθεια κατάσχῃ τὴν ψυχήν), it 
will have perfect bliss (τελέως εὐδαιµονέω).77  
According to Philo, the horseman – the mind that is oriented toward the acquisition 
of virtue – is riding passion because of its own initial impulse toward injustice. 
Hence, in the passage quoted above, the subject of the aorist active participle, ‘after 
starting out’ (ὁρµήσας), is ‘the mind’ (νοῦς). This recalls the divergent explanation 
of the source/cause of passion between the Stoic and the Platonic/Aristotelian 
approaches to the passions outlined in the previous chapters, where the Stoics 
argued that the mind is the only source or cause of impulse and movement in the 
soul, but both Plato and Aristotle located the cause of the passions in other psychic 
powers ulterior to the mind. It differs from the Platonic explanation by location the 
origin of the movement toward doing a deed of injustice in the mind, which rather 
located it in the disobedience or rebellion of one of the horses, but also unlike 
Stoicism by still positing the existence of the horse or passion as an alternative to the 
mind. While this passage primarily signals a break from a Platonic approach to 
justice in the soul, when we couple this with his stress on the important role played 
by Dan, or ‘judgment’ (κρίσις), another Stoic technical term,78 in overcoming 
passion, it certainly points to Philo’s effort to introduce and integrate Stoic notions 
into the Platonic elements of his psychology by situating both within a larger 
narrative of the soul’s journey from fool to sage.  
Philo next adds that even if the mind has already started to move the soul toward 
doing an unjust deed, the mind can still stop short of realizing the wrong act. Thus, 
one and same mind is responsible for both parts of the psychic movement, namely, 
setting the soul into motion and halting it. He uses a cluster of phrases to convey this 
later idea, including ‘to drop behind’ (ὑστερίζω), ‘to fall backwards’ (πίπτω εἰς τὰ 
ὀπίσω), ‘to not follow up’ (οὐ ἐπεκτρέχω), and ‘to fall off’ (ἀποπίπτω). All of these 
terms clearly reflect the biblical imagery in Gen. 49:17, but Philo’s point here 
follows from the logic of assigning responsibility to the mind for initiating an 
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impulse: If the mind has the power to set an impulse into motion, it likewise has the 
power to bring it to a standstill.  
As discussed above, Philo followed the Stoics in defining a passion as an 
immoderate and excessive impulse of the soul.79 So, once the soul has launched into 
an inordinate motion, it will not be easy to quieten. Or, to return to Philo’s 
horseman/rider metaphor, if the passionate impulse is like a horse that is galloping 
uncontrollably, it requires the skill of horsemanship to slow it to a trot. Thus, Philo 
observes a few lines later that the horseman’s ‘work’ (ἔργον) is to ‘master’ (δαµάζω) 
and ‘bridle’ (ἐπιστοµίζω) his horse when it ‘is restive’ (ἀφηνιάζω). Philo then holds 
out the possibility that if the mind conquers the passion and ‘stays behind’ (κατόπιν 
µένω), which is to say, does not mount another passion/horse, it will reap as a 
reward the psychological states associated with the Stoic sage, namely, ‘apatheia’ or 
‘freedom from passion’ (ἀπάθεια), freedom from soul sickness, and ‘perfect 
happiness’ (τελέως εὐδαιµονέω).80 Philo’s treatment of the horseman/rider metaphor 
with his strict contrast between the rider and horseman, his emphasis on the mind as 
the source of passion, and his moral ideal of apatheia, thus reflects a Stoicizing 
reinterpretation of the chariot metaphor into a three-stage journey of the soul from 
foolish rider, to horseman who has learned how to curb the passions, to a perfected 
sage that has quit passions altogether.  
Transformation #2: The chariot metaphor and Philo’s journey of the soul 
Philo integrated the chariot metaphor into a wider Platonic-inspired vision of the 
soul’s journey to wholeness and contemplation of the intelligibles,81 but one that is 
significantly modified by a Stoic outlook. The journey of the soul is one of the most 
pervasive themes in his corpus,82 and on a couple of occasions he relates this 
journey to the chariot metaphor.83 We will quote a passage from Philo’s De 
migratione Abrahami that nicely summarizes most of the important elements of his 
discussion, and supplement it with passages from Legum allegoriae where he 
discusses it in much greater detail:  
                                                
79 Philo, Spec. 4.79. 
80 Philo, Leg. 2.100-2; Agr. 123. 
81 C. Lévy, ‘Philo’s Ethics’ (2009), 164-6; S. Sandmel, Philo (1979), 25, 84-8. 
82 So likewise concludes Roskam. See G. Roskam, Path to Virtue (2005), 217. 
83 Philo, Migr. 66-7; Leg. 3.114-59. 
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‘Upon your breast and your belly (στῆθος καὶ κοιλία) you shall go’ 
(Gen. 3:14), in the literal sense applies to the serpent (ὄφις), but is really 
a truly Divine oracle applying to every irrational (ἄλογος) and passion-
loving (φιλοπαθής) man; for the breast (τὰ στέρνα) is the abode of fierce 
spirit (θυµός), and desire (ἐπιθυµία) dwells in the belly (κοιλία). The 
fool’s (ὁ ἄφρων) whole course through every moment of his journey 
depends on this pair, fierce spirit and desire; since he has got rid 
(ἀποβαλών) of mind (νοῦς), who is the charioteer (ἡνίοχος) and monitor 
(βραβεύς). The man of the opposite character (ὁ ἐναντίος τούτῳ) has 
exscinded (ἐκτέτµηται) fierce spirit and desire, and chosen as his patron 
and controlling guide (κυβερνήτης) the Divine Word (λόγον θεῖον). 
Even so Moses, best beloved of God, when offering the whole burnt 
sacrifices of the soul, will ‘wash out the belly (κοιλία)’ (Lev. 8:1), that 
is, will cleanse away desire in every shape (ὅλον τὸ ἐπιθυµίας εἶδος 
ἐκνίψεται), but ‘the breast (στηθύνιον) from the ram of consecration he 
will take away (ἀφαιρέω)’ (Lev. 8:29). This means, we may be sure, the 
warlike spirit (ὁ πολεµικὸς θυµός) in its completeness; and the object of 
taking it away is that the better portion of the soul, the rational part (τὸ 
λογικόν), that is left, may exercise its truly free and noble impulses 
(ὁρµαί) towards all things beautiful (πρὸς τὰ καλὰ πάντα), with nothing 
pulling against it (ἀντισπάω) any longer and dragging it in another 
direction (µεθέλκω).84 
In this passage, Philo sets into opposition two types of souls, in the strongest of 
terms. First he discusses ‘the fool’, then a man of ‘opposite character’, namely, 
Moses. The fool possesses fierce spirit and desire, but he has got rid of the mind. 
This recalls the metaphor discussed above of the horses removing the mind and 
taking over the chariot. Moses, on the other hand, exercises the rational part only; he 
has extirpated fierce anger and washed out every desire. For Philo, Moses functions 
as a sort of super-sage. It is as if the fool’s chariot comprises only the horses, 
without a charioteer, while Moses’ chariot has the charioteer, but no horses. The 
implications are clear: the fool is utterly irrational, since he has got rid of the mind, 
while the Moses-soul is utterly rational and free from all passion, since he has cut 
                                                
84 Philo, Migr. 66-7. 
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off and cleansed anger and desire. Thus, it comes as no surprise that Philo describes 
the fool as ‘an irrational and passion-loving man’, while he portrays Moses as a 
passion-hater inasmuch as he has cut out and removed both passions.  
Additionally, the two opposing types of soul follow different leaders. The fool 
aimlessly goes wherever fierce anger and desire lead, since he has got rid of his 
charioteer and monitor. There is no overarching direction or meaning to his life, 
except for the fulfilment of the next desire, whatever it may be. In contrast, Moses is 
led by the Divine Word, the source of all rationality in the cosmos, like a pilot of a 
ship (κυβερνήτης). As such, his impulses are oriented only ‘toward beautiful things’ 
(πρὸς τὰ καλὰ πάντα). Consequently, the different characters of the souls’ impulses 
also contrast, and are oriented in different directions – the fool toward the earth, 
body, and pleasures of the body,85 the other toward heaven, the Divine Word, and 
beautiful things (τὰ καλά)86. Since the fool is ruled by anger and desire, moreover, 
his impulses as passions are by definition excessive and erratic. In contrast, Moses, 
having removed both passions, exercises only impulses that are always noble and 
free. Given that his impulses are under the guidance of the Divine Word, Philo’s 
ascription of nobility to Moses’ impulses implies a certain moderation, orderliness, 
and propriety in their movements.  
The notion of treating entities of diverse character as different soul-types, in this 
case the fool versus Moses, was not new. As noted earlier, Plato had already done 
this in the Republic, where he sought to outline a five-part typology for individual 
souls that mirrored the five kinds of city-states in the community – the aristocratic or 
kingly, timocratic, oligarchic, democratic, and tyrannical.87 Each of the five soul-
types reflects differing configurations of rule among Plato’s three parts of the soul. 
The tyrannical soul, for instance, is dominated by the appetitive part, while the 
kingly is properly ruled by the rational mind. While we might initially think that 
Philo’s description of the fool and the Moses-soul corresponds to Plato’s highest and 
lowest kinds of character, the tyrannical and the kingly, in fact the fit is poor. Unlike 
Plato, Philo does not conceive of the fool and Moses-soul as consisting of all three 
parts of the soul, but in alternative arrangements. Instead, he removes one or more 
parts of the soul altogether for each of the soul-types. Whereas Plato’s tyrannical 
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86 Ibid., 64, 67, 70. 
87 Plato, Resp. 8.544e-545c, 9.580b, 587c. 
   
184 
soul subordinates rational and spirited part to the appetitive, Philo removes the mind, 
leaving the spirited and appetitive parts to mindlessly direct the soul coordinately. 
Alternatively, while Plato arranged the parts of the kingly soul according to the ideal 
order of rational, then spirited, and finally appetitive, Philo’s Moses-soul comprises 
only the rational part. The spirited and appetitive parts have been cut off and washed 
away respectively. Additionally, the overall scheme for soul-types differs for each 
author. While Plato could certainly set the kingly and tyrannical soul-types in 
opposition to one another on occasion, his wider aim in the Republic was to show a 
progression from the kingly soul-type to the tyrannical, evenly distributed among the 
five classes. Philo, conversely, sets the fool and Moses-soul in sharp contrast to one 
another. He does put forward a third kind of soul-type that exists between those two, 
to which the chariot metaphor best corresponds, as we will see later. Nevertheless, 
the overall thrust of his discussion of soul-types differs from Plato’s. The emphasis 
in the text above and elsewhere is on the juxtaposition of the two, not, as in Plato, 
the progression from one end of the spectrum to the other.  
Philo instead opted for a basic Stoic framework overlain with a body-soul 
dichotomy drawn from the Phaedo, wherein humankind is divided into ‘two classes’ 
(διττὸν εἶδος): the wise man who lives ‘by the divine spirit and reason’ (θείῳ 
πνεύµατι λογισµῷ), and the fool, who lives by ‘blood’ (αἷµα), that is, ‘soul’ (ψυχή), 
with its irrational sense perception, impressions, and impulses, as well as the 
pleasure of the flesh, all of which are associated with the body and from which the 
wise soul withdraws as described in the Phaedo and discussed in greater detail 
above.88 The first resembles the ‘divine image’, but the second is ‘earthly’.89 As we 
have already noted in Philo’s text above, the Stoics had likewise juxtaposed two 
classes of souls, ‘the fool’ (ὁ φαυ̂λος) and the sage or ‘wise man’ (ὁ σοφός).90 They 
often expressed this juxtaposition in terms of the so-called ‘Stoic paradoxes’,91 vis-
à-vis sayings like ‘only the sage possesses knowledge, everyone else is a fool’, or 
‘only the sage is good, all others are evil’.92 These paradoxes underscore the basic 
                                                
88 Plato, Phd. 80d-81d; 82c-84b. 
89 Philo, Her. 56-7.  
90 Stob., Anth. II 7.11g. 
91 For an exquisite example of Philo’s use of the Stoic paradoxes in his description of the sage, 
see Philo, Sobr. 56.  
92 In fact, this Stoic paradox formed the basis of Philo’s Quod omnis probus liber sit, a book 
chock-full of the Stoic paradoxes. Roberts notes that ‘no single ancient source … offers a catalogue 
or count of all of the paradoxes’. Cicero’s Paradoxa Stoicorum lists six: 1) virtue is the only good, 2) 
virtue is sufficient for happiness, 3) all vices and all virtuous actions are equal, 4) all fools are insane, 
   
185 
difference between the Stoic and Platonic mind-set in the Republic regarding the 
moral and spiritual life of the soul. Whereas Plato’s ideal for the kingly and 
tyrannical soul-type might approach the Stoic portrait of sage and fool in some 
ways, although with important differences, the Stoics posed a strict and absolute 
dichotomy between the two.93 Rather than present the distinction between the two 
kinds of soul as a gradual metamorphosis toward the kingly soul-type via 
philosophy, depending on their natural ability determined by their moral progress in 
a previous life, the Stoics instead positioned the sage and fool right next to one 
another in their ethical system. One is either a fool or a sage. Strictly speaking, there 
is no third option of one who is neither a fool nor a sage, or who is a mix of the two. 
Even when later Stoics such as Panaetius of Rhodes94 or Seneca did recognize a 
third soul-type, that is, ‘the one who is progressing’ (ὁ προκόπτων) toward perfect 
wisdom, this soul-type was still technically categorized among the vicious, even if 
they did recognize growth in virtue among the progressing souls.95 The Stoics were 
fond of pointing out that for a man submerged under the water, it makes no 
difference whether he is two inches or two miles below the surface, he is drowning 
in either case.96 Plato, by contrast, envisioned three intermediate stages between the 
kingly and tyrannical – the timocratic, oligarchic, and democratic soul-types – that 
not only represented genuine stages of evolution or devolution from the kingly to the 
tyrannical and vice versa, but also a mixing of the two. When we survey Philo’s 
soul-type scheme, we find that he too adopted the uncompromising Stoic bifurcation 
between fool and sage as his basic framework; his biblical patriarchs served as 
examples of the Stoic doctrine that a sage is ‘a law incarnate and made vocal’,97 but 
other biblical figures typified fools, and various types of progressing souls. 
On one side of his scheme for the soul, Philo placed the fool. He employed a 
wide assortment of terms to describe those classed as fool, including, in order of 
                                                                                                                                    
5) all fools are free, 6) and all fools are slaves. See E. Roberts, Philo, Paul, Stoic Paradox (2004), 14. 
Roberts adds that the paradox that the sage alone is king, though Stoic, was particularly prominent in 
Philo. See E. Roberts, Philo, Paul, Stoic Paradox (2004), 2. 
93 R. Bett, ‘Stoic Ethics’ (2006), 531-2. 
94 Cic., Off. 1.46. 
95 Sen., Lucil. 72.9-11. Bett points out that a greater attention devoted to moral progress was one 
of the features of the ‘later period of Stoicism’, which reflected its more practical orientation. See R. 
Bett, ‘Stoic Ethics’ (2006), 546. For further discussion and references, see also R. Sorabji, Ghandhi 
and the Stoics (2012), 116-7. Philo similarly reflects this growing emphasis. See C. Lévy, ‘Philo’s 
Ethics’ (2009), 166. 
96 G. Roskam, Path to Virtue (2005), 25-9. 
97 S. Sandmel, Philo (1979), 48-9, 57. 
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importance to Philo: ‘bad man’ or ‘vicious man’ (ὁ φαυ̂λος), ‘fool’ (ὁ ἄφρων), 
‘impious man’ (ὁ ἀσεβής), ‘unworthy one’ (ὁ ἀνάξιος), and ‘unrighteous man’ (ὁ 
ἄδικος).98 Rather than discuss the vicious soul in the abstract, although he was not 
averse to doing so at times, Philo instead often explicitly identified a constellation of 
biblical figures with the vicious soul, including Pharaoh,99 Esau,100 Cain,101 
Laban,102 Balaam,103 Lamech,104 and Onan.105 Without necessarily denying their 
historicity,106 Philo associated these characters with what he called ‘temperaments’, 
‘characteristics’, or ‘tendencies of the soul’ (ψυχῆς τρόπων).107 He did not equate 
each biblical character with the archetypal fool in every way; rather, he identified 
each with one or more aspects of a fool. By stressing certain elements in each fool’s 
character over others, Philo thus emphasized the overall confused, scattered, and 
variegated character of the bad man against the unified, stable, and consistent 
character of the sage.108 In other words, while what is true, beautiful, good, and 
pious is unified and coherent, as the Stoic doctrine of the oneness of the virtues had 
posited,109 that which is false, ugly, vicious, and impious is always ‘many and 
confused’ (πολλοὶ καὶ διαφέροντες) and focused on what is many, secondary, and 
created.110  
In the bullet-list below, we outline the ways in which Philo identified each of the 
biblical soul-types with various aspects of the fool soul-type, presented in order of 
relative importance to Philo. The variation in the characteristics among the fool 
                                                
98 For an especially colourful description by Philo of the worthless man, see Philo, Abr. 20-1. 
99 Philo, Leg. 3.13. 
100 Philo, Sacr. 17; Congr. 59-61. 
101 Philo, Det. 119. 
102 Philo, Agr. 42. 
103 Philo, Cher. 32-3. 
104 Philo, Post. 75. 
105 Ibid., 179-81. 
106 Philo, Abr. 52, 88; Ebr. 144. 
107 Philo, Abr. 17, 47-9, 52-4, 88, 147, 217-20; Gig. 60-7; Somn. 2.98; Spec. 4.114; Her. 81; 
Deus 112. 
108 Philo, Migr. 153. 
109 For further discussion of the unity or singleness of Stoic virtue, see R. Bett, ‘Stoic Ethics’ 
(2006), 533; M. Schofield, ‘Stoic Ethics’ (2003), 240, 247-8. For Philo, see Post. 129. Again, this 
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the ‘tree of life’ (τὸ ξύλον τῆς ζωῆς) and the river (in the singular) that flows from Eden at Gen. 2:9-
10. See Philo, Leg. 1.59-65. Philo later identified ‘generic virtue’ with Abraham’s wife ‘Sarah’ after 
her name change from Sarai. See Philo, Cher. 5-8; Mut. 130, 148. Like the Stoics, Philo also asserted 
that to have one virtue is to have them all. Philo, Mos. 2.7. 
110 Philo, Praem. 61; Spec. 1.327; Virt. 213. 
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soul-types themselves illustrates their ethical and psychological confusion. We will 
then amalgamate these facets into a single, composite depiction in order to illustrate 
the salient features of Philo’s fool soul-type:  
• Pharaoh: Pharaoh served as the archetypal fool. Philo interpreted 
Pharaoh to mean ‘scatterer of noble things’ (ὁ σκεδαστὴς τῶν καλῶν) or 
simply ‘scattering’ (σκεδασµός or σκέδασις).111 Since Egypt represented 
the body,112 Pharaoh, as the king of Egypt and foil to the archetypal sage 
Moses, symbolized body-oriented soul that scatters noble thoughts that 
relate to virtue and dissipates itself following the passions.113 Hence, 
Philo described him as ‘the lover of the body’ (φιλοσώµατος),114 like 
Cain, ‘the lover of self’ (φίλαυτος),115 ‘pleasure-loving’ (φιλήδονος),116 
‘the lover of passion’ (φιλοπαθής),117 and ‘proud’ (ὑπέραυχος),118 since 
he fancies himself to be a king. Additionally, as the biblical enemy to 
God’s people, one who said, ‘I know not the Lord’,119 Philo frequently 
depicted the Pharaoh-soul as the crowning example of ‘impiety’ 
(ἀσέβεια),120 that is both ‘atheistic’ (ἄθεος)121 and ‘hostile to God’ 
(ἀντίθεος).122 Pharoah’s atheism takes the form of a rejection of the 
existence of God or Providence in favour of the worship or service of 
created things.123 On the surface, this description closely matches that of 
the Cain-soul below. The difference between the two, however – and it is 
only hinted at by Philo – is that ‘the atheism’ of the Pharaoh-soul takes 
the form of polytheism. Philo had already explicitly linked polytheism 
and atheism when he argued that polytheism ‘creates’ (κατασκευάζω) a 
type of atheism, since polytheists cease to honour God when they deify 
                                                
111 Philo, Sacr. 48, 69; Somn. 2.211; Leg. 3.12, 236, 243; Her. 60; Det. 95 
112 Philo, Migr. 77; Congr. 21; QG 3.16. For further documentation of Philo’s identification of 
Egypt with the body, see S.J.K. Pearce, Land of the Body (2007), 87-9. 
113 Philo, Mut. 128, 170-1; Somn. 2.237, 181; Det. 161-2. 
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118 Philo, Ebr. 111; Mos. 1.88. 
119 Ex. 5:2 (LXX). See Philo, Ebr. 19, 77; Leg. 3.12, 243; Somn. 2.182; Mos. 1.88. 
120 Philo, Mut. 19; Somn. 2.182. 
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the mortal and created.124 Pharaoh’s atheism-as-polytheism consequently 
related to his status as the king of the literal Egypt, whose polytheism 
Philo singled out as embodying the greatest impiety among all the 
nations with its worship of idols and sacred beasts.125  
• Esau: Esau symbolized the foolish soul that is crafty in vice, because 
scripture described Esau as a great hunter. This sort of soul is ‘utterly 
senseless’ (πολλὴ ἀγνωµοσύνη or ἀφροσύνη), ‘irrational’ (ἄλογος), 
‘rustic’ (ἀγροῖκος), and ‘untrained’ (ἀπαιδευσία) in relation to what is 
true and good.126 However, his ignorance and foolishness differs from 
stupidity or lack of mental prowess. As ‘a skilled hunter’,127 he could be 
quite inventive when practicing vice. Philo observed that Esau-souls take 
‘folly’ (ἄνοια) as their counsellor and ‘make up’ their own truth about 
life and reality, a truth that is in fact ‘a myth’ and ‘fiction’. As a result, 
such souls become stiff-necked and disobedient to the guidance of right 
reason.128 Esau, as the symbolic father of a nation of vice, ultimately 
becomes the progenitor of Amelek or ‘passion’ through his son’s 
concubine Timna,129 since ‘the wicked man begets passion by his 
concubine.’ 
• Cain: Cain represented the vicious soul that is especially directed toward 
‘self-love’ (φίλαυτος) and atheism, which Drummond argues Philo 
considered to be the ‘greatest evil, and the source of all evils’.130 As such, 
in contrast to Abel, who, as one who follows God,131 refers all that is best 
to God,132 the Cain-soul refers all things to itself. In contrast to the 
                                                
124 Ibid., 110; Philo, Fug. 114; Praem. 162; Virt. 212-4. At other times, Philo did not treat 
polytheism as a type of atheism. Rather, he distinguished the two as alternative species of impiety 
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131 Philo, Sacr. 2.  
132 Ibid., 51. 
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Pharaoh-soul’s polytheism-as-atheism, the Cain soul instead constructs a 
religious creed that excludes God or the gods altogether.133 
Philosophically, Philo linked the Cain-soul’s ‘impious and atheistic 
opinion’ with the Protagorean dictum that the human mind is the measure 
of all things.134 Since the secular world of pleasure, pain, and perpetual 
change is its only horizon, it consequently ends up experiencing the most 
painful of the four Stoic passions, ‘fear’ (φόβος) and ‘grief’ (λύπη). For 
such a life, evil is always either present, resulting in grief, or impending, 
giving rise to fear.135  
• Laban: Laban symbolized the vicious soul whose life is governed by 
sense perception and, by implication, agnosticism. His name means 
‘variety of quality’ (ποιότης).136 As such, the Laban-soul focuses on ‘that 
which has quality’ (ὁ τῶν ποιοτήτων ἠρτηµένος), rather than on ‘the 
nature that is without quality’ (τὴν ἄποιον φύσιν), namely, God.137 
Outward objects of sense perception, whether things of the body or 
external to the body, serve as the highest good and chief end of life for 
the Laban-soul, while he ignores God or what benefits the soul or 
mind.138 Hence, Philo does not portray Laban as opposed to God so much 
as indifferent to Him. Inasmuch as Philo argued that the passions take 
their start from the experience of sense objects, he sometimes equated 
Laban with the passions themselves,139 though he elsewhere identified 
Amelek as the biblical symbol for ‘passion’.140 
• Balaam: Balaam represented sophistry, vanity, and illicit pathways 
toward religious knowledge found among fools. Sometimes, Philo 
referred to him as ‘a sophist’ (σοφιστής). This type of soul speaks 
eloquently about the life of virtue, but does not practice what it teaches. 
                                                
133 Philo, Conf. 122-8; Post. 51-3; Sacr. 2-3, 52; Det. 32, 48, 119. Compare also with Philo, Leg. 
3.28-31. Ranocchia shows that Philo’s polemic against Cain’s impiety and atheism included a sharp 
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136 Philo, Migr. 28, 213. 
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138 Philo, Agr. 42; Ebr. 46-50; Leg. 3.16, 20; Det. 4. 
139 Philo, Leg. 3.19.  
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Instead, it gives itself over to the pursuit of pleasure and the rule of the 
passions.141 At other times, Balaam signified ‘vain people’ (µάταιον 
λαόν) that make their goal the vain pursuit of material gain.142 In either 
case, such a life is full of chaos and disturbance since it casts aside all 
virtue and lives instead in accordance with the unstable world of sense 
and body.143 Finally, Philo occasionally associated Balaam with the soul 
that deals in augury, prodigy, and divinization. Using all of these false 
paths to knowledge, it vainly tries to re-stamp God’s providence and 
defaces genuine heaven-sent prophecy in the process.144 
• Lamech: Lamech, a minor figure for Philo, signified the worthless man 
that deliberately chooses wicked ends with the hope that his evil plans 
will be executed easily.145 He illustrates the truism that the soul that 
strives for any one of the innumerable possible bad objectives always 
injures itself in the end.146  
• Onan: Another minor character for Philo, Onan symbolized the fool 
oriented to ‘self-love’ (φιλαυτία) and ‘the love of pleasure’ (φιληδονία). 
He represented those soul-types who pursue pleasure above all else.147  
When we examine Philo’s depictions of the vicious soul-types above, we find a wide 
variation in characteristics. The discordant and scattered quality of fools means that 
they wonder in numerous ‘pathless wilds’ (ἀνοδίαι), as opposed to adhering to the 
one, royal road of the sage.148 Hence, Pharaoh represents souls bent on polytheism, 
while Cain symbolizes the atheistic soul, Laban agnosticism, and Balaam 
superstition and magic. Similarly, while all soul-types are oriented downward to the 
endless variety of created, material things, each pursues different aspects of it. 
Hence, Philo identifies Pharaoh with the body, Laban with the senses or the passions 
in general, Onan with pleasure, and Balaam with the acquisition of that which is 
external to the body.  
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with a similar characterization as Balaam. See Philo, Cher. 8-10; Sobr. 9. 
142 Philo, Cher. 32-5; Det. 181-2. 
143 Philo, Conf. 65-9. 
144 Ibid., 159. 
145 Philo, Post. 75, 79-81. 
146 Philo, Det. 50-1. 
147 Philo, Post. 180-1; Deus 16-8. 
148 Philo, Decal. 81. Compare also Philo, Conf. 42-3; Praem. 117; Spec. 1.215, 4.109; Mos. 
2.138. 
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At the same time, if we combine these characteristics into a single, composite 
portrait, we find that Philo’s fool answers to the contours of the classic depiction of 
the Stoic fool as morally vicious, godless, ignorant, unskilled in living, wretched, 
and sick, coupled with the strong body-soul dichotomy drawn from Plato’s 
Phaedo.149 Firstly, in all of the figures above, Philo followed the Phaedo in 
consistently describing the foolish mind of the bad soul as always oriented 
downward toward the body and earthly concerns, both of which are matters of 
indifference.150 This deviated from the Stoics, for whom all of existence is material 
and ‘earthly’. Philo uses a number of terms to describe the many forms of this 
orientation found among vicious souls. It may be ‘body-loving’ (φιλοσώµατος),151 
‘passion-loving’ (φιλοπαθός), ‘pleasure-loving’ (φιλήδονος), ‘full of wants’ 
(πολυδεής),152 ‘a money-lover’ (φιλάργυρος),153 or ‘a lover of honours’ 
(φιλόδοξος).154 Secondly, the fool lives a wicked life. We see this especially in his 
descriptions of Pharaoh, Cain, Lamech, and Onan. Throughout his corpus, Philo 
repeatedly connected the fool’s character to each of the four cardinal virtues, 
namely, foolishness, injustice, cowardice, and intemperance. Hence, he called the 
vicious soul ‘a hater of the good’ (µισόκαλος) and ‘an evil-lover’ (φιλοπόνηρος), 
though again each fool may practice one vice more than another.155 Thirdly, this, in 
turn, leads to various kinds of impiety in that the bad soul worships and exalts 
something in a shadowy created realm, and its own abilities, above the One who is 
truly real. As we can see in Pharaoh, Esau, Cain, and Balaam, this soul-type may 
worship many gods, explicitly reject the true God, practice superstition, or simply 
ignore God altogether. Hence, Philo called the fool ‘impious’ (ἀσεβής).156 Fourthly, 
Philo described the bad soul as ignorant. This characteristic is especially evident in 
the depictions of Esau and Balaam above. It can take many forms. The fool might 
look knowledgeable to the unwise, as in the case of the sophists; clever at devising 
                                                
149 Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.119; Stob., Anth. II 7.11g-i. 
150 Philo, Somn. 2.256-7. Compare with Plato, Phd. 64e; 65c-66d, 82c-84b. 
151 Philo, Abr. 103. 
152 Philo, Virt. 9. 
153 In Book 4 of the Republic, Plato had connected those souls that are led by the appetitive part 
with the merchant class of his city, both of which are later associated with the tyrannical soul in Book 
9.  
154 Philo, Prob. 21. This differs significantly from Plato, who associated the love of honour with 
the spirited part of the soul and with the soldier class in his ideal polis. The love of honour is not 
connected with Plato’s closest equivalent to the fool, his tyrannical soul.  
155 Philo, Abr. 21. 
156 Philo, Post. 34. 
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unjust strategies as in the case of Esau; accomplished in business as in the case of 
Balaam, or he might be quite uneducated. Whatever the case, as one who is ignorant, 
the fool’s ‘knowledge’ is in fact conjecture and opinion, insecure, and subject to 
shifting. Hence, Philo described the fool variously as ‘ignorant’ (ἀγνωµοσύνη or 
ἀφροσύνη), ‘uneducated’ (ἀπαίδευτος), ‘unskilled’ (ἄνευ τέχνης), and ‘irrational’ 
(ἄλογος). Finally, given its ignorance, orientation toward fleeting passions, 
especially pleasure, and the ever-changing world of sense, Philo characterized the 
fool’s soul as unstable, disordered, confused, and scattered.157 Consequently, every 
fool is by nature ‘a slave’ (δοῦλος),158 especially to pleasure, and his life is 
‘wretched’ (κακοδαίµων, µοχθηρός),159 though according to external circumstance 
the fool might be a king or queen or a sage a slave.160 
On the other side of his soul-type scheme, Philo opposed the sage to the fool. 
Contrary to the fool, whose depictions vary widely in detail, reflecting their 
fragmented and scattered existence, the virtues of Philo’s many sages coinhere as a 
single set of common attributes that is ‘essentially identical’ with the Stoic portrait 
of the sage.161 The Philonic sage is: metaphorically nobly born, rich, and king, free, 
glorious, harmonious, unbowed by circumstance, cosmopolite, the embodiment of 
virtue, a lover of solitude, though a lover of people, a follower of God or nature, and 
divine; the Philonic sage’s soul is a replica of heaven, contemplative, ordered, 
smooth, and consistent.162 Just as a diamond has many facets, so the sage’s many 
strengths are one, unified, and cohesive, even if we can distinguish many distinct 
features. Though Philo associated individual characteristics with each of his sage 
figures, these differences relate primarily to the pathway taken by each to attain 
perfection. Indeed, throughout his corpus Philo was fond of describing the path to 
full acquisition of wisdom in terms of the theme of ‘migration’ or ‘journey’ 
(µετανίστηµι/ἀποικία). This was especially the case for the Abram/Abraham and 
Jacob/Israel figures, reflecting their many journey stories in Genesis. However, 
when we examine their descriptions after they have attained sagehood, we find that 
all the portrayals look remarkably uniform. 
                                                
157 Philo, Abr. 83-4, 212; Congr. 58. 
158 Philo, Leg. 3.89; Prob. 1. 
159 Philo, Det. 119; Congr. 57. 
160 Philo, Prob. 16-18. 
161 D. Winston, ‘Sage and Super-sage in Philo’ (1995), 815. 
162 Ibid., 815-21. 
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Philo utilized a variety of designations for the sage.  These include, in 
descending order of importance, ‘the wise man’ (ὁ σοφός), ‘man of sound character’ 
(ὁ σπουδαῖος), ‘man of worth’ (ὁ ἀστεῖος), ‘perfect man’ (ὁ τέλειος), ‘worthy one’ 
(ὁ ἄξιος), ‘righteous man’ (ὁ δίκαιος), and ‘genuine philosopher’ (ὁ τοῦ 
φιλοσοφήσαντος ἀνόθως). Among the Greek-speaking Stoics, Socrates and 
Diogenes the Cynic were cited as examples of a sage.163 Philo likewise cited 
Socrates as an example of a virtuous man164 and Diogenes the Cynic as an example 
of the freedom that a virtuous man possesses,165 but he preferred figures drawn from 
Torah as his standard models, including above all, Moses, Philo’s super-sage, then 
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,166 a trichotomy of Platonic/Pythagorean inspiration,167 
as well as minor figures such as the Levites,168 Caleb,169 and Enoch.170 Let us take a 
closer look at each of the biblical sage figures, beginning with the two that attained 
sagehood other than through progress – Moses, Philo’s favourite sage, and Isaac:  
• Moses: Philo located Moses above all other sages as a sort of super-
sage,171 though he could also model him on Plato’s philosopher-king,172 
describing his education on the ideal curriculum outlined by Plato in the 
Republic.173 This is apparent first of all in the manner of Philo’s 
exegetical and apologetic project itself; namely, he expounds the 
Pentateuch only, the work of ‘Moses the great sage’, who is the prophetic 
vehicle of God’s revealed word’, who can as a ‘philosophos beat the 
famous Greek lawgivers’.174 Indeed, as Winston points out, ‘Moses 
would appear to transcend the virtually unattainable moral standard’ of 
                                                
163 Epic., Ench. 51.3 (Socrates); Diatr. 4.1.152 (Diogenes the Cynic); J. Sellars, Stoicism (2006), 
40. 
164 Philo, Prov. 2.21. 
165 Philo, Prob. 98, 121-4. 
166 Philo, Abr. 48-55; Det. 46. The Stoics acknowledged that their ideal Stoic sage was rare 
indeed. The Greek Stoics named Socrates, the legendary Heracles, and Diogenes the Cynic; the 
Roman Stoics added Cato the Younger. J. Sellars, Stoicism (2006), 39-41. 
167 C. Lévy, ‘Philo’s Ethics’ (2009), 165. 
168 Philo, Plant. 62-4; Sacr. 119-27. 
169 Philo, Mut. 123-4. 
170 Ibid., 34-8. 
171 D. Winston, ‘Sage and Super-sage in Philo’ (1995), 821-4; Goodenough emphasizes Moses’ 
uniqueness from ‘incarnation’, describing it in terms reminiscent of later Christian discussions of 
Jesus. See E.R. Goodenough, ‘Philo on Immortality’ (1946), 104-5. 
172 Philo, Mos. 2.2. See also Mos. 1.148, 158, 334; Plato, Resp. 5.473c-d; L.H. Feldman, Philo’s 
Portrayal of Moses (2007), 282-7, 315, 363, 373, 375-6. 
173 Philo, Mos. 1.23; Plato, Resp. 7.528e-530c. For further discussion and references, see L.H. 
Feldman, ‘Philo’s View of Moses’ Birth and Upbringing’ (2002) 261. 
174 D.T. Runia, ‘How to Read Philo’ (1990), 190. 
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the Stoic sage.175 Arius Didymus, for instance, portrayed the Stoic sage 
as ‘particularly happy’ (εὐδαίµων µάλιστα), ‘prosperous’ (εὐτυχής), 
‘blessed’ (µακάριος), ‘fortunate’ (ὄλβιος), ‘pious’ (εὐσεβής), ‘loved by 
God’ (θεοφιλής), ‘meritorious’ (ἀξιωµατικός), ‘kingly’ (βασιλικός), ‘fit 
for command’ (στρατηγικός), ‘political’ (πολιτικός), ‘good at managing 
the household’ (οἰκονοµικός), and ‘making money’ (χρηµατιστικός).176 
Philo applied most of these standard descriptions of the Stoic sage to 
Moses.177 Like the Stoic sage, who has attained complete ‘freedom from 
all passions’ (ἀπάθεια),178 Moses comes to experience ‘perfect 
happiness’ (τελέως εὐδαιµόνησις),179 since he has ‘cut off’ (ἐκτέµνω) and 
‘washed away’ (πλύνω) the passions in their entirety so that only the 
‘rational part’ (τὸ λογικόν) remains,180 and destroyed ‘the wretched 
mind’ (ἄθλιος νοῦς) that rides upon the passions like horses.181 As a 
result, he must be truly ‘handsome’ (καλός), not only physically, but also 
since a sage possesses a perfect harmony of propositions and impulses in 
the mind.182 Moreover, like the Stoic sage, Philo described Moses as 
‘blessed’ (µακάριος),183 ‘pious’ (εὐσεβής),184 ‘loved by God’ 
(θεοφιλής),185 and ‘meritorious’ (ἀξιωµατικός).186 Though Philo never 
applied the terms ‘fit for command’ (στρατηγικός), ‘political’ 
(πολιτικός), ‘good at managing the household’ (οἰκονοµικός), or ‘making 
money’ (χρηµατιστικός) to Moses, he did attribute to him the ‘royal’ 
(βασίλειος), ‘legislative’ (νοµοθετικός), and ‘priestly’ (ἱερώσυνος) 
                                                
175 D. Winston, ‘Philo on the Emotions’ (2008), 203. 
176 Stob., Anth. II 7.11g. Compare also Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.117-25. 
177 For Philonic passages that include one or more of the Stoic paradoxes concerning the sage 
beyond his direct application to Moses, see É. Bréhier, Philon d’Alexandrie (1950), 2556. 
178 Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.117; Philo, Leg. 3.129. 
179 Philo, Leg. 2.102. 
180 Ibid., 3.114-59. 
181 Ibid., 2.102. 
182 Philo, Mos. 1.15; 2.70; QG 4.99; Cic., Fin. 3.75; B. Inwood and P. Donini, ‘Stoic Ethics’ 
(1999), 722. Feldman argues that this reflects Plato’s conception of his philosopher-king in the 
Republic. See Plato, Resp. 7.535a; L.H. Feldman, Philo’s Portrayal of Moses (2007), 363; L.H. 
Feldman, ‘Philo’s View of Moses’ Birth and Upbringing’ (2002) 278-80. 
183 He assigned Moses this appellation by virtue of his status as a sage. See Philo, Mos. 2.230. 
184 Philo, Mos. 2.66. 
185 Ibid., 2.67. 
186 ‘The wise man [Moses] consecrates his whole soul as being worthy to be offered to God’ 
(ὅλην … τὴν ψυχὴν ἀξίαν οὖσαν θεῷ προσάγεσθαι … ὁ σοφὸς καθαγιάζει). Philo, Leg. 3.142. Philo 
characteristically interpreted this in a strongly religious direction. Moses’ merit is with God, which is 
really the only merit that counts. Elsewhere, Philo similarly described Moses as ‘prized’ (ἰσότιµος) of 
God. See Philo, Sacr. 8. 
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offices.187 While both explicitly recognized ‘the royal’ role for their 
sages, the Stoics could also described their sage as ‘a priest’ (ἱερεύς).188 
Moreover, Philo’s ‘legislative’ role for Moses corresponds to the Stoics’ 
‘political’ role, which included serving as magistrates, judges, and 
orators.189 Finally, though Philo never used the term ‘fortunate’ (ὄλβιος), 
he did describe Moses as ‘prosperous’ (εὐτυχής). Just as the Stoics 
allowed for their sage to make money or become rich while pursuing 
public office if circumstances allowed,190 Philo likewise depicted Moses 
as someone who had been blessed with prosperity, though he too 
recognized it as a spurious good.191  
• Philo went still further, describing Moses as the greatest sage, who 
surpasses all other regular sages or philosophers, concluding his Life of 
Moses in the same as Plato had in the Phaedo with reference to 
Socrates,192. Unlike the other sages, Moses bides in the inner sanctuary, 
whereas the others remain in the outer court.193 Moses begins his course 
in training at the highest point of wisdom attained by Abraham.194 Philo 
counted Moses as the ‘holiest of all people yet born’195 and described 
him in the superlative as ‘the most holy Moses’ (ὁ ἱερώτατος 
Μωυσῆς),196 setting him above all other priests. This especially fit his 
role as the greatest prophet, which in turn formed the basis for placing 
the Jewish scriptures above those of any other religion. Similarly, Philo 
lionized Moses as the greatest of legislators, greater than the famed 
Greek legislators Solon and Lycurgus of Sparta. Moreover, Moses 
surpasses all the other sages in the biblical account, who are listed 
below.197  
                                                
187 Philo, Agr. 41-4, 50; Mos. 2.2-7, 66. 
188 Stob., Anth. II 7.5b12. 
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• Yet Philo went even further, and portrayed Moses as one who 
‘transcends’ even the ideal of the Stoic sage.198 Firstly, unlike the Stoics 
who were not at all ascetic,199 Philo described a demanding ascetic ideal 
for Moses. This is probably rooted in Philo’s Platonic body-soul dualism 
inspired by the Phaedo discussed above. Since he lives only for the soul 
and not for the body, Moses eschews both pleasure and prosperity. 
Though Moses only allowed to the body those pleasures appointed by 
nature,200 which was also true of the Stoic sage, he sometimes scorned 
even necessary pleasures in super-human fashion. In support of this, 
Philo refers to the biblical witness that Moses did not eat or drink for 
forty days. Instead he lived only on ‘the heavenly foods’ (οὐράνιοι αἱ 
τροφαί) of knowledge in its various forms.201 Here indeed, Moses 
‘transcends’ the Stoic sage in Platonic manner202 in his disdain for 
anything bodily or external to the body, eschewing even necessary food 
and drink. Moreover, he is not merely ‘loved by God’ (θεοφιλής), but 
‘most beloved of God’ (τελειότατος).203 He is loved to such a degree that 
the Existent One addresses to him alone the promise, ‘but as for you, 
stand here by Me’.204 Philo interprets this to mean that Moses’ 
transcendence is so great that the Existent One translated Moses into His 
own presence, even beyond the Platonic incorporeal realm of the ideas 
and genus.205 Philo connects his apatheiac206 ideal for the sage with the 
Pythagorean-Platonic noetic quest for the divine, but then ‘transcends’ 
that too. His description of Moses’ translation to the Existent One draws 
upon Plato’s vision in the Phaedrus of the erotic flight of the 
unembodied soul back to the gods where it can once again gaze directly 
upon the Ideas of Justice, Temperance, Knowledge and, above all, the 
                                                
198 D. Winston, ‘Philo on the Emotions’ (2008), 207. 
199 Stob., Anth. II 7.11g. 
200 Philo, Mos. 1.28-9.  
201 Philo, Leg. 3.142, 161-2, 179; Ex. 34:28 (LXX).  
202 Compare Plato, Phd. 64e, 65d, 67c-d, 68c-d, 80e, 82c. 
203 Philo, Ebr. 94. 
204 Deut. 5:31 (LXX).  
205 Philo, Sacr. 8-10; Leg. 3.100-1. 
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Beautiful that are located beyond the heavens.207 However, whereas the 
consummate experience for gods and unembodied souls in the Phaedrus 
is to see the ideas, Moses goes beyond the realm of ideas to stand in the 
presence of the ineffable One Himself. As a result, just as the Existent 
One is not subject to addition or diminution in his fullness, immutability, 
perfection, and happiness,208 so also nothing can be ‘added’ (πρόσθεσιν) 
to Moses nor is there any more room for further spiritual advance.209 
Since his mind is ‘more perfect’ (τελεώτερος) and ‘more thoroughly 
cleansed’ (κεκαθαρµένος νοῦς) than any other,210 the Existent One has 
made him ‘a sharer’ (µεταδίδωσιν) in the unchanging ‘repose’ or ‘rest’ 
(ἠρεµία) of his nature,211 with the result that Moses’ mind and judgment 
are firmly established, free from the possibility of the tumult of passion, 
experiencing only joy. As a result, Moses now lives in a supreme and 
perfect happiness’ (τῆς ἄκρας καὶ τελείας εὐδαιµονίας).212 Hence, as 
Winston observed, ‘the Mosiac mind is accordingly the closest possible 
approximation to the Divine Mind’.213  
• Isaac: Isaac symbolized the sage that attained perfection without 
progress, acquiring virtue by nature. While Isaac, whose name means 
‘laughter’ (γέλως),214 could signify either ‘self-taught wisdom’ (ἡ 
αὐτοµαθῆ σοφία)215 or the eupatheia of ‘joy’ (χαρά) itself,216 he often 
symbolized those souls who have acquired virtue ‘by nature’ (ἐκ φύσεως) 
without the agency of another.217 Philo described the Isaac soul-type as 
‘one who drew for himself from the well of knowledge, listening to no 
other, learning from no other, and without the aid of another’ (τὸν 
αὐτηκόου καὶ αὐτοµαθοῦς καὶ αὐτουργοῦ τῆς ἐπιστήµης ἀρυσάµενον) 
because God has ‘rained down’ from heaven the gifts of self-learning and 
                                                
207 Plato, Phdr. 246d-247e, 250b-e. 
208 Philo, Abr. 202; Cher. 86. 
209 Philo, Sacr. 8-10;  
210 Philo, Leg. 3.100. 
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self-teaching.218 Now that this soul-type possesses the fullness of God’s 
gifts, it experiences joy. 
Now we turn to biblical figures that attained sagehood through progress:  
• Abraham: Abraham represented the sage that gained perfection ‘through 
instruction’ (8$ #$%*) or ‘by learning’ (μ"#).219 After 
pursuing wisdom as Abram through ‘the study first of nature’ 
(+#(%() and then of ‘ethical philosophy’ (2)_* ]& <"#$]& 
#%((&), he finally attained perfection and was renamed Abraham by 
God.220 Abraham thus acquired knowledge of the Creator and gained the 
virtue of ‘piety’ (P#) through study. As a sage,221 this soul-type 
now treads the royal road of wisdom without swerving either to the left 
or to the right,222 and finally attains perfection.223 
• Israel: Based on Philo’s understanding of the etymology of Israel as ‘the 
one who sees God’ (K "_& K)s&),224 derived from Gen. 32:31, Israel 
could represent the sage that has attained perfection through training or 
practice. After achieving victory in his struggle against the passions by 
means of training, Jacob became Israel,225 as a gift of God to His 
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concludes by observing that ‘unwritten nature gave him the zeal to follow [nature] where wholesome 
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) is, in the Stoic account, another way of speaking of apatheiac impulses. With regard to 
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Winston, ‘Philo on the Emotions’ (2008), 22047. 
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further discussion, see E. Birnbaum, The Place of Judaism in Philo’s Thought: Israel, Jews, and 
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225 Philo, Ebr. 67-72, 82-3, 94; Fug. 88-9; Plant. 63-8; Sacr. 119-20, 129; Somn. 2.34, 273. Philo 
also cited Levi as an example of those who attain to perfection by making progress in virtue. For 
example, while Reuben, ‘the man of natural gifts, is the first-born of Jacob, the Levi soul-type (K 
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!* )/2(*) is the first-born of Israel.  
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suppliants.226 By this Philo means that the Israel-soul, having cast off all 
the passions through ascetic training, is now able to intellectually 
apprehend the truth both that God exists and that He is the maker of all 
things by means of His powers. As a result, he accords God genuine 
devotion and honour.227 Israel’s apprehension of God or the Existent One 
falls short of direct vision. No one, not even the wise, is able to see ‘the 
essence’ (οὐσία) of ‘the Existent One’ Himself, since He is the invisible, 
inapprehensible ‘God of real being’ (ὁ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι θεός), who 
transcends all things, including His powers. Hence, when Philo says that 
the Existent One is ‘visible’ (τὸ ὁρατὸν εἶναι τὸ ὅν) to Israel, he 
understands scripture to be referring to each of the powers (God, Lord, 
Reason, etc.) that follow behind and attend to the Existent One. 
Paradoxically, the Israel-soul’s vision resides precisely in his ability ‘to 
comprehend that [the Existent One] is incomprehensible’ (καταλαβεῖν ὅτι 
ἀκατάληπτος) and ‘to see that he is incapable of being seen’ (ἰδεῖν ὅτι 
ἐστὶν ἀόρατος).228  
Finally, Philo identified three minor figures, all of whom had attained sagehood 
through progress, though he did not identify the specific pathway for each figure. 
Each, however, highlights key aspects of the sage that correspond with their 
narrative role in scripture:  
• Levites: The Levites symbolized the sage’s pious worship and service to 
God. For Philo, the Levite represents ‘mind that has been perfectly 
cleansed and purified’ (ὁ τελείως ἐκκεκαθαρµένος νοῦς). It has 
renounced all that pertains to what is dear to the flesh and senses and all 
that belongs to the world. Instead, it devotes itself unhampered to the 
things of the noetic world and to the only Uncreate God and Cause of all 
things.229 It represents the sage’s habit of ‘service’ (θεραπεία) to God that 
is the special provenance of the wise, whose existence serves as a ransom 
                                                
226 Philo, Mut. 81-2; Praem. 43-6; C. Termini, ‘Philo’s Thought within Middle Judaism’ (2009), 
123. 
227 Philo, Plant. 60. 
228 Philo, Post. 14-21, 166-9; Sacr. 134. 
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for the fools.230 As such, this soul-type receives from God the great 
prizes of ‘peace’ (εἰρήνη) and ‘priesthood’ (ἱερωσύνη).231  
• Caleb: Caleb signified the perfect repentance (µετάνοια) of those sages 
who attained perfection via progress.232 Philo interpreted ‘Caleb’ to mean 
‘all heart’. Though once a fool, this soul-type makes a complete 
conversion to the life of wisdom. As such, it does not waver or oscillate 
in its change, but rather converts entire soul to a supreme perfection.233  
• Enoch: Enoch occasionally symbolized the sage who ‘pleases’ 
(εὐαρεστέω) God.234 These souls have persevered in their repentance and 
have chosen an extreme ascetic life that finally dissolves the earthly 
element in them so that they have ‘become [like] unembodied minds’ 
(ἀσώµατοι διάνοιαι γεγονότες), fixing their purpose on only pleasing 
God. As a result, God translates such souls from mortality to immortality 
and from progress to perfection.235 
When we examine Philo’s portraits of the sage soul-types above, we find that in 
contrast to the fool, whose common features overlay an underlying anarchy and 
plurality, the sage’s superficial differences coalesce in a set of features shared by all, 
centred on what Philo described as ‘knowledge of the monarchical principle’ (ἡ περὶ 
µοναρχίας ἐπιστήµη).236 The sage puts his trust in nothing created, which is by 
definition multiple, secondary, and at root, polytheistic. Instead, he trusts only in the 
One Cause, who is ‘the One, the Primal, the Uncreated and Maker of all’.237 When 
                                                
230 Philo, Sacr. 119-20. 
231 Philo, Ebr. 74. 
232 See Philo, Virt. 180 for Philo’s connection between repentance and the soul’s progress. 
233 Philo, Mut. 124. 
234 Roskam treats Enoch as a member of the first triad that never reaches perfection, though he 
acknowledges that Enoch is ‘sometimes even presented as an example of a sage’. See G. Roskam, 
Path to Virtue (2005), 170. 
235 Philo, Mut. 34-8. 
236 Philo, Virt. 220; Termini suggests that this identification of God with a monarchical principle 
may have had for its model the Eastern monarchies. See C. Termini, ‘Philo’s Thought within Middle 
Judaism’ (2009), 98. 
237 Philo, Virt. 213-8; Bonazzi attributes this turn toward philosophical monism to Eudorus, who 
exhibited a ‘Pythagoreanizing Platonism interested in Aristotle’. In Eudorus’ Neo-Pythagorean 
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(1940), 140-1; R. Radice, ‘Philo’s Theology and Theory of Creation’ (2009), 139. Philo, however, 
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the soul establishes this virtue of faith, it gains with it all of the other virtues and 
characteristics that make up Philo’s sage. These characteristics, moreover, 
correspond to several of the basic contours of the Stoic sage as morally virtuous, 
godly, knowledgeable, skilled in living, happy, and healthy,238 but with a strong 
body-soul, material-immaterial Platonic overlay drawn especially from Plato’s 
Phaedo. 239 Firstly, for all of the biblical figures above, Philo consistently described 
in Platonic manner the mind of the sagacious soul as oriented upward toward the 
incorporeal, noetic, and divine realm. The God-loving sage casts its vision away 
from the body and external objects and instead fixes its sights on the ordinances of 
virtue under the guidance of right reason.240 As a result, the sage is a person of ‘few 
wants’ (ὀλιγοδεής). Philo noted that the sage does have some wants because his 
body is mortal and requires certain basic necessities to live, such as food, water, and 
clothing. At the same time, because his soul desires immortality like the Enoch-soul 
above, he does not have countless needs like the fool, who is driven like Tantalus to 
satisfy his passionate desires.241 This strong ascetic impulse and quest for 
immortality reflected the Phaedo’s emphasis on despising the body and material and 
instead seeking rather the immaterial, noetic, and invisible,242 in opposition to the 
Stoic materialism, which vehemently rejected Platonic ideas or forms as nothings,243 
in no way affirmed such strong asceticism, nor held out the possibility of 
immortality, even for the sage as noted above. Secondly, the sage lives an utterly 
virtuous life. The Abraham, Isaac, and Moses soul-types especially stress this aspect 
of sagehood. Philo thus called the sage ‘one who loves virtue’ (φιλάρετος), ‘loves 
goodness’ (φιλάγαθος), and ‘hates evil’ (µισοπόνηρος).244 Thirdly, in both the 
                                                                                                                                    
Praem. 40; D.T. Runia, ‘Rehabilitation of the Jackdaw’ (2007); Bréhier sees the combination of a 
transcendent, primordial ‘One’, metaphysical arthmetic, and ascetic ethics as a form of Neo-
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171-2. Termini states that the oneness of God was an unalterable affirmation in all of ‘Middle 
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upon which all depends. The Letter of Aristeas even went so far as to suggest that Zeus and the 
Jewish God are one and the same. Aristeae 16; C. Termini, ‘Philo’s Thought within Middle Judaism’ 
(2009), 97. In Philo we see this dual emphasis on the Jewish oneness of God and rapprochement with 
Greek philosophical principles.  
238 Galen, Plac. V 9.2; Cic., Fin. 3.75-6; Sen., Lucil. 75. Stob., Anth. II 7.5b8-5b12, 7.11g.  
239 Compare to Plato, Phd. 65e, 66a, e, 67e-68a, 79d, 80d-81a. 
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241 Philo, Virt. 9. 
242 Plato, Phd. 63c, e, 64d-67a; 82c-84b. 
243 For further discussion of the deflation or rejection of Plato’s Forms, Ideas, or universals by 
the Stoics, see R. Sorabji, ‘Universals Transformed’(2006), 105-8. 
244 Philo, Mos. 2.9. 
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Levitical and Abrahamic soul-types, Philo emphasized the godliness of the sage, 
describing this soul-type as ‘a God-lover’ (φιλόθεος)245 and ‘pious’ (εὐσέβεια). It is 
the only kind of soul that can offer legitimate ‘service’ (θεραπεία) as a priest to God. 
Philo’s sages, however, contrast sharply with the Stoic ideal of virtue as an 
achievement of one’s own, an idea that he associated with the foolish Cain-soul. 
Instead, his sages attain to virtue by divine aid in conjunction with their pious 
reliance on God.246 Fourthly, the sage possesses ‘knowledge’ (ἐπίστηµος) and ‘skill’ 
(τέχνη) in living.247 Philo hinted at this notion in his description of the Abraham-
soul as one who ascends from knowledge of nature to knowledge of God through 
instruction and learning. He made it explicit in his descriptions of Israel as the one 
who sees the incomprehensible God and Moses as the soul-type that is stationed 
next to God. Finally, given the attributes outlined thus far, Philo characterized the 
sage’s disposition as ‘stable’ (βέβαιος) and at ‘peace’ (εἰρήνη). This answers 
especially to his description of the Caleb-soul as one who turns to God with its 
whole heart without wavering, and of Moses’ firm and undisturbed mind. As such, 
the sage lacks nothing in his embrace of God and virtue; instead he always aims at 
the right moral end and reaches it. Moreover, the impulses and actions of his soul 
are ‘perfect’ (τέλειος) and smooth, never erratic or immoderate. Consequently, every 
sage is ‘free’ (ἐλεύθερος)248 and his life ‘happy’ (εὐδαιµονία). 
In general, Philo’s depiction as outlined above matches many of the contours of 
the Stoic ideal for both the fool and the sage, with the exception of the sage’s strong 
asceticism, his ascent to the Platonic noetic sphere, both of which are inspired 
especially by the Phaedo, and his rejection of Stoic self-achievement of virtue. The 
view that the philosophic soul ascends from the material realm of shadows to the 
noetic realm of the forms in its quest to comprehend reality reflects the influence of 
Plato, dramatically set forth in the Phaedo, but outlined in with more nuanced detail 
in his allegory of the cave in book seven of the Republic. The Stoics, in contrast, 
were much more materialistic in their physics and empiricist in their 
epistemology.249 The Stoic sage possessed perfect knowledge and skill anchored in a 
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firm grasp of sensory impressions. The sage certainly did possess ‘notions’ (νόησις) 
or ‘general concepts’ (ἔννοια) about incorporeals that in a sense corresponded to 
Plato’s ideas,250 but these always remained rooted in the material and sensory 
experience itself. The ultimate reality that the Stoic sage grasped was material. This 
fundamentally contrasted with the Platonic notion that the intelligible realm of ideas 
and forms is what is most real, while the sensory and material is illusory and 
shadowy. In the Platonic system, the soul must take leave of the material to gain a 
conception of what is true, even if it takes its start from the material copy to begin its 
climb to the archetypes. To this, Philo added the fundamental religious conviction 
that even the sage cannot succeed in his quest without the God’s help. Consequently, 
while Philo’s depiction of the sage and fool structurally reflects the rigid dualism of 
the Stoic ethical system, he nevertheless simultaneously fused it with a Platonic 
conception of the ascending philosophic soul, and a Jewish piety that relied on 
God’s aid to attain to virtue and the vision of God.  
We are now in a position to understand what Philo means in the passage from 
his De migratione Abrahami quoted above, where he says that the Moses-soul cuts 
out fierce spirit and desire, while the fool gets rid of the mind. In contrast to the fool, 
who ‘throws out’ (ἀποβαλών) the mind, the sage has chosen as his patron-guide the 
Divine Word. For Philo, the sage does not merely possess a mind while the fool rids 
himself of it. Rather, the Moses-sage possesses a mind that follows the Divine Word, 
the very archetype and guide of the sensible cosmos. By emphasizing the connection 
between the mind of the Moses-soul and the Divine Word, Philo thus stresses its 
rationality. Thus, the Moses-soul ‘cut out’ (ἐκτέτµηται) anger and desire, which are 
the irrational parts of the soul, with the result that only ‘the rational part’ (τὸ 
λογικόν) remains. He then further underscores the Moses-soul’s perfect rationality 
by observing that all of its impulses are ‘truly free’ and do not experience anything 
pulling in the opposite direction.  
In contrast, in describing the fool as removing its mind, Philo is emphasizing the 
fool’s irrationality. Certainly, Philo explicitly calls the fool ‘irrational’ and ‘passion-
loving’. However, the fool’s irrationality needs further definition. By lopping off the 
mind, is the soul now irrational in the sense that its impulses and actions oppose 
right reason and the Divine Word, and instead it wilfully follows the lead of its 
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Platonic two horses, wrath (θυµός) and desire (ἐπιθυµία)? The fool’s removal of its 
charioteer and the mind does not mean that it is left mindless or non-rational, as if it 
had experienced a lobotomy! Instead, as we discussed previously in the section 
regarding Philo’s distinction between the horseman and rider, the foolish soul 
exchanges one sort of mind for another. Rather than having a mind that guides and 
directs the horses, as in the case of the horseman, it is passively carried wherever the 
careening horse takes it.  
Philo’s meaning is made yet clearer, moreover, when we note that he went 
further and made the dichotomy between the two soul-types absolute and strict. Not 
only is the mind of the Moses-soul or the fool rational or irrational, but it is 
completely or absolutely so. Note Philo’s consistent use of totalizing language in De 
imgratione Abrahami 66-7:  
• ‘…the whole course through every moment’ (ἀεὶ µηδένα διαλείπων 
χρόνον) of the fool’s journey is dependent on wrath (θυµός) and desire 
(ἐπιθυµία) 
• Gen. 3:14 applies to ‘every irrational and passion-loving man’ (ἐπὶ 
παντὸς ἀλόγου καὶ φιλοπαθοῦς ἀνθρώπου) 
• The fool completely removes the head [implicit] 
• Moses ‘offers whole burnt sacrifices of the soul’ (τὰς ὁλοκαύτους τῆς 
ψυχῆς ἱερουργῇ) 
• Moses cleanses away ‘every desire in every shape’ (ὅλον τὸ ἐπιθυµίας 
εἶδος ἐκνίψεται) 
• Moses cuts away ‘the warlike spirit in its completeness’ (ἀφελεῖ… 
σύµπαντα τὸν πολεµικὸν θυµόν) 
• ‘…nothing’ (µηδενὸς) pulls against the mind of the sage  
As we have already noted, the dualist and opposing structure of Philo’s soul scheme 
already reflects a Stoic framework. To that we can add that Plato never envisioned 
his philosophical or kingly soul-type as removing the two horses. These irrational 
parts are permanent and distinct parts of the soul. Conversely, in the case of the 
tyrannical soul, the large desire-drone dominates the mind. Nevertheless, the rational 
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part of the soul remains, even if it is subservient to desire. Hence, for Plato, the 
distinction between his soul-types is always a matter of degree.  
As we can see from the observations above, however, Philo opposed the two 
soul-types categorically. This dichotomizing language in turn helps us to elucidate 
what Philo means when he describes the removal of the horses or of the charioteer. 
These excessive, disorderly impulses, which Philo identifies with the two Platonic 
horses of desire and wrath, are ultimately none other than impulses of the mind itself 
responding to tugs and pulls of the pleasures of the belly that tempt and deceive it. 
In other words, Philo is saying that the fool and the sage represent two orientations 
of the mind, which initiate two contrary types of impulses in the soul. In the case of 
the sage, his mental impulses are always orderly, moderate, and in accord with right 
reason and nature, while in the case of the fool, his mental impulses are disorderly, 
excessive, and opposed to right reason. In the context of Plato’s chariot metaphor, 
the mental impulses in the fool are, by definition, the two horses, wrath and desire, 
which Philo had also identified in the text leading up to Migr 66-7 as a single horse 
of ‘passion’ (τὸ πάθος)251 or alternatively as the Stoic four cardinal passions of 
pleasure, desire, grief, and fear (ἡδονή, ἐπιθυµία, λύπη, φόβος).252 Consequently, the 
perfected Moses-soul has attained what Philo, in the parallel passage from Legum 
allegoriae, calls apatheia, or ‘freedom from all passion’ (συνόλως ἀπάθειαν),253 
whereas by contrast he calls the fool ‘passion-loving’ (φιλοπαθής).  
Charioteering as metriopatheia: The case of Aaron, the progressing soul 
Finally, in the parallel passage from Legum allegoriae, Philo offers an extended 
discussion of the chariot metaphor in relation to the soul’s spiritual and moral 
journey. In this case, however, he introduces a third soul-type – the Aaron-soul:  
God assigned to the wise man a share of surpassing excellence, even the 
power to cut out the passions (τὸ ἐκτέµνειν τὰ πάθη δύνασθαι). You 
observe how the perfect man (ὁ τέλειος) always makes perfect freedom 
from passion (τελεία ἀπάθεια) his study. But Aaron, the man who is 
making gradual progress (ὂ προκόπτων), holding a lower position 
(δεύτερος ὤν) [than Moses], practices moderation (ἀσκέω 
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µετριοπάθεια), as I have said; for his power does not go so far 
(ἀδυνατέω) as to enable him to cut out the breast and the high-spirited 
element (ἐκτεµεῖν…τὸ στῆθος καὶ τὸν θυµόν), but it brings to it, as 
charioteer (ἡνίοχος), reason (λόγος) with the virtues attached to it ... 254 
Earlier in the passage, Philo contrasts the Aaron-soul and Moses-soul in relation to 
the first horse, anger: 
Aaron, then, being inferior (δεύτερος) to Moses who cuts the breast 
clean out (ἐκτέµνω τὸ στῆθος), that is the spirited part (ὁ θυµός), suffers 
it not to be carried away by random impulses (οὐκ ἐᾷ αὐτὸν ἀκρίτοις 
ὁρµαῖς ἐκφέρεσθαι), for he is afraid that, if it be given the rein, it may 
someday get unmanageable (ἀνασκιρτήσας), as a horse does, and 
trample down all the soul. No, he curbs (θεραπεύω) and controls 
(ἐπιστοµίζω) it, first by reason (λόγος), that being driven by an excellent 
(ἄριστος) charioteer, it may not get too restive (σφόδρα ἀφηνιάζω).255 
In the same way, Philo later contrasts the Aaron-soul and Moses-soul in relation to 
the other horse. Unlike Plato, however, who had identified the second horse with 
desire alone, Philo equates it with either desire or pleasure. He argues that the love 
of pleasure begets desire.256 So, in his view, the appetitive part of the soul is the 
location of both passions. The appetitive part loves pleasure; it seeks it when it is 
absent or enjoys it when it is present.257 With this in mind, Philo discusses the 
Moses and Aaron-souls relative to the appetitive part of the soul:  
In a corresponding manner we shall find Moses, the wise man, in his 
perfection (ὃ σοφὸς τέλειος), scouring away and shaking off pleasures 
(ἡδονὰς ἀπορρυπτόµενος καὶ ἀποσειόµενος), but the man of gradual 
improvement not so treating pleasure in its entirety (ὁ δὲ προκόπτων οὐχ 
ἅπασαν), but welcoming simple and unavoidable (ἀνάγκη) pleasure, 
while declining that which is excessive (περισσός) and over-elaborate 
(περίεργος) in the way of delicacies.258 
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In these passages Philo typifies Aaron as ‘the one who is making moral progress’ (ὂ 
προκόπτων). This soul-type differs from both the sage and the fool above. On the 
one hand, the Aaron-soul is inferior to the Moses-soul. While the Moses-soul is 
‘perfect’ (τέλειος), the Aaron-soul remains ‘imperfect’ (ἀτελής).259 The Moses-soul 
experiences Stoic apatheia, that is, the complete freedom from all passion, whereas 
the Aaron-soul merely practices the Peripatetic moderation of the passions, not their 
removal altogether.260 The Moses-soul possesses the power to cut out the breast, 
while the Aaron-soul does not. It can only curb and guide the high spirit and desire. 
So, while the Aaron-soul still experiences anger, though in moderation, the Moses-
soul experiences no anger at all, only inner tranquillity.261 In a corresponding 
manner, later in the passage Philo observes that the sage ‘washes the entire belly’, 
namely, all the bodily pleasures. The sage even foregoes and rejects necessary food 
and drink, as for instance when Moses ate no bread and drank no water for forty 
days.262 The progressing soul, in contrast, merely ‘washes the innards and the feet, 
but not the whole belly’, that is to say, he avoids excessive and elaborate delicacies, 
but still welcomes the simple and unavoidable pleasures connected to necessary 
food and drink.263 As a consequence, Philo notes that the Moses-soul experiences 
virtue ‘apart from any toil’ (ἄπονος), while the Aaron-soul exerts much ‘toil’ 
(πόνος) in its efforts to charioteer the stiff-necked and restive horses of anger and 
desire.264  
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On the other hand, the Aaron-soul is superior to the other prototypical fool soul-
types discussed above such as Pharaoh, Cain or Balaam. Whereas these fools are 
fixed upon their vicious existences, the Aaron-soul instead aims to make genuine 
moral improvement – hence Philo’s favourite term for this type of soul as ‘one 
making progress’ (ὃ προκόπτων). Whereas Philo described prototypical fools as 
passion-loving souls whose entire course depends on fierce spirit and desire, the 
progressing Aaron-soul rather ‘curbs’ (θεραπεύω), ‘controls’ (ἐπιστοµίζω), and 
‘trains’ (παιδεύω) both of these parts of the soul to be gentle. Unlike the fool, whose 
entire course is irrational, since it ‘has given its mind over to the inferior’ 
(ἐκδοθῆναι τῷ χείρονι) impulses of anger and desire, the progressing soul does not 
permit its anger to be ‘carried away by random impulses’ (ἀκρίτοις ὁρµαῖς 
ἐκφέρεσθαι), but curbs its ‘excessive impetuosity’ (ἡ ἐπὶ πλέον φορά).265 The 
distinction is curious since anger, as a Stoic passion, is by definition a random and 
excessive impulse. The key difference between the prototypical fool above and the 
Aaron-soul, then, lies in the degree of randomness and excessiveness that 
characterizes the passion. While the foolish soul gives itself over to unmitigated 
anger, the Aaron-soul, though still angry, moderates the soul’s motion and reduces 
its randomness when gripped by the passion. Additionally, the fool prefers ‘the ease’ 
(ῥᾳστώνη) of incontinence and bodily pleasure to the toil that necessarily follows 
those ‘profitable things’ (τὰ συµφέροντα) for the soul.266 Hence, the fool, as a lover 
of pleasure, ‘moves on the belly’, that is to say, it ever seeks after pleasures 
connected to bodily sense perception, especially those associated with eating, 
drinking, and sexual indulgence.267 The Aaron-soul in contrast prefers ‘the hardship’ 
(κακοπάθεια) of discipline and ‘toil for the sake of virtue’ (ὁ ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς πόνος) to 
the fool’s quest for pleasure.268 Thus, while the fool serves created things, the 
Aaron-soul has instead made a fundamental shift in its philosophical and religious 
orientation toward knowing and honouring God, which in turn purifies reason and 
begins the healing of the soul. As such, Philo argues that the Aaron-soul is a 
recipient of God’s favour, since the perverted mind of the fool cannot be the source 
of its own purification. Instead, the soul’s turning from vice to virtue, which 
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accounts for its transition from fool to progressing soul, comes from beyond the 
soul, from God.269 
As was the case with the sage and the fool above, Philo treated numerous 
biblical figures in addition to Aaron as types of the progressing soul, including Seth, 
Enos, Enoch, Noah, Abram, and Jacob. Listed below are the soul-types that 
represent various types of the progressing soul, in order of their appearance in the 
biblical narrative: 
• Seth: Seth represents those minds that make a beginning toward good 
disposition and virtue.270 He stands as the head of the race of souls that 
acknowledge that God is the author of everything, and loves virtue.271 
• Enos(h): Enos typifies ‘hope’ of ‘man’ in God, or human rationality.272 
He represents those soul-types that are taking their first step on the 
journey toward virtue because of the expectation of good things from 
God, namely, happiness, the ability to see God, the culmination of 
perfect virtue, and to live in accordance with nature.273  
• Enoch: Enoch generally symbolizes the gift of repentance when the soul 
begins to make ‘a change for the better’ (πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἡ µεταβολή). 
Such souls abandon the base and instead choose the excellent.274 Enoch 
could also symbolize those who acknowledge that everything comes 
from God and who thus seek to please God alone. As a result, God 
translates such souls from mortality to immortality and from progress to 
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Hecato treated hope as a type of desire, that when embraced, inevitably leads to fear. Instead of hope, 
Seneca commended foresight. See Sen., Lucil., 5.7-9; D. Winston, ‘Philo on the Emotions’ (2008), 
21718. Lévy sees Philo’s introduction of ‘hope’ as a novel transformation of Stoicism. See C. Lévy, 
‘Philon et les Passions’ (2006), 30. Conversely, Philo’s approach is quite un-Platonic inasmuch as 
Plato associated ‘hope’ with the lower, mortal part of the soul and connected it to ‘fear’ and 
‘confidence’, emotions oriented to pleasant or unpleasant future experiences. See S. Knuuttila, 
Emotions (2004), 1621. 
273 Gen. 4:26; Philo, Abr. 7-14; Plant. 88; 11-4; Det. 138-40; QG 1.79; M. Graver, ‘Philo and 
Stoic Προπάθειαι’ (1999), 314-6. 
274 Philo, Abr. 17-8, 24-7; Praem. 15-6. 
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perfection. In this case, Philo associated Enoch not with progressing 
souls, but with the sage.275 
• Noah: Noah represents those who are perfect in virtue relative to their 
generation, although not absolutely so.276 Such souls have made 
significant progress, but they fall short of the perfection of the sage.  
• Abram: Philo interpreted Abram to mean ‘uplifted father’. As such, 
Abram represents ‘the virtue-loving soul’ who begins his search for the 
true God by first contemplating the harmonious order and beauty of 
nature.277 He then rises higher to pursue the philosophy of the heavens 
and the beings that dwell there. Finally, this soul-type mounts up yet 
higher through its love of knowledge to explore the divine nature 
itself.278 As a result, the Abram-soul finally attains perfection through 
teaching and study. 
• Jacob: Jacob symbolizes the man of earnest effort,279 based on the 
etymology of the name of Jacob as ‘the supplanter’ (ὁ πτερνιστής) given 
in Gen. 27:36.280 He embodies the notion of ‘progress’ (προκοπή)281 by 
means of ‘toil’ (πόνος) against especially the passions,282 which is in 
keeping with the principle of ‘self-mastery’ (ὁ σωφροσύνης λόγος).283 
When connected with his later identity as perfect Israel, he represents the 
soul that is perfected in virtue through ‘training’ or ‘discipline’ (ἐξ 
ἀσκήσεως).284 His training includes such practices as investigation, 
examination, reading, hearing, attention, self-mastery, indifference to 
those things that ought to be categorized as indifferent, living only on 
                                                
275 Philo, Mut. 34-8. 
276 Philo, Abr. 27-39, 46-7; Deus 109, 117. 
277 Philo, Abr. 60-1, 69, 78-80; Cher. 7; Gig. 62. 
278 Philo, Cher. 4; Gig. 62-3; Mut. 66-8; Somn. 1.60; Leg. 84. 
279 ‘ὁ ἀσκητὴς Ἰακώβ’ or simply ‘ὁ ἀσκητής’. This was one of Philo’s favourite designations for 
Jacob. See for example, Philo, Conf. 80; Ebr. 82; Fug. 52; Plant. 90; Post. 59; Sacr. 5, 64; Somn. 
1.171, 2.19. Philo’s other favourite designation for Jacob is ‘the supplanter’ (ὁ πτερνιστὴς Ἰακώβ). 
See for example, Philo, Mut. 81; Somn. 1.171; Leg. 1.61, 2.89, 3.15, 3.93; QG 4.163. 
280 Philo, Leg. 3.190-1; Migr. 201. 
281 Philo, Sacr. 120; Ebr. 82; Sobr. 65; Somn. 1.170. 
282 Philo, Leg. 2.89, 3.93 
283 Ibid., 2.99. 
284 Philo, Abr. 52; Agr. 42; Mut. 81; Somn. 1. 120-6, 169; Mos. 1.76. 
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what is necessary, low and mean, and eschewing luxury, pleasure, and 
popularity.285 
• The nation of Israel: Philo approached the nation of Israel from the 
perspective of their biblical lineage and from the story of the exodus. 
With regard to their ancestry, the people of Israel represent ‘the new 
race’ and ‘holy nation’ of souls that springs forth from Enos, Enoch and 
especially Noah. Their family tree terminates in sages such as Abraham, 
Isaac, and Moses.286 With regard to the exodus, the journey of the 
Israelites from Egypt to the Promised Land served as an example of the 
long and arduous journey from vice toward virtue. In contrast to the 
journey of Abram, which terminates in wisdom through learning (i.e. 
Abraham), the Israelites themselves never reach sagehood. Instead, Philo 
treated the nation of Israel as a symbol of the journey itself, that is, the 
progression of the soul. 
• Aaron: Aaron symbolizes ‘an inferior’ (δεύτερος ὤν) stage in the 
progress of the soul to that of Moses. The Aaron-soul corresponds to the 
soul in which the rational part trains and curbs the lower parts, with the 
result that their ‘passions are moderated’ (µετριοπάθειαν). Philo 
elsewhere described Aaron as counted neither among those dead to the 
life of virtue, nor among those who live in supreme happiness. Rather, he 
‘touches’ (ἐφάπτεται) both. Nevertheless, since he aspires to moral 
excellence and aims for the truth by ‘the deliberate choice of the good’ (ἡ 
ἑκούσιος αἵρεσις τἀγαθοῦ), he is making genuine improvement.287  
As we can see, Aaron comes at the end of a series of biblical figures that appear 
chronologically as the biblical narrative unfolds. Each figure highlights different 
aspects of this intermediate stage. Seth serves as a symbol of the inauguration of the 
life of virtue, Enos as a symbol of hope, Enoch of repentance, Noah of relative 
justice, Abram of progressing through learning, Jacob of progress through 
                                                
285 See Μ. Sheridan, ‘Jacob and Israel’ (1995), 222-33, for further discussion of the key elements 
of the ‘spiritual struggle’ against the passions in Philo. Sheridan shows that Philo’s interpretation of 
Jacob’s name change was taken up by later Christian authors, including Clement of Alexandria, 
Origen, early Coptic monastic literature, fourth century Greek patristic writers and some Latin 
authors, including John Cassian. 
286 Philo, Abr. 56-9. 
287 Philo, Post. 78; Somn. 2.236-7; Leg. 3.45. 
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discipline, and the nation of Israel of the journey itself. In the same way, Aaron 
represents the moderation of the passions exercised by progressing souls.  
These types also broadly correspond with specific moments in the soul’s 
progression toward virtue. In De agricultura, Philo sketched a scheme for the moral 
progress of the soul that leads from vice and ignorance toward perfection in virtue 
and the vision of God.288 He divided the soul’s progression into a series of stages:289 
• The fool: As discussed above, Philo portrayed the fool as morally vicious, 
godless, ignorant, unskilled in living, wretched, and sick. 
• The beginner (ὁ ἀρχόµενος): Philo likened the beginner to ‘a suitor’ 
(µνηστήρ), who hopes to one day marry ‘discipline’ (παιδεία).290 Though 
such souls still lack knowledge, God has given them ‘a readiness to learn’ 
(εὐµάθεια) so that they begin the journey toward virtue.291 Philo associated 
this sort of soul especially with hope for a better life. 
• The progressing one (ὁ προκόπτων): Philo compared the one who is 
progressing to ‘the husbandman’ (γεωργός). Just as he cares for the trees to 
ensure their growth, so the progressing soul seeks to bring about the utmost 
development in the principles of prudence.292 
• The recently perfected (ὁ πρῶτον τέλειος): Philo likened these souls to a 
house whose plaster has just received the finishing touches, but has not yet 
become compact and ‘firmly settled’ (πῆξις).293 Such souls have reached 
completeness, but remain unpracticed and unaware of their perfection.294 
• The sage: As outlined above, Philo depicted the sage as morally virtuous, 
godly, knowledgeable, skilled in living, happy, and healthy. 
This partition of the stages of the soul’s progress into fool, beginner, progressing 
soul, recently perfected, and sage, still fits under Philo’s overarching Stoic division 
                                                
288 Philo, Abr. 54, 57-8; Gig. 64; Post. 100-2; Deus 3, 143-5, 159-62. For Abraham’s vision of 
God, see Philo, Abr. 79-80. For a description of Philo’s spiritual scheme using the patriarchs as types, 
see Philo, Abr. 48-9, 56-8; Gig. 60-4; Sacr. 1-10. On occasion he outlines a more general 
schematization of the spiritual life. See for example, Philo, Gig. 60-1. 
289 Philo, Agr. 157-68. Philo sometimes used alternative metaphors to describe this theme. For 
instance, taking his start from the terminology and images in Gen. 6 (LXX), Philo divided souls into 
three classes: the earth-born (οἱ γῆς), heaven-born (οἱ οὐρανοῦ), and God-born (οἱ θεοῦ). This 
tripartite scheme answers to Philo’s philosophical division of souls into fools, those who are 
progressing, and sages. 
290 Philo, Agr. 158. 
291 Ibid., 168. 
292 Ibid., 158. 
293 Ibid., 158, 160.  
294 Ibid., 160-1, 165. 
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of all souls into fools and sages.295 The fool comprehends ‘pure’ fools such as the 
Pharaoh-soul above, the beginners, and those who are progressing, while the sage 
includes those who are newly perfected as well as the experienced and settled sage. 
Philo referred to the middle soul-type variously as ‘one who is making progress’ 
(προκοπή), one that is on the way to ‘betterment’ (βελτίωσις), 296 ‘a practicer’ (ὁ 
ἀσκητής), or simply the soul-type that is ‘in the middle’ (ἡ µέση [ψυχή]).297 On the 
one hand, although Philo distinguished the beginner and progressing soul from one 
another, both were instances of souls that are making progress. As such, he 
distinguished them from the newly perfected soul and the sage as those who remain 
‘imperfect’ (ἀτελής), while like the Aaron-soul above they also differ from the fool 
proper in that they have turned toward God.298 The beginner and progressing soul 
differ from one another, on the other hand, with regard to the degree of progress 
they have made toward virtue and perfection. The beginner is more ‘inexperienced’ 
(ἄπειρος) and ignorant than the progressing soul, who has practiced virtue and 
discipline for some time now. 299 Nevertheless, both the beginner and progressing 
soul are still counted as fools, since both remain fundamentally ignorant, unskilled, 
and imperfect. 
Philo’s distinction among varying degrees of progress within the fool soul-type 
was also of Stoic provenance,300 but with perhaps some important Peripatetic and 
religious influences as well.301 Although the Stoics posited a strict bifurcation of all 
humans into the two classes of fool or sage,302 they nevertheless differentiated those 
foolish souls that are making genuine progress toward virtue and sagehood from 
those that are not. They referred to this improving sort of fool as ‘one who is 
progressing’ (ὃ προκόπτων or qui proficit),303 and compared him to a drowning man 
that is swimming toward the water’s surface. Inasmuch as these souls remain below 
the water’s surface, they are still subject to the passions. As a consequence, they are 
                                                
295 E. Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics (1870), 270-5, 294; J. Sellars, Stoicism (2006), 36-
8. 
296 For examples in Philo of improvement as ‘betterment’, see Philo, Opif. 128; Sacr. 113; Mut. 
88; Post. 174; Spec. 1.260. 
297 Philo, Mut. 19, 30; Leg. 3.144. 
298 Philo, Abr. 7, 15-6, 48. 
299 Philo, Agr. 160, 165. 
300 Cic., Off. 1.46; Sen., Lucil. 72.9-11, 75.8-15. J. Rist, Stoic Philosophy (1969), 90-1; J. Sellars, 
Stoicism (2006), 38; R. Sorabji, Ghandhi and the Stoics (2012), 116-7; D. Winston, ‘Philo on the 
Emotions’ (2008), 22045; E. Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics (1870), 294-6.  
301 Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.127; G. Roskam, Path to Virtue (2005), 197-219. 
302 Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 7.127; Plut., Quomodo 75b-c. 
303 Arnim, SVF (1903-5), 3.539-40; Epic., Diatr. I 4.1, 9, 21. Sen., Lucil. 75.8-10. 
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still in danger of drowning. Nevertheless, they have made genuine progress toward 
reaching the surface and attaining the life of virtue and wisdom.304 The actual 
passage from one state to the other must be ‘momentary and instantaneous’.305 
Philo’s division between newly perfected souls and the mature sage above also 
reflects a Stoic outlook. The Stoics had distinguished between those perfected souls 
that have only recently attained perfection and those who have been established as 
wise for some time, although they did not use different terms for them. They had 
argued that the newly perfected are often quite unaware of the fact that they have 
arrived at perfection.306 Because they have laid aside both passions and diseases of 
the mind, such souls are no longer in danger of slipping back, yet they lack the 
assurance that comes from proving their newfound perfection.307 The sage has not 
only attained perfection, but is also cognizant of the fact and remains firm and 
steady in his virtue through practice.308 Philo made the same fundamental 
distinctions between the recently perfected and the mature sage. Like the Stoics, 
Philo’s recently perfected are still unpracticed in virtue and ‘unconscious of their 
wisdom’ (διαλεληθότες εἶναι σοφοί).309  
Like later Stoics such as Panaetius and Seneca,310 Philo abandoned the Stoic 
paradox that all sins are equal and rather opted for admitting of degrees of moral 
progress toward perfection. Roskam argues that Philo’s outlook reflects a wider 
Peripatetic-Platonic trend that adopted the Stoic fool / progressing soul-sage 
framework, but revised it to allow for distinctions among faults and to accept the 
genuine diminution of one’s wickedness.311 By so doing, Middle Platonists 
transformed the framework into a genuine three-stage framework of fool – 
progressor – sage.312 In support of this conclusion, Roskam argues that Philo 1) 
never mentions the typical Stoic paradoxes to illustrate the fundamental viciousness 
                                                
304 Arnim, SVF (1903-5), 3.539. 
305 Plut., Comm. not. 1062e; Quomodo 75d; E. Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics (1870), 
275-6. 
306 Plut., Comm. not. 1062e; Sen., Lucil. 75.9; E. Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics (1870), 
2691, 2755. 
307 Sen., Lucil. 75.9. 
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309 Philo, Agr. 161, 165; G. Roskam, Path to Virtue (2005), 214-6. 
310 Cic., Off. 1.46; Sen., Lucil. 72.9-11. 
311 We find a similar three-phase scheme in Plutarch, Alcinous, and Apulius. See G. Roskam, 
Path to Virtue (2005), 144, 218, 220-390. 
312 For an excellent schematic survey that details Philo’s three-part scheme, see G. Roskam, Path 
to Virtue (2005), 196. He draws up a simple table that shows how many of Philo’s biblical figures or 
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of the progressor, 2) did not regard all faults as equal, and 3) did recognize the 
diminution of evil among progressing souls; that is to say, such souls are ‘good’ 
before they become ‘perfect’.313 The problem with Roskam’s analysis is that he 
overlooks the abandonment of the idea that all sins are equal and recognition of a 
qualitative change that comes from progress among at least some Stoics themselves. 
Seneca, for instance, argued that some souls advance so far that they are already in 
the harbour, though not yet on dry land like a sage, and as such, this type of 
progressing soul is not sick, though not yet well.314 He elsewhere argued that some 
progressing souls can reach a stage where they have escaped all diseases of the soul, 
but are yet still liable to experiencing passions, while still others have only laid aside 
only the greatest of the mind’s sicknesses and passions.315 All such descriptions 
reflected genuine distinctions in degrees of virtue or progress. While the shift to a 
trichotomous scheme of moral advancement would come to also characterize Middle 
Platonism, Philo in any case stands at the beginning of this transformation.316 This 
underscores just how much Philo’s moral psychology owes to the Stoic outlook. 
Hence, in what may have been a novel move that bypassed the old debate 
between Peripatetic promotion of metriopatheia and Stoic apatheia, Philo made the 
two ideals complementary by overlaying both on his scheme of souls in various 
stages of progress toward virtue, as represented by figures in the biblical 
narrative.317 Beginning with Seth, Philo treated various members of his family tree 
as types of different degrees of moral advancement. In the De posteritate Caini, 
Philo schematized the biblical lineage into a series of three stages of improvement, 
                                                
313 G. Roskam, Path to Virtue (2005), 207-12. Again, while the insistence on these theses may 
reflect Platonic innovations, the scheme was still essentially adopted from the Stoics. The Platonic 
insistence on the equality of faults and the recognition of degrees of nearness to virtue, moreover, in 
many ways represents a development of concepts already present in orthodox Stoicism. B. Inwood 
and P. Donini, ‘Stoic Ethics’ (1999), 726-7. In this light, Roskam’s distinction between a Stoic and 
Middle Platonic scheme for the soul’s moral progress becomes increasingly fine. 
314 Sen., Lucil. 72.9-11. 
315 Sen., Lucil. 75.8-15. 
316 Tobin offers a similar caution in relation to Philo’s Logos doctrine. T.H. Tobin, ‘Was Philo a 
Middle Platonist?’ (1993), 148-9. Dillon likewise locates Philo at ‘the earliest stages of its [Middle 
Platonism’s] development’, though he sees Philo as his ‘best evidence for Middle Platonism’ for the 
period. See J.M. Dillon, ‘Response to Runia and Sterling’ (1993), 151. Given his early position in the 
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317 J.F. Procopé, ‘Alexandrian Understanding of Old Testament’ (1996), 458-9. Dillon suggests 
that Philo made the two complementary because he is ‘quite missing the significance of the great 
debate’. J.M. Dillon, ‘Metriopatheia and Apatheia’ (1983), 515. Contra Dillon, Philo did not treat 
‘apatheia’ as a ‘truly logic ideal’. Rather, Philo understood the Stoic theory of the emotions in 
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objectives dictated.  
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each building on the previous one. The first advance begins with Seth, the second 
with Noah, and the third with Abraham, culminating with Moses, the man who is 
wise in all things.318 Conversely, in De Abrahamo and in De praemiis et poenis, 
Philo simplified this scheme into two stages, each of which comprised three soul-
types. Enos, Enoch, and Noah made up the first triad and Abraham, Isaac and Jacob 
the second. The first triad symbolized progressing souls in the first stages of the 
soul’s journey toward virtue, and the second those in the latter stages.319 Although 
one might be tempted to try to make these schematizations fit Philo’s fivefold 
division into fool, beginner, progressing soul, recently perfect, and sage, no exact 
correspondence exists. At first sight, Philo’s division of the progression into two 
stages in De Abrahamo for instance might appear to correspond to his beginning-
progressing soul distinction, but only Enos as a symbol of hope or Enoch as a type 
for repentance could be construed as a beginner, who has begun the path of 
rationality, but is not fully rational like the sage.320 Noah, who is also a member of 
the first set of soul-types, has made such progress that Moses called him perfect in 
his generation, though he is not absolutely good like the sages who would come 
later.321 As such, each of these biblical figures rather fit into the spectrum of souls at 
different stages of the journey from foolishness to perfection. As such, the lineage 
that extends from Seth to the nation of Israel and Moses represents the beginning of 
the race of soul-types that are truly reasonable.322  
Philo’s portrayal of the Aaron-soul as a symbol of the moderation of the 
passions in the progressing soul was particularly compatible with his use of the 
chariot metaphor. As noted in our discussion above, Plato’s ideal was not the 
eradication of anger, desire, or erotic love, but their subordination to and 
harmonization with reason. Hence, in his employment of the chariot metaphor, the 
charioteer manages first to constrain and then later to tame the black horse, but at no 
point does the charioteer remove either of the horses. In the same way, since the 
Aaron-soul is unable to cut out desire and anger entirely, he must settle for the more 
limited goal of ‘metriopatheia’ (µετριοπάθεια) or the taming of the horses/passions 
                                                
318 Philo, Post. 173. 
319 Philo, Abr. 7-48; Praem. 10-51. 
320 Graver suggests that in Stoicism, these propatheia such as hope ‘might be useful to 
progressors as a warning to withhold assent from that impression and thus avoid emotion’. See M. 
Graver, ‘Philo and Stoic Προπάθειαι’ (1999), 319. 
321 Gen. 6:9 (LXX); Philo, Abr. 31-7. 
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through training.323 This notion of metriopatheia reflects the Platonic and Peripatetic 
application of the ideal of the mean to the soul and to the passions.324 Against the 
Stoic notion of apatheia or the complete cutting off of all passions in the sage, the 
Platonic and Peripatetic traditions had argued that the aim of ethics was rather to 
exercise each passion in ‘an intermediate manner without excess or deficiency’ (τὸ 
µέσον ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως).325 For instance, the Middle-Platonist Alcinous 
argued that a virtuous soul might fear. If it fears everything, or in a manner that is 
beyond what is moderate, it becomes ‘a coward’ (δειλός). If it fears nothing, then it 
becomes ‘over-bold’ (θρασύς). The virtue of ‘courage’ (ἀνδρεία) is rather the 
moderate form of fear or confidence.326 Similarly, the soul can be angry at the right 
things and at the right time and in the right place, but it should not be hot-tempered 
and irascible, nor slavish and compliant. Rather than take sides in the philosophical 
dispute between Platonists, Peripatetics, and Stoics, Philo instead incorporated both 
paradigms into his scheme of moral progression.327 The soul passes from Stoic fool 
to Peripatetic/Academic progressing soul to Stoic sage. 
Among his various soul-types, Philo’s progressing soul thus most closely 
matched Plato’s description of the soul in both the Republic and the Phaedrus. In the 
passages quoted from Legum allegoriae above, observe the characteristics of Philo’s 
description of the Aaron soul-type:  
• The Aaron-soul practices moderation  
• The Aaron-soul is powerless to cut out the breast [and belly] 
• Reason serves as the charioteer and guide to the breast and spirited part 
• The Aaron-soul does not allow the breast to be carried away by random 
impulses 
• Reason curbs and controls the breast 
• Reason does not allow the breast to get too restive 
• Philo describes reason in the Aaron-soul as ‘excellent’ (ἄριστος) 
                                                
323 Philo, Abr. 255-61; See also Philo, Virt. 195; Deus 162. 
324 Diog. Laert., Vit. phil. 5.31; Cic., Tusc. IV 43-46; Acad., 2.135-6; Asp., In Eth. Nic. 44; 
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325 Plut., Virt. mor. 443c. 
326 Albinus, Epit. 30.5-6. 
327 Dillon likewise concluded that Philo treated metriopatheia as a state proper to the progressing 
soul. See J.M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (1977), 1511. 
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• The Aaron-soul welcomes necessary pleasures, but declines excessive 
delicacies 
Like Plato’s description of the chariot metaphor, Philo’s Aaron-soul possesses 
reason/charioteer and horses/breast and belly. This contrasts with Philo’s description 
of the Moses-soul, who has effectively removed the breast and belly entirely, 
leaving a chariot team without horses. Philo’s description of the Aaron-soul’s reason 
as ‘excellent’ likewise matches Plato’s consistently positive portrayal of the 
charioteer in the Phaedrus and Republic. It also matches Philo’s positive depiction 
of reason in the sage, but contrasts sharply with his characterization of the mind of 
the fool, which possesses a malfunctioning reason that is oriented toward what is 
bad. Similarly, like Plato’s charioteer, Philo described the role of reason in the soul 
as that of a charioteer and guide to the horses. Reason ceases that function in the 
sage, who no longer possesses any horses, while in the fool, reason fails to guide and 
direct, but rather is passively carried along. Although Philo ignored Plato’s nuanced 
treatment of the relation among charioteer/reason, white horse/spirited part and 
black horse/appetitive part, as noted above in our comparison of his depiction of the 
chariot metaphor with that of Plato, he nevertheless depicted reason in the Aaron-
soul as aiming to moderate, control, and curb the horses, like Plato’s charioteer. This 
contrasts with Philo’s sage, who ‘cuts off’ both horses, and the fool, whose horses 
both run riot.  
All in all, then, Philo’s depiction of the Aaron-soul is the one that most closely 
approached Plato’s description of the soul as manifest in the chariot metaphor. In the 
Aaron-soul, the charioteer is unable to cut off the horses, just as both horses are 
permanent elements in Plato’s depiction of the soul. In both, the mind is virtuous 
and guides the lower parts. Moreover, like Plato’s better soul-types, the charioteer in 
the Aaron soul-type controls the horses. In both depictions, the soul only indulges in 
what is ‘necessary’ and ‘useful’ (τὸ ἀναγκαῖον µόνον καὶ χρήσιµον) for the 
nourishment of the body, and no more.328 Thus, Philo’s moral scheme advanced 
from Stoic fool to Platonic philosopher-king to Stoic sage.329  
                                                
328 Philo, Leg. 3.141-44, 147, 157. 
329 Dillon sees Philo’s Moses as a ‘fully fledged Middle Platonist’ on the model of the ‘Stoicized 
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Conclusion 
Philo made extensive use of Plato’s chariot metaphor and related horse similes. The 
winged chariot metaphor itself usually implied some version of Plato’s tripartite 
soul. In the metaphor, the charioteer corresponds to the mind, the white horse to the 
spirited part, and the black horse to the appetitive part. Philo adopted many of the 
basic contours of Plato’s myth in his own exposition of the soul, but also conflated it 
with elements drawn from the Timaeus and Republic.  
Philo nevertheless diverged from Plato in several significant ways in his account 
of the charioteer myth. He removed references to the chariot wings, disconnected it 
from any discussion of erotic love, and emphasized the pride of the horses, all of 
which point toward Jewish modifications to the myth. Further, Philo associated the 
white horse with masculine soul characteristics, but the black with feminine, in 
contrast to Plato’s depiction of both as male. This corresponds to his idiosyncratic 
conception of femininity and maleness that permeates his work. Philo made both 
horses allies against the mind and identified them with ‘unruly impulses’, while 
Plato treated the white horse as an ally to the mind. Moreover, Philo emphasized the 
driver’s lack of skill as responsible for the destruction of the chariot team, not as in 
Plato, the insolence of the black horse. Philo’s occasional identification of the horses 
with the senses and, in the case of the related horse and rider images, of the horse’s 
four legs with the four Stoic cardinal passions, again all reflect a Stoicizing turn in 
his use of the metaphor, perhaps taking his cues from Posidonius.  
Philo situated the chariot-metaphor within a wider Platonic narrative of the 
mind’s quest to ascend to the purely intellectual existence, but with a significantly 
modified Stoic outlook. He framed the entire journey as one between the two poles 
of the Stoic fool and the sage, via an intermediate ‘progressing’ stage. He then 
allegorically identified various biblical figures with various soul types or kinds of 
minds at different stages of the journey. Pharaoh, Esau, and Cain represented 
different kinds of fools, while Moses, Abraham, and Isaac corresponded to different 
kinds of sage souls, and Aaron to the progressing soul. This schematization in turn 
impacted Philo’s treatment of the chariot scheme. The passion-loving fool’s chariot 
has horses, but no driver; the apatheiac sage possesses only a charioteer, and no 
horses, but the progressing soul has both driver and horses, since he practices 
metriopatheia.  
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Hence, Philo creatively integrated Platonic metaphors, such as that of the 
charioteer, into a wider Stoic idea of apatheia by associating it with the 
psychological character of progressing souls. For Philo, the soul in its ideal form 
will look like the Stoic monistic account, even as he grafted the Stoic soul-
progressing/soul-sage scheme within a wider Platonic narrative of the soul’s journey 
toward the vision of God.  
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Summary: Philo’s creative use of Stoic and Platonic philosophy in 
service of his exposition of Torah 
Philo creatively synthesized a wide variety of opposing psychological elements 
current in his day in pursuit of his own religious philosophy. In the first chapter, we 
outlined how Philo closely followed the Stoics, especially Zeno, in identifying 
passion as a type of impulse that follows a wretched mind’s assent to a false 
judgment or opinion about what is good or evil and worthwhile pursuing or 
avoiding. In support, he could draw upon themes drawn from Stoic anthropology 
including their monistic psychology, first impulse, the theory of appropriation, and 
their division of impulse into the three classes of selection, passion, and eupatheia. 
Philo accommodated this Stoic approach to a wider Platonic body-soul dualism, 
drawn from the Phaedo, that located the source of the temptations in bodily 
pleasure, personified as the biblical serpent, with sense perception serving as the 
gateway, symbolized by the biblical Eve.  
In chapter two, we showed that like the Stoics, Philo characterized the passions 
as irrational, excessive, unnatural, fluttering, and, as a consequence, blameworthy. 
Though the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions could likewise describe the passions 
as irrational, both traditions tended to treat their irrationality in terms of 
disobedience to and conflict with the mind. Philo constantly drew upon this Platonic 
theme in his own treatment of the passions’ irrationality, but sought to accommodate 
it to the Stoic notion of irrationality as a movement of a perverted mind against its 
own better judgment. Additionally, neither the Platonic nor Peripatetic traditions 
understood the passions to be necessarily excessive, aiming instead at their 
moderation. By contrast, Philo followed the Stoics in portraying all passions as 
excessive movements or activities of the soul. Finally, while neither Plato nor 
Aristotle considered the passions to be unnatural or inheritly blameworthy, Philo 
joined the Stoics in treating the passions without exception as contrary to nature, 
harmful to the soul under all circumstances, and hence always deserving censure. 
Though Stoics such as Seneca could portray passions as vile in an effort to provide a 
remedy for the mind, Philo was unique in the degree to which he stressed their 
vileness and the first to explicitly describe them as ‘blameworthy’ (ἐπίληπτος) and 
‘guilty’ (ὑπαίτιος) in the history of Greek thought. For this reason, like the Stoics, 
   
222 
Philo everywhere argued for the elimination of the passions from the soul, a 
proposal the Platonic and Aristotelian accounts considered impossible.  
In chapter three we described how Philo could also make use of Plato’s tripartite 
division of the soul into rational, spirited, and appetitive parts. He could likewise 
relate Plato’s three parts to the four cardinal virtues. From Plato’s tripartism, Philo 
often picked up the themes of the passions pushing-pulling, disobeying, or deceiving 
the mind. Further, following the trend in Middle Platonism after Aristotle, as well as 
developments in Plato’s own more mature thought as reflected in the Timaeus, he 
likewise made a more fundamental bipartite division between rational and irrational 
parts of the soul. Finally, Philo was especially drawn to the body-soul anthropology 
of the Phaedo, with its theme of the immortality of the soul, though he deviated 
importantly from Plato by rejecting his doctrine of reincarnation. Philo also 
modified these Platonic ideas by normally treating the spirited part as an ally to the 
appetitive part rather than mind as in Plato and de-emphasizing the agent-like 
characteristics of the three parts in a more functionist direction. Both tendencies 
perhaps reflect an effort of Philo’s part to accommodate these Platonic elements to 
his preferred Stoic approach to the passions. 
We also noted in each chapter that the biblical creation narrative about Adam, 
Eve, and the serpent played a significant role in the shape of Philo’s psychology.1 
He coordinated both the Platonic tripartite and the Stoic eightfold division of the 
soul with his biblical typology of Adam-Eve-serpent. Adam corresponded to the 
mind/hegemon in both philosophies. Philo related Eve with sense perception or the 
Stoic seven lower parts of the soul, comprised of the five senses and the faculties of 
generation and speech, and with Plato’s bodyguards to the citadel of the mind. Philo 
could likewise relate the serpent, pleasure, to either the Stoic passions, Plato’s 
spirited and appetitive parts, or Plato’s deceptive and personified pleasure of the 
Laws. Pleasure represented the starting point either for the other three cardinal Stoic 
passions of desire, grief, and fear or as the Platonic personified temptress that 
utilizes the senses as a means to deceive the mind.  
In the fourth chapter, we showed how Philo utilized images and terminology 
drawn from a conflated reading of the Republic and Phaedrus with supplemental 
interpretations drawn from the Timaeus. When utilizing the chariot metaphor, Philo 
                                                
1 Dillon likewise concludes that the Adam-Eve allegory is ‘basic’ to Philo. See J.M. Dillon, The 
Middle Platonists (1977), 175. 
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followed Plato in treating the mind as charioteer and desire and wrath as horses. 
While Philo could also join Plato in treating the horse representing the spirited part 
in a better light, he normally opposed both horses to the charioteer, negatively 
depicting them as restive and violent, disobedient and rebellious. Additionally, Philo 
distinguished between the horses’ gender, while Plato did not, and Philo nowhere 
connected the chartioting theme with erotic love represented by the chariot wings, 
which was so central to Plato’s Phaedrus. 
Philo deviated from Plato in two important ways. First, Philo treated the theme 
rather elastically. He often coupled the theme with other, related analogies, 
interchanging the chariot metaphor with that of a pilot and boat, for instance. 
Second, at other times, Philo creatively extended the metaphor in new directions, 
usually in connection with a word or imagery found in the biblical text upon which 
he was commenting. Hence, the metaphor could morph into related images of herd 
and husbandman or rider and a single horse. 
These transformations often reflected Stoicizing reinterpretations such as ‘four 
footed’ horses representing the four cardinal Stoic passions, the goal of the rider 
dismounting or falling off of the horse altogether and becoming horseless, which 
represented the ideal of the apatheiac perfection of a Stoic sage, or the portrayal of 
the chariot metaphor as an intermediate step in the process symbolized by Aaron. 
Philo thus encased his use of the chariot metaphor within a Platonic and Stoic vision 
of the soul’s intellectual and moral end, which he in turn related to the unfolding of 
the biblical narrative in Torah. He identified the soul’s intellectual and spiritual end 
with the Platonic quest to despise the body as a prison or corpse and leave behind 
the shadowy world of the senses and opinion and soar first to the incorporeal and 
intelligible realm of the forms and then beyond to a vision of the truly existent God 
Himself.2 At the same time, Philo matched the soul’s moral end with the ideal of the 
apatheiac Stoic sage.  
Philo situated these themes within an allegorical reading of Moses. After 
describing a Platonic creation of the noetic archetypes of the soul and their 
subsequent copies in the sensible cosmos, he described the soul’s fall into the 
passions through serpent’s/pleasure’s attack on Adam/the mind through Eve/sense 
                                                
2 Philo, Praem. 30, 38-40. Malone argues that the conception of the realm of the forms as the 
home of only the Good and Beautiful, not of Ugliness or Evil, is a later development among the 
Church Fathers and Neoplatonists that is not found in Plato. J.C. Malone, Psychology (2009), 56-7, 
61-2. In Philo, we already see this shift. 
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perception.3 He then used the biblical story that begins with Seth and Abel and 
culminates in Moses to describe the Stoic progression of the soul from fool to 
progressing soul to sage. Each figure in the biblical account symbolized different 
elements in the soul’s journey, depending on their role in the story and the meaning 
of their name. Cain and Pharaoh as key antagonists in the biblical narrative 
represented archetypal fools, while protagonists such as Abraham, Isaac, and Moses 
symbolized sages. Philo identified his depiction of the soul as a charioteer and two 
horses with the progressing soul that is passing from fool to sage. By so doing, he 
connected the Peripatetic-Academic ideal of metriopatheia with the aims of 
intermediate souls such as the Aaron soul-type. 
Ultimately, Philo saw himself as an adherent of the sage Moses,4 not Plato, 
Aristotle, or Zeno. Moses, as the greatest sage, not only embodied wisdom in his 
own person, but also served as a divinely inspired historian and legislator,5 and 
ultimate source of the best of Greek philosophy.6 The lives of the patriarchs in Torah 
embody the life that accords with nature; its statutes serve as copies of the law of 
nature.7 Since Philo accepted the authority of Moses above all, his allegorical 
reading of the Law inspired, informed, and shaped his decisions regarding when, 
where, and how he might use elements drawn from Platonic and Stoic moral 
psychology or anthropology. The mythical, narrative, and legislative forms of the 
books of Moses, together with his exegetical and philosophical interpretive 
strategies,8 provided Philo with great flexibility in creatively relating his religious 
                                                
3 Ranocchia observes that Philo was the first in the Hellenic philosophical tradition to make 
pleasure, as a principle of evil, ‘an irrational agent, independent and external to man, that appeals to 
his pride and his basest instincts to induce him to sin and rebellion against God’. By so doing, he 
foreshadowed the Devil or Satan of the later Christian tradition. See G. Ranocchia, ‘Moses against 
the Egyptian’ (2008), 94. Bréhier points out that the diatribe against the seductions of pleasure as a 
foundation of evil also reflected the popular preaching of both Cynic and Stoic literature of, for 
instance, Musonius or Dion Chrysostom. É. Bréhier, Philon d’Alexandrie (1950), 261-8. Pohlenz, by 
contrast, argues that Philo’s pitting mind against sense perception, especially when serving as a 
pathway for the serpent pleasure, was essentially anti-Stoic. M. Pohlenz, Philon von Alexandreia 
(1942), 456-7. I rather think that Philo remains faithful to the Stoic suggestion that the mind is duped 
by the false goods of pleasure that come to it via the senses. Such an account could certainly fit 
within a Stoic account. We should not, however, overlook the Platonic background for the 
identification of pleasure as a source of deception for the soul. See Plato, Leg. 9.863b. 
4 G.E. Sterling, ‘Platonizing Moses’ (1993), 101-3, 111.  
5 Philo, Mos. 1.1, 29. 
6 Dillon argues that, like Antiochus, Philo saw Moses as the progenitor of a single philosophical 
tradition that descended from Pythagoras, through Plato and Aristotle and their followers, to the 
Stoics. As such, he felt free to draw on any part of that tradition when practicing exegesis upon the 
sacred text. See J.M. Dillon, ‘Philo and Hellenistic Platonism’ (2008), 226.  
7 Philo, Abr. 1-6. 
8 J. Mansfield, ‘Philosophy in the Service of Scripture’ (1988). 
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philosophy to that of the other schools. For Philo, the way of Moses transcended the 
sectarian disputes existent among the other philosophical schools, even as his 
philosophy shared many elements with them.9 Consequently, Philo’s free use of 
Platonic and Stoic philosophical elements strongly contrasted with, for instance, a 
partisan like Galen, who vigorously defended Plato’s tripartite psychology against 
Chrysippus’ monistic psychology in De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis. His 
approach might initially appear to be more akin to that of a ‘semi-sceptical’ Platonist 
like Cicero, who in the Tusculanarum disputationum or De finibus likewise drew 
freely from competing philosophies, especially Stoicism.10 For instance, Philo could 
show a surprising indifference to basic philosophical questions at times: against the 
Stoics, he might pronounce the soul incorporeal, but then join them in identifying its 
essence as breath.11 Similarly, he showed little interest in definitively locating the 
mind in either the head, like Plato, or the heart, like Chrysippus.12 Nevertheless, 
Philo’s Mosaic dogmatism strongly distinguished his approach to philosophy from 
the scepticism of philosophers like Cicero. In the end, the philosophy of Moses 
represented a vision for life that transcended that of the other schools, even as it was 
able to comprehend within itself Platonic and Stoic elements. 
                                                
9 Philo, Mos. 1.24.  
10 R.W. Sharples and R. Sorabji, Greek and Roman Philosophy (2007), 2, 12. 
11 Philo, Somn. 1.30-4. 
12 Philo, Sacr. 136; Spec. 1.213. 
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Outlook 
Having come to the end of this study, one realizes that much work remains to be 
done. As in any research, this investigation was subject to limitations in scope and 
space. Philo’s theory of the passions must be understood in relation to the 
Hellenistic philosophical milieu of his day as well as to the antecedents that formed 
the background to the philosophical traditions he knew, especially his wide, first-
hand knowledge of Plato. This methodological orientation toward the philosophical 
emphases in Philo’s writings finds support in his ubiquitous focus on the 
philosophical life, which was framed in terms of progressing toward the ideal of the 
sage. As a consequence, Philo often borrowed themes from Hellenistic anthropology 
and moral psychology and nearly always cast his allegorising exposition of the 
Torah in terms of Hellenistic virtue and vice, passions, and moral sickness.1 By 
focusing on the Greek side of Philo’s thought we have shown the central, organizing 
role in his philosophy of the monistic Stoic conception of the passions, the tripartite 
Platonic image, and the Platonic charioteer metaphor. However, henceforth further 
investigation is needed of the Jewish side of his thinking. Similarly, in moral 
psychology, having shown how the Stoic fool/progressing-soul/sage narrative 
provides the framework within which he placed his themes of Platonic ascent and 
soul types, there remains a need for inquiry into potential Jewish sources. The Stoic 
theory of the passions profoundly informed Philo’s conception and characterisation 
of the passions, but the fact that Philo was commenting on Moses, not Plato’s 
Timaeus or Aristotle’s Categories, reminds us that there was a Jewish and biblical 
side to his thought. In this regard, further research concerning the Jewish elements 
and sources of inspiration of his moral psychology is required. Areas touched upon 
in this study that serve as possible candidates for exploration include rabbinic 
discussions around desire,2 possible moral interpretations of biblical themes of 
journey or migration, and interpretations of biblical figures that Philo related to one 
or more of the passions, such as Enoch (hope) or Cain (grief). Similarly, although 
we have sought to pay attention to the literary context surrounding Philo’s 
comments upon the soul and its passions, acting upon Runia’s reminder that we 
                                                
1 D. Winston, ‘Philo and Rabbinic Literature’ (2009), 236-7. 
2 For one such recent study, see H. Svebakken, Philo’s Exposition (2009). 
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must attend to the biblical problem and text with which he was wrestling could yield 
yet more insight, and enable us to ensure a proper interpretation of his meaning, if 
done systematically.3 We know that Philo related specific biblical texts or images to 
specific emotions, as with Cain and Enoch. Does he systematically do the same for 
all emotions? If so, how are these same texts utilized elsewhere? What problems are 
they related to?  
Due to the limitations of space, moreover, several topics and themes initially 
identified in the preparation of this study merit further research, especially in 
relation to the relatively unexplored area of the structure of the passions and 
eupatheia in Philo of Alexandria. To begin with, we focused on the conception of 
the passions in Philo. We probed its origin in the mind as an impulse, and its 
characteristics. The Stoics were also quite well-known for their penchant for their 
comprehensive system of classifying the passions using the metrics of moral 
valuation, time orientation, and change in the shape of the corporeal soul.4 Further 
research on Philo’s approach to classifying the passions, if at all, and what metrics 
he used, will further probe the depth of his adherence to and deviations from the 
Stoic theory of the passions. Further, though we did touch on Philo’s conception of 
eupatheia as the obverse side of the emotions, much work remains to be done to 
understand the characteristics, classification, metrics, and symbols of the eupatheia 
in Philo. The passions, moreover, were embedded by moral philosophers within a 
wider spectrum of spiritual and moral maladies, including sicknesses, infirmities, 
proclivities and aversions. Though Philo never explicitly used the technical Stoic 
terms for ‘proclivity’ (εὐεµπτωσία) or ‘aversion’ (προσκοπή), the notions of moral 
or spiritual ‘sickness’ (νόσηµα) and ‘infirmity’ (ἀρρώστηµα) permeate his writings, 
providing the broader context within which his discussion of the passions took 
place. Detailed analysis is still required to determine whether or not Philo 
consistently recognized and utilized the Stoic distinction between a ‘sickness’ and 
‘infirmity’, whether or not he implicitly recognized and utilized Stoic proclivity and 
antipathy, and how this wider medical conception of moral weaknesses relates to the 
passions in his thought.  
                                                
3 D.T. Runia, ‘Rehabilitation of the Jackdaw’ (2007), 489-95. 
4 Arnim, SVF (1903-5), 3.94; Rabel argues that the Stoics distinguished the specific passions 
from one another on the basis of either the particular object in question or ‘a particular stage or 
quality of the motion of the soul’ that characterizes the passion. R.J. Rabel, ‘Stoic Generic and 
Specific Pathe’ (1977), 41-2. Nussbaum makes the same distinction. See M.C. Nussbaum, Therapy of 
Desire (1994), 386-7. 
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Thirdly, we noted in this study the influence of the LXX biblical terminology and 
stories on the nuances of Philo’s conception of the emotions.5 Significant research 
around this topic remains to be done. A detailed comparison of the LXX’s emotional 
terminology and Philo’s own vocabulary could well yield further nuance and insight 
into the logic of his approach. Similarly, a close comparison of Philo’s treatment of 
these emotions in view of their usage in the LXX could reveal additional nuances in 
the contours of Philo’s own thought. 
Fourthly, Philo and other ancient philosophical writers nearly always engaged in 
the analysis of the passions with a view toward their proper diagnosis and therapy. 
Hence, the ongoing controversies around the proper understanding of the soul and 
passions nearly always relate to the pressing matter of their therapy in practice, all 
with a view toward how one may live well. Using the metaphor of the physician, so 
popular among the Stoics, we might say that this study aimed at understanding 
Philo’s analysis of the soul and its passions so that one can make a proper diagnosis. 
The next step will be to explore in detail Philo’s understanding of the soul’s therapy 
in the light of his theory of the passions outlined in this study. While a proper 
understanding of his approach to the therapy of the passions is not possible until we 
have first established what a passion is, an analysis of Philo’s moral psychology 
remains incomplete until we have provided a full account of the therapy process.  
Finally, further research is required to fully appreciate Philo’s conception of the 
emotions within the divine realm, as we limited our study to the emotional life of 
humankind. While Philo’s treatment of emotions in God shows some analogy with 
his understanding of emotions in his super-sage Moses, since the apatheiac sage 
comes to approximate the ‘likeness of God’ in his moral life, potential differences 
remain given the divergent ontological status of each. In this regard, close attention 
must be given especially to Philo’s hermeneutical principles. Citing the biblical 
principle that ‘God is not as a man’, drawn from Num. 23:19 of the LXX, Philo 
denied any correspondence between God and the created things. At the same time, 
Philo also cited a second, subordinate principle, drawn from Deuteronomy 1:31 and 
                                                
5 Philo explicitly cites the LXX version as his bible of choice. Such an extraordinary, inspired 
achievement made the LXX’s authors ‘not translators but heirophants and prophets’. See Philo, Mos. 
2.40. He treated its translation as ‘both word-for-word and ‘sense-for-sense’. See A. Kamesar, 
‘Biblical Interpretation in Philo’ (2009), 65-72. 
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8:5 of the LXX that ‘God is as a man’.6 For Philo, this second principle applies to 
those anthropomorphic references to God in the scriptures. He argued that they are 
not to be understood literally, but are to be used for pedagogical purposes among 
those who have not advanced morally.7 Philo’s approach is further complicated by 
his rather intricate conception of the divine order, with its numerous ‘powers’ and 
utterly transcendent God. Understanding Philo’s conception of the emotions in the 
divine realm will entail the additional hermeneutical task of sorting out whether or 
not Philo is speaking of transcendent God or one of the many powers. A productive 
case study to test Philo’s application of these two principles would be his handling 
of the biblical attribution of anger to God. One would expect that Philo would use 
the second principle to metaphorically ascribe anger to God, while ultimately 
denying it of God on the basis of the first. A more interesting case might be to 
examine Philo’s common attribution of joy to the divine, which would test the limits 
of his first principle. Given his distinction between passionate and eupatheiac 
emotions, one wonders how far Philo would go in literally ascribing joy to the 
divine. Does he ultimately apply joy only figuratively, as in the case of passions like 
anger? Does he apply it to one or some of the powers, but not to the transcendent 
One? The conclusions of such research would in turn have significance for his 
anthropology and, in particular, for his understanding of the biblical and Platonic 
spiritual goal of becoming ‘like God’. What exactly is the relation and character of 
the apatheia of the sage to that of the divine order? Is the sage to approximate the 
apatheia of the transcendent God or merely that of one of the powers, assuming 
there exists a difference among them?  
To conclude, though we have restricted our reflections on remaining research to 
Philo studies, we should note that this study provides potential background for 
research on the emotions in Hellenistic philosophy, Pauline studies, Johannine 
Christology, and Patristics, especially in the case of Clement and Origen. Philo 
provides an important witness in the ongoing development of both 
Platonic/Peripatetic and Stoic philosophy regarding the soul and emotions. Philo’s 
use of Platonic tripartite language and the charioteer metaphor alongside an 
otherwise Stoic approach to the passions could well reflect developments within 
                                                
6 Philo, Sacr. 94, 101; Deus 53, 62, 69; Conf. 98; Migr. 113; Somn. 1.237; Decal. 32; QG 1.55a, 
2.54ª. 
7 Philo, Deus 53-4. 
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Stoicism by figures such as Panaetius of Rhodes or Posidonius in their debates with 
Academic and Peripatetic philosophers. 
As a Hellenistic Jew, Philo also serves as an important witness to possible 
developments in late second temple Judaism and early Christianity. Scholars such as 
Troels Engberg-Pedersen have already shown that ancient Stoic ethics provides 
important insight into the interpretation of themes around body, spirit, emotions, 
cognition and participation in Paul's letters. Similarly, Philo provides another point 
of comparison, a unique Stoic approach to the passions, revised as it is by his 
Platonic and Jewish commitments, that could offer fresh light on Paul’s 
understanding of the passions. Further, Philo’s Stoic distinction between passions 
and eupatheia in the sage, in the divine powers, and perhaps even in God could help 
us better understand the account of Jesus’ emotions in relation to his humanity and 
divinity in the Gospel of John. Finally, this study provides important background to 
understand the passions in Clement and Origen, both as a source of influence and as 
a point of comparison for understanding their own unique developments, 
innovations, and deviations from Stoic and Platonic moral psychology within the 
Alexandrian context and as Christian theologians. A close examination of the 
character and structure of the soul and emotions in both authors in the light of 
Philo’s approach will in turn help us better understand their vision of the soul’s 
journey to God, the therapy of the passions, and their own ideals of apatheia.  
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